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The Psychological Flexibility Model describes a process-oriented approach to behaviour change 
that underpins Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), a contextual cognitive 
behavioural intervention. ACT promotes psychological flexibility, which refers to a person’s 
ability to connect with the present moment fully as a conscious human being (mindfulness and 
non-judgemental acceptance), and to change or persist with behaviour that is in line with 
identified values. For people distressed and/or disabled by auditory hallucinations, it is 
theorised that this experience is responded to in a psychologically inflexible manner: becoming 
a target for avoidance, control or focus, appraised as more powerful than the person 
experiencing the voices, and leading to actions that come at the cost of engaging in chosen life 
directions. Previous research on coping, cognitive models and mindfulness interventions for 
voice hearing point to the possibility that promoting active acceptance and changing the 
relationship with voices may be associated with better outcomes. This thesis investigates the 
role of psychological flexibility with voice hearing using correlational, single-case and 
experimental research designs.  
The first study in this thesis investigated the relationship of psychological flexibility and 
mindfulness with distress, disability, and behavioural responses to voice hearing, using self-
report questionnaires in a sample of 50 distressed voice hearers. The findings suggest that 
psychological flexibility and non-judgemental acceptance, over and above appraisals of voices 
and thought control strategies, is related to voice hearers’ levels of general depressive and 
anxiety symptoms, and behavioural resistance to voices, but not to engagement with voices, 
voice-related distress or life disruption. The second study reports the findings of a 10-session 
ACT intervention for eight distressed voice hearers using multi-baseline single case design, 
assessing whether outcome changes following ACT are concomitant with increasing 
psychological flexibility. Following ACT there were group-level improvements in depressive 
symptoms, quality of life and social functioning, with changes in psychological flexibility (non-
judgemental acceptance, independent action from voices). The third study involved 110 non-
clinical participants experiencing simulated auditory hallucinations in an experimental 
analogue, and investigated differences in response following training in a regulation strategy 
(acceptance, reappraisal or suppression). This study did not show any significant differences 
between groups; the potential explanations for this lack of expected difference include the 
features of simulated voices, sample characteristics, and participants’ degree of adherence to 
the coping strategy. The findings of these studies are considered within the broader context of 
emotional wellbeing with voice hearing, functional approaches to understanding responding to 
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Overview of the thesis 
This thesis investigates the Psychological Flexibility Model and its applicability to understanding 
and influencing the responses people have to auditory hallucinations.  
The thesis is organised into eight chapters: the first four chapters will summarise the literature. 
The first chapter will review psychological models of hallucinations and coping, set in the broader 
context of cognitive-behavioural therapies. The second chapter will provide a description and 
review of contextual behavioural science, the Psychological Flexibility Model, and acceptance and 
mindfulness processes. In the third chapter interventions based upon the Psychological Flexibility 
Model will be described, in particular Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT).  The empirical 
evidence for ACT and mindfulness will follow, with specific reference to interventions for people 
experiencing distressing/disabling auditory hallucinations.The fourth chapter will review the 
experimental literature on analogues of ACT and cognitive therapy treatment components, and 
regulation strategies of acceptance, reappraisal and suppression.   
Chapters five through to seven describe three studies conducted to investigate the thesis 
questions. Chapter 5 will report the first study, looking at the relationship of psychological 
flexibility with voice hearers’ wellbeing, beliefs about voices, behavioural responses to voices, and 
use of thought control using a cross-sectional design; Chapter 6 will describe the second study, a 
clinical intervention evaluation using a single case design, investigating outcome and process 
changes during 10 sessions of ACT for people experiencing distressing voices; Chapter 7 will report 
the third study, an experimental analogue of hearing voices, with non-clinical participants trained 
in acceptance, reappraisal and suppression as coping methods while completing a challenging task 
and experiencing simulated hallucinations.   
Finally Chapter eight will discuss the results, limitations, implications, and future research 
directions informed by the findings of the three studies. Appendices of material developed over 




Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
This chapter will provide a background to a contemporary psychological understanding of auditory 
hallucinations and how people respond to this experience, which may lead to distress and 
disability.  
This chapter will set the scene by describing the foundational assumptions for this thesis, that are 
consistent with psychological models of psychosis (the dimensional and single-symptom 
approaches), and then go on to discuss the phenomena of auditory hallucinations. Cognitive 
models of auditory hallucination will be outlined, as psychological understandings of hearing 
voices, emerging from the dimensional approach and what is understood to be the factors 
associated with disability and need for treatment.  
Current understanding of how people respond to the experience of hearing voices will then be 
reviewed, with a focus on coping and emotion regulation, including the use of suppression and 
active acceptance. There will be a description of the role of appraisals of hearing voices, and how 
beliefs influence responses to resist or engage with this experience. Finally there will be a review 
of the evidence for cognitive-behavioural interventions for auditory hallucinations, in terms of 
outcomes and processes of change.   
1.1 Foundational Assumptions for this Thesis 
This section will outline the foundational assumptions that guide the psychological understanding 
of auditory hallucinations described within this thesis: the dimensional and single-symptom 
approaches. The advantages of this stance can be described and contrasted with the alternate 






1.1.1  A Dimensional Approach to Understanding Psychosis 
A number of authors have argued that auditory hallucinations lie on a continuum with other 
experiences (Bentall & Slade, 1985; Johns et al., 2002; van Os et al., 2009).  This dimensional 
model of psychosis makes the assumption that experiencing symptoms such as delusions and 
hallucinations is not inevitably associated with the presence of a (psychotic) disorder. This is 
related to a view that psychosis is expressed as a continuous phenotype in the general population, 
and this phenotype is expressed at levels below what is considered a clinical disorder (van Os, 
Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul & Krabbendam, 2009). This low-level psychosis phenotype has 
been variously called psychosis proneness, psychotic-like experiences (PLEs), or schizotypy 
(Claridge, 1997; Verdoux et al., 1998; Yung et al., 2003). The factors that increase the risk of a 
person meeting criteria for a clinical disorder have been hypothesized to be dependent on 
dimensions of symptoms such as frequency and intrusiveness, and co-morbidities such as mood 
disorder, in addition to coping, societal tolerance, illness behaviours and associated 
developmental impairment (Johns & van Os, 2001; van Os et al., 2009). 
Esterberg & Compton (2009) present the advantages of both the categorical and dimensional 
approaches to understanding psychopathology. The categorical approach, using diagnostic criteria, 
is advantageous in ensuring consistency across researchers and clinicians (by improving reliability), 
facilitating decision making regarding treatment, and allowing an efficient means of 
communicating about psychotic syndromes amongst researchers, clinicians and the general public.  
In contrast to the categorical perspective, Esterberg & Compon (2009) argue that the dimensional 
approach is advantageous because it mitigates against the loss of information that occurs when 
continuous-level data are being categorized; this has been shown to be increasingly advantageous 
as there is strong evidence for psychotic phenomena being on a continuum in the general 
population, with more people experiencing anomalous experiences than meet diagnostic criteria 
for a disorder (van Os, Hanssen, Bijl & Ravelli, 2000; Verdoux, Maurice-Tison, Gay, van Os, Salamon 
& Bourgeois, 1998). In addition there is a high degree of overlap amongst categorically-defined 
disorders (e.g., Krueger, Watson, & Barlow, 2005; Taylor & Amir, 1994): this suggests that while 
reliability is increased using diagnoses, there may be a disadvantage in terms of validity. Finally, 




power for clinical symptoms, treatment response, and outcomes (Peralta, Cuesta, Giraldo, 
Cardenas, & Gonzalez, 2002; Rosenman, Korten, Medway, & Evans, 2003).   
It is for the advantages described above that this thesis was conducted from a dimensional 
approach. As the focus of the thesis is understanding, and influencing, peoples’ responses to 
auditory hallucinations, the unit of analysis is this behaviour in context, rather than a diagnostic 
entity such as schizophrenia. Additionally, from the functional contextual perspective taken within 
this thesis a categorical approach is antithetical (see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of 
functional contextualism). The advantages of studying phenomena that increases the possibility of 
informing treatments and understanding outcomes fit with the pragmatic goals of this research. 
 
1.1.2  The Single Symptom Approach  
The work in this thesis has also been influenced by the single-symptom approach as a research 
strategy. The argument extends from the dimensional approach described above: it is more 
pragmatic and empirically progressive to study psychotic symptoms in their own right, as the unit 
of analysis, rather than through the frame of diagnostic entities, such as schizophrenia (Bentall, 
Jackson and Pilgrim, 1988). The single-symptom approach has been outlined by several authors 
(Bannister, 1968; Persons, 1986; Slade & Cooper, 1979). Persons (1986) has argued that the 
advantages of studying single symptoms are that the focus is on the phenomena, which are usually 
ignored in models based on diagnosis. By studying single symptoms the problems of diagnosis and 
classification are avoided, and theoretical development is facilitated; this is particularly relevant 
with schizophrenia – due to the heterogeneity of symptoms within this category (Bentall, 1990). A 
substantial number of people diagnosed with schizophrenia do not have auditory hallucinations 
(Laroi et al., 2012), and  to better understand the experience of hearing distressing voices there is 
greater validity in studying the phenomenon directly, than using the schizophrenia category as the 
focus . It is also recognised that clinical phenomena are related to normal behavior (the continuum 
model, as above). A further advantage argued by Persons (1986) is that improvement in 





 It has been demonstrated that empirical progression for psychological models of psychosis has 
been greatly facilitated by the use of the single symptom approach as a research focus (Bentall, 
Jackson & Pilgrim, 1988; Garety & Hemsley, 1994; Trower & Chadwick, 1995).   
Thus, within this thesis, consistent with the single symptom approach, the focus of research has 
been upon distressing auditory hallucinations as the unit of analysis, and exploring the role of 
contextual factors such as psychological flexibility on responses to this experience, rather than 
seeking to investigate these processes within a categorical frame of schizophrenia, or other 
disorders for which auditory hallucinations are a symptom.  
The next section will describe the phenomenon of auditory hallucinations, their prevalence, and 
relationship to distress and disability.   
 
1.2 Auditory Hallucinations 
A hallucination can be defined as an involuntary sensory perception that has the compelling reality 
of a true perception but occurs in the absence of external stimulation of the related sensory organ 
(APA, 1994; Slade, 1988). Hallucinations can occur in any sensory modality, and have been found 
to occur across a range of emotional and organic states, including psychiatric and neurological 
conditions (Asaad & Shapiro, 1986; Johns, Hemsley & Kuipers, 2002). However, hallucinations are 
not diagnostically specific, and also occur within the general population without associated 
disorder (Hanssen, Bak, Bijl, Vollebergh & Van Os, 2005; Ohayan, 2000).  
In the case of auditory hallucinations, these experiences tend to have properties of spoken 
language and are often personified, meaningful and subjective to the person experiencing them 
(David, 2004). Beavan (2011) describes five essential phenomenological characteristics of auditory 
hallucinations that have been identified by voice hearers: the content of voices is personally 
meaningful, the voices have a characterised identity, the person has a relationship with their 





1.2.1  Prevalence & Phenomenology of auditory hallucinations 
Estimates of the prevalence of auditory hallucinations in the general population vary across 
gender, ethnicity and context, as well as being affected by differences in definitions and 
methodologies used: in a review of the literature Beavan, Read and Cartwright (2011) report that 
prevalence of hearing voices may range from 3.1% - 19.5% (median 13.2%). In addition, of those 
people who experience auditory hallucinations it has been found that the proportion of those 
distressed or disabled by hearing voices (or receiving a mental health diagnosis) is a minority 
(Bentall & Slade, 1985; Tien, 1991). Thus, although auditory hallucinations have been commonly 
thought of as symptoms of severe mental illness such as schizophrenia, population prevalence 
studies suggest an alternate view: that hearing voices may be a variation on normal human 
experience (Johns & Van Os, 2001).  
Laroi et al (2012) provide an overview of the phenomenological features of auditory hallucinations 
in healthy populations and across a number of clinical disorders. They report that for those who do 
not seek help, auditory hallucinations may occur only rarely and in specific contexts (during stress, 
sleep deprivation). In addition studies by Honig et al (1998) and Daalman et al (2011) suggest that, 
compared to clinical groups, healthy participants who hear voices tend to have fewer negative 
voices, and are less afraid of them. Their voices are less frequent and shorter in duration, they 
have more perceived control over their voices, were younger when they first experienced a voice, 
and experience less distress with less negative voices. Interestingly, they are more likely to report 
an external explanation for the origin of their voices than the clinical group, suggesting that the 
difference between the two groups is not merely one of ‘insight’. However, they had a greater 
tendency to attribute the origin of voices to spiritual sources rather than real people (government 
agents, gang members, neighbours) (Daalman et al., 2011), consistent with other findings that 
clinical groups are more likely to make specific ‘paranoid’ appraisals about their psychotic 
experiences (e.g., Brett et al, 2007). Using the same sample but comparing the healthy voice 
hearers to matched controls, Sommer et al (2010) report that voice hearing participants, while not 
having clinically defined delusions, disorganization, or negative symptoms, had a lower global level 
of functioning than controls, and a significantly greater tendency toward schizotypal and 




mental illness in the hallucinating group. Based on these findings, Sommer et al (2010) and Laroi et 
al (2012) suggest this group may be considered on the less severe end of the psychosis spectrum. 
Laroi et al (2012) report that the phenomenological characteristics of auditory hallucinations in 
many clinical disorders (substance abuse, dissociate disorders, borderline personality disorder, 
bipolar disorder) appear to be similar to those of schizophrenia: such patients may experience 
unpleasant, third person voices that are frequent and uncontrollable, associated with delusional 
beliefs, elicit anxiety and distressing emotions, and may disrupt functioning.  
For those diagnosed with clinical disorders auditory hallucinations are typically experienced as 
voices, but can also take the form of other sounds (e.g., ringing, animal noises) (Laroi, et al., 2012). 
Voices are commonly experienced as second or third person speech, and non-personal sentences 
may also be present. Voices can vary in loudness, with negative derogatory voices being louder 
than positive voices; there can also be variance in the degree of clarity of voices. Similarly there is 
variability in the frequency of auditory hallucinations, ranging from once or twice weekly through 
to a continuous experience of hearing voices. On average, voice hearers report hearing three 
different voices; voices are more commonly male, and personified by the individual (Nayani & 
David, 1996). The content of voices are frequently in the form of commands, comments about the 
voice hearer and others, and descriptions; frequently voices are negative in content, although 
positive or neutral voices may also be present. Shawyer, MacKinnon, Farhall, Trauer & Copolov 
(2003) report that nearly half of command hallucinations can stipulate harmful or dangerous 
actions, although patients report being more likely to comply with trivial rather than harmful 
command hallucinations (Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994). Amongst other factors, it has been found 
that those more likely to comply with command hallucinations appraise their voices as omnipotent 
and benevolent (Beck-Sander et al., 1997) or malevolent (Barrowcliff & Haddock, 2010), and 
believe that the voice has a known identity (Beck-Sander at al., 1997; Erkwoh, Willmes, Eming-
Erdmann & Kunert, 2002).  
Auditory hallucinations are a common experience for people who have been diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, with prevalence estimated between 40-80% (Aleman & Laroi, 2008). For 25-30% of 
people with schizophrenia auditory hallucinations can be a persisting symptom, despite adherence 




voices in schizophrenia is that the person perceives having little control over the experience 
(Lowe, 1973; Honig et al., 1998).  People with schizophrenia vary in their attributions for auditory 
hallucinations: from considering this experience as being self-generated, through to (more 
commonly) being caused by an external agent (Stephane, Thuras, Nasrallah & Georgopoulos, 
2003). 
1.2.2 Summary 
Auditory hallucinations are not necessarily a distinguishable symptom of psychotic disorders, 
occurring in a number of other psychiatric disorders, as well as across a range of neurological and 
emotional states, and within the healthy population.  
It appears that the presence of auditory hallucinations does not necessarily predicate specifically 
poor functioning or disorder, although those who hear voices may show comparatively poorer 
functioning compared to the general population who do not have this experience. Differences 
between those distressed and/or disabled to a clinical degree and those who are not, seem to be 
associated with factors related to the direct experience of hearing voices (greater frequency and 
duration of voices, presence of more negative voices), as well as factors theoretically amenable to 
psychological intervention (personal sense of control, appraisals, coping responses).    
Cognitive models of auditory hallucinations, which account for these individual differences, are 
described in the next section.  
 
1.3  Cognitive Models of Auditory Hallucinations 
Cognitive theories of psychotic symptoms have emphasised cognitive processes that are 
hypothesised to be involved in the formation and maintenance of psychotic symptoms. Models of 
auditory hallucinations are based upon the conceptualisation that they are internal cognitive 
events misattributed to an external source (Bentall, 1990; Frith, 1992; Morrison, Haddock & 
Tarrier, 1995).  Various theories have speculated that the source of this misattribution is some 




sensory input (Hemsley, 1993), a disruption on language production processes (David, 1994; 
Hoffman, 1986), or a deficit in internal monitoring (Frith, 1992). The studies by Baker and Morrison 
(1998) and Morrison & Haddock (1997) suggest that voice hearers may have generalised problems 
with correctly identifying and attributing the source of internally generated signals (see Waters et 
al, 2012, for a review).  
Other theories have suggested that auditory hallucinations are due to biases in normal cognitive 
functioning, rather than a cognitive deficit. It has been proposed by Morrison (2001) amongst 
others that metacognitive processes (such as beliefs and expectations) can influence this bias, and 
reinforcement processes (in particular anxiety reduction) may facilitate the misclassification of 
particular types of internally-generated events as externally-generated (see below for further 
description).  
1.3.1  Appraisal-based models 
Chadwick, Birchwood and Trower (1996) describe a cognitive model that conceptualizes 
experiencing an auditory hallucination as an event that results in affective and behavioural 
consequences through the mediating beliefs about the voices. This model does not speculate on 
the process that generates auditory hallucinations. The beliefs that Chadwick and colleagues 
describe are appraisals of the power (omnipotence) and intentionality of the voice(s) (whether 
they are seen as malevolent or benevolent toward the voice hearer), while the responses toward 
voices are described as engagement and resistance (described in further detail later in this 
chapter). This model suggests that psychological intervention should focus on weakening the 
beliefs about voices’ omnipotence and intentions through cognitive restructuring (Chadwick & 
Birchwood, 1994;  Chadwick, Sambrooke, Rasch, & Davies, 2000) , to reduce distress and promote 
functioning.   
Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman & Bebbington (2001) present a cognitive model of the positive 
symptoms of psychosis, hypothesising a central role for emotional processes, and accounting for 
disruptions in automatic cognitive processes, maladaptive appraisals, and social factors in 
symptom formation and maintenance. Garety et al (2001) put forward that there may be two 




cognitive and affective changes (most common pathway: a triggering event evokes disruption to 
cognitive processes in a predisposed person), and the second pathway through affective changes 
alone. In the first pathway anomalous experiences (due to psychosis proneness) trigger a search 
for explanation (Maher, 1988), that is influenced by biased conscious appraisal processes, such as 
a “jumping to conclusions” information gathering style, externalising attributional biases, and 
deficits in understanding the intentions of others (theory of mind: Premack & Woodruff, 1978; 
Frith, 2004), which are also susceptible to being worsened by negative emotional states.  These 
changes may occur within a social-cognitive context (adverse social environments, traumatic 
experiences, isolation) that limits alternative data gathering, heightens negative emotions, 
reinforces negative schematic models about the self and the world fostering external attributions 
and low self-esteem (possibly due to an enduring cognitive vulnerability due to early adverse 
experiences). For a smaller proportion of people, the second pathway is hypothesised to account 
for developing positive symptoms: triggering events lead to disturbed affect,  which activates 
biased appraisal processes and maladaptive self/other schemas, leading to an externalised 
appraisal (a delusional belief) for the life event or disturbed affect (Garety et al., 2001).   
The Garety et al. (2001) model suggests a number of targets for psychological intervention: 1) 
altering the key external appraisal so that disturbing hallucinations are appraised as internally-
generated, through changing appraisals and negative self-schemata, and compensating for biased 
reasoning processes, 2) addressing safety behaviours, ineffective coping and problem-solving to 
disrupt the maintenance cycle, 3) changing social environments by reducing expressed emotion 
and improving affect from family and care-givers, 4) improving communication with family 
members so that alternative explanations for psychotic experiences are discussed in manner that 
changes the externalising appraisal (another means of achieving first target).   
Morrison, Haddock and Tarrier (1995) presented a model that proposed that metacognitive beliefs 
inconsistent with intrusive thoughts lead to the external attribution of these thoughts as auditory 
hallucinations. This misattribution is maintained by the anxiety-reduction function of reducing 
cognitive dissonance between the intrusive thoughts and beliefs. The role that metacognitive 
beliefs and processes play in the maintenance of psychotic symptoms was further developed by 




dysfunction (Wells & Mathews, 1994), and hallucinations may be low-level thought intrusions that 
are mediated by self-beliefs (Baker & Morrison, 1998). Morrison (1998), relating auditory 
hallucinations to the model of anxiety devised by Clark (1986), suggested that the maintenance of 
distressing auditory hallucinations may occur where an internal or external trigger results in a 
normal auditory hallucination that is misinterpreted as threatening to the physical or psychological 
integrity of the individual (i.e., “I must be mad”, “The voices will hurt me unless I obey their 
commands”). As a result of these misinterpretations there is an increase in physiological arousal 
and negative mood, which produces more hallucinations, resulting in a vicious circle (Morrison, 
1998). In addition, such misinterpretations elicit safety seeking behaviours (such as 
hypervigilance), which increases the occurrence of auditory hallucinations and prevent the 
disconfirmation of the misinterpretations, resulting in the maintenance of the belief. Morrison 
(2001) has also speculated that it may be the way intrusions into awareness are misinterpreted 
that will lead them to be viewed as psychotic phenomena. It is suggested that it is the cultural 
unacceptability of the misinterpretation that results in the classification of these phenomena as 
psychotic.  
Some doubts have emerged recently about the putative causal role of metacognitive processes in 
generating hallucinations, suggesting that they are implicated in the accompanying distress and 
emotional disorders instead (Varese & Bentall, 2011). Nevertheless, some helpful treatment 
strategies targeting attentional processes and metacognitive beliefs are suggested by Morrison’s 
model, such as attention retraining, increasing the person’s awareness of their metacognitive 
beliefs, and the teaching of detached mindfulness.  
In summary, cognitive models of auditory hallucinations suggest that the components of effective 
psychological interventions with voice hearers involve: influencing the appraisals of power and 
intentionality of voices, altering unhelpful metacognitive beliefs, and reducing the use of safety 
behaviours and avoidance, while strengthening problem-solving and direct attempts to improve 
the social environment. The models also suggest that treatments target how the person responds 





1.4  Coping and emotion regulation strategies with auditory hallucinations 
The next section will review the literature on how people with psychosis respond to persisting 
auditory hallucinations. Included in this review is the literature on coping with auditory 
hallucinations, as well as how people relate to auditory hallucinations. Finally the literature on 
emotional regulation strategies used by distressed voice hearers will be reviewed, with a particular 
focus upon the role of suppression, before a summary and implications for research questions are 
outlined.  
1.4.1  Coping with auditory hallucinations 
One consideration in the differences in outcome and functioning between people who have 
auditory hallucinations, has been whether there are ways of coping and responding to this 
experience that are more effective than others. Natural coping methods (those developed by 
voice hearers without advice from mental health professionals), as well as the potential of 
enhancing coping to improve functioning (e.g., Tarrier, Harwood, Yusopoff, Beckett & Baker, 1990) 
have been the focus of study. Finally, coping has been researched within theoretical frameworks, 
typically within a stress and coping paradigm (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  
Most studies of coping with auditory hallucinations have been with samples of people diagnosed 
with schizophrenia, due to this being a common persisting symptom (as described above). Study 
samples have varied in terms of whether people have been recruited from community or inpatient 
settings, have a primary psychotic disorder diagnosis, and how long they have heard voices for, 
which makes it more difficult to establish reliable findings (e.g., Carter, MacKinnon & Copolov, 
1996; Farhall & Gehrke, 1997; Falloon & Talbot, 1981; Romme & Escher, 1993). It is also possible 
that these samples skew the understanding of coping with voices, as clinical groups may constitute 
those who have not managed this experience effectively. In a review of this literature, Farhall, 
Greenwood and Jackson (2007) argue that most coping methods are not specific to hallucinations 
in schizophrenia: similar methods are reported as ways of coping with psychotic symptoms in 
general, or by voice hearers diagnosed with other disorders (Breier & Strauss, 1983), as well as by 




Research in the area of coping with auditory hallucinations has mostly been descriptive, with a 
smaller set of studies using theoretical frameworks to investigate the functions and effectiveness 
of coping methods (Farhall, Greenwood and Jackson, 2007). A range of methods have been used 
to elicit voice hearers’ coping methods, with open-ended interviews, semi-structured schedules, 
and pre-generated lists of coping strategies reported, which may account for differences between 
studies (see Farhall, Greenwood & Jackson for a review of methods).  Descriptive investigations 
have classified coping methods by topography (e.g., Falloon and Talbot, 1981; Shergill, Murray & 
McGuire, 1998) or by putative mechanism (e.g., Carter, MacKinnon & Copolov, 1996; Romme & 
Escher, 1993; Tarrier, 1987 ).  
Voice hearers report a range of strategies to cope with voices (e.g., Falloon & Talbot, 1981; Carter, 
MacKinnon & Copolov, 1996; Farhall & Gehrke, 1997), although typically people may use a small 
number of strategies regularly (Frederick and Cotanch, 1995; O'Sullivan, 1994; Singh et al., 2003). 
Most of the coping strategies that voice hearers report are self-generated (Farhall & Gehrke, 1997; 
O’Sullivan, 1994; Tsai & Ku, 2005), rather than developed through contact with mental health 
professionals (although this could be a function of less availability of psychosocial approaches in 
the settings that these studies were conducted in). Studies have reported a diversity of coping 
strategies, describing methods that involve behavioural, cognitive and physiological components 
(Farhall, Greenwood and Jackson, 2007; Frederick & Contach, 1995; Knudson & Coyle, 1999; 
Nayani & David, 1996 ). There are some indications that having a limited, inflexible repertoire of 
coping strategies is associated with greater distress and poorer functioning (Carter et al., 1996; 
Falloon & Talbot, 1981); in addition, MacKinnon, Copolov & Trauer (2004) report that people who 
comply with command hallucinations tend to have fewer coping strategies to manage voices 
compared to those who resist commands.   
Several studies suggest that active acceptance of voices (an openness toward the voices being part 
of the self; not resisting nor engaging with voices to the detriment of personal goals; see 
discussion further in this chapter), may be associated with better functioning and less distress 
(e.g., Falloon & Talbot, 1981; Farhall & Gehrke, 1997; Romme & Escher, 1993); in contrast, there 
are inconsistencies between studies regarding which strategies are regarded as ineffective or 




participants to be effective in the Nayani & David (1996) study, but ineffective by Carter, 
MacKinnon & Copolov (1996) and Tsai & Ku (2005). These inconsistencies may possibly be due to 
differences in the metrics of what may be regarded as effective (e.g. controlling or stopping voices, 
reducing distress, or achieving personal goals), as well as variability with the samples recruited.     
Descriptive approaches, however, may have limited applicability for developing improved 
interventions; it may be more pragmatic empirically to adopt an underlying theoretical approach 
to refine the similarities and distinctions between coping methods in function or effectiveness 
(Farhall, Greenwood and Jackson, 2007). From this perspective, studies have explored coping 
methods from a coping and stress framework, conducting factor analyses to group coping 
methods and investigate links with outcomes (Farhall & Gehrke, 1997; ; Hayashi, Iagarashi, Suda 
and Nakagawa, 2007; Mann & Packenham, 2006; Singh, Sharan & Kulhara, 2003). 
Farhall and Gehrke (1997) investigated coping responses to voices, and ratings of sense of control, 
distress and overall coping. Participants described using multiple coping strategies including 
problem-solving, mental disengagement, behavioural disengagement, and decreasing 
physiological arousal. Farhall and Gehrke (1997) found three factors through principal components 
analysis: active acceptance, passive coping, and resistance coping. It was found that active 
acceptance was associated with perceived control over hallucinations, while passive coping 
predicted reduced distress, and resistance coping predicted greater distress. Singh, Sharan and 
Kulhara (2003) found a four factor solution (problem-solving, diversion, avoidance and help-
seeking), with symptom severity and distress associated with greater use of a problem-solving 
strategies. Mann & Packenham (2006) found three factors:  active coping (distraction), withdrawal 
(emotion-focused/ arousal reduction strategies), and suppression coping. Mann & Packenham 
(2006) report that active coping was inversely associated with negative voice appraisals; 
withdrawal was strongly associated with negative appraisals, voice severity, anxiety and 
depression; while suppression coping had no significant associations. Finally, Hayashi, Iagarashi, 
Suda and Nakagawa (2007) found two factors similar to Farhall and Gehrke’s (1997) passive coping 
and resistance coping factors, described as distraction and counteraction (e.g, echoing voices, 
making noises, retorting to voices). It was found that counteraction coping methods were more 




phenomena.  These findings may suggest strategies such as active acceptance, distraction or 
passive coping are more effective than resistance or suppression for voice hearers. However it 
should be noted that these studies used cross-sectional designs, and causality cannot be 
determined: it may that those who find their voices are more controllable tend to use active 
acceptance; in a similar vein, problem solving and efforts to resist may be required when voices 
are more severe and distressing.  
In their review Farhall, Greenwood and Jackson (2007) argue that cross-sectional studies do not 
show a clear benefit for particular coping strategies; however there does appear to be an 
association between poor outcome and a smaller natural coping repertoire, and a failure to switch 
to effective strategies at the expense of less-effective ones. A challenge in assessing the 
effectiveness of different types of coping with auditory hallucinations is that many studies have 
considered effectiveness to be measured solely by the outcome of a reduction in the frequency of 
auditory hallucinations (hallucination control). Farhall, Greenwood and Jackson (2007) suggest 
that future studies exploring coping with voices and outcome utilise multiple outcomes, such as 
hallucination control and distress reduction, as it appears that while there may be limited effects 
for coping strategies reducing the frequency/ intensity of voices, many participants describe 
reductions in their level of distress when using certain strategies. 
There do not appear to be any longitudinal studies investigating the role of coping strategies with 
auditory hallucinations, relating these with longer-term well-being/ functioning. A study by 
Delespaul, Vries and van Os (2002) offers an example of how these relationships could be 
investigated: the authors describe using the Experience Sampling Method over a 1 week period 
with voice hearers with schizophrenia and depressive disorders, and exploring the links of 
hallucination intensity, mood, current activity and social contact. Delespaul et al. (2002) report 
that hallucination intensity was shown to be influenced by context: social withdrawal, work 
activity and doing nothing producing decreases, while passive leisure activities such as watching 
TV resulted in increases in hallucination intensity over time. Similar methodologies are required to 





1.4.2  The relationships between broader coping and functioning for people with psychosis 
A related literature, concerning the coping strategies of people with psychosis, may be useful in 
understanding broader relationships of coping styles, wellbeing and functioning. There have been 
several studies where the focus of coping is undifferentiated with regard to a particular symptom, 
emotion or challenge (Bak et al., 2003; Boschi et al., 2000). 
Bak et al (2003) found that need for care was associated with the severity of psychotic symptoms 
rather than distress, level of control, or the number of coping strategies. The results suggested 
that engaging with symptoms may be unsuccessful: coping methods involving symptomatic coping 
(spending time focused on symptoms; having important actions guided by the content of 
symptoms) were associated with less perceived control over these symptoms and a higher 
probability for the need for mental health treatment (Bak et al, 2003). 
A longitudinal study by Boschi et al. (2000) investigated the prospective role of coping methods 
and subsequent psychosocial functioning two years following a first hospitalisation (with an early 
psychosis sample). The classification of coping methods was consistent with Hollahan and Moos 
(1987), with strategies categorized as active-behavioural, active-cognitive, and avoidant. Boschi et 
al (2000) found that active coping (when compared to avoidant strategies) toward positive 
symptoms predicted improved psychosocial functioning 2 years later. In addition the most 
frequently used coping strategies were cognitive, while the most effective were behavioural.  
There was no relationship between number of strategies used, reduction in distress or 
psychosocial outcome; similarly there was no association found between the use of coping 
strategies and sense of control over symptoms.   
These studies suggest that, for the outcomes of greater functioning and reduced need for mental 
health care, active coping strategies, and a style of relating to symptoms where actions are chosen 
independently of symptoms, may be more effective than coping through using avoidance or 






1.4.3  Emotional regulation strategies and auditory hallucinations 
As reviewed earlier in this chapter, suppression and deliberate ignoring are commonly-reported 
coping methods used to control auditory hallucinations (e.g., Shergill, Murray & McGuire, 1998). 
The review by Farhall, Greenwood & Jackson (2007) summarised that the coping strategies 
described by voice hearers are, for the most part, non-specific to managing the stressor of hearing 
voices or with psychosis, but may reflect broader styles of coping for evocative emotional 
experiences.  
It may be that voice-related disability results from efforts to cope with the emotions evoked by 
this experience, which may be sustained (and potentially amplified) by difficulties in regulating 
negative emotions. Therefore there may be value in considering the relationship of emotion 
regulation strategies, auditory hallucinations, well-being and functioning.  
This section will comprise a brief description of how emotion regulation is understood in the 
general population, with a focus on the use of suppression as a strategy. Following this, the 
theoretical perspectives that have implicated a role for suppression in the formation and 
maintenance of auditory hallucinations will be briefly described. Finally, the modest literature for 
the emotional regulation strategies reported by people with psychosis will be described,  
specifically for those who hear voices.   
 
1.4.4  Emotion Regulation 
Emotion regulation refers to a diverse set of processes in how “individuals influence which 
emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions” 
(Gross, 1999, p. 557). In the emotional regulation literature two strategies have been extensively 
studied (although not necessarily with psychosis): suppression (reducing emotion-expressive 
behaviour by inhibition during a state of emotional arousal: Gross & Levenson, 1993) and 
reappraisal (the reinterpretation of emotionally-valenced stimuli in unemotional terms: Speisman, 
Lazarus, Mordkoff & Davison, 1964). A more detailed discussion of emotion regulation is in 




1.4.4.1  Suppression: the effects of inhibiting emotional expression and private experiences 
Within the general population, coping by engaging in suppression to inhibit public displays of 
emotion, as well as toward experiencing private experiences (thoughts, sensations and emotions), 
is normative (Gross, 1998); the use of suppression is established in childhood but over the course 
of development to adulthood tends to be relied on less frequently as other coping strategies are 
acquired (Gullone, Hughes, King & Tonge, 2009; John & Gross, 2004). It appears that the habitual 
use of suppression in adulthood is associated with a variety of negative outcomes. Thought 
suppression and emotional avoidance are have been found to increase arousal (Cioffi & Holloway, 
1993; Gross & Levenson, 1997; Wegner & Gold, 1995); chronic attempts to suppress or avoid 
emotional experiences have been shown to increase negative emotions and thoughts, leading to 
psychological distress (e.g., Roemer & Borkovec, 1994), poor memory and social interactions 
(Gross & John, 2003), and reduced opportunities to habituate to emotional stimuli (Foa & Kozak, 
1986). Hayes and Gifford (1997) have reviewed evidence that suggests that poorer clinical 
outcomes across a number of disorders are seen in people who frequently use coping strategies 
aimed at suppressing or avoiding negative emotions and thoughts (described as experiential 
avoidance, and reviewed in Chapter 2), rather than solving problems by overt behaviour change.  
The use of suppression as a coping strategy tends to be applied to private experiences that have 
high social disapproval, or to content that relates to harming self or others (Freeston & Ladouceur, 
1993; Purdon & Clark, 1994). The suppression of unwanted thoughts can additionally be conceived 
as a means of coping with emotional experiences (Lynch, Robins, Morse & Krause, 2001). The 
literature on the effects of thought suppression suggests that this may result in the paradoxical 
increased frequency of the experiences targeted for suppression (Wegner, Schneider, Carter and 
White, 1987; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). Attempted suppression of a thought may lead to a 
continuation of the unwanted thought because an attempt to “not think of X” requires thinking 
the very target thought to be avoided (Hayes, 1987). Wegner and Zanakos (1994) found that 
people who both avoid emotions and use thought suppression experience greater depressive 
symptoms, than those who only avoided emotions. Finally, it has been found that thought 
suppression may reduce the conscious control over simultaneously occurring overt behaviours 




1.4.4.2  The role of suppression in psychosis: a formation and maintenance factor? 
Cognitive models suggest that suppression and other control-based strategies may play a role in 
exacerbating and maintaining positive psychotic symptoms (e.g., Morrison, 2001). Morrison, 
Haddock and Tarrier (1995) proposed that active suppression-based coping strategies may 
exacerbate intrusive thoughts, psychological distress, autonomic arousal, and auditory 
hallucinations. As the content of most psychotic symptoms is usually personally salient (Haddock, 
Bentall & Slade, 1993), it may be that they become prime targets for suppression, especially if the 
content is considered harmful or socially inappropriate. Morrison (2001) has suggested that 
selective attention and heightened self-focus in psychosis may increase the actual frequency or 
perceived frequency of intrusions into awareness, so that safety behaviours and attempts at 
control are implicated in the maintenance of distress.   
Badcock, Paulik and Maybery (2011) hypothesised that over-use of suppression in schizophrenia 
may contribute to the maintenance of auditory hallucinations by depleting already-limited 
executive abilities such as inhibitory control, with less successful/ frequent inhibition being 
associated with increases in the frequency or duration of hallucinations (Waters et al., 2003).  
There is some indication that the use of suppression may increase proneness to experiencing 
auditory hallucinations in healthy samples: Garcia-Montes, Alvarez & Fidalgo (2003) found that 
instructed suppression of self-discrepant thoughts over a 48 hour period greatly increased 
vividness of auditory illusions, compared to a focalization instruction (to simply note thoughts and 
continue with activities).  
Psychological models have also considered the influence of metacognitive beliefs (beliefs about 
thinking and the content of thoughts: Wells, 1995) in reinforcing efforts to control and suppress 
voices and other unwanted experiences.  It may be that people with psychosis are more prone to 
engaging in unhelpful efforts to control thinking, due to a greater focus on thinking itself: 
Rosenburg & Tucker (1979) found that people with schizophrenia tend to talk more about issues 
related to disordered thinking, and make more frequent references to their own cognition, as 
compared to healthy controls. In investigating the use of thought control strategies in clinical 




punishment and worry-based strategies, but in contrast with previous studies, significantly less 
distraction-based control strategies, than healthy controls. Jones and Fernyhough (2006) found 
that for non-clinical participants prone to auditory hallucinations, metacognitive beliefs that 
worrying thoughts are uncontrollable and dangerous positively influenced the use of suppression, 
and increased intrusive thoughts. Proneness to auditory hallucinations was predicted by this 
process, in combination with high awareness of thoughts and low memory confidence.  However a 
review and meta-analysis by Varese and Bentall (2011) demonstrated that while metacognitive 
beliefs are strongly associated with hallucination proneness in non-clinical samples, when co-
morbid symptoms are controlled for in clinical samples, there is a weak relationship, suggesting a 
non-causal role for these beliefs in the development of hallucinations. Varese and Bentall (2011) 
suggest, however, that metacognitive beliefs may be influential in the distress associated with 
psychotic experiences.     
 
1.4.4.3  Empirical studies: Emotion regulation for people with psychosis 
People with schizophrenia have been found to have comparative deficits in emotional processing 
(Aleman & Kahn, 2005), and may have greater emotional reactivity than healthy controls (Myin-
Germeys et al., 2000). There are indications, however, that the subjective experience of emotion 
in schizophrenia is not markedly different (Kring & Neale, 1996).  
Comparisons of whether people with schizophrenia differ from healthy controls in the use of 
reappraisal or suppression regulation strategies, have largely found that there are no differences 
in the self-reported habitual use of strategies (Henry, Rendell, Green, McDonald & O'Donnell, 
2008; Perry, Henry & Grisham, 2011). Van der Meer, Wout & Aleman (2009) did find in their study 
that people with schizophrenia used significantly more suppression and less reappraisal than 
healthy controls; however the magnitude of differences between groups was small.   
Further, Perry, Henry and Grisham (2011) found that people diagnosed with schizophrenia, while 
using similar levels of reappraisal and suppression coping as healthy controls, did engage in less 
active acceptance (a response-focused strategy that encourages the experience of emotion and 




Asmundson, 2008). Perry, Henry and Grisham (2011) report that the use of acceptance was 
associated with less anxiety, depression and stress in both samples, as well as being associated 
with better psychosocial functioning for those with schizophrenia.    
1.4.4.4  Empirical studies: Emotion regulation and auditory hallucinations 
Badcock, Paulik and Maybery (2011) investigated the relationship of emotional regulation 
strategies and auditory hallucinations by comparing voice hearers with psychosis with healthy 
controls. It was found that the psychosis sample did not differ from controls in the use of 
reappraisal or expressive suppression, however they did show significant differences with greater 
use of worry and rumination as emotional regulation strategies. However, the use of expressive 
suppression was associated with greater auditory hallucination severity (frequency, duration, 
loudness) and life disruption (community functioning). Rumination, but not worry, was found to be 
associated with greater depression and hallucination distress. 
1.4.4.5  Treatment outcomes using suppression-based and distraction interventions for hearing 
voices 
In the treatment literature there have been attempts to use thought suppression and distraction 
techniques as ways of managing psychotic symptoms. For example, the use of sub-vocal 
distraction techniques have been suggested by a number of authors to be useful in the 
management of auditory hallucinations, but such techniques have found to be difficult to 
generalize from training environments and do not appear to have long-lasting effects (Gallagher, 
Dinan & Baker, 1995; Margo, Hemsley & Slade, 1981; Nelson, Thrasher & Barnes, 1991). The use of 
aversive conditioning techniques in suppressing auditory hallucinations have been found to 
produce mixed results (e.g., Alford and Turner, 1976; Weingartner, 1971), with the possibility that 
such interventions produce a reduction in the verbal reports of hallucinations but no reduction in 
actual frequency or intensity of hallucinatory experiences (Falloon & Talbot, 1981). More broadly, 
it appears that there is little evidence for teaching distraction as an effective way to manage 
psychotic symptoms (Crawford-Walker, King & Chan, 2005).   
In addition, it may be that interventions for distressed voice hearers that teach distraction-based 




treatments that used distraction (blocking voices through alternative activity) and focusing 
(encouraging patients to focus on or expose themselves to their hallucinations) in the 
management of auditory hallucinations, with a follow-up period of two years. Although no 
differences were found between the groups for outcome on symptom severity, it was found that 
during treatment patients in the focusing intervention had increases in self-esteem while those in 
the distraction intervention had a decrease in self-esteem. In addition patients in the focusing 
intervention showed a greater belief that their voices were their own thoughts at final follow-up. 
When both treatments were combined there was a significant reduction in the frequency of 
hallucinations and disruption to life caused by voices during the treatment, however this result 
was not maintained at follow-up.  
 
1.4.5  Summary of Coping and Emotional Regulation in Voice Hearers  
The limitations within the coping literature are that studies have used a variety of methods to 
elicit the natural coping methods used by people who hear voices, and so there are likely to be 
differences between the results that are due to methodological differences. Similarly samples 
have varied, with studies having differing proportions of people with schizophrenia spectrum 
diagnoses, durations of mental health problems, those in inpatient or community treatment 
settings. With some exceptions (e.g., Romme & Escher, 1993), studies have involved voice hearers 
who have received mental health treatment: there is a bias in these samples as their membership 
is of those who have not successful coped with auditory hallucinations and other intrusive, 
unusual experiences. Thus, it may be difficult to identify effective coping methods or the contexts 
that promote their use.  
In addition many studies have been descriptive, developing lists of coping methods, which are 
then classified along topographic lines or based upon previous classifications that have assumed 
differences between methods that involve overt and covert behaviour (i.e., cognitive methods), 
for example. Only a minority of studies have used factor analytic methods and theoretical 




However, while taking these limitations into account, there are several conclusions to be drawn 
from the literature on coping with auditory hallucinations, and general symptomatic coping for 
psychosis.  
These studies suggest that:  
1. People typically use a number of natural coping methods, associated with varying 
effectiveness. A larger repertoire of coping strategies may be associated with more 
effective coping, however, for the range of strategies  the relative effectiveness of 
particular coping  methods has not been consistently demonstrated (with the exception of 
suppression, distraction and acceptance discussed below).  
2. People use similar styles of coping with auditory hallucinations as with emotions and other 
experiences; it may also be that people with psychosis use similar regulation strategies as 
the general population. However, the use of distraction or suppression, while 
understandable and normative, may not be as effective as other ways of coping with 
voices, and may reduce resilience toward negative experiences.  
3. When auditory hallucinations are a negative experience, trying to suppress the voices is 
associated with poorer outcomes, particularly if other strategies are also used less 
frequently. The habitual use of suppression as an emotion regulation strategy is associated 
with poor functioning for those with psychosis, and may be implicated in the maintenance 
of symptom proneness, frequency and distress.  This reflects similar outcomes for 
suppression in the general population from the emotional regulation literature (Gross, 
2002; John & Gross, 2004). 
4. Symptom-focused coping is less effective than active efforts to engage with personal goals 
and social roles. Choosing what to do independently of the voices is more workable long-
term than coping through using suppression, avoidance, or focusing on auditory 
hallucinations (which may involve a focus on trying to control or limit the experience at 




5. coping methods that involve the active acceptance of experience may present an 
alternative to symptom-focused coping/ resistance and engagement  
 
1.5  Acceptance as a coping method  
As outlined earlier, acceptance toward auditory hallucinations has long been suggested as a 
potentially effective coping strategy (e.g., Falloon & Talbot, 1981; Romme & Escher, 1993). The 
arguments above suggest that there may be a role for the use of acceptance-based interventions 
to reduce unhelpful avoidance, thought control and suppression strategies in psychosis, and 
therefore possibly reduce the influence that such experiences exert on functioning. It may be that 
those who cope poorly with auditory hallucinations may underuse acceptance.  
 In the literature the idea of “acceptance” has been conceptualised in two ways, as:  
1)  a cognitive insight or appraisal related to the origin of the experience of voices. This form of 
acceptance is presumed to assist the voice hearer to gain greater insight into their experience, by 
agreeing (accepting) a shared, socially condoned (medical) understanding of their problems, that 
results in less distress and preoccupation with their auditory hallucinations. It could be argued that 
cognitive interventions for voices can sometimes involve this form of acceptance: by accepting 
voices as part of an illness rather than coming from real people it is hoped that this results in 
improved adaptation and disengagement from voices (Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994; van der 
Gaag, 2006; Shawyer, Thomas, Morris & Farhall, in press).   
2) an active coping style that involves present moment awareness and choice, neither attempting 
to control, or be guided by, the experience of auditory hallucinations (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 
1999; Barlow, Allen & Choate, 2004).  
This second type, an active acceptance, is a central focus for this thesis, being a core process in the 
Psychological Flexibility Model (Chapter 2).  
Active acceptance, involving a detached, non-judgemental noticing and a chosen willingness to 




contrasted with engulfment in symptoms, involving resignation to voices.  Non-judgemental 
acceptance also encompasses the relationship with appraisals of experiences, the person 
responding to automatic evaluations from a dispassionate stance (Baer et al., 2004). The use of 
acceptance therefore involves a disavowal of strategies aimed at controlling emotional 
experience, an allowance of feelings and their processing, limiting experiential avoidance as a 
habitual mode of coping (Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 2002). Through this mindful action a person 
may be able to step back from distressing auditory hallucinations, gain perspective and permit 
feelings to emerge that provide direction for action, thus breaking the maladaptive use of control 
(Chadwick, 2006; Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 2012). 
 
1.6  Relating to voices: appraisals of power, intention and social rank 
Cognitive models of auditory hallucinations hold central the appraisal of voices as an important 
factor in influencing how people cope with this experience. Consistent findings demonstrate 
associations between appraisals of voices, and voice hearers’ affect and behaviour, which are not 
accountable by the presence of auditory hallucinations or their content alone (Birchwood & 
Chadwick, 1997; Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994; Peters, Williams, Cooke & Kuipers, 2011; van der 
Gaag, Hageman and Birchwood, 2003).   
Chadwick and Birchwood (1994, 1995) demonstrated that there are substantial variations in voice 
hearers’ relationships to their voices, which are associated with appraisals of the voice 
intentionality (malevolence, benevolence). Chadwick and Birchwood (1994) described two 
behavioural responses to voices as a means of coping: engagement (elective listening, willing 
compliance, doing things to initiate voices) and resistance (arguing, non- or reluctant-compliance, 
avoidance of voice cues, distraction). Subsequent studies have found that resistance to auditory 
hallucinations is associated with malevolence appraisals, depression and anxiety (Birchwood & 
Chadwick, 1997; Chadwick, Lees & Birchwood, 2000; Peters et al.,2011; Sayer, Ritter, and Gournay, 
2000; van der Gaag, Hageman and Birchwood, 2003;), as well as appraisals of voice omnipotence 
(Birchwood & Chadwick, 1997) and voice-associated distress (Peters et al.,2011). Similarly it has 




benevolent (Chadwick, Lees and Birchwood,2000; Peters et al.,2011; So & Wong, 2008), and 
engagement is negatively associated with depression and anxiety, as well as omnipotence 
(Birchwood & Chadwick, 1997; Chadwick, Lees and Birchwood, 2000). Appraising a voice as 
powerful (omnipotent) has also been found to be associated with compliance with command 
hallucinations (Beck-Sander, Birchwood & Chadwick, 1997; Braham, Trower, & Birchwood, 2004; 
Fox, Gray & Lewis, 2004;). People who appraise their voices as malevolent and negative in content 
tend to experience greater distress and report higher levels of suicidal ideation, than those whose 
voices are appraised as benevolent (Fialko et al., 2006). 
  
1.6.1  Social ranking and auditory hallucinations 
Further research has been conducted to understand voice hearers’ responses from the framework 
of evolutionary theory (Gilbert & Allan, 1998). A prediction from social ranking theory is that 
stimuli perceived as powerful and threatening (such as auditory hallucinations), can activate self-
protective responses, including submissive and escape behaviours (Birchwood et al., 2000). Gilbert 
& Allan (1998) posit that the appraisal of social subordination is influenced by a process of social 
comparison which serves the formation of social ranks; Birchwood et al (2000) hypothesised that 
voice hearers who perceive themselves to be of lower rank and entrapped by their voices would 
be more depressed than those who did not.  
Birchwood, Meaden, Trower, Gilbert, and Plaistow (2000) found that feelings of subordination 
toward others in general predicted voice hearers’ subordination toward the voices, appraisals of 
voice as powerful, and greater hallucinatory distress. Gilbert, Birchwood, et al. (2001) then 
investigated the role of dominant and subordinate behaviours in relation to auditory 
hallucinations, comparing people with psychosis who hear voices with a sample of depressed 
participants. There were no differences between the groups on how powerful they found their 
experiences; depression in the voices group was associated with feeling inferior to the voice and 
omnipotence appraisals (replicating Birchwood et al., 2000); inferiority toward voices was 
associated with a general social comparison of being inferior to others, and a sense of entrapment. 




controlled for. Gilbert et al (2001) suggest that distressed voice hearers have a relationship to their 
voices as angry subordinates, unwilling to subordinate themselves but also thinking they cannot 
easily defeat the voices. An implication from these studies is that underlying social schemata may 
mediate the relationship between appraisals of voice omnipotence and malevolence, and 
hallucinatory distress. 
 
1.6.2   Summary and Implications 
There is a growing body of evidence that demonstrates that appraisals of auditory hallucinations 
are associated with depression, anxiety, voice-related distress and responses to voices. The 
experience that voice hearers have with their hallucinations can be usefully described as a 
relationship and evidence suggests that this relationship is influenced by prior learning and 
context: people who relate to others in a submissive manner also tend to relate to their voices in a 
similar way. Beliefs about the power of a voice as well as its intentionality appear to play a role in 
whether this experience is engaged with, or resisted.   
There may be value in taking a contextual view of responses to voices, considering the situational 
influences on how a person responds to distressing and/or commanding voices: resistance and 
engagement are currently measured in a trait-like fashion, although it is likely that these responses 
are more variable (e.g., Sayer, Ritter, and Gournay, 2000) and layered. For example, a person may 
resist a voice by partially complying, i.e. choosing to act on a less harmful or socially unacceptable 
command in order to appease the voices (see Barrowcliff & Haddock, 2010 for a discussion in 
relation to command hallucinations). Engagement and resistance are based on clinical 
observations about the function of behaviour in the context of hearing voices, and while it has 
been found that there is a clear factor structure for these constructs (Chadwick & Birchwood, 
1995), it is likely that there are other ways of responding to voices, such as active acceptance that 
are not currently measured in research studies (see discussion earlier in the review of coping, and 





1.7  Cognitive Behavioural Therapies for Psychosis 
Based upon the cognitive models of the positive symptoms of psychosis (described earlier), 
cognitive behavioural therapy for psychosis (CBTp) has been the focus of development, 
particularly within the United Kingdom (Wykes, Steel, Everitt & Tarrier, 2008). Based upon the 
evidence for efficacy of CBTp, the UK National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) currently 
recommends that CBTp is routinely offered to all people with psychosis (NICE, 2009). 
CBTp has been used as an adjunctive treatment in schizophrenia and psychosis, in combination 
with medication; recent research suggests that CBTp may be effective for those who choose not to 
take antipsychotic medication (Morrison et al., 2011). In clinical practice, CBTp is the 
contemporary evidence-based psychological approach to help people distressed and disabled by 
auditory hallucinations (e.g., Penn et al., 2009; Trower et al., 2004; Wykes et al., 2005; ). 
1.7.1  Models 
CBTp is an application of a generic cognitive model (Beck, 1976), toward the understanding of the 
problems of psychosis. This model proposes that the way that people appraise events has 
consequences for what emotions they feel and their actions, and that these appraisals are 
maintained by unhelpful thinking biases and behavioural responses. The model also suggests that 
appraisals are influenced by core beliefs (schemas), formed from life experiences.  For psychosis, 
as discussed above in Section 1.3, the extension of the cognitive model suggests that it is not the 
prime experiences of psychotic phenomena that cause distress and disability, but rather the 
appraisals (or meaning) of these experiences (Tai & Turkington, 2009). Thus, for example, it has 
been found that the impact of auditory hallucinations and anomalous experiences can be 
accounted for by unhelpful appraisals, rather than their presence alone (Brett et al., 2007; Peters, 
Williams, Cooke & Kuipers, 2011). CBTp models formulate how positive symptoms of psychosis 
occur when anomalous experiences that are commonly experienced in the population (Johns & 
van Os, 2001) are mis-attributed in a way that has a threatening and/or highly important personal 





1.7.2  Components of CBTp  
CBTp is characterised by a variety of therapeutic approaches and theoretical bases (Morrison & 
Barratt, 2010). This heterogeneity of intervention components of CBTp (Turkington, Kingdon and 
Chadwick, 2003)and the research emphasis on large-scale randomised controlled trials has made it 
difficult to identify the active ingredients to increase the efficacy and efficiency of the intervention 
(Birchwood & Trower, 2006). 
Lecomte and Lecomte (2002) described the specific and non-specific factors that may contribute 
to the effectiveness of CBTp, noting that at the time there were limited findings about these 
factors. They suggest effective change in CBTp is influenced by the therapeutic alliance; training 
and personal qualities of the therapist; client characteristics such as capacity for insight, 
motivation and cognitive flexibility (e.g., Garety et al., 1997); and elements of the CBT approach 
that emphasise learning new skills and patterns, promoting alternative understandings of unusual 
experiences, normalization, and the use of cognitive reframing.    
Morrison and Barratt (2010) describe an effort to develop a consensus from the expert community 
on the important components of CBTp - as well as a number of generic therapeutic elements, 
there was consensus on the importance of a number of reappraisal-based methods, such as 
identifying and working with beliefs about auditory hallucinations, modifying core beliefs/ 
schemas, setting up behavioural experiments to test beliefs and modify safety behaviours, and 
finding alternative explanations for unusual experiences.  Tai and Turkington (2009) report a trend 
in CBTp development for approaches that incorporate mindfulness, metacognitive awareness, 
attentional training and compassionate practices, reflecting broader contextual developments in 
cognitive and behavioural therapies (Hayes, 2004; described in detail in Chapter 2). A number of 
these developments are being incorporated as additions/ augmentations of CBTp in clinical 
practice (Gaudiano, 2005; Tai & Turkington, 2009).  
1.7.3  Current status of the evidence for CBTp: efficacy and processes of change 
There is now a considerable amount of evidence that demonstrates the efficacy of CBTp  for 
positive and negative symptoms, functioning, mood and social anxiety, post-therapy (Tai & 




Widerlov, 2011). The UK National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE), based upon the evidence 
from efficacy and effectiveness studies, has recommended CBTp as a treatment for schizophrenia 
(NICE, 2002, 2009).  
A meta-analysis by Wykes, Steel, Everitt and Tarrier (2008) reported a moderate effect size (0.4; 
95% CI = 0.252, 0.548) which dropped to a small effect size when only CBTp trials deemed 
‘methodologically rigorous’ were included (estimated effect size = 0.223; 95% CI = 0.017, 0.428). 
This meta-analysis was more rigorous than earlier reviews due to the use of weighted effect sizes, 
the inclusion of all eligible trials, and greater consideration of the methodological variability of the 
trials (e.g., Gould, Mueser, Bolton, Mays & Goff, 2001; Pfammatter, Junghan & Brenner, 2006; 
Pilling, Bebbington, Kuipers, Garety, Orbach & Morgan, 2002; Rector & Beck, 2001 ).  Included in 
this meta-analysis was the trial of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy by Gaudiano and Herbert 
(2006); studies were rated independently by the degree to which they emphasised behavioural 
versus cognitive components, with a non-significant trend toward effect sizes being greater for 
studies that were more behavioural in emphasis (Wykes et al., 2008).  While a number of meta-
analyses show that CBTp produces robust, if moderate effects (Pfammatter et al., 2006; Pilling et 
al., 2002), there has also been criticism of the methodological rigour of these reviews (Lynch, Laws 
& McKenna, 2010) and lack of comparisons with supportive therapy approaches to determine 
efficacy (Newton-Howes & Wood, 2011).  Favourable effect size gains have been shown for CBT 
for psychosis compared to treatment as usual, although there are less robust and specific benefits 
when compared to non-specific supportive interventions (Gaudiano, 2005). Related to this latter 
point, a recent Cochrane review (Jones et al., 2012) has concluded that CBTp is not any more 
efficacious than other psychological interventions for schizophrenia. 
1.7.4  Moderators and Mediators of cognitive behavioural therapies for psychosis 
There is a small and developing literature on potential predictors of CBTp treatment response, 
with  factors identified such as the person displaying cognitive flexibility toward delusions (Garety 
et al., 1997), and holding a psychological view of problems and the potential to gain control 




Based on the cognitive models described earlier, there are several processes that could be 
hypothesized to mediate improved outcomes in CBTp: the externalizing appraisal of anomalous 
experiences; unhelpful appraisals (such as power of voices); reasoning biases; reliance upon safety 
behaviours and avoidance; self and social schemata; metacognitive beliefs and perseverative 
thought processes, amongst others. It has been observed that while appraisals of voices are a 
central target of CBTp, there have been inconsistent outcomes regarding altering these appraisals 
and subsequent reductions in voice-related distress (Mawson, Cohen & Berry, 2010 for a review).  
There is limited evidence of process changes in CBTp mediating therapy outcome (Klingberg et al., 
2010). Several studies have been conducted: Hodgekins and Fowler (2010) report that in a 
recovery-focused CBTp increases in positive beliefs about self (schemas) were found to mediate 
improvements in activity;  while Garety et al (2008) report that changes on insight, schemas or 
reasoning were unrelated to outcome in their large-scale CBTp symptom reduction and relapse 
prevention trial. Kumari et al. (2011) report that symptom reduction in CBTp may be mediated 
through changes in threat processing at a neural level.   
 
1.7.5  Summary on CBT for Psychosis  
Cognitive behavioural therapies for psychosis have a developing evidence base, with estimates of 
modest effects for reducing the intensity of psychotic symptoms and distress; it is contested 
whether CBTp out-performs other psychosocial interventions for psychosis. There are a small 
number of studies that have identified predictors of treatment response or investigated process 
changes that link with outcome.  
Treatment packages in CBTp show substantial variance in emphases and methods, while remaining 
consistent with a broad cognitive model of psychological distress. It may be that this variance in 
procedures, as well as the heterogeneous populations recruited in research trials, has led to the 
modest effects suggested by meta-analyses. CBTp benefits from the development of increasingly 
refined psychological models of symptoms (consistent with the single-symptom approach) that 
may result in greater precision of interventions that change processes associated with distress and 




mindfulness-based methods within CBTp, with these interventions being included in meta-
analyses.  Contemporary cognitive models of psychotic symptoms, however, do not (yet) 
incorporate processes that may be influenced by mindfulness, such as experiential avoidance or 
non-judgemental acceptance (discussed in the next chapter).   
 
1.8  Chapter Implications 
The development of an empirical psychological understanding of auditory hallucinations has 
demonstrated the importance of how people make sense of their experiences (appraisal) and 
what actions they take in response to them (coping; regulation strategies; efforts to engage, resist, 
comply, suppress, or accept voices).  These two broad factors are implicated in how effectively 
people manage the experience of hearing voices, and are a focus for intervention when voice 
hearers are engaged in cognitive behavioural therapy. 
There are (at least) two areas that this chapter highlights as being of empirical interest: the 
potential of acceptance as a broad-based strategy to foster in distressed voice hearers, and further 
investigation of the processes of change in cognitive behavioural therapies for psychosis.    
In contrast to responding to voices either by resisting or engaging, active acceptance may be a 
functionally different response, that is not symptom-focused, nor places the voice hearer in a 
subordinate position to their experiences; the broader literature regarding acceptance will be 
reviewed in Chapter 2, as part of the Psychological Flexibility Model.   
In addition, Chapter 2 will review how a contextual approach provides a strategy to researching 
the processes of change in psychological therapies, and the implications of this for cognitive 






Chapter 2  




This chapter will review the background for Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: contextual 
behavioural science, functional contextualism, Relational Frame Theory and the Psychological 
Flexibility Model.  
 
2.1  Contextual Behavioural Science 
 
The research conducted for this thesis is presented as consistent with a contextual behavioural 
science (CBS) approach.  
Contextual behavioural science is the descriptive term for “a naturalistic, inductive approach to 
system building in the behavioral sciences that emphasizes the evolution of historically and 
situationally embedded action, extending that unit across levels of analysis and into knowledge 
development itself” (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 2012, p.356). CBS is an extension from behavioural 
analysis and is based upon functional contextualism as a philosophy of science (Vilardaga, Hayes, 
Levin & Muto, 2009). The features of a contextual behavioural science approach include: unified 
models; an explication of trans-diagnostic processes and processes of change; and the use of 
methods that are based more on changing the function of psychological events (cognition, 
emotion) than their particular form or frequency (Hayes, Villatte, Levin & Hildebrandt, 2011).  
These features are reflected in developments of Relational Frame Theory, the Psychological 
Flexibility Model, and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy.  
 





“In practice, all these ways of changing a man’s mind reduce to manipulating his 
environment, verbal or otherwise” B.F. Skinner, 1969, p. 239.  
 
In this section I will discuss the tenets of functional contextualism, contrast with mechanistic 
assumptions, and present the implications of contextualist stance for the development and 
practice of psychological interventions 
Functional contextualism is a philosophy of science that underpins applied behaviour analysis, and 
can be seen as a contemporary description of radical behaviourism (Biglan & Hayes, 1996; Gifford 
& Hayes, 1999). Skinner (1953) stated, in a declarative fashion, that the purposes of science were 
prediction and control; subsequently other radical behavioural theorists have argued that these 
purposes can be regarded as an assumptive stance (e.g., Hayes, 1993). The term “functional 
contextualism” points to two essential elements in radical behaviourism: 1) that behaviour must 
be understood in terms of its context, and 2) that studying the function of behaviour is important 
in order to understand and influence it (Torneke, 2010). Radical behaviourism is a bottom-up, 
inductive science that has the goal of developing fundamental, universally valid principles for 
understanding behaviour (Torneke, 2010).   
Functional contextualism can be contrasted with the dominant philosophy that underpins most of 
mainstream psychology, mechanism (Morris, 1993). Although some may find the term 
“mechanism” has a pejorative connotation, it simply describes a philosophy that specifies a root 
metaphor and truth criterion to create a system for evaluating knowledge (Biglan & Hayes, 1996; 
Chiesa, 1998; Smith, 1986).   
Functional contextualism has roots in philosophical pragmatism (e.g., James, 1907), and has a 
pragmatic truth criterion.  Functional contextualism begins with the assumption that the world is 
an undivided and undistinguished whole, which humans partition through our interaction in and 
with it (Hayes, 1993; Vilardarga, Hayes, Levin & Muto, 2009); from this stance the world is 
considered “real”, but as organisms interact with it, the world becomes non-arbitrarily structured 
in multiple ways. Importantly, science to a functional contextualist is not ontological: analyses do 
not reveal the “true” nature of the universe. To a functional contextualist science is not the only 




Instead, the value of science is in its usefulness, in enabling humans to interact with the world 
more effectively through the development of general rules and principles. As a philosophy of 
science this pragmatism needs to be linked to assessable claims, and analytic goals need to be 
established a priori since this makes sense of any epistemological effort to build knowledge and 
produce change (Vilardarga et al., 2009).  
Functional contextualism can be related to other forms of contextualism, such as social 
constructivism (Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2003), in terms of the indivisibility of the whole event 
and knowledge being considered in terms of purpose, although there are also differences, 
particularly regarding the purpose of analyses (Hayes, 1987). Contextualism as a philosophical 
world view was described by Stephen Pepper in his book World Hypotheses (Pepper, 1942), which 
demonstrated that it is a fallacy to consider that there are no data that are free of interpretation 
(the central error of logical positivism). Pepper (1942) posited that root metaphors (an underlying 
worldview that shape understanding of a situation) are necessary in epistemology, and outlined 
what he considered to be four adequate world hypotheses (conceptual systems): formism, 
mechanism, contextualism, and organicism. Pepper (1942) argues that each of these philosophical 
systems is qualitatively distinct and adequate in its own right, without reflecting on the adequacy 
of the others. Pepper determined “adequacy” by two features of each philosophy: scope (the 
ability to explain everything) and precision (explaining uniquely and not vaguely). 
The analytic goal of functional contextualism is the prediction and influence of psychological 
events, and the method is a focus on the manipulable variables in the context of psychological 
events (the act-in-context). Functional contextualists therefore study how people’s history of 
interacting with their environment affects their psychological events in the current setting and 
simultaneously work to influence these psychological events. The root metaphor and truth 
criterion of functional contextualism therefore are dependent upon the purpose of the analysis. 
This means the act-in-context is meaningful only in terms of the explicit goal; similarly the truth 
criterion of successful working can only be judged in relation to the achievement of a stated 
objective. Functional contextualists seek the development of empirically based concepts and rules 
that allow psychological phenomena to be predicted and influenced with precision, scope, and 




2.2.1  How behaviour and context are defined 
Functional contextualism maintains the definition of behaviour that is the hallmark of radical 
behaviourism, separating it philosophically from other forms of behaviourism: behaviour is 
defined as any and all activity that anyone (and possible only one person) can observe, predict and 
influence (Skinner, 1945). This definition means that private experiences, which can only be 
observed by the person themselves such as thoughts, feelings, urges and sensations, are 
considered behaviours. This distinction has been present in radical behaviourism since Skinner 
(1953), contrasting this philosophy of science with forms of “black box” behaviourism, such as S-R 
learning theories (e.g., Hull, 1954; Thorndike, 1932). The “radical” in radical behaviourism relates 
to the consistency of the philosophy, which extends to the behaviour of the scientist as well 
(Leigland, 2010; Torneke, 2010). In radical behaviourism the activity of the scientist is also under 
contextual control, and thus scientists do not have a “god’s eye”, or objective, view in their 
analyses; they are also part of the context that is being functionally analysed (Skinner, 1953, 
1974).   
The act-in-context is considered as a single unity (Kantor, 1970), as behaviour cannot be 
understood without studying its context. The context therefore is the situational and historical 
variables that allow for the prediction-and-influence goal to be met. Situational variables include 
the current setting or environment in which an event occurs (including physical, social, biological 
and cultural features); historical variables relate to a person’s lifelong history of interacting with 
his or her environment. The meaning, purpose and function of an action is determined by past 
events, that is by historical context.  
 
2.2.2  Influence: an emphasis on manipulable contextual variables 
Hayes (2004) argued: “If one adopts “prediction and influence” as a unified goal (ie., if principles 
and theories should help accomplish both simultaneously), then it is logically necessary for 
analyses to include manipulable contextual variables…. While analyses that begin and end in the 




good levels of prediction, a gap necessarily exists between these analyses and the actions that 
might change psychological events” (p. 9) 
The implications of the prediction-and-influence analytic goal are: 
1) An emphasis on environmental and historical variables  
The therapist/ scientist is part of the other person’s environment: anything that they may do to 
influence the learning or performance of an individual occurs in the environment of the individual 
(the context of their behaviour). Developing theories that directly help the therapist/scientist to 
influence the learning or performance of others must therefore include environmental or 
historical variables (NB. “historical” in essence means a consideration of the individual’s learning 
history) 
2) An emphasis on experimental methods 
Isolating the contextual features that are related in the changes in the psychological event 
requires controlled experimentation. Correlational or descriptive research may provide some clues 
to these contextual features, which then need to demonstrate a functional relationship through 
experimentation, also verifying the general utility of the principles.   
 
2.2.3  Contrasting Functional Contextualism with the dominant philosophy of mainstream 
psychology: Mechanism 
As described above, Mechanism is a description of the world hypothesis that much of mainstream 
psychology and science in general operates within (Chiesa, 1998; Walls, 1982). The above 
discussion hopefully has highlighted to the reader that functional contextualism differs from 
mechanism in a number of fundamental ways. Table 2.1 below describes the defining features that 
contrast mechanism and functional contextualism.  
 
 
Table 2.1 Philosophical characteristics of Mechanism & Functional Contextualism (based upon 





Characteristic Mechanism Functional Contextualism 
Truth criterion Correspondence: truth is found 
through the construction of 
statements and formulae that 
reveal via predictive verification, 
the assumed organisation of the 
universe 
Successful working: what is 
regarded as true is what is 
pragmatic. Statements about the 
world are judged in terms of their 
ability to achieve goals,  
Goal  To produce accurate models of 
the world 
To act effectively 
A priori assumption The universe is organised into 
events, relations, parts and 
forces.  
The universe is One; acts-in-
context 
What is regarded as a cause? Events that regularly precede 
what we are trying to explain 
Ways of speaking that accomplish 
ends: analyses that focus on 
manipulable environmental 
variables 
Root metaphor The machine Act-in-context 
 
 
2.2.4 Causes in functional contextualism (FC) 
 
Functional contextualists are interested in the historical and situational contexts that give rise 
both to thoughts and their mutual relation to emotions and actions. The monism of functional 
contextualism (Martell, Addis & Jacobsen, 2001) means that all psychological events are analysed 
as acts-in-context, where the whole is primary. During a functional analysis when we may consider 
the act-in-context in parts, these parts are considered secondary (e.g., such as the antecedent-
behaviour-consequence relation in behaviour analysis) and do not have an ontological status. 
Rather, such analyses are merely constructions or ways of speaking (Hayes, Hayes & Reese, 1988) 
that may or may not serve the analytic goal. Therefore truth is tied to practical consequences, 
rather than ontological assumptions. Therefore contextualists regard causes as ways of speaking 
to accomplish ends, rather than considering causes as existing independently of context (Hayes, 









Functional contextualism as an underlying philosophy extends beyond the application of 
psychological therapies: there will be brief discussion in Section 2.3.3 below of these wider 
applications, based upon Relational Frame Theory.  
The implication of this stance means that functional analyses must start with considering the 
changeable contexts of behaviour, and for clinicians to accept that they are part of context that 
they wish to change. The clinician is interested in the functional relations between changeable 
contextual features and the behaviours these are integrated with (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 
2012). Therefore a contextual clinician rejects the idea that thoughts and feelings cause actions, as 
they are all considered to be dependent variables: rather, the interest is in which contexts select 
for this type of relationship between thoughts, feelings and action (Hayes & Wilson, 1995), and 
how this context can be altered so that different functional relationships help the client achieve 
their goal(s).  
As an example, consider the role that unhelpful beliefs play in clinical disorders (e.g., Beck, 1993). 
From a contextual stance a belief is conceptualised as being an act in context (Hayes, Strosahl & 
Wilson, 1999), i.e., the behaviour of believing rather than having a belief as a discrete entity. 
Rather than assuming that beliefs are causal in subsequent behaviour the therapist would 
investigate the contextual relationship between internal events (such as thoughts and feelings), 
observable behaviour and the contingencies operating in this relationship Thus, it may be that 
unhelpful thinking and believing play a causal role in subsequent behaviour, but it may also be that 
thinking plays no direct role or may be an outcome of contingency-based behaviour or respondent 
conditioning (Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1991).The therapist helps the client to change the context of 
their problems by altering the functional relationships between antecedents, behaviour (including 
thoughts and beliefs), and consequences.  
Defined in this way, psychological intervention is essentially a verbal enterprise on the part of the 
therapist to help the client alter the context for their problems. According to this viewpoint it is 
important to focus on what can actually be changed within an intervention. A contextual criticism 
of cognitive models is that beliefs are not entities that can be directly changed; rather it is through 
the changing of verbal behaviour, the environment, or a person’s behavioural repertoire that 




Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) and other interventions considered as contextual 
behavioural therapies (Hayes, Villate, Levin & Hildebrandt, 2011), such as contemporary 
Behavioural Activation (Martell, Addis & Jacobsen, 1999), Functional Analytic Psychotherapy (FAP; 
Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1991), and Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993).  
 
 
2.3  Relational Frame Theory 
Relational frame theory is a comprehensive contextualistic account for human language and 
cognition, that provides the theoretical rationale for acceptance and commitment therapy, but 
extends beyond psychotherapies to other applied areas, such as education (e.g., Cassidy, Roche & 
Hayes, 2011), prevention (Biglan, 2004) and social change (Biglan, 2009; Dixon, Dymond, Rehfeldt, 
Roche, & Zlomke, 2003; Lillis & Hayes, 2007;).  
Relational Frame Theory (RFT) is a post-Skinnerian conceptualisation of human language, which 
conceptualizes language and cognition as forms of relational responding (learning to respond to 
one event in terms of another) (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001). RFT is based on the 
premise that such derived relational responding is a historically established overarching class 
similar to generalized imitation (Hayes, 1994), and represents a particular type of operant 
conditioning. To date, it appears that the learning process of derived relational responding is only 
present in humans possessing a capacity for language (Blackledge, 2003; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & 
Roche, 2001; Torneke, 2010).   
This means that humans can come to respond to stimuli not solely based on their formal 
properties but rather on a history of reinforcement for the application of a particular relational 
response, behaviour called “arbitrary applicable relational responding” (Pistorello, Follete & 
Hayes, 2000). This powerful form of behaviour is explicitly rewarded by the verbal community, and 
once it emerges it is maintained by the instrumental value of relating and the effects of coherence 
and sense-making. If relational networks are internally coherent people feel confident that they 
understand, and because such understanding does often predict an ability to control events, 






2.3.1  Relational framing and experiential avoidance  
According to RFT, such instrumental success does not necessarily extend to altering internal 
experiences such as thoughts, memories, emotions and urges. In this area relational framing 
(verbal relating) can actually lead to greater distress as sense-making and the use of control may 
not make internal events more predictable and controllable, but may paradoxically result in the 
opposite. This is because verbal relations are bi-directional (discussed below), which makes self-
knowledge useful, but also makes it painful (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999). Humans persist in 
such experiential avoidance due to the reinforcement that they have received from the verbal 
community and sense-making, which results in experiential avoidance being a form of rule-
governed behaviour (Hayes, 1989), the result of which can make organisms relatively immune to 
the non-verbal contingencies of their behaviour.  
RFT argues that derived relational responding emerges from both a genetically evolved capacity 
and a history of reinforcement from the verbal community (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 2012). 
Relational framing is a behaviour that is acquired and brought under the control of arbitrary 
contextual features through reinforcement of approximations in multiple exemplar training 
(Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 2012); an example of this in natural language learning is the behaviour 
of naming, where the child is reinforced through thousands of examples for derived relations (e.g., 
pointing to mother when hearing “where’s mother?”, and gaining social approval when doing so).   
 
2.3.2  Characteristics of language and arbitrary applicable relational responding 
Derived relational responding involves the ability to relate stimuli in a variety of ways even though 
a person has never been reinforced for relating those stimuli in those specific ways (Blackledge, 
2003). Derived relational responding therefore means that stimuli are being related without direct 
training. An extension of this is arbitrary applicable relational responding, where learned relational 
responding can come under the control of arbitrary contextual cues, not solely the formal 
properties of what is being related nor direct experience with them (formal properties are those 




A RFT definition of language is: “the process of arbitrarily applicable derived relational responding 
that is non-arbitrarily applied” (Blackledge, 2003). The term “non-arbitrarily applied” refers to the 
observation that the social environment only reinforces relational responses to certain arbitrary 
stimulus properties in certain contexts (Blackledge, 2003). So, for example, the social environment 
discriminates what “makes sense” in terms of relational responding, so that certain relations are 
rewarded while others are not (i.e., what is regarded as coherent not arbitrary).    
Barnes-Holmes, Hayes and Roche (2001) describe relational framing as a learned behaviour that 
shows four processes under arbitrary contextual control - relational responding, mutual 
entailment, combinatorial entailment, and transformation of the stimulus function.   
This is illustrated in Figure 2.1 below, with an example.  
1) Relational responding - this means that what is responded to is the relation between two 
stimuli, rather than each stimulus separately 
2) Mutual entailment - this means that a relation learned in one direction entails another in the 
opposite direction (Blackledge, 2003; Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 2012). In Figure 2.1 the relation of 
word “snake” to an [image of a snake] is learned directly, and the relation in the opposite direction 
is derived, so that [seeing a snake] is derived as the name “snake”.  
3) Combinatorial entailment - refers to the reciprocal relationships that exist between two stimuli 
by virtue of how these stimuli are related to other, intermediary stimuli (Blackledge, 2003). It 
means that mutual relations can combine (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 2012). In Figure 2.1 the 
relation learning that [image of a snake] is related to the word “bumbara”, also means that the 
relation of “bumbara” and “snake” is derived. (“bumbara” is a word from the language of the 
Gunggari people of Western Queensland, Australia) 
4) Transformation of Stimulus Functions - when two sets of stimuli are related, some of the 
functions of each stimulus change according to what stimulus it is related to, and how it is related 
to that stimulus (Blackledge, 2003). In Figure 2.1 if a person is afraid of snakes and learns that 
“Bumbara” is another name for “snake”, then “Bumbara” will also have the same  stimulus 
functions (i.e., physiological and behavioural responses of fear), due to being framed relationally in 
coordination with “snake”.   
 













                  “bumbara” 
 
   
Directly trained         
Mutual entailment 
Combinatorial mutual entailment   
*Image of a Western Taipan from: 
Pearn, J., & Winkel, K. D. (2006). Toxinology in Australia’s colonial era: A chronology and perspective of human 
envenomation in 19th century Australia. Toxicon, 48(7), 726–737.  
 
 
2.3.3  Evidence for RFT 
A detailed review of the empirical evidence for RFT is beyond the scope of this thesis; the theory 
has produced studies that suggest that RFT is an operant (Berens & Hayes, 2007;Healy, Barnes-
Holmes & Smeets, 2000;), by demonstrating the role of multiple examples in training derived 
relations (e.g., Luciano, Becerra & Valverde, 2007), the role that context has upon relational 
responding (e.g., Steele & Hayes, 1991), and how consequences influence this behaviour (Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes & McHugh, 2004). It has also been shown that derived relational 
responding can alter other forms of learning, such as respondent conditioning (e.g., Smyth, 
Barnes-Holmes & Forsyth, 2006): studies like this provide the basis for the argument that 
relational operants should be considered in current behavioural interpretations of complex human 
behaviour (Berens & Hayes, 2004; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001). There have been 
empirical advances based on RFT in the understanding of metaphor and analogy (Stewart, & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2001; Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, Hayes & Lipkens, 2002), reasoning (Stewart & 




McHugh & Stewart, 2012), and implicit attitudes and cognition (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, 
Stewart & Boles, 2011).  
 
2.3.4  The implications of RFT for psychological therapies 
As discussed above a functional contextualist view of clinical problems focuses upon those 
environmental factors that can be influenced by the therapist, which includes identifying contexts 
where language is contributing to the problem and attempting to change the context so that 
unhelpful relational framing has less influence over the client’s behaviour. Contexts that have 
been identified as influential in a number of clinical disorders and problem are ones that support 
1)  literality (in colloquial language, taking thoughts too literally), and 2) experiential avoidance 
(attempts to control private experiences to the degree that these efforts cause harm). These will 
be discussed further in Section 2.4 on the Psychological Flexibility model.   
Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche (2001) describe the implications of RFT for psychotherapy and 
understanding psychopathology:  
1) It is not practically viable to eliminate the cognitive processes that lead to 
psychopathology, as they are some of the same processes that allow verbal problem-
solving and reasoning;  
2) Cognitive networks cannot be logically restricted or eliminated as these networks are a 
reflection of historical learning processes: this is analogous to the findings that extinction 
inhibits but does not eliminate learned responding (Hayes et al., 2006);  
3) Direct change attempts that focus on key nodes in a cognitive network create a context 
that elaborates the network and increases the functional importance of these nodes;  
4) It is possible to reduce the impact of negative cognitions regardless of whether they 
continue with frequency and/ or in the same form (e.g., Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006a;  
Zettle & Hayes, 1986), as the impact of cognitive networks is controlled by distinct 
contextual features (Hayes et al., 2006) 
Therefore, compared to psychotherapies that may focus on changing the form or frequency of 
cognitions to reduce impact, instead, the aim of RFT-based interventions is to loosen the control of 




fusion. Hayes et al (1999) describe the main way of weakening verbal relations effectively is to 
alter the context supporting literal verbal processes, not by focusing upon the verbal content per 
se. So, verbal relations are loosened by contexts that do not support linear, analytic sense-making; 
do not encourage right and wrong thinking or reason-giving; do not encourage experiential 
control; and that support the dispassionate observation and mindfulness of verbal relations as an 
on-going process. The weakening of such verbal relations allows the client to be in contact with 
the natural contingencies of internal experiences, rather than the amplified contingencies due to 
experiential avoidance. The use of behavioural commitment strategies further weakens verbal 
relating, and allows the client choice and committed action in areas that can be verbally regulated, 
such as overt behaviour (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999). 
 
2.4  The Psychological Flexibility Model 
Based upon functional contextualism and relational frame theory is the Psychological Flexibility 
model (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 2012; Levin et al., 2012), a model of psychological health, 
psychopathology, and psychological intervention.  
This model proposes six interrelated processes that build psychological flexibility, which has been 
defined as: “the ability to contact consciously the present moment and the thoughts and feelings it 
contains more fully and without needless defence, and based on what the situation affords, to 
persist or change in behaviour in the service of chosen values”  (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda & 
Lillis, 2006). The six processes that have been identified as comprising psychological flexibility are: 
Acceptance, Defusion,  Flexible attention to the present moment, Self as context, Values, and 
Committed action. A set of definitions for these processes is in Table 2.2 below.  
 
 
Table 2.2  Core Processes of the Psychological Flexibility Model (Luoma, Walser & Hayes, 2007; 






Acceptance the active and aware embrace of private events 
that are occasioned by our history, without 
unnecessary attempts to change their frequency 
or form, especially when doing so would case 
psychological harm 
Defusion the process of creating non-literal contexts in 
which language can be seen as an active, ongoing 
relational process that is historical in nature and 
present in the current context 
Self as context (Flexible perspective-taking) The process of developing a stronger connection 
with self as an aspect of the “I-here-nowness” of 
experience; cultivating an observer perspective   
Flexible attention to the present moment Ongoing, non-judgmental contact with 
psychological and environmental events as they 
occur 
Values  Verbally-constructed, global, desired, and chosen 
life directions 
Committed Action The process of linking specific actions to chosen 
values, and building successively larger patterns 
of effective actions 
 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the relationship of these six processes. The four processes to the left are 
understood as mindfulness and acceptance processes, while the four on the right are commitment 
and behavioural activation processes (Hayes, 2004). The diagram shows that the six processes are 
considered to be interrelated, so that an emphasis on increasing one process is liable to show 
concomitant changes in the other processes too. It is suggested that an absence of one or more 
these processes risks psychological inflexibility, which is claimed to be a root cause of human 
suffering and maladaptive functioning (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 2012), Psychological inflexibility, 
therefore, is the result of the inverse of the skills described above: experiential avoidance, 
cognitive entanglement/ fusion, rigid attentional processes, lack of values clarity, poor perspective 
taking, and rigid behavioural repertoires (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999, 2012; Kashdan & 



























The processes described in the Psychological Flexibility Model are considered to be mid-level 
terms, that is not to be taken literally, but a useful clinical language to orientate the researcher 
and clinician to important features in the therapeutic context; there is a more technical behaviour 
analytic account underneath, linked to Relational Frame Theory. For example, the process of 
fusion is described as “contexts in which verbal transformations of function are readily occurring” 
(Blackledge, 2007, p. 3), conversely defusion is defined as “disrupt[ing] ordinary meaning functions 
of language such that the ongoing process of framing events relationally is evident in the moment 
and competes with the stimulus products of relational activity” (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999, p. 
74) and “[defusion] breaks down the tight equivalence classes and dominant verbal relations that 
establish stimulus functions through verbal means” (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999, p. 74).   
 




In the next section I will highlight two processes that are implicated in clinical disorders - 
experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion - and are suggested to contribute to psychological 
inflexibility.  
These processes form the foci for this thesis: these are the two most empirically-developed areas 
of the Psychological Flexibility Model and ACT psychopathological research. Mindfulness, later 
outlined in this chapter, in ACT terms also implicates perspective taking and attention processes, 
in order to help clarify values and foster engagement in committed actions (Hayes, Strosahl & 
Wilson, 2012). More broadly and relevant to psychosis, there have also been a small number of 
studies on perspective-taking in schizophrenia (Villatte, Monestès, McHugh, Freixa i Baqué, & 
Loas, 2010, 2011), however interventions are still in infancy (e.g., O’Neil, 2012 unpublished thesis) 
and discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis.   
The final part of this section is a review of the current evidence for the Psychological Flexibility 
Model.  
 
2.4.1  Experiential avoidance 
“Many forms of psychopathology are not merely bad problems, they are also bad solutions” - 
Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette & Strosahl, 1996, p. 1162.  
 
Experiential avoidance (EA) has been defined as  “when a person is unwilling to remain in contact 
with particular private experiences (e.g., bodily sensations, emotions, thoughts, memories, 
behavioral predispositions) and takes steps to alter the form or frequency of these events and the 
contexts that occasion them, even when this process is unhelpful” (Hayes, Wilson & Strosahl, 
1999). EA is the immediate consequence of following verbal rules that suggest the suppression, 
control, or elimination of unwanted private experiences is important to well-being (Hayes, Strosahl 
& Wilson, 1999).  
EA is hypothesised to be involved in the development and maintenance of numerous clinical 
disorders (Hayes et al, 1996; Hayes et al. 2004). EA can be considered to be a generalised 
psychological vulnerability (Kashdan, Barrios, Forsyth & Steger, 2006); it has been proposed to be 




valence) of private psychological and emotional experiences (Hayes et al., 1999; Kashdan et al., 
2006).  
It has been proposed by Hayes et al. (1996) that EA contributes to psychopathology via three 
pathways:  
1) that deliberate avoidance strategies operate as verbal rules which include the target of 
avoidance, as a result the target may increase in accessibility and further influence 
cognition and behaviour (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000);  
2) that private experiences are often classically conditioned, and thus may not be 
amenable to verbal control strategies, for example as suggested by studies about the 
neural pathways of fear conditioning (LeDoux, 1996: cited by Chawla & Oastafin, 2007);  
3) even if avoidance strategies are effective, there may be unworkable costs associated 
with engaging in them, such as the example of a person with paranoia avoiding leaving the 
house and thus not being able to work or sustain friendships.   
 
It has been argued by Hayes et al. (1996) that an advantage of EA as a construct is that it provides 
a functional perspective of psychological symptoms, which is preferable to a syndromal 
perspective toward psychopathology. Thus EA is consistent with a transdiagnostic approach to 
understanding psychological problems.  
Within the literature the term “acceptance” has been used to describe the opposite process to EA 
(Barlow, Allen & Choate, 2004; Hayes & Wilson, 1994).  The action of acceptance can be described 
as “intentionally allowing painful psychological events to be present and felt, so as to be able to 
move in a valued direction” (Hayes et al., 2011).  
2.4.1.1  How experiential avoidance is theorised to occur - relational framing and support from the 
verbal community 
A necessary component of experiencing emotion is appraisal (Lazarus, 1982), an evaluative and 
predictive language process. Hayes et al’s (1996) theory specifies that when such language 
processes are excessively applied to private events (such as emotions, memories and thoughts) 




experiential avoidance is due to the bi-directional transfer of verbally established functions to 
private events (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001). Therefore if “anxiety,” for example, is an 
entirely “bad” emotion, then anxiety must be avoided or suppressed to control a bad outcome. 
The immediate effects of experiential avoidance often appear to be positive. An example is the 
immediate effect of cognitive distraction or other forms of thought suppression, which usually 
results in a reduction of the avoided event – however, it is only over time that the avoided thought 
increases in frequency (Gold & Wegner, 1995). This pattern of a short term reduction leading to a 
long term increase, can easily establish a self-amplifying loop that might be fairly resistant to 
change. 
  Thus maintenance of experiential avoidance has been theorized to occur due to short-term 
negative reinforcement effects, but also as a result of reinforcement from the verbal community 
and the generalized effects of sense-making, which results in experiential avoidance being a form 
of rule-governed behaviour (Hayes, 1989). It has been found that rule-governed behaviour results 
in organisms being relatively immune to the contingencies of behaviour (Hayes, 1989). It can be 
observed that the effects of rule-governed behaviour are seen in a number of clinical disorders, 
where individuals persist with dysfunctional ways of coping despite the negative effects. 
Experiential avoidance is reinforced by the wider community, particularly in the form of beliefs 
about the efficacious effects of thought- and emotional-suppression (e.g., “Don’t think about it”, 
“Just get over it”, the power of “positive thinking” and affirmations), and efforts to attain a state 
of permanent happiness (Hayes et al, 1999).  
Hayes et al (1996) have argued that experiential avoidance is harmful because private events are 
often unresponsive or even paradoxically increased by deliberate control efforts, that many forms 
of experiential avoidance result in poorer functioning, that sometimes difficult emotions are 
experientially important, and that healthy behavioural changes often initially produce 
psychological discomfort. Thus, excessive experiential avoidance is likely to be associated with 






2.4.1.2  Measurement of EA 
EA is considered to be a uni-dimensional construct, consistent with the definition described above 
and the Psychological Flexibility model. EA has been most commonly measured using a self-report 
measure, the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ: version 1 Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson et al., 
2004; version 2 Bond, Hayes, Baer et al., 2011, see Appendix A-2.1 and Chapter 5, Section 5.3.4  
for a description of the psychometrics of the AAQ-II).  
The AAQ-I was published in 9- and 16-item versions, with factor analyses suggesting that the 
measure had a somewhat unstable structure. The original validation study suggested a single 
factor for the 9- and 16-item AAQ-I (Hayes et al., 2004), but other studies found a two-factor 
structure (Bond & Bunce, 2003). The current, second version of the AAQ (AAQ-II) was designed to 
improve on the psychometric limitations of the AAQ-I, in particular, its internal consistency (Bond 
et al., 2011), which, potentially as a result of item complexity, may have resulted in the unstable 
factor structure. In the studies cited below, measurement of EA is with the original version of the 
AAQ.     
 
2.4.1.3  The association of EA and psychopathology 
Numerous studies have demonstrated significant relationships between EA and disability, distress 
and ineffective coping across disorders and populations (Bond et al., 2011; Hayes et al., 1996; 
Hayes & Gifford, 1997; Hayes et al., 2004; Hayes et al., 2006;). EA has been shown to be associated 
with general psychopathology in both clinical and healthy samples (Hayes et al., 2004) and have 
strong associations with measures of anxiety and depression (Bond et al., 2011; Cribb, Moulds, & 
Carter, 2006; Marx & Sloan, 2005; Roemer et al., 2005; Tull, Gratz, Salters & Roemer, 2004 ).  
A meta-analysis (Hayes et al., 2006) and a review (Chawla & Ostafin, 2007) have found that EA 
predicts a wide range of quality of life and well-being outcomes (e.g., depression, anxiety, pain 
intensity, general mental health, job satisfaction, work performance), with an average effect size 
of r =.42. Bond, Hayes and Barnes-Holmes (2006) review studies that demonstrate that EA predicts 
outcomes, even after controlling for other variables, such as negative affectivity, thought 




has been found that it mediates the impact of acceptance-based interventions (e.g., Bond & 
Bunce, 2000), moderates the effect of interventions (e.g, Masuda, Hayes, Fletcher et al., 2007) and 
the impact of coping processes such as cognitive reappraisal (Kashdan, Barrios, Forsyth & Steger, 
2006).   
A consistent finding across studies is that EA is associated with greater impact of distressing and 
unwanted experiences: for example, in chronic pain psychosocial disability is predicted more by 
the experiential avoidance of pain than by the degree of pain (McCracken, 1998). Similarly 
experimental studies of anxiety suggest that EA is not merely a concomitant or consequence of 
anxiety, instead EA appears to be a psychological vulnerability for anxiety pathology, that is, EA 
appears to amplify anxiety symptoms in those who have no history of anxiety disorder (Feldner, 
Zvolensky, Eifert & Spira, 2003; Karekla, Forsyth & Kelly, 2004; Kashdan et al., 2006 ). 
EA appears to mediate coping and outcomes: in reviewing the published literature Chawla & 
Ostafin (2007) summarise that EA appears to mediate the relationship between maladaptive 
coping, self-regulatory strategies, and distress. Similar EA mediation effects, for example, have 
been found in the relationships between current mental health and childhood psychological 
abuse, (Reddy, Pickett & Orcutt, 2006), adolescent sexual victimisation (Merwin,  Zachary 
Rosenthal & Coffey, 2009; Polusny, Rosenthal, Aban & Follette, 2004); problem behaviours and 
childhood trauma (Kingston, Clarke & Remington, 2010); and the relationship between 
maladaptive perfectionism and worry (Santanello & Gardner, 2007). 
Correlational studies across disorders suggest that EA as measured by the AAQ shows associations 
with general psychopathology, rather than symptom specific associations (Bond et al., 2011): for 
example, with generalised anxiety disorder (Roemer, Salters, Raffa & Orsillo, 2005) and PTSD (Tull 
& Roemer, 2003). As the AAQ was originally designed as a population level measure, rather than a 
clinical questionnaire (Hayes et al., 2004) it may be that disorder-specific experiential avoidance is 
not adequately captured: various EA measures have been developed that are more disorder-
specific, including measures for pain content (McCracken, 1998; McCracken, Vowles & Eccelston, 
2004), substance abuse (Luoma, Drake, Hayes, Kohlenberg, 2011), tinnitus (Westin, Hayes & 






2.4.1.4  Experiential avoidance/ Psychological Flexibility and psychosis 
Since commencement of this programme of research in 2006 there have been a collection of 
studies published investigating the relationship of EA with psychotic symptoms and anomalous 
experiences.  
Several studies have explored the association between experiential avoidance and delusional 
ideation. Oliver, McLachlan, Jose and Peters (2011) investigated the associations between 
delusional ideation, mindfulness and negative schemas in a sample of 700 university students.  It 
was found that a mindfulness measure of non-judgemental acceptance (a component of 
Psychological Flexibility), was demonstrated to have significant direct effects on all dimensions of 
delusional ideation, moreover, the effect of negative schemas on delusional distress was mediated 
by non-judgemental acceptance. In a similar cross-sectional study with an internet-recruited 
community sample Fliss (unpublished thesis, 2010) found that the relationship between delusional 
ideation and quality of life was statistically mediated by EA; a similar mediation was found 
between social functioning and delusional ideation. In a comparison EA appeared to be a stronger 
mediator between delusional ideation and quality life or social functioning than thought 
suppression.   
Goldstone, Farhall, and Ong (2011a) investigating non-clinical and psychosis samples using a cross-
sectional design, reported a mediating role for EA in the relationship between life hassles and 
delusional ideation/ delusions across both groups. This suggests that people who cope with a 
psychologically inflexible stance tend to experience more frequent and distressing delusional 
ideas, regardless of whether they have been diagnosed with a psychotic disorder (Goldstone, 
Farhall & Ong, 2011a).  A further study with these samples (Goldstone, Farhall & Ong, 2011b), 
exploring vulnerabilities to psychosis and pathways to delusions, found that EA partially mediated 
the association between the combination of childhood trauma plus life stresses with delusional 
ideation/ delusions. In addition it was found that genetic heritability combined with EA 




Experiential avoidance has additionally shown moderator effects with delusional ideation, 
negative schemas and anxiety. A longitudinal study by Oliver, O’Connor, Jose, McLachlan and 
Peters (2012) found that the effect of negative schemas on delusional ideation was mediated by 
anxiety; in addition it was found that EA/psycholological flexibility moderated the associations 
between schemas, anxiety and delusional ideation, suggesting that people who cope in an 
avoidant, inflexible way are at increased risk of delusional thinking in the presence of negative 
schemas and anxiety. This result can be seen as similar to the conclusions by Kashdan et al., 2006 
about problems with anxiety, in that EA appears to amplify the effects of negative experiences.    
EA has also been investigated with hallucinations and paranoia. Valiente et al. (2011) investigated 
the role of EA in the association between insight and self-acceptance for people with 
schizophrenia presenting with paranoia. Valiente et al. (2011) report that EA acted as a moderator 
in this relationship: low insight was associated with greater self-acceptance directly, while when 
EA was high, higher insight was associated with less self-acceptance. Goldstone, Farhall and Ong 
(2011c) report that for a sample of people with psychosis that hallucination persistence was 
predicted by pathway of life hassles, early sexual trauma and EA. Varese et al. (2011) used the 
experience sampling method to examine the relationship between paranoia, hallucinations, 
dissociation and EA in a sample of people diagnosed with schizophrenia and healthy controls. The 
study found that hallucinations were significantly predicted by dissociation and EA, however after 
controlling for comorbid paranoia only dissociation remained significant.    
Udachina et al. (2009) explored the relationships between EA, paranoia and self-esteem in a 
student sample, using structural equation modelling and the experience sampling method with a 
sub-sample of participants who scored high or low on paranoia. Udachina et al. (2009) report a 
direct association between EA and paranoia, and that the interaction of EA and stress predicted 
negative self-esteem. It was concluded that EA as a stance of coping with negative self-content 
comes at significant cost, involving greater risk of paranoid thinking and lowering self-esteem.        
Finally the relationship between EA and general distress/ well-being has been explored in people 
recovering from psychosis. White, Gumley et al. (2012) examined the associations between 
psychological flexibility, mindfulness, and depression and anxiety following psychosis: it was found 




depression and anxiety, however in regression analyses psychological flexibility alone was found to 
be a significant predictor of distress. In an early psychosis sample O’Donoghue, Evangeli and 
Morris (submitted) investigated the relationship between negative automatic thoughts, global 
distress, mindfulness and psychological flexibility; it was found that EA and mindfulness fully 
mediated the relationships between automatic thoughts and global distress for young people 
recovering from psychosis.     
Thus, from this small literature there are indications that for both non-clinical and clinical 
populations that experiential avoidance may play a possible role in potentiating unusual 
experiences (or reducing resilience to these experiences through inflexible coping), with 
associated negative effects on wellbeing (similar to the research in anxiety by Kashdan et al. 
(2006) showing that EA appears to amplify the effects of negative experiences).   
 
2.4.2  Cognitive Fusion 
Cognitive fusion is a process by which verbal events exert strong stimulus control over responding, 
to the exclusion of other contextual variables/ sources of behavioural regulation (Hayes, Strosahl 
& Wilson, 1999; Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 2012, p. 69). Cognitive fusion makes it hard for humans 
to distinguish between a verbally-conceptualised and evaluated world and one that is directly 
experienced (Strosahl, Hayes, Wilson & Gifford, 2004). This can mean that action based on these 
products may be relatively immune to natural contingencies (Hayes, 1989): that is, direct 
experience plays less of a role in influencing behaviour.  
It can be tremendously adaptive for humans to be influenced more by verbal networks than by 
directly-experienced environmental consequences (Bach & Moran, 2008): this allows for 
experiences to be shared symbolically (e.g., “don’t touch that, it will burn you”), and for long-term 
and abstract goals to be achieved despite experiencing it as aversive (e.g., completing a PhD). It 
can be unhelpful in some contexts however, as the products of cognitive fusion are typically 
experienced as being synonymous with reality, without recognition that they are the result of 
evaluative language processes. This can lead to narrow and unhelpful behavioural repertoires, 




service of valued ends (Blackledge, 2007; Eifert & Forsyth, 2005; Luoma, Hayes & Walser, 2007; 
Valvidia-Salas, Sheppard & Forsyth, 2010). 
There are several forms of cognitive fusion that are targeted in the Psychological Flexibility Model: 
(1) fusion between evaluations and the events they are tied to, (2) fusion with the imagined 
toxicity of painful events, and (3) fusion with arbitrary causal relationships that form the client’s 
“explanation”, and (4) fusion with a conceptualised past or future (Strosahl et al, 2004).  
It has been argued by Hayes et al. (1999) that the functional contexts that support cognitive fusion 
and experiential avoidance are ubiquitous (due to framing relationally being a generalised 
operant: see discussion above in Section 2.3.2). In RFT terms fusion involves contexts that enhance 
the transformation of stimulus functions for language and cognition (Blackledge, 2007). These 
functional contexts are also maintained by the verbal community, through normative social 
demands. The contexts that support cognitive fusion are those of literality (where symbols are 
treated similarly to the things they refer to), reason-giving (where behaviour is based upon 
constructed “causes”, and particularly when these causes are non-manipulable, such as 
conditioned private events; e.g., Addis & Jacobsen, 1996), and experiential control, where the 
control of emotional and cognitive states becomes the primary goal and measure of successful 
living (Hayes et al., 2006). Thus, normative social demands can maintain unhelpful cognitive 
control and avoidance, by reinforcing people trying to understand and explain psychological 
events when this is unnecessary (Hayes, 2002), providing socially-valid but unhelpful explanations 
for actions (reasoning giving, e.g., “I couldn’t go out because I was depressed), or folk psychology 
about the “right” sorts of thinking and emotions (e.g., stigma about anomalous experiences or 
unusual beliefs).  
 
2.4.2.1  Defusion - disrupting and reducing verbal transformation of stimulus functions 
Defusion is “the process of relating to thoughts just as thoughts so as to reduce their automatic 
impact” (Hayes et al., 2011). It is a term used to describe the inverse process to cognitive fusion 
(Hayes, Stosahl & Wilson, 1999), where direct experience and derived relating (i.e. appraisals) are 




A further RFT conceptualisation of defusion by Wilson and Murrell (2004) suggests that 
“interventions that attenuate the relationally conditioned functions of thoughts can be considered 
defusion strategies… cognitive defusion… refers to procedures that broaden [behavioural] 
repertoires with respect to stimuli that have their psychological functions through relational (or 
verbal) learning processes” (Wilson & Murrell, 2004; p.131).  
Therefore defusion involves expanding attention to thinking and experiencing as an ongoing 
behavioural process, rather than a causal, ontological result (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999). In 
RFT terms defusion methods reduce the transformation of stimulus functions by altering the cues 
and contexts that support fusion (Blackedge, 2007; Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 2012). This involves 
teaching mindfulness, undermining sense-making, and exploring the limits of the usefulness of 
evaluations, and using language conventions within therapy that highlight the process of thinking 
(described further in Chapter 3, on Acceptance & Commitment Therapy).  
 
2.4.2.2  Evidence for cognitive fusion as a process 
The early work that led to RFT was based on clarifying the effects of rule governance (Hayes, 1989 
for a review). Rule governed behaviour could be distinguished from that which was contingency 
shaped (Skinner, 1969), and a noticeable effect was the relative insensitivity to contingencies of 
reinforcement that followed the introduction of a verbal rule (Galizio, 1979; Hayes, Brownstein, 
Haas, Greenaway, 1986; Hayes, Brownstein, Zettle, Rosenfarb & Korn, 1986). RFT provides a 
means of better specifying the effects of verbal rules (Barnes-Holmes, Healy & Hayes, 2000; Hayes, 
Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001), particularly describing the properties of mutual and combinatorial 
entailment, and transformation of stimulus functions (see section on RFT above). Cognitive fusion, 
therefore, is a description of contexts where rule governance is influencing behaviour.  
There is an emerging literature supportive of the contention that cognitive fusion/defusion 
processes are important in understanding and influencing a number of clinical problems, such as 
chronic pain (Johnston et al., 2010; McCracken & Vowles, 2006; Wiksell et al., 2008), depression 
(Zettle & Hayes, 1986; Zettle & Rains, 1989), eating disorders (Hayes & Pankey, 2002), substance 




al., 2010) and tinnitus distress (Hesser, Westin, Hayes, & Andersson, 2009). Similarly these 
processes are implicated with unhelpful behaviours in healthy populations (e.g., Healy et al., 2008; 
Hinton & Gaynor, 2010; Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda, Feinstein, Wendell, & Sheehan, 2010; 
Takahashi, Muto, Tada & Sugiyama, 2002;).  
Studies of psychological treatments that aim to modify the effects of cognitive fusion have 
typically used believability as a proxy variable for cognitive fusion (Bach & Hayes, 2002; Zettle & 
Hayes, 1986;). This is usually measured by asking the participant to rate the extent to which one 
believes the content of a thought describes reality (e.g., Bach, Hayes & Gallop, 2011; Masuda et 
al., 2004;). For example, in the Bach & Hayes (2002) trial for psychosis participants were asked to 
rate “On a scale of zero to 100, to what degree do you believe that it is true [i.e. gang members 
are stalking you; the voices are telling you that you are a bad person]?”. A similar scale was also 
used as an outcome and a process measure in Gaudiano and Herbert’s (2006) clinical trial for 
psychosis, where it differentiated between groups and mediated change (Gaudiano, Herbert, & 
Hayes, 2010).  
It can be noted that the wording of the believability question is almost identical to ‘conviction’ 
items in measures such as the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales (Haddock et al. 1999) and Peters 
Delusions Inventory (Peters, Joseph & Garety, 1999). We have argued elsewhere (Farhall, Shawyer, 
Thomas & Morris, in press) that believability is, in essence, a similar variable to conviction, 
measured within a number of studies of cognitive therapy for psychosis (e.g., Chadwick & Lowe, 
1994; Garety et al., 2008). Rating believability/conviction of a thought that is, in fact, not literally 
true makes sense as an indicator of defusion, however, such a measure cannot pick up defusion 
from thoughts that are true such as “I’m going to die”.  
Measures of change processes in several treatment studies (depression and psychosis) have 
shown rapid reductions in believability of negative thoughts and unacceptability of negative 
feelings, even if these thoughts and feelings continue at some frequency (Bach & Hayes, 2002; 
Zettle & Hayes, 1986). Zettle and Hayes (1986) compared cognitive therapy (CT) and ACT in the 
treatment of depression, demonstrating there were differential change processes, even though 
there were equivalent outcomes. Process measurement suggested that ACT was associated with 




thought frequency and slower rates of believability reduction (Zettle & Hayes, 1986). It has been 
argued that these results are suggestive of metacognitive processes and targeting of experiential 
avoidance, as fits with the ACT model (Pankey & Hayes, 2003). A further study by Zettle and Rains 
(1989) comparing ACT, cognitive therapy without decentring, and full cognitive therapy for 
depression, found equivalent reductions in depression at 12 weeks and 2 month follow-up, 
however there were differences in process, with significant positive differences in levels of 
dysfunctional attitudes for both forms of cognitive therapy, compared to ACT. Zettle, Rains & 
Hayes (2011) further analysed the data from this study, finding that compared to CT, ACT was 
shown to produce greater reductions in levels of self-reported depression using an intent-to-treat 
analysis, with post-treatment levels of cognitive defusion mediating this effect at follow-up. In 
contrast the occurrence of depressogenic thoughts and level of dysfunctional attitudes did not 
function as mediators (Zettle, Rains & Hayes, 2011).  
Gaudiano & Herbert (2006) report on a mediational analysis which showed that within an ACT 
intervention reductions in the believability of auditory hallucinations were related to fewer 
rehospitalisations for a sample of patients with psychosis. Further mediational analyses on this 
sample (Guadiano, Herbert & Hayes, 2010) , and then combined with the Bach & Hayes (2002) 
sample, suggest that reduction of rehospitalisation at the 4-month follow-up, was mediated by 
symptom believability but not symptom-related distress (Bach, Gaudiano, Hayes & Herbert, 2012).  
Experimental studies of defusion have also shown that such techniques appear to reduce the 
believability of thoughts as well as distress (Healy, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Keogh, Luciano 
& Wilson, 2008; Masuda, Hayes, Sackett & Twohig , 2004; Masuda et al., 2009). For example, 
Masuda et al. (2004) demonstrated in a series of time-series designs and a group study that a 
defusion technique involving rapid verbal repetition rapidly reduces distress and believability of 
negative self-referential thoughts. 
Until recently there has not been a formal measure of cognitive fusion: Dempster, Gillanders, 
Bolderston & Bond (submitted) have developed the Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ), a 13-
item self-report questionnaire. An initial validation by Dempster and Gillanders (2009) suggests 
that CFQ is associated in the expected directions with beliefs about worry, mindful responding to 




measure for anxiety, the Believability of Anxious Feelings and Thoughts Questionnaire is also being 
developed (Herzberg, Sheppard, Forsyth, Credé, Earleywine & Eifert, 2012).  
 
2.5  Summary  
Psychological Flexibility is a general model of psychological functioning and intervention, based 
upon functional contextualism and a behavioural theory of language and cognition. There is 
increasing empirical support that at least two processes specified by the model, experiential 
avoidance and cognitive fusion, have an influential role in a number of psychological problems and 
social challenges. Further, there is evidence to suggest that these processes are implicated in the 




Chapter 3  
Acceptance & Commitment Therapy and mindfulness-based interventions 
 
This chapter will describe a clinical intervention based upon the Psychological Flexibility Model and 
the current research on its use with the problems of psychosis, including distress and disability 
related to hearing voices.  
In addition Mindfulness as a clinical intervention and construct will be discussed, and situated 
within a contextual behavioural framework. Outcomes and processes for ACT and Mindfulness 
interventions for psychosis will be outlined.  
3.1  Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
The intervention that is specified by the Psychological Flexibility Model is Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT), a contextual cognitive behavioural therapy that uses acceptance and 
mindfulness processes, and commitment and behaviour change processes, to produce greater 
psychological flexibility (Hayes, Strosahl, Bunting, Twohig & Wilson, 2004). The ultimate goal of 
ACT is to “bring verbal cognitive processes under better contextual control and have the client 
spend more time in contact with the positive consequences of his or her actions immediately in 
the present as part of a valued life path” (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 2012, p. 65).  
Compared to other cognitive behavioural therapies ACT emphasises changing the way people 
relate to their thinking and feeling, rather than directly trying to change the form or frequency of 
these experiences. This has been suggested to be a key feature of the “third wave” in the 
development of behaviour therapies (Hayes, 2004).  
3.1.1   “Third Wave”, contextual approaches to CBT  
In considering the history of behaviour therapy, Hayes (2004) put forward the contention that the 
development of CBT can be considered as having three waves of development, with each wave 




by the behaviour therapy of the 1950’s and 1960s, which focused on direct behaviour change (e.g., 
Wolpe & Lazarus,1966), and although successful in a number of domains, did not have adequate 
methods for addressing client problems that appeared influenced by cognition (such as reason-
giving, unhelpful rule-following). Influenced by the cognitive revolution in psychology (e.g., 
Chomsky, 1959), the second wave of CBT saw the introduction of methods directly focused on 
changing the form and frequency of cognition linked to clinical disorders (e.g, Beck, 1970; 
Meichenbaum & Cameron, 1974), while also incorporating the exposure- and skills-based 
techniques from traditional behaviour therapy. Hayes (2004) argues that these approaches to 
cognition also represented a move away from operant and classical conditioning accounts of 
human behaviour, to that of information processing. However it has been argued that while 
models of clinical disorders based on information processing were developed, these models were 
not based strongly upon basic accounts in cognitive psychology (Teasdale, 1993; Strauman & 
Merrill, 2004), but instead were clinical cognitive models (e.g., Beck, 1993;). This has raised some 
contention, with suggestions that possibly cognitive restructuring techniques based upon the 
rationales of these models may not be active components in CBT (e.g., Longmore and Worrell, 
2007; Jacobson et al., 1996).   
Hayes (2004) argues that mindfulness-based CBT approaches belong to a complimentary grouping 
of therapies, which have an emphasis on second-order change, that is, process- rather than 
content-focused change as a putative change process. Hayes (2004) described this grouping as a 
“third wave” of behaviour therapies as representing a shift in emphasis to the target of therapy 
being on the problematic processes of thinking, rather than the content (a contextual focus). Thus, 
with this categorising, any cognitive-behavioural approach that focuses upon process change can 
be considered a third-wave/ contextual CBT. Within this grouping therefore are approaches that at 
the level of philosophy and theory are dissimilar, with the  major differences between sets of 
approaches upon whether they are based upon a functional contextualist or mechanist 
philosophy, and, subsequently, whether they subscribe to a relational operant (described in the 
Relational Frame Theory section) or an information processing model of human behaviour.   
 





As described in section 2.3 above, ACT has emerged from the basic research on rule governance 
and relational frame theory: based on these findings it was hypothesised that many psychological 
problems are (at least in part) the result of following unhelpful rules to receive social approval 
(pliance), or inaccurate rules about how private experiences work (tracking). It was suggested that 
more effective behaviour could be developed through contingency-shaped procedures (i.e., 
learning from experience; Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999), however because psychological 
therapy can be largely a verbal enterprise, there were risks that unhelpful rule governance could 
be reinforced (e.g., doing exposure to please the therapist; strengthening the unhelpful link 
between the “right” types of thinking and personal goals) (Morris & Oliver, 2012). In addition 
verbal behaviour seemed to play a role in amplifying distress and dysfunction (see Sections 2.4.1 
and 2.4.2  above on cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance), with clients describing problems 
with private experiences, particularly in efforts to control and eliminate them, as well as engaging 
in reason-giving, so that it became a barrier to engaging in effective behavioural methods such as 
exposure (Hayes, 1989). These observations suggest that it is not the presence of particular 
cognitions that was dysfunctional, instead it was the function of these experiences.  
The prototype treatment that became ACT was called “Comprehensive Distancing” (Zettle & 
Hayes, 1986), which was designed to alter the functions of negative thoughts through elaborated 
and extended forms of cognitive distancing. “Cognitive distancing” was suggested by Hollon & 
Beck (1979, p.179) as the “first, critical step” in cognitive therapy to helping the client detect their 
thoughts and see them as hypotheses rather than facts (which then subsequently would be 
altered through cognitive restructuring). The difference was that in Comprehensive Distancing 
cognitive restructuring was not a component of treatment, rather clients were encouraged to 
engage in mindfulness and defusion exercises, as well as behaviour components such as goal-
setting. (The results of the Comprehensive Distancing studies by Zettle & Hayes (1986) and Zettle 
& Rains (1989) are described in Section 2.4.2.2 above). As the basic work that formed RFT 
proceeded (e.g., Hayes, 1984) Comprehensive Distancing was modified to include components on 
self as context and values (Zettle, 2005), and was renamed Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 





3.1.2  Treatment approach 
ACT is designed to help clients use psychological acceptance as a strategy in situations where 
internal or external sources of distress cannot be easily changed. In ACT the client is encouraged to 
accept unavoidable private events through developing mindfulness of the process of cognition, 
and learn to identify and focus on actions directed toward valued goals. The aim in ACT is to help 
clients become less entangled with their symptoms and more focused on effective behaviour 
(Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999), with the goals to treat emotional avoidance, excessive literal 
response to cognitive content, and inability to make and keep commitments to behaviour change 
(Hayes & Wilson, 1994). 
ACT does this through the use of acceptance strategies and encourages the client’s commitment 
to valued life directions and choices. The use of acceptance involves a disavowal of strategies 
aimed at controlling emotional experience, an allowance of feelings and their processing, and an 
end to experiential avoidance as a habitual mode of coping (Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 2002). 
Through this mindful action the individual is able to step back from distressing internal 
experiences, gain perspective and permit feelings to emerge that provide direction for action, thus 
breaking the maladaptive use of control.  
The ACT approach encourages the client to view internal experiences (such as thoughts, images 
and feelings) as “events in the mind” rather than literal content, and helps the client to develop a 
mindfulness regarding these experiences. The model for ACT argues the case for using this form of 
intervention when clients are struggling with internal events that are not amenable to control, and 
when persisting with the unhelpful change agenda leads to problems in everyday living. An aspect 
of this is to undermine literal sense-making where it is not useful, helping the client to notice 
contexts where “making sense” of experiences leads to paradoxical outcomes. Thus “making 
sense” may be function as an unhelpful form of control that serves to maintain difficulties. The 
ACT model facilitates a change in agenda from controlling internal events that may not be able to 
be avoided to focusing upon behaviour change that can lead to positive outcomes. 
ACT was developed to foster experiential learning, helping the client to contact the effects of their 




(Morris & Oliver, 2012). There is a concordance between the functional contextualist philosophy 
and ACT in practice in terms of an a-priori value or goal: the client is encouraged to consider the 
workability of their actions from the perspective of whether this helps them make progress in 
valued directions (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999, 2012). This results in ACT emphasising different 
outcomes than many mainstream psychological therapies, with a primary focus on quality of life, 
functioning and meaning, rather than symptom elimination (Ciarrochi & Bailey, 2008; Morris & 
Oliver, 2012).  
Case formulation in ACT is dimensional and functional (Bach & Moran, 2008). The formulation 
focuses on how particular behaviour repertoires are interfering with valued life goals, and how the 
client can develop a more psychologically flexible approach to what life offers. Functional analysis, 
rather than diagnosis, is used to understand the client’s problems, considering the functional 
relationships between the client’s behaviour and the environmental variables that support 
problems or influence clinical improvements (Bach & Moran, 2008). The formulation informs 
which skills are emphasised from the Psychological Flexibility Model (Figure 2.2 and Table 2.2): 
some clients will require the development of several skills, while for others it may be one or two 
areas. Due to the ACT processes being inter-related, progress in one domain will facilitate the 
strengthening of the others (e.g., values work may contact flexible attention to the present 
moment, acceptance and defusion, as the client takes actions that evoke previously-avoided 
feelings).  
 
3.1.3  Outcome Studies 
Following the publication of the Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson (1999) treatment manual there was 
skepticism regarding the empirical status of ACT (e.g., Corrigan, 2001), and criticism from cognitive 
therapy advocates regarding whether the model did work by differing processes compared to 
mainstream CBT (Hofmann, 2008; Hofmann & Asmundsson, 2008).  
At the time of writing there have been 62 randomised controlled trials of ACT, across a wide range 
of disorders and problems: for example, depression (Zettle & Hayes, 1986), work stress (Bond & 




Vowles & McCracken, 2008), borderline personality disorder (Gratz & Gunderson, 2006), 
treatment refractory epilepsy (Lundgren, Dahl, Melin & Kies, 2006),generalised anxiety disorder 
(Roemer, Orsillo & Salters-Pedneault, 2008), amongst other problems (the randomised controlled 
trials for psychosis will be discussed below, in Section 3.2.2).  
Several meta-analyses and systematic reviews have been conducted regarding ACT outcome 
studies (Hayes et al., 2006; Ost, 2008; Powers, Zum Vorde Sive Vording & Emmelkamp, 2009; Ruiz, 
2010).  
Hayes et al. (2006) reviewed the outcome studies published until 2005 comparing ACT to 
treatment as usual, placebo and waiting list, producing large weighted average effect sizes. Hayes 
et al (2006) reported that in studies that directly compared ACT to CBT preliminary between-
condition effect sizes appeared to favour ACT; this was based upon a modest combined sample, 
and with ACT studies that lacked methodological rigour, with the increased chance of effect sizes 
being inflated. Ost (2008) subsequently compared ACT studies with a matched set of CBT trials, 
criticising the methodological weaknesses of ACT trials, concluding that ACT was not an evidence-
based treatment. Gaudiano (2009) responded to these criticisms, arguing that matching ACT and 
CBT studies was a flawed comparison, as a substantial number of the ACT studies were not 
matched because there was not an equivalent CBT study, in addition these ACT studies were with 
more severe problems in hard to treat populations (e.g., chronic medical conditions, psychosis, 
borderline personality disorder, compared to the CBT studies: 2 trials for depression and 11 for 
anxiety). In addition Gaudiano (2009) demonstrated that there were significant differences in 
funding favouring CBT trials (so that these trials were more methodologically sound, due to having 
significantly more resources).  
Powers et al. (2009) produced a meta-analysis combining the ACT trials that had compared ACT 
with waiting lists, psychological placebos, treatment as usual, and established therapies. The 
authors concluded that ACT demonstrated efficacy over control conditions, and was superior to 
waiting lists, psychological placebos and treatment as usual. Compared to established treatments 
(cognitive therapy and interpersonal therapy), Powers et al (2009) found that ACT did not 
demonstrate any distinct advantage, however they suggested that this was not a weakness due to 




of outcome studies across clinical psychology, health interventions, and areas such as work and 
sport performance, and the reduction of stigma and prejudice. Ruiz (2010) concluded that ACT 
shows efficacy across disorders where experiential avoidance is present, in the context of 
cognitive fusion; that comparisons with CBT are in early days, with ACT showing promise as being 
equivalent to CBT in some disorders and in some cases potentially more efficacious; and that 
studies suggest that ACT does appear to work through the processes suggested by the 
Psychological Flexibility Model (reducing experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion).  
Based upon these reviews it can be asserted that ACT is showing increasing empirical support in 
treatment efficacy across a range of clinical disorders and problems. Studies show that ACT 
performs better than no-treatment and active controls, and indicate equivalent outcomes to 
established empirically-based treatments (usually cognitive therapy or CBT) for several disorders. 
However, the early ACT randomised controlled trials were less methodologically rigorous, possibly 
due to comparatively less funding; recent studies have been more rigorous (e.g., Arch, Eifert, 
Davies, Vilardaga, Plumb; Rose & Craske, 2012; Forman, Shaw, Goetter, Herbert, Park & Yuen, 
2012).  
 
3.1.4  ACT Mediation and process of change studies 
The Psychological Flexibility Model specifies the processes of change that are hypothesised to 
occur in ACT and other contextual behaviour therapies (see section 2.4). A number of ACT 
treatment studies have investigated the mediation of outcomes through changes in psychological 
flexibility (see Section 2.4.2.2 for a discussion of the mediation analyses by Zettle, Rains & Hayes, 
2010, and Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006).  
These mediation analyses have been conducted using the steps described by either Baron & Kenny 
(1986) or McKinnon et al. (2002). Hayes et al. (2006) and Hayes, Levin et al. (2012) report that 
analyses have suggested that changes in psychological flexibility mediate outcomes for ACT 
interventions (but not comparison interventions) in: workplace stress (Bond & Bunce, 2000), 
diabetes management (Gregg, 2004), smoking cessation (Gifford et al., 2004), counsellor burnout 




al., 2004), treatment-refractory epilepsy (Lundgren, Dahl, Melin & Kies, 2005; Lundgren et al., 
2008), outcomes from trainee therapists (Lappalainen et al., 2007), and distress in obesity (Lillis, 
Hayes, Bunting & Masuda, 2009). These mediational studies are variable in quality, with some of 
the studies demonstrating mediation using processes assessed before outcome differences are 
shown, while in other studies the mediators were assessed concurrently with outcome (Hayes et 
al., 2011).  
There are a number of ACT studies that have reported changes on processes variables consistent 
with the Psychological Flexibility Model: for example, McCracken, Vowles and Eccleston (2007) 
found that changes in acceptance of pain during treatment were associated with change in a 
number of outcome variables, including depression, pain-related anxiety, physical and 
psychosocial disability. Similarly process changes associated with outcome have been reported in 
ACT studies for trichotillomania (Woods et al., 2006), social phobia (Block & Wulfert, 2000), and 
OCD (Twohig, Hayes & Masuda, 2006).   
Based upon the criticisms of ACT being proposed to work by different processes of change than 
cognitive therapy (e.g., Hofmann & Asmundsson, 2008), Ruiz (2012) conducted a systematic 
review and meta-analysis of the 16 studies that have compared ACT versus CBT for outcomes and 
processes of change. Ruiz (2012) found that mean effect sizes for primary outcomes favoured ACT, 
specifically for depression and quality of life outcomes. In addition ACT showed a greater impact 
on its processes of change and no differences were found with CBT proposed processes; this was 
from nine studies that conducted formal mediation analyses. Ruiz (2012) concludes that, based on 
these comparisons, there is support for ACT working through the processes of change identified by 
the Psychological Flexibility Model, while CBT has not yet shown similar results for the processes 
of change suggested by the cognitive model.  
 
3.2  ACT for Psychosis 
 




In addition to the advantages described above for promoting Psychological Flexibility in terms of 
well-being, broadening narrow behavioural repertoires that are unhelpful (avoidance), and 
promoting quality of life and values-based living, there may be particular benefits related to the 
problems of psychosis.  
Relational Frame Theory suggests that there may be a risk of iatrogenic effects for interventions 
that focus on the modification of private events (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001). It may be 
possible that some therapeutic efforts to modify thoughts in psychosis may inadvertently maintain 
or accentuate unhelpful processes that are contributing to disability (Bach, 2004), through 
functionally encouraging thought suppression, excessive focus on cognition, and beliefs about the 
necessity of “fixing thinking” before effective action can be taken.  
 People with schizophrenia tend to talk more about disordered thinking, and make more 
references to their own cognitions compared to normal controls (Rosenberg & Tucker, 1979), 
which may be suggestive of greater cognitive fusion and excessive inward focus with psychotic 
symptoms. Morrison (2001) has suggested that selective attention and heightened self-focus in 
psychosis may increase the actual frequency or perceived frequency of intrusions into awareness, 
so that safety behaviours and attempts at control are implicated in the maintenance of distress. It 
has been found that hallucinators have stronger beliefs about the abnormality of intrusive or 
unwanted thoughts, greater desire for consistency in cognition, and less confidence in their 
cognitive processes (Lobban, Haddock, Kinderman & Wells, 2002). In addition (as discussed in 
Chapter 1) attempts at thought suppression can result in paradoxical rebound effects (Wegner, 
1994). Excessive focus on cognition appears to come at a price: Bargh & Chartrand (1999) discuss 
evidence that suggests that when a person tries to control private events in one domain of 
behaviour, it becomes more difficult to exert conscious control over simultaneously occurring 
behaviours.  
An ACT approach to psychosis aims to avoid these potential pitfalls by focusing on the functional 
relationship between cognition and overt behaviour (e.g., Péréz-Alvérez et al., 2008). This is based 
on a functional contextualist view that thoughts/beliefs do not cause behaviour, rather it is 
contextual features that link, for example, an appraisal to behaviour, such as support for the literal 




clients notice the process of appraisal while maintaining flexibility with regard to action. The target 
in this approach is altering the relationship of behaviour and positive symptoms, rather than trying 
to change symptom frequency, challenging the veracity of delusions, or altering the thinking errors 
or biases associated with the symptoms. ACT focuses on altering the believability and behavioural 
impact of problematic cognitions without directly challenging them or targeting their content for 
change (Bach & Hayes, 2002). What is important is the functional relationship between an 
appraisal and overt behaviour. The rationale for the ACT approach to psychosis is that real 
difference in patients’ lives and their level of functioning comes from behaviour rather than the 
presence of symptoms (Bach, 2004). Making changes in behaviour, however, frequently involves 
changes in psychological flexibility.  
ACT suggests willingness and defusion as the means that clients learn that acceptance of aversive 
private emotion or bodily state is a process rather than an outcome (Pankey & Hayes, 2003). ACT 
shifts the focus from modifying private experience to modifying the behavioural reaction to the 
private experience. Acceptance of private experience involves learning that literal truth or falsity 
of cognition need not be a target for change, rather it may be more effective to focus the efforts 
of change on goals and behaviours (Pankey & Hayes, 2003). Thus there is a focus on the 
workability of the individual’s behaviour, with greater flexibility and expansion of response being 
more important than the nature of the new response functions (Hayes & Pankey, 2003).  For 
example, a person who typically responds to hearing voices by social isolation and arguing with 
the voices may through acceptance work develop a broader repertoire of behavioural responses 
to voice hearing. These might include activities such as going out of the house, having a 
conversation with another person, deliberately appreciating the acoustic properties of the voices, 
or engaging in a valued activity as well as the responses that were developed to control the voices. 
The clinical focus would be to add new functions to the experience of hearing voices so that there 
is a chance for alternative contingencies to operate, rather than just the previously dominant 
aversive and avoidant functions (I.e., transformation of stimulus functions: see section 2.3). 
 




There is emerging evidence to suggest that the contextual approach to psychosis using acceptance 
and mindfulness may help to reduce the impact of psychotic symptoms, particularly in terms of 
believability and disruption to functioning.  
There have been a small number of studies investigating the efficacy of ACT in the treatment of 
psychosis showing promising results (Bach & Hayes, 2002; Guidiano & Herbert, 2006; White, 
Gumley McTaggart, Rattrie, McConville, Cleare & Mitchell, 2011). Protocols have been developed 
for the use of ACT with psychosis, in brief (<6 sessions in RCTs: Bach & Hayes, 2002; Gaudiano & 
Herbert, 2006) and longer forms (10 sessions: White et al., 2011). There have also been studies 
published that have used ACT components, within a broader CBTp framework (Hepworth, Startup 
and Freeman, 2011; Shawyer et al.,  2011;). There have a number of case studies published using 
ACT with various problems in psychosis (e.g., Bach, Gaudiano, Pankey, Herbert & Hayes, 2006; 
Bloy, Morris & Oliver, 2011; Garcia & Perez, 2001; Pankey & Hayes, 2003; Thomas, Morris, 
Shawyer & Farhall, in press; Valmaggia & Morris, 2010; Veiga-Martinez, Perez-Alvarez and Garcia-
Montes, 2008; ).  
Bach and Hayes (2002), in a study with participants who have been hospitalized with psychosis, 
found that ACT had short-term benefits in reducing subsequent re-hospitalization within a follow-
up period of 4 months. The participants in this study were recruited from an inpatient unit and 
following an individual four-session intervention, participants that were in the ACT condition were 
half as likely to be hospitalized compared to treatment as usual (TAU) control participants at four 
month follow-up. There was an outcome difference between participants primarily reporting 
delusions and those primarily reporting hallucinations, with the intervention having little impact 
on the re-hospitalization rate of participants with delusions and a large treatment effect for 
auditory hallucinations. For those reporting symptoms at the follow-up period, ACT participants 
showed greater reductions in the believability of symptom content. Bach, Hayes and Gallop (2012) 
reported on an extension of the follow-up for this trial to 1 year by consulting health records in the 
hospital system of Nevada. It was found that those in the ACT condition showed a significant 
reduction in re-hospitalisation at 1 year; survival analyses demonstrated effects favouring ACT at 1 




Gaudiano & Herbert (2006) conducted randomised controlled trial to replicate and extend the 
previous findings by Bach and Hayes (2002). The participants were inpatients with psychotic 
symptoms who were randomly assigned to enhanced TAU or enhanced TAU plus individual 
sessions of ACT (mean number of sessions = 3). The results showed greater improvements in the 
ACT group at post-treatment on affective symptoms and global improvement, and self-rated 
distress associated with hallucinations and impairment in social functioning. Large effect size 
improvements were demonstrated in both groups pre- to post-treatment, with medium effect size 
differences between groups favouring the ACT condition. In addition, significantly more 
participants in the ACT condition reached clinically significant improvements in overall symptoms 
at post-treatment. At 4-month follow-up, 45% of participants in the ETAU only group had been re-
hospitalised compared to 28% of those in the ACT group.  
White, Gumley et al. (2011) conducted a blind-rated feasibility trial of ACT for emotional 
dysfunction following an episode of psychosis. The participants in this study were people 
recovering from a recent episode of psychosis and experiencing depression and/or anxiety. A 10 
session ACT intervention plus TAU (community psychiatric care), was compared with TAU alone. 
White et al (2011) found that those receiving ACT showed a significant reduction in negative 
symptoms and a greater increase in mindfulness skills; those in the ACT condition also has 
significantly fewer crisis contacts over the course of the study (although potentially due to 
increased therapeutic contact). Changes in mindfulness skills were associated with changes in 
depressive symptoms. Significant differences between conditions were not found on measures of 
positive symptoms, anxiety or depression, similarly there were no significant changes on a 
measure of psychological flexibility. However post-hoc analyses of caseness showed that a 
significantly greater proportion of those in the ACT condition changed from being depressed on 
entry to the study (established by a cut-off score) to not being depressed at 3 month follow up. 
This study established that ACT is an acceptable treatment for participants, and may have 
potential as a therapy for depression in the context of psychosis. 
 




Several studies have used ACT components as part of a broader cognitive behavioural 
intervention.  
Hepworth, Startup and Freeman (2011) describe the pilot evaluation of a brief intervention, 
Emotional Processing and Metacognitive Awareness (EPMA), that was trialled on 12 patients with 
persisting persecutory delusions. The EPMA protocol was designed to facilitate emotional 
disclosure for the purpose of reducing delusional distress; the three session protocol contained 
ACT components of cognitive defusion and acceptance (e.g., Masuda et al., 2004; Hayes & Smith, 
2005). It was found that EPMA reduced delusional distress with improvements maintained at 
follow-up; the authors reported that these results are likely to be an inflation of the effect of the 
intervention, due to the lack of a control group and blind ratings.   
Shawyer et al. (2012) investigated the use of an “acceptance-enhanced” CBT (A-CBT) intervention 
for command hallucinations, comparing this with befriending in a randomised controlled trial. The 
CBT intervention had acceptance and defusion components from the Bach & Hayes (2002) ACT 
protocol. The study found no significant differences in the blind-rated outcome measures between 
the A-CBT and befriending groups (the interventions both showed improvements compared to 
waiting list), although the A-CBT participants reported subjectively greater improvement in 
command hallucinations. Shawyer et al. (2012) report within-group analyses and comparisons of 
combining the treatments compared to waiting list: these results suggested that both treatments 
produced improvements in confidence in coping with command hallucinations and reductions in 
life disruption from auditory hallucinations as well as the omnipotence of the voices, compared to 
waiting list. Shawyer et al report that there were differences between A-CBT and befriending in 
the pattern of treatment effects: A-CBT was associated with changes in illness severity, global 
functioning and quality of life, as well as process measures of acceptance of auditory 
hallucinations; befriending was associated with trend improvements across outcome variables, 
significant improvements in acceptance of command hallucinations and reductions in distress 
(only in this condition and at the study endpoint). While Shawyer et al (2012) report that the trial 
quality was objectively high one of the limitations was that, despite a wide recruitment strategy, 
they were not able to recruit the full number of participants with command hallucinations to have 




3.2.4  Mediation in ACT for Psychosis Outcome Studies 
There have been several mediation analyses conducted on randomised controlled trials of ACT for 
psychosis, using the data from Gaudiano and Herbert (2006a) alone, and also combined with Bach 
and Hayes (2002).  
Two mediation analyses have been conducted on the data from the Gaudiano and Herbert (2006a) 
trial. The first of these (Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006b) explored the general relationship between 
hallucination frequency, believability (a proxy for cognitive fusion, see the earlier discussion in 
Section 2.4.2 on this variable), and symptom distress, using the recommendations by Baron and 
Kenny (1986) to establish mediation. Gaudiano and Herbert (2006b) demonstrated that in this 
sample believability in hallucinations mediated the relationship between symptom frequency and 
distress. The authors then argue that because improvement in the believability of hallucinations 
over time was only observed in the ACT condition, that this may be supportive of the hypothesised 
processes of change for ACT. However Gaudiano and Herbert (2006b) also report that they were 
not able to establish mediation analyses by treatment group, due to low power; in addition 
conclusions regarding mediation are limited due to lack of clarity around the temporality of the 
variables, due to the Gaudiano and Herbert (2006a) assessment procedures.  
A subsequent mediation analysis of treatment effects was reported by Gaudiano, Herbert & Hayes 
(2010). This analysis was conducted using the non-parametric bootstrapping procedure described 
by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008), which has several advantageous over the Baron and Kenny 
(1986) approach and does not require distributional assumptions, making it more appropriate for 
smaller samples.  Gaudiano, Herbert & Hayes (2010) report that these analyses demonstrated that 
believability of hallucinations at post-treatment mediated the effect of treatment condition on 
hallucination distress. This hallucination believability appears to explain the effect of ACT on 
hallucination distress, relative to those participants who received treatment as usual. Again, 
conclusions regarding mediation in this study are limited due to the temporality issues described 
above.         
Finally Bach, Gaudiano, Hayes and Herbert (2012) describe an analysis based upon the combined 




Hayes, 2002 and Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006a). Samples were combined to provide greater 
statistical power. Bach et al (2012) investigated post-treatment scores of psychotic symptom 
believability, distress and frequency as mediators of rehospitalisation, while controlling for 
baseline scores of these measures. It was found that believability mediated differences in 
rehospitalisation between the ACT and treatment as usual conditions for this combined sample. 
The same analyses for symptom distress or frequency as mediators of rehospitalisation were not 
significant. Further analyses were conducted to check whether differences in the temporality of 
variables taken from the two studies may have influenced the results: this did not appear 
significant. Bach et al (2012) conclude that these results strengthens the conclusions from the 
Gaudiano, Herbert and Hayes (2010) study regarding a process of change in ACT for psychosis 
being the promotion of cognitive defusion.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
3.2.5  Summary 
The small number of studies exploring the efficacy of ACT for psychosis suggests that this approach 
may have potential in ameliorating the impact of hallucinations, negative symptoms and 
depression, through promoting mindfulness (White, Gumley et al., 2011) and reducing 
believability (e.g., Bach et al., 2012). These changes are consistent with the processes described by 
the Psychological Flexibility Model. Of note is that ACT studies have demonstrated mediation 
consistent with theorised processes of change, while CBT for psychosis studies have not been able 
to (yet) demonstrate mediation (e.g., Garety et al., 2008; Granholm, Ben-Zeev & Link, 2009). There 
is mixed evidence to suggest that the incorporation of ACT components such as defusion and 
active acceptance within broader CBT packages is efficacious (e.g., Hepworth, Startup and 
Freeman, 2011; Shawyer et al., 2012;).  
 
3.3  Mindfulness 
“Wherever you go, there you are” –J. Kabat-Zinn, 1994 
 
Mindfulness describes a method of paying attention that, as a practise, is thousands of years old in 




traditions such as Buddhism (Kabat-Zinn, 1982; Linehan, 1993) and has been gaining increasing 
interest in the West. Mindfulness is generally described as “paying attention in a particular way: 
on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p. 4), where a 
person intentionally focuses their attention on the experience of the present moment in a non-
judgemental and accepting way. This state of mind can be contrasted with behaving automatically 
and when attention is focused elsewhere, on private experiences such as memories, worries, plans 
or fantasies (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Segal, Teasdale and Williams (2002, 2004) describe 
mindfulness as a “being” mode of mind, which can be usefully contrasted with the “doing” mode, 
which dominates cognitive processes and may play a role in supporting unhelpful rumination and 
worry. Kabat-Zinn (2003) describes mindfulness as also including compassion and curiosity toward 
experiences that are observed in the present moment (regardless of how pleasant they are).  
Bishop et al. (2004) provide the following consensus definition of mindfulness: “… a process of 
regulating attention in order to bring a quality of non-elaborative awareness to current experience 
and a quality of relating to one’s experience within an orientation of curiosity, experiential 
openness, and acceptance... [it is] a process of gaining insight into the nature of one’s mind and 
the adoption of a de-centered perspective… on thoughts and feelings so that they can be 
experienced in terms of their subjectivity (versus their necessary validity) and transient nature 
(versus their permanence)”. (p. 234) 
Mindfulness has been the focus of scientific investigation as psychological therapy approach over 
the past 30 years, and recently with increasing interest. Mindfulness-based therapy approaches 
aim to increase a focused, purposeful awareness of the present moment and relating to one’s 
experiences in an open, nonjudgemental, and accepting manner (Baer et al., 2006; Kabat-Zinn, 
1994;). The pre-eminent therapy approach was Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR: 
Kabat-Zinn, 1982, 1990), which is based on an intensive training in mindfulness meditation, and 
developed in a behavioural medicine setting for people with chronic pain and stress-related 
conditions.  Within the cognitive-behavioural tradition mindfulness has been a component of a 
number of therapy approaches, first introduced by functional analytic behaviour therapies such as 
with Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) for women with borderline personality disorder (Linehan, 
1993) and Behavioural Activation for depression (Martell, Addis & Jacobson, 2001). Similarly 




treatment for depression and anxiety (Hayes & Zettle, 1986; Zettle, 2005). In cognitive therapies 
mindfulness as practiced within MBSR was incorporated as a component of Mindfulness-Based 
Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) by Segal, Williams and Teasdale (2002), as a means of helping people 
who experienced recurring major depression prevent further relapses.  
Typically mindfulness is practiced using the following steps (Baer & Krietemeyer, 2006): 1) the 
participant is encouraged to focus their attention on an activity (such as breathing, walking or 
examining an object like a raisin) and to observe it carefully; 2) the participant is directed to notice 
when their attention wanders from the focus to private experiences; and when this happens, 3) to 
observe briefly that their mind has wandered; and 4) to return to attention to the focus of the 
exercise. Participants are encouraged to observe their experiences of bodily sensations, emotions 
and urges, to notice what it feels like to have these experiences, including where in the body they 
are felt, and whether these experiences are changing over time. Mindfulness may include some 
covert labelling of experiences, such as the participant using short words or phrases (e.g., “a 
thought”, “irritation”, “urge to move”), in order to encourage an observing perspective in the 
present moment (Baer & Kreitmeyer, 2006). The aim of mindfulness exercises is not to achieve a 
state such as relaxation, but rather to notice the process of thinking and feeling, and practice a 
stance of non-judgement and acceptance to the changing stream of stimuli that is experienced. 
There are varied practices across therapies about how much of a focus there is upon formal 
meditation: in MBSR and MBCT formal meditation practice is a central activity, while in the 
functional analytic approaches of DBT, ACT and Behavioural Activation mindfulness meditation is 
encouraged, but other practices are also considered to be building the skills associated with 
mindfulness and may be focused upon more (e.g., ACT defusion exercises, use of compassionate 
imagery and perspective taking, brief “noticing” exercises).   
3.3.1  How mindfulness is conceptualised: cognitive and contextual accounts 
One of the challenges of research into mindfulness is that although there are agreements about 
how mindfulness can be used as a technique, there is not an agreed-upon definition of 
mindfulness in the psychology literature (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 2012). Hayes and Wilson 




Linehan, 2003; Kabat-Zinn, 1994) outline a psychological process, an outcome, or a collection of 
techniques. This is also in part the result of a folk psychology concept being incorporated into 
interventions without adequate specification of the processes the technique is hypothesised to 
influence: specification of processes also points to the assumptions of science that a treatment is 
developed within. Hayes, Strosahl and Wilson (2012) argue that a progression in understanding 
mindfulness may be helped by researchers outlining their starting assumptions - this may clarify 
the difference in paradigms (e.g., mindfulness interventions based upon Buddhist, functional 
contextualist and cognitive accounts).  
This can be illustrated by the rationales, based on differing starting assumptions, between 
cognitive and contextualist paradigms for understanding and using mindfulness.   
For example, as part of the rationale for MBCT, the practice of mindfulness is seen as an 
alternative cognitive mode (Teasdale, 1999), where the focus of processing is at a level of 
representation that is not conceptual, so that specific discrepancies are not the prime target of 
processing (Segal, Teasdale & Williams, 2004). This feature of mindfulness makes it incompatible 
with the kind of cognitive processing that has been shown to engender relapses in depression. 
Other cognitive researchers have described mindfulness as a way shifting attention to reduce the 
influence of maladaptive beliefs on on-line processing (e.g., Wells, 2002). Mindfulness therefore 
promotes the type of cognitive distancing described by Hollon & Beck (1979): the difference 
between a traditional cognitive therapy account and current theorising is that several authors 
have suggested that distancing may be a central process that enables cognitive therapy to achieve 
its effects (Ingram & Hollon, 1986; Teasdale, Segal & Williams, 1995), rather than a component 
that is necessary but not sufficient before more active intervention occurs by engaging in cognitive 
restructuring. Again, this cognitive account considers constructs such as cognitive processing and 
attention as mental mechanisms capable of being understood independently of the contexts in 
which they occur: this has implications for how mindfulness is conceptualised and what 
techniques are considered to be “mindfulness”.    
The rationale for mindfulness within ACT focuses instead on how it may promote flexible 
repertoires of behaviour based upon chosen personal values. Fletcher and Hayes (2005) define 




attention to the present moment, acceptance, defusion, and self as context. This definition is 
couched within the functional contextual perspective of “a whole organism acting in context, 
historically and situationally”.  Fletcher and Hayes (2005) argue that this conceptualisation of 
mindfulness is advantageous because (1) it links more tightly core processes of literal language 
and cognition (as outlined by a Relational Frame Theory account); (2) other definitions do not 
specify each of the four processes, in particular, in most definitions processes for promoting a 
transcendent sense of self (Hayes, 1984) are rarely specified/ implicit; and (3) the functional 
definition of mindfulness in ACT means that there is no linkage with particular methods or 
techniques, so that any method that changes these processes is considered relevant (Hayes & 
Shenk, 2004). This is in contrast with other definitions which are written in more general or folk 
psychology language and may implicitly suggest that what mindfulness achieves is singularly 
fostered by meditation (e.g., MBSR).  
 
3.3.2  Measurement of mindfulness – trait and state 
Mindfulness has typically been measured using self-report scales, as a trait or disposition (e.g., 
Baer, Smith & Allan, 2004), and as a state (e.g., the Toronto Mindfulness Scale, Lau et al., 2006). 
Other measurement approaches have explored correlates of mindfulness using 
neuropsychological (e.g., Holzel et al., 2007) and cognitive measures (Sauer et al., 2012), as well as 
qualitative interview methods (Griffiths et al., 2009; Abba, Chadwick & Stevenson, 2008).   
The standard approach of self-report has attracted criticism: Grossman (2008) contends that 
approaches to measuring mindfulness lack a common conceptualisation of the construct, and that 
this is due in part to researchers being unfamiliar with the theoretical concept of mindfulness as 
described in Buddhist psychology. Several authors have described that mindfulness is a subtle and 
somewhat elusive construct and that defining it in concrete terms is difficult (Block-Lerner, Salters-
Pedneault, & Tull, 2005; Brown & Ryan, 2004). Related to this, Grossman (2008) argues that self-
report of mindfulness may be biased due to idiosyncratic and naive understandings of 
mindfulness: that the novice and experienced meditator may rate their ability to be mindful at 
similar levels, despite there being an actual difference between them. Sauer, Walach, Schmidt et 




an example of the measurement problem of response shift (e.g., Oort et al., 2009), due to 
changing internal reference standards for participants.  
Despite the contention that mindfulness should be considered a unitary construct (Brown & Ryan, 
2003), there is an emerging consensus from studies measuring mindfulness by self-report that it is 
a multidimensional construct (Baer et al., 2004; Brown & Ryan, 2004; Brown et al., 2007; Chadwick 
et al., 2008). Consistent with the definition of mindfulness put forward by Bishop et al. (2004), 
mindfulness appears to consist of two distinct factors: 1) an attentional focus to the present 
moment, and 2) acceptance, ie a genuine, non-judgemental, open and accepting attitude to what 
is happening in the present moment.  In addition to the psychometric findings supporting a two-
factor conceptualisation (eg., Kohls et al., 2009), there is some experimental evidence for the 
validity of this concept of mindfulness (Sauer et al. 2011). 
The two most frequently cited mindfulness measures are the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness 
Skills (Baer, Smith and Allen, 2004) and the Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale (Brown & 
Ryan, 2003). These will be described below, as well as other major instruments that have been 
developed using a multidimensional conceptualisation of mindfulness.  
Baer, Smith and Allen (2004) described the development of the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness 
Skills (KIMS), which aims to measure the mindfulness skills taught in MBSR, MCT, DBT and ACT.  
The four subscales of the KIMS are described as: Observe (attending to a variety of stimuli, both 
internal, such as bodily sensations, cognitions and emotions, as well as external, sounds and 
smells), Describe (describing or labelling phenomena by covertly applying words), Acting with 
Awareness (engaging fully in current activity with undivided attention), and Acceptance without 
Judgement (accepting or being non-judgemental about present moment experience). Baer, Smith 
and Allen (2004) report that in validating the KIMS with student samples the inventory was found 
to have high internal consistency and good test-retest reliability, construct and discriminant 
validity, with a clear four factor structure, fitting with the four aspects of mindfulness the scale 
was based upon; this factor structure has also been found in other studies including with clinical 




A study to validate the KIMS with clinical samples (Baum et al. 2010) found that internal 
consistency, reliability and correlation analyses were similar to student samples previous reported 
(Baer, Smith and Allen, 2004; Baer et al., 2006), and that the four mindfulness scales were 
sensitive to change for people who had participated in MBCT.  In a further development Baer, 
Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer and Toney (2006) report on the validation of the Five Factors 
Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ), a measure that attempts to unify various published 
mindfulness questionnaires into one tool. The FFMQ incorporates the 4 subscales of the KIMS and 
includes one additional factor (nonreactivity to inner experience; Baer et al., 2006). In studies of 
the FFMQ the Accept without Judgement subscale has been negatively associated with 
psychological symptoms, neuroticism, thought suppression, difficulties in emotion regulation, and 
experiential avoidance (Baer et al., 2006); all five FFMQ mindfulness scales have been found to be 
sensitive to change for people with chronic physical health problems who engaged in a 
mindfulness-based intervention (Carmody & Baer, 2008).  
The Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) is the other most 
frequently cited mindfulness measure. Brown and Ryan (2003) report that it is a unitary measure 
of mindfulness, consisting only of the present moment attention aspect, seen as the primary 
component of mindfulness that subsequently builds acceptance, non-judgement and compassion. 
The MAAS has been reported to have a single factor structure (Brown & Ryan, 2003; MacKillop & 
Anderson, 2007). Strictly speaking, the MAAS does not measure mindfulness; instead it measures 
“mindlessness”, and makes the assumption that mindfulness can be measured by using an inverse 
concept (Brown & Ryan, 2003). This feature of the MAAS has been found be a substantial 
challenge to the construct validity to the scale (Van Dam, Earleywine & Borders, 2010).  
Other multidimensional measures of mindfulness typically have a two factor approach, such as the 
Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (Cardaciotto et al. 2008b), the Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory 
(which measures a Buddhist conception of mindfulness: Bucheld et al., 2001; Kohls et al., 2009), or 
multiple factors with a second-order mindfulness factor such as the Cognitive and Affective 
Mindfulness Scale-Revised (Feldman, Hayes, Kumar, Greeson & Laurenceau, 2007) and the Five 




In contrast to the scales mentioned above, the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS; Lau, Bishop, 
Segal, Buis, Anderson, Carlson, Shapiro et al. 2006) measures mindfulness as a state. Lau et al 
(2006) describe the Scale as a retrospective assessment of the subjective experience of being in a 
mindfulness state due to meditation techniques. The validation study of TMS demonstrated that 
the measure had two factors, Curiosity and Decentring, and that TMS scores improved when 
people had increasing meditation experience; the Decentring scale predicted improvements in 
clinical outcome after 8 weeks of mindfulness for people who had not engaged in meditation 
before. However TMS scores do not discriminate between people who have 8 weeks of meditation 
experience and those with 2 or more years’ experience (Thompson & Waltz, 2007), suggesting that 
the scale may lack sensitivity. In addition the relationship between mindfulness as an everyday 
activity (a trait) and mindfulness as a state as measured by the TMS has not been established 
(Thompson & Waltz, 2007). There has been subsequent work to develop a trait version of the scale 
(Davis, Lau & Cairns, 2009).  
 For the problems related to psychosis, aside from the use of the measures described above 
(particularly the use of the KIMS: e.g. used in the White et al., 2011 ACT study) there has been the 
development of a measure specific to the experiences of psychosis, the Southampton Mindfulness 
Questionnaire (SMQ; Chadwick, Hember, Symes, Peters, Kuipers & Dagnan, 2008). The SMQ is a 
unidimensional measure of mindfulness, but includes items that suggest present moment 
awareness and accepting attitudes toward all experience. The SMQ has shown acceptable internal 
consistency, concurrent validity in showing significant associations with the MAAS, negative affect 
and severity of psychotic symptoms, in predicted directions (Chadwick et al., 2008). The SMQ has 
demonstrated positive change following participation in mindfulness groups for voices and 
paranoia (Chadwick, Hughes, Russell, Russell & Dagnan, 2009). Chadwick, Barnbrook & Newman-
Taylor (2007) report on a version of the SMQ for voices (the SMVQ), which has shown good 
internal consistency, associated positively with the MAAS, and had negative correlations with 
negative affect, distress associated with voices, beliefs about voices omnipotence and 
malevolence, and resistance to voices.    
For the purposes of the studies conducted as part of this thesis, it was decided to use the KIMS as 




consistent with contextual approaches such as DBT and ACT (Baer, smith & Allen, 2006), rather 
than measure mindfulness according to Buddhist ideas (e.g., like the Freiberg Mindfulness 
Inventory, Kohls et al., 2009), which were not considered to be relevant to the Psychological 
Flexibility Model (e.g., Hayes & Shenk, 2004). At the time of this decision (July 2006) the 
Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire variants were still in development, and it was unclear 
whether the factor structure would be consistent with the emerging consensus around two 
factors, or whether it would conceptually fit with a contextual paradigm.    
 
3.3.3  Evidence for mindfulness as an empirically supported process 
Mindfulness, as described above, has become a popular intervention to research. There are 
numerous reviews suggesting that there are benefits for mindfulness and mindfulness-based 
therapies in reducing stress, depression and anxiety (e.g., Baer, 2003; Burke, 2010; Carmody & 
Baer, 2009; Fjorback, Arendt, Ørnbøl, Fink & Walach, 2011; Keng, Smoski & Robins, 2011; Irving, 
Dobkin & Park, 2009; Mackenzie, Carlson, & Speca, 2005; Matchim & Armer, 2007; Praissman, 
2008;  Winbush, Gross, & Kreitzer, 2007 ).  
Published meta-analyses have more systematically investigated the effects of mindfulness in a 
number of clinical disorders and problems. Mindfulness-based therapies have been associated 
with substantial reductions in anxiety and depression in mental health (Chiesa & Seretti, 2011; 
Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt & Oh, 2010; Klainin-Yobas, Cho & Creedy, 2012; McCarney, Schulz & Grey, 
2012; Vollestad, Nielsen and Nielsen, 2011;) and in oncology settings (Ledesma & Kumano, 2008; 
Piet, Wurtzen and Zachariae, 2012); the prevention of relapse of major depression, at least for 
those who have had three or more relapses (Piet and Hougaard, 2011); better management of 
chronic pain (Baer, 2003; Veehof, Oskam, Schreurs & Bohlmeijer, 2011);  reductions of ruminative 
thinking and stress for healthy people (Baer, 2003; Chiesa & Seretti, 2009);  and reductions of 
distress in physical health conditions (Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004).  
In reviewing this literature a common challenge that is reported is in finding the specific effects for 
mindfulness in therapy packages that contain other evidence-based components (e.g., Chiesa & 




issue: some meta-analyses include MBSR, MBCT, DBT and ACT, while others have limited reviews 
to MBSR/MBCT arguing that mindfulness is not a central intervention in the behaviour analytic 
therapy approaches of ACT and DBT (e.g., Burke, 2010; Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt & Oh, 2010). 
Another challenge in establishing robust effect sizes for mindfulness is that in some clinical areas 
there are a small number of studies (Burke, 2010; Dunford & Thompson, 2010); similarly there is 
substantial variance in the effect sizes between studies, and considerable variance in 
methodological rigor. Finally, there are a variety of outcomes measured in mindfulness treatment 
studies, ranging from established measures commonly used in outcome studies, to more theory-
driven measures that have unclear construct validity and reliability. In part, this reflects 
differences in paradigms as discussed above: for contextual studies mindfulness outcomes are 
about promoting broader, flexible behavioural repertoires, while cognitive approaches focus on 
distress and symptom reduction as the prime outcomes (e.g., Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt & Oh, 2010).  
 
3.4  Mindfulness-based approaches with psychosis 
In addition to Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, several other mindfulness-based approaches 
for psychosis have been described in the empirical and clinical literatures.  
The rationale for using mindfulness as a clinical intervention for psychosis is similar as for other 
problems and disorders: in developing present moment awareness and practicing non-judgement 
toward experiences through mindfulness, it may be possible to enhance coping and reduce stress 
(Davis & Kurzban, 2012). Additionally it may be possible for a person with positive psychotic 
symptoms to reduce the impact of their symptoms by having a changed relationship to them 
through cultivating active acceptance and non-judgement (Péréz-Alvérez et al., 2008). It can be 
seen that these are similar targets of change as with cognitive behavioural approaches to auditory 
hallucinations (e.g., Farhall et al., 2009; Trower et al., 2004), although altering the relationship may 
involve greater use of cognitive restructuring and behavioural experiments in CBT.    
Mindfulness-based approaches for psychosis can be divided between those that teach mindfulness 
as a general technique (e.g., Jacobsen, Morris, Johns & Hodkinson, 2011; Johnson, Penn, 




mindfulness as a component of a formal therapy model (e.g, Chadwick, 2006). There is also a mix 
of training formats for mindfulness, with studies of people with psychosis being engaged in 
individual mindfulness sessions with a therapist, or mindfulness delivered within a group context.   
 
3.4.1  Mindfulness as a general technique 
The potential of teaching mindfulness as a technique to help people with psychosis manage affect 
has been explored in several small-scale, uncontrolled studies with mixed results. These studies 
have made the target of intervention to be reductions in, or better management of anxiety (York, 
2007) or aggression (Singh et al., 2007), with significant improvements reported. However Miller 
(unpublished thesis, 2011) describes providing individualised mindfulness training to 10 people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, and post-intervention there were improvements in levels of general 
distress, but not for distress related to positive symptoms, anhedonia symptoms, and quality of 
life. Miller (2011) reports analyses suggesting no association between improvements in 
mindfulness and outcomes.  
 
3.4.2  Person-based Cognitive Therapy  
Chadwick (2006) described his development of Person-based Cognitive Therapy (PBCT), a therapy 
approach to help people distressed by psychosis, that emphasises mindfulness and the 
development of metacognitive awareness to reduce experiential avoidance and entanglement 
with psychotic experiences. PBCT uses as a case formulation model Vygotsky’s (1978) zones of 
proximal development to formulate clients’ distress, but also their strengths and positive 
characteristics. This model consists of four individual zones: symptomatic meaning, relationship 
with experience, schemata and symbolic self, and is defined as “a social process, whereby with the 
support of a radically collaborative and skilled therapist, a client eases distress, develops 
metacognitive insight and achieves self-acceptance through proximal development in all four 




PBCT is based upon a clinical cognitive model of psychosis (Chadwick, Birchwood & Trower, 1996; 
Chadwick, 2006) and the process of change is about promoting metacognitive awareness (e.g., 
Teasdale, 1999; Wells, 2000). By fostering the ability to decentre from thinking, acceptance of 
unpleasant (psychotic) sensations and self-acceptance may occur, reducing the impact of 
symptoms. In PBCT acceptance is a process of continually bringing mindful awareness to difficult 
experience, allowing an opening of awareness to all aspects of the self; this directly builds self-
acceptance, because accepting psychosis means that it no longer defines the entirety of the 
individual (Ellett, in press).   
PBCT has demonstrated mixed findings as an intervention for the problems of psychosis: In an 
uncontrolled study, there were shown to be significant improvements in well-being following a 
PBCT mindfulness group intervention (Chadwick, et al., 2005). A randomised controlled trial 
feasibility study of PBCT group-based mindfulness did not show significant differences between 
the intervention and control group; secondary analyses showed improvements in clinical 
functioning along with associated changes in mindfulness of thoughts and images favouring the 
mindfulness group (Chadwick, Hughes, Russell, Russell & Dagnan, 2009). More recently Dannahy 
et al. (2011) described an uncontrolled evaluation of 9 PBCT groups where 62 participants 
experienced 8-12 sessions of mindfulness. The authors report that post-groups there were 
significant improvements in well-being, distress, control and dependence upon voices.  
There is evidence to suggest that PBCT may work by the processes of change outlined in the 
model. Abba, Chadwick and Stevenson (2008) report on a grounded theory analysis of the 
processes associated with mindfulness groups: they found that for the participants there was a 
central core process of learning to relate differently to distressing psychosis. This altered 
relationship appeared to be through decentering in awareness of voices, thoughts, images in the 
moment; allowing voices, thoughts, images to come and go without reacting/struggle; and 
reclaiming power through acceptance of psychosis and self (Abba, Chadwick & Stevenson, 2008).   
Single case design studies have been conducted on PBCT to explore changes in process linked with 
outcome. Reduced believability and distress associated with voices was observed in two single 
cases following introduction of mindfulness intervention; in addition significant positive changes in 




Lievesley (unpublished dissertation, 2008) did not find any discernable improvements or 
consistent patterns of change for four people who engaged in mindfulness over an 8 week 
intervention period.   
 
3.4.3  Other Mindfulness Groups 
Studies of other forms of group-based mindfulness intervention have been reported. Langer, 
Cangas, Salcedo & Fuentes (2012) investigated the impact of MBCT-style groups for 23 people with 
psychosis using a waiting list control design. The study used one global measure of schizophrenia 
symptoms along with the AAQ and the SMQ; post intervention the only significant change Langer 
et al (2012) report was that the intervention group had significantly higher levels of mindfulness of 
thoughts and images (SMQ).  
Ashcroft, Barrow, Lee and MacKinnon (2011) report on a qualitative evaluation of a group 
mindfulness intervention, based on a PBCT model, for young people in an early psychosis service. 
Similar to Abba, Chadwick and Stevenson (2008), grounded theory analysis was used to investigate 
the nine participants’ experiences of engaging in at least six sessions of mindfulness practice. It 
was found that all participants could describe benefits and challenges of practicing mindfulness; 
themes that emerged were about using mindfulness in every day settings and challenges of 
practicing, making sense of mindfulness and how it facilitated a greater sense of personal control, 
relating to people differently (possibly as a result of group processes), and greater understanding 
and acceptance of self.  
In a similar vein, van der Valk, van de Waerdt, Meijer, van den Hout, & de Haan (2012) report an 
uncontrolled study of group mindfulness for people recovering from a first episode of psychosis 
(N=16). These 8 session groups were conducted in a four week timespan, with measures of 
positive and negative symptoms, general distress and the SMQ used to evaluate outcome. The 
results showed significant changes in levels of anxiety and agoraphobia, however no changes were 
found for levels of mindfulness or psychotic symptoms.    
These studies combined with the PBCT group investigations along with other reports (e.g., 




groups to be an acceptable intervention and report changes in levels of mindfulness following the 
groups. It is less clear whether group mindfulness interventions produce significant changes in 
functioning and well-being however.    
 
 
3.4.4  Compassion-based mindfulness approaches 
Mindfulness and acceptance are also components of interventions designed to foster greater self- 
and other-compassion, such as Compassionate Focused Therapy (CFT: Gilbert, 2009; Gilbert and 
Proctor, 2006).  
CFT is based upon evolutionary social ranking theory (Gilbert, 1992), and derived from a 
neuroscience understanding of positive emotions. This theory suggests that there are two basic 
positive affect regulation systems, one focused upon achievement and doing, and another focused 
on contentment and social soothing.  The soothing system is posited to be regulator of the threat 
system, which is overly activated in people with chronic problems (Gilbert & Proctor, 2006). CFT 
promotes the increasing awareness of negative self-to-self relating, and using skills to access and 
feel positive emotions of warmth and contentment, to foster greater self-compassion and activate 
the soothing system. It is a therapeutic approach developed to help people with high levels of 
shame and self-criticism (Gilbert, 2000), and has been more widely applied to people distressed by 
a variety of experiences, including with people with psychosis, where there are some indications 
that relapse, shame and avoidance are interlinked (Gumley, 2007). CFT incorporates cognitive 
behavioural methods such as identifying and changing safety behaviours, increasing awareness of 
the effects of self-critical thinking, validation, and distress tolerance, along with the use of 
compassionate imagery, mindfulness and self-acceptance exercises.  
There have been several studies that have investigated the impact of compassion focused therapy 
and related interventions for people with psychosis. Mayhew and Gilbert (2008) present a case 
series using CFT to assist three people hearing malevolent, distressing voices. It was found that 
following individualised CFT all three participants reported less persecuting and malevolent voices 
and greater reassurance from the voices. Similarly there were improvements in general distress, 




Gumley, Braehler, Laithwaite, MacBeth and Gilbert (2010) describe how a compassion-focused 
model may aid with recovery after a psychotic episode. In particular, as both a clinical intervention 
as well as more systematised approach to mental health services, approaches to develop greater 
compassion may address stigma, shame and social avoidance that may be reinforced through 
unhelpful styles of relating between service users and clinicians. Gumley et al (2010) outline the 
advantages of compassion to build resilience and social relationships in people who have had poor 
attachment experiences and may be prone to finding caring relationships threatening as a result, 
delaying seeking help when relapsing. Laithwaite and colleagues (2009) investigated the effects of 
a group intervention based on this conceptualisation for 19 individuals recovering after psychosis 
in the context of a high security special hospital. The intervention explicitly utilized group 
processes and peer attachment. Significant changes were found at follow up for levels of 
depression and self-esteem, general psychopathology, and social comparisons of self as inferior, 
suggesting that compassion-focused intervention may be a promising approach.  
Finally, Johnson et al (2011) describe a pilot uncontrolled study of the use of loving-kindness 
meditation to improve negative symptoms for 18 people diagnosed with schizophrenia. The 
loving-kindness meditation had a similar rationale to CFT, to increase feelings of warmth and 
caring for self and others, as a means of broadening of the range of emotional responses and 
choices available (to possibly offset deficits in anticipatory pleasure associated with schizophrenia; 
see Gard et al., 2007).  Following a six week group intervention and follow up session, it was found 
that there were large improvements in frequency and intensity of positive emotions, self-
acceptance, and life satisfaction; there were significant decreases in anhedonia and negative 
symptoms. The authors conclude that this intervention is promising, although there were 
limitations to the study with no control group, non-blind ratings, and the use of some measures 
that had not been validated.    
3.4.5  Summary on mindfulness with psychosis 
On balance, mindfulness interventions appear to have promise for helping people distressed by 
psychosis to reduce the impact of their symptoms, experience greater self-acceptance and life 
meaning. Mindfulness appears to be a feasible and acceptable intervention in this population. 




as a means of promoting metacognitive awareness, developing greater self-soothing and 
compassion, and having greater personal control over emotions and symptoms. There is some 
indication that mindfulness interventions promote attentional flexibility and acceptance, similar to 
non-psychosis clinical populations. The literature reflects the early phase of treatment 
development: a number of uncontrolled studies have been reported, for a range of different 
problems associated with psychosis, with mixed outcomes. These early promising results are 
strengthened if the ACT for psychosis literature is also considered: this combination suggests that 
the promotion of mindfulness along with values-based behavioural activation may have distinct 
advantages.  
3.5  Chapter Implications 
There is emerging evidence to suggest that the contextual approach to psychosis which promotes 
acceptance and mindfulness to internal experiences in general and acting on personal values from 
a self-accepting stance, may help to reduce the impact of psychotic symptoms, particularly in 
terms of believability and disruption to functioning.  
However, while there is some evidence to implicate a role for EA increasing the propensity to and 
impact of auditory hallucinations, there is a gap in the literature about the role that EA and trait 
mindfulness have with dimensions of voice hearing, beliefs and responses to voices.  
In addition, while there have been studies of brief ACT for psychosis showing an impact on voice 
hearing, interventions of longer duration and with psychometrically-robust measures have not yet 
been conducted.  The use of a broader set of measures (than believability alone) would strengthen 
an ACT for voices study: this would clarify whether the processes of change consistent with the 
Psychological Flexibility Model , such as changes in relating to voices, acceptance, and levels of 




Chapter 4  
Experimental studies of acceptance, reappraisal and suppression 
 
This chapter will summarise the findings and implications from experimental studies that have 
investigated the effects of three regulation strategies - acceptance (discussed in Chapters 1 & 2), 
suppression (discussed in Chapter 1), and reappraisal.  
In order to contextualise this research this chapter will outline two broad and related areas of 
empirical research relevant to the regulation of private experiences: the emotion regulation 
literature, and the research on the relationship between thought suppression and 
psychopathology. These two areas will be considered alongside the Psychological Flexibility Model.  
The rationale will be presented for using experimental analogues to test components of the 
Psychological Flexibility (acceptance) and Cognitive Models (reappraisal), as well as understanding 
pathological processes (suppression). This will include discussion of the advantages and 
disadvantages of testing psychological treatment models using experimental analogues. Finally the 
results of experimental analogue studies of acceptance, reappraisal and suppression will be 
discussed in terms of the outcomes of distress intensity, stimuli tolerance and task persistence, 
and believability.  
 
4.1 The regulation of private experiences: theoretical perspectives 
The skillful regulation of emotions, thoughts and other private experiences is important for well-
being and enables effective behaviour in pursuing life goals and valued directions, particularly as 
doing this means tolerance and management of a wide range of emotional states and internal 
experiences, including those that are uncomfortable through contact with a sense of vulnerability, 
risk and uncertainty (Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown & Hofmann, 2006; Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 
2012; White & Gumley, 2010). As previously discussed, people who are distressed and disabled by 




(e.g., Farhall & Gehrke, 1997), with varying success in terms of distress reduction, influencing the 
experience, and enhancing the ability to pursue meaningful goals. It has been suggested that 
active acceptance may be an under-utilised (Perry et al, 2011) but potentially effective strategy to 
manage psychotic experiences.  
 
4.2  Emotion regulation  
Emotion regulation refers to a diverse set of processes in how “individuals influence which 
emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions” 
(Gross, 1999, p. 557). While there are other definitions with varying emphases (e.g., Thompson, 
1994; Gratz & Roemer, 2004), including whether the purpose of emotion regulation is to modify 
the experience of emotion or the behaviour associated with emotion, Gross’ definition remains 
the most influential in the literature (Bloch, Moran & Kring, 2009). This definition situates emotion 
regulation within the self, with limited consideration of contextual factors to influence emotions 
(such as the behaviour of others or environment).  
Gross (1998) proposed the process model of emotion regulation that delineates strategies in 
terms of when they have their primary impact on the emotion generation process. In this model 
strategies may have an effect before the emotional response has been activated (antecedent-
focused), or after (response-focused). An example may be that a person who hears distressing 
voices may avoid situations where they feel fearful, such as contacting friends (an antecedent-
focused strategy), or, if in contact with the voices and fearful, may engage in pacing or distracting 
herself by listening to music through earphones (a response-focused strategy).  
Gross’ (1998) process model distinguishes five groups of emotion regulation strategies, in 
temporal order: four are antecedent-focused (situation selection, situation modification, 
attentional deployment, cognitive change), while one is response-focused (response modulation). 
Antecedent-focused strategies alter the effect of emotion-generating cues, while response-
focused strategies are focused on altering emotional output (e.g., action, expression). This 
grouping is conceptual: it is assumed that most emotion regulation attempts involve multiple 




reappraisal has been conceptualised as an antecedent-focused strategy (Gross & Thompson, 
2007), while suppression is seen as response-focused (Gross, 1998). John and Gross (2004) have 
suggested that antecedent-focused strategies may be more effective and require less effort than 
response-focused strategies, because an emotional response can be regulated before it has risen 
to an overwhelming peak. Certain cognitive researchers (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2009) have argued 
from the Gross (1998) conceptualisation that acceptance is a response-focused strategy, 
hypothesising that it is a less-effective regulation strategy than reappraisal as a consequence. In 
contrast, Kollman, Brown and Barlow (2009) have posited that acceptance can be considered as 
combining aspects of antecedent-focused and response-focused emotion regulation, as it entails 
both the appraisal of emotion acceptability and allowing of emotional experience after generation 
in the absence of efforts to control this experience. I Both reappraisal and acceptance have been 
identified as conceptually-distinct adaptive alternatives to the use of suppression (Gross, 1998; 
Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999).  
This emotion regulation theory encompasses both positive and negative experiences of emotion: 
depending on context, emotion regulation processes may be used to make things either better or 
worse (Gross & Thompson, 2007). Emotion regulation in this model involves changes in the 
intensity or duration of the components of emotion - subjective experience, physiology and 
behaviour (Gross, 1998).  
A meta-analysis of the habitual use of emotion regulation strategies by Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Schweizer (2010) found that dispositional maladaptive strategies (i.e. suppression, rumination, 
avoidance) were related to symptoms of psychopathology (anxiety, depression, eating- and 
substance-related disorders), while dispositional adaptive strategies (i.e. reappraisal, acceptance 
and problem solving) were inversely related to psychopathology. Aldao et al (2010) suggest that 
these findings indicate that there is a pattern of functional and dysfunctional strategies within 
emotion regulation strategies. In this meta-analysis Aldao et al. (2010) did not directly compare 
the individual strategies with respect to their impact on outcome measures. It was found, 
however, that the maladaptive strategies were more strongly related to psychopathology than 
adaptive strategies, suggesting that the presence of a maladaptive strategy may have more impact 




(2011) have subsequently found that maladaptive emotion regulation strategies may moderate 
the influence of adaptive strategies.  
 
4.3  Reappraisal  
Reappraisal has been defined as “changing the way a situation is construed so as to decrease its 
emotional impact” (Gross, 2003; Lazarus & Alfert, 1964). Reappraisal may involve changing either 
appraisals related to the situation or appraisals regarding one's emotional responses to that 
situation. Reappraisal has been theorised to be a protective process against psychopathology 
(Gross & John, 2003) and hypothesised to be an effective means to down-regulate negative 
emotions.  
Appraisal is considered to be a central factor in determining emotional experience (Lazarus, 1991). 
Lazarus (1982) described a theory of cognitive appraisal that divided into several forms (primary, 
secondary, and reappraisal) with further elaboration of this theory positing that distinct emotions 
are elicited by specific and distinctive patterns of appraisal (e.g., Smith & Lazarus, 1993). 
“Cognitive change” refers to changing how a person appraises the current situation so as to alter 
its emotional significance, either by the person changing how they think about the situation, or 
changing the perception of the person’s capacity to manage the demands it poses (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007).   
4.3.1  The effects of the habitual use of reappraisal 
Gross and John (2003) report that habitual use of reappraisal is associated with greater experience 
of positive emotion, less negative emotion, and fewer symptoms of depression. Habitual use of 
reappraisal has been associated with lower levels of stress-related symptoms (Moore, Zoellner and 
Mollenholt, 2008), lower levels of emotional arousal (Kuppens, Oravecz, & Tuerlinckx, 2010; 
Meyer, Smeets, Giesbrecht & Merckelbach, 2012), and better interpersonal functioning (Haga, 
Kraft, & Corby, 2009). Augustine and Hemenover (2009) report a meta-analytic finding that 
compared to other emotion regulation strategies, reappraisal is one of the most effective 




Schweizer (2010) report in their meta-analysis that, in comparison with other emotional regulation 
strategies, reappraisal was associated with less psychopathology, with a small medium effect size 
on levels of distress and problems.  
 
4.3.2  Reappraisal from the cognitive therapy perspective  
The process of strengthening the habitual use of reappraisal is a hallmark of Cognitive Therapy 
(CT): the schema-central model that underpins the intervention assumes a primary mechanism of 
action for CT that involves a change in biased information processing (cognitive mediation; Clark & 
Beck, 2010). There is evidence to demonstrate that CT reduces negative thinking (e.g., Garrett et 
al. 2007), alters information processing biases (e.g., Matthews et al., 1995; Mogg et al., 1996), and 
produces a shift from negative schema activation to endorsement of more positive beliefs (Clark & 
Beck, 2010). The literature is more mixed about whether these changes are specific to cognitive 
therapy or associated improvement in emotional processing regardless of intervention (Garrett et 
al., 2007).  
In terms of the external validity of how reappraisal is fostered within Cognitive Therapy, it could be 
argued that reappraisal is used more frequently as an “on-line” strategy (Sheppes & Meiran, 
2007), that is used when emotion is already evoked (e.g., a voice’s comment is appraised as 
threatening, there is physiological responding, affect), and therefore may be considered to be 
response-focused rather than antecedent-focused. A possibility is that following Cognitive Therapy 
a person more habitually uses reappraisal as an antecedent-focused strategy, which may accord 
with the literature on differences in emotional reactivity post-successful cognitive therapy (e.g., 
Segal et al., 1999).  
Allen, McHugh & Barlow (2008) describe two fundamental antecedent misappraisals: 1] the 
probability of a negative event happening, 2] the consequences if the negative event did happen. 
The aim of cognitive reappraisal is to allow for other possible interpretations that may be more 
likely based on the evidence, while allowing all possible appraisals to exist in the mind, without 




4.4  Suppression 
There have been several forms of suppression that have been the focus of empirical interest, such 
as the suppression of the outward expression of emotion (Gross, 1998), and the suppression of 
unwanted thoughts (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000).  As an emotion regulation strategy Gross and 
Levensen (1993) have defined suppression as the conscious inhibition of emotional expressive 
behaviour while emotionally aroused. As outlined above, the emotion regulation framework by 
Gross (1998) considers suppression to be a response-focused strategy; as a result of this strategy 
occurring late in the emotion generation process it is more effortful than antecedent focused 
strategies such as reappraisal, and may not be as successful (Gross, 1999; Gross & Thompson, 
2007). Suppression has long been theorised to be a risk factor for psychopathology (e.g., Aldao, 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Schweizer, 2010; Gross, 1998).  
 
4.4.1  Effects of habitual use of emotional suppression 
In the meta-analysis by Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema & Schweizer (2010) suppression was associated 
with greater psychopathology, with a medium effect size on levels of distress and problems. Gross 
and John (2003) report that habitual use of suppression is associated with decreased well-being, 
lower levels of positive emotions, poorer social adjustment, and higher levels of negative 
emotions. In addition habitual use of suppression has been associated with increased physiological 
arousal and memory impairments (Gross, 2002; Hofmann et al., 2009). Combined with the results 
from studies of experiential avoidance (e.g., Feldner, Zvolensky, Eifert & Spira, 2003; Sloan, 2004;), 
it can be concluded that the persistent use of emotional suppression is associated with increased 
reactivity to emotion-provoking stimuli (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006) and greater distress and poorer 
functioning for those who are already depressed or anxious (Hayes et al., 2004). 
 
4.4.2  Thought suppression and control 
There is a large body of evidence to suggest that efforts to avoid and suppress unwanted thoughts 




clinical disorders, including people suffering post-traumatic stress, obsessive compulsive disorder, 
depression, and anxiety disorders (Abramowitz, Tolin & Street, 2001; Dalgleish and Yiend, 2006; 
Najmi and Wegner, 2008; Purdon, 1999; Wenzlaff and Wegner, 2000). In addition there have been 
investigations of the types of thought control strategies people use: Wells and Davies (1994) 
describe the development of the Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ), with five subscales derived 
from factor analysis, measuring the use of distraction, seeking social support, reappraisal, worry, 
and punishment, when regulating unwanted thoughts. It has been found that the worry and 
punishment subscales of the TCQ are associated with greater psychopathology (e.g., Amir, 
Cashman & Foa, 1997; Reynolds & Wells, 1999), and that the frequency of use of thought control 
strategies discriminates clinical and healthy samples (e.g., Abramowitz, Whiteside, Kalsy & Tolin, 
2003; Warda & Bryant, 1998;). Wegner (1994) has outlined an ironic process theory, which posits 
that the intention to suppress a thought instigates a monitoring process that ironically increases 
the cognitive accessibility of the unwanted thought, resulting in rebound effects. 
The associations between efforts to engage in thought suppression, and voice-related distress and 
disability have been thoroughly discussed in Chapter 1.  To recap this literature, it appears that 
voice hearers’ who habitually use suppression to cope with auditory hallucinations tend to have 
poorer emotional and functional outcomes  
 
4.5  Acceptance  
Acceptance has been defined as “the active and aware embrace of those private events 
occasioned by one’s history without unnecessary attempts to change their frequency or form, 
especially when doing so would cause psychological harm” (Luoma, Hayes & Walser, 2007, p. 17). 
It is the opposite process to experiential avoidance (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999).  
The Psychological Flexibility Model suggests that attempts to engage in suppression and control of 
internal experiences such as thoughts, feelings, sensations and voices, may in many contexts be 
unhelpful, particularly if these efforts result in narrow and rigid behavioural repertoires 
(experiential avoidance; Chapter 2). In contrast the model posits a central role for the active 




many contexts, as it allows for greater flexibility in repertoires and fosters values-based actions 
(thereby increasing contact with intrinsic reinforcers: Wilson, Bordieri, Flynn, Lucas & Slater, 
2010).  
Central to the concept of acceptance is willingness (or experiential openness) to the reality of the 
present moment and giving up on engaging in unhelpful efforts to control private experiences 
(Kollman, Brown & Barlow, 2009). Acceptance can be considered an emotion regulation strategy, 
although definitionally it does not involve an explicit control effort, as it is a volitional response to 
the occurrence of internal events that significantly impacts on emotional dynamics; moreover, it 
appears to be a empirically distinct process from reappraisal and perceived emotion control 
(Kollman, Brown & Barlow, 2009).  
 
4.5.1  The effects of the habitual use of acceptance 
The literature on the effects of the habitual use of acceptance has previously been described in 
Chapter 2. Hayes et al. (2006) and Bond et al (2011), in describing the aggregated literature on 
acceptance and psychological flexibility, report that acceptance is associated with lower levels of 
depression, stress, anxiety and overall psychological distress, as well as behavioural effectiveness 
(such as job performance, chronic pain management). Aldao et al (2010) report in their meta-
analysis that acceptance had a small to medium effect size on levels of psychopathology, although 
non-significant in this study.   
4.5.2  Perspectives on emotion regulation from Psychological Flexibility Model  
As discussed in Chapter 2 acceptance is hypothesised to be a protective process against 
psychopathology (e.g., Hayes et al., 1996; Kashdan et al., 2006; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010).  
In contrast, emotional and cognitive suppression have been linked in the construct of Experiential 
Avoidance (EA; discussed in Chapter 2), and have been theorised to be a result of normal language 
processes, that in some contexts lead to psychological harm (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999).  
The use of reappraisal as a strategy is not emphasised in the Psychological Flexibility Model - for 




suggested by Relational Frame Theory is that the attempts to change the content of cognition may 
inadvertently strengthen language processes that maintain narrow and rigid repertoires across 
contexts and reinforce less functional relations, such as linking cognitive control with life success 
(Biglan, Hayes & Pistorello, 2008; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001). However, to date, there 
has not been experimental evidence to support these assertions: further, it can be argued that the 
cognitive control strategies that have been compared to ACT components (such as distraction, 
positive imagery and self-talk) are more like forms of pathological responses than analogues of 
cognitive reappraisal methods (Kanter, 2011). Studies that have compared reappraisal and 
acceptance strategies are reviewed below (Hofmann et al., 2008; Perry, Henry, Nangle & Grisham, 
2012; Szasz, Szentagotai & Hofmann, 2011, 2012;).   
Finally, the Psychological Flexibility Model focuses on the function of regulatory efforts - this is an 
added dimension to emotion regulation models, with the clearest example being experiential 
avoidance (Boulanger, Hayes, Pistorello, Kring & Sloan, 2010). This functional layer to 
understanding emotional regulation is less emphasised in current models (e.g., Gross & 
Thompson, 2007). Thus the use of reappraisal needs to be considered within context: this strategy 
could be part of engaging in values-based behaviour, or serve an experiential avoidance function. 
There is evidence to suggest that experiential avoidance mediates the impact of a variety of coping 
and emotional regulation processes, including cognitive reappraisal, controllability of stressors, 
anxiety sensitivity, and emotional response styles, demonstrated in correlational and longitudinal 
designs (Kashdan et al., 2006). 
4.6  Experimental analogues for acceptance, reappraisal and suppression: a 
rationale 
Both cognitive and contextual approaches to psychotherapy rely upon experimental studies to test 
treatment components and develop new intervention methods (Clark, 2004; Vilardaga, et al., 
2009). 
There are advantages and disadvantages to using experimental analogues. The advantage of these 
studies is that they allow for the investigation of important theoretical questions in highly 




clearly demonstrated. This enables researchers to test treatment components and explore 
processes of change outside of using randomised controlled trials, and to develop new 
interventions, strengthening the link between empirically-based interventions and basic science 
(Clark, 2004; Clark & Beck, 2010). The external validity trade-off of greater experimental precision 
and control potentially allows for an understanding of the mechanisms (or contextual effects) of a 
treatment component that could not be achieved in treatment outcome research (Hayes, Levin, 
Plumb-Vilardaga, Villatte & Pistorello, 2011; Kazdin, 1978;). Similarly experimental analogues allow 
for the use of comparison conditions that would not be practical or ethical to use (e.g., such as 
single strategy coping; using potentially iatrogenic strategies like rumination or suppression; Levin 
et al., 2012). A final advantage to using experimental analogues is that these designs are smaller 
and less costly than treatment trials, and allow for refinement of theory and treatments if 
theoretically-derived components do not perform as hypothesised (Clark, 2004; Levin et al., 2012).  
In terms of disadvantages, experimental analogues may involve a level of abstraction that 
challenges the generalisability of results in a number of ways. There may be a trade-off in 
designing experiments with high internal validity, where procedures and samples are tightly 
specified to better determine causality, which can result in limited generalizability of the findings 
(Campbell, 1957).  Thus there is a risk that the analogues of psychological treatment components 
may be less generalizable to the clinical context. For example various responses may be used as 
proxies for clinically-relevant phenomena, such as the use of task persistence as a measure of 
willingness in studies of acceptance (e.g., Gutiérrez et al., 2004).  The regulation strategies that are 
the focus of this chapter have been assumed to be analogous to components of ACT (acceptance) 
and Cognitive Therapy (reappraisal); in addition suppression has been assumed to be analogous to 
the construct of unhelpful experiential control that is implicated in the Psychological Flexibility 
Model. However, the concept of experiential avoidance is broader than suppression (Bond et al., 
2011; Hayes et al., 1996); similarly both ACT and CT have a broader set of components than just 
acceptance and reappraisal, respectively. For example, the Cognitive Therapy approach for 
distressing voice hearing has a central component of changing behavioural responses associated 
with compliance with voices (i.e., a change in the relationship to voices), in addition to altering the 




On balance it can be argued that the advantages to using experimental analogues outweigh the 
disadvantages, particularly in advancing the development of empirically-based components of 
cognitive-behaviour treatment packages. The experimental investigation of treatment 
components is dissimilar to the efficacy questions that can be addressed through randomised 
controlled designs; these analogues are not a test of the outcomes of these multi-component 
treatments.  
From this  perspective, experimental studies have provided support for aspects of the cognitive 
model for a number of disorders (e.g., Clark et al., 1988; Radomsky, Rachman & Hammond, 2001; 
Ross, Freeman, Dunn & Garety, 2011; Salkovskis et al., 1999; Teasdale & Bancroft, 1977; Teasdale 
& Fogarty, 1979 ). Similarly experimental support has been demonstrated for contextual processes 
described by the Psychological Flexibility Model and RFT (e.g., Forman et al., 2007; Masuda, Hayes, 
Sackett & Twohig, 2004; Smyth, Barnes-Holmes & Forsyth, 2006; Villatte et al., 2010). Levin, 
Hildebrandt, Lillis and Hayes (2012) present a meta-analytic review of experimental studies testing 
components that relate to the psychological flexibility model (acceptance, defusion, values, 
present moment, self as context, committed action): it is reported that compared to inactive 
conditions, psychological flexibility components show large effect sizes and in expected directions. 
Levin et al (2012) also report that, compared to conditions that promote experiential control, 
there were small but significant effect sizes favouring psychological flexibility, and medium effect 
sizes relative to conditions promoting cognitive fusion (rumination, worry conditions); there were 
no differences in size of effect between distressed and convenience samples (e.g., students).  
The literature reviewed in this chapter has explored the use of acceptance, reappraisal and 
suppression largely for analogues of anxiety, depression, pain and trauma, using mostly healthy 
samples (some clinical samples, e.g., Campbell-Sills at al., 2006; Najmi, Riemann & Wegner, 2009; 
Vowles et al., 2007;). These studies have been conducted from the theoretical perspectives of the 
Psychological Flexibility Model, as well as emotion regulation research and information processing 
accounts of clinical phenomena. There has been one experimental study conducted with a sample 
of people with psychosis exploring differences in trained emotional regulation strategies  (Perry, 
Henry, Nangle, & Grisham, 2012: described below); there have been no studies of emotion 




have been studies that have investigated the potential of simulating auditory hallucinations in 
order reduce stigma toward people with schizophrenia, see   Ando, Clement, Barley & Thornicroft, 
2011, for a review].   
 
4.7  Experimental instructions  
This section will describe the typical procedures for training participants to engage in acceptance, 
reappraisal and suppression as regulation strategies within experimental analogues.  
4.7.1  Acceptance instructions 
Instructions for acceptance typically involve training participant to respond to the experimental 
condition in an experientially-open manner, by practicing willingness toward any internal 
experiences, present-moment awareness and mindfulness.    
A way of providing instructions for acceptance that is theoretically consistent with ACT is through 
the use of metaphor. As discussed in Chapter 2 the experiential approach of ACT suggests that 
metaphor may be an effective means of helping people recognise their problems and indicate 
possible, but unexpected, behavioural alternatives (Heffner, Greco, & Eifert, 2003; McCurry & 
Hayes, 1992). Metaphorical talk may work through using figurative language to synthesise 
emotionally-relevant experiences in a non-confrontational  and non-threatening way, and by 
indirectly suggesting contingencies, where acceptance is reinforced and emotional avoidance and 
control is punished (Barnes-Holmes, Cochrane, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart & McHugh, 2004; Eifert & 
Heffner, 2003). 
The “Swamp Metaphor” (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999) has been frequently used in 
experimental studies (e.g., Kehoe et al., 2005; McMullen et al., 2008): this metaphor describes the 
experience of engaging in a valued action and coming into contact with aversive experiences, such 
as unwanted feelings and thoughts, as analogous with willingly walking through a swamp in order 
to get to where you planned to go. The metaphor encourages willingness and acceptance of these 




It has been noted that studies that provide acceptance instructions without the use of metaphor 
or experiential methods (e.g., Hofmann, Heering, Sawyer, & Asnaani, 2009) tend to show lower 
effects for the acceptance condition. The meta-analysis by Levin et al (2012) demonstrated that 
larger effect sizes are seen for experimental acceptance conditions that include experiential 
methods, compared to those that include only a rationale. In addition several studies that have 
shown superior acceptance effects have embedded this strategy within a values-based context 
(Branstetter-Rost et al., 2009; Páez-Blarrina, Luciano, Gutiérrez-Martínez, Valdivia, Rodríguez-
Valverde, et al., 2008).      
 
4.7.2  Reappraisal instructions 
Several different types of reappraisal instructions have been reported: consistent with the work by 
Gross (1998) most studies have instructed participants to reappraise by thinking objectively to 
decrease emotional reactivity to the aversive stimuli (e.g., Goldin et al., 2008; Ochsner et al., 2002; 
Perry et al., 2012); in other studies participants have been instructed to consider the negative 
perspective of the stimuli (e.g., Szasz et al., 2012, with the negative health consequences of 
smoking), or to consider the positive things they may get from the situation (e.g., Rood et al., 
2012). Schartau, Dalgleish and Dunn (2010) describe four “reappraisal themes” used in 
experimental instructions, to help participants to adopt a broader perspective toward the aversive 
situation so that positive or adaptive information can be integrated:   
1) Bad things happen - bad things happen in the world and I need to put them behind me 
and move on.  
2)  Silver lining - there are usually some good aspects to every situation and it is important 
to focus on these.  
3)  Broader perspective - bad events are rare overall and lots of good things are happening 
all of the time.  
4)  Time heals - in the (near) future, this will not seem anywhere near as bad as it does 




It is unclear whether there are systematic differences between these various instructions for 
reappraisal in terms of experimental outcomes; based on the published literature, to date this 
question has not been investigated.   
 
4.7.3  Suppression instructions 
There have been several types of suppression instructions reported in the literature: emotion 
suppression instructions have involved instructing participants to not show any emotion while 
engaged in the experimental task (typically watching distressing film clips), so that a person 
watching the participant would not know that they were experiencing any emotion (Richards & 
Gross, 1999). Other instructions have presented suppression of thoughts and feelings as consistent 
with effective self-control and appealed to the participant’s personal history of successfully using 
control (e.g., Campbell-Sills et al., 2006; Levitt et al., 2004): these instructions have told 
participants that they can control their feelings by pushing them away, and reminded them that 
they have been successful at self-discipline in the past. In addition these instructions have used 
similar metaphors as the comparison conditions, but slanted toward suppression: for example, in 
the Levitt et al (2004) study an ACT metaphor “Tug of War with the Monster” (Hayes, Strosahl & 
Wilson, 1999) was used to encourage emotional control (by pulling the rope to beat the monster), 
instead of the usual purpose of the metaphor, to instruct acceptance (by letting go of the rope/ 
struggle). Finally, within the literature exploring thought suppression from an ironic process theory 
perspective (Wegner, 1994) participants are told to suppress or block out the target thought, and 
to continue to try not to think about it while reporting the thoughts that come to mind during a 
recall period of several minutes (Wentzlaff & Wegner, 2000).   
 
4.8 Multiple outcomes in experimental studies of emotion and thought 
regulation 
A number of different outcome variables have been used to investigate the effects of emotion 
regulation in experimental studies (Werner & Gross, 2009, for a review). Emotion regulation can 




levels of affect and distress, as well as behavioural task persistence and tolerance of the stimuli 
(both typically measured by how long a participant chooses to stay in contact with aversive 
stimuli, and whether they tolerate repeated exposure to stimuli) (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Schweizer, 2010; Gross & Thompson, 2007). There have also been differences reported about 
impaired memory performance related to the use of suppression (Cambell-Sills, Barlow, Brown & 
Hofmann, 2006). The thought suppression literature has used as outcomes the presence and 
frequency of target thoughts, as well as affect (Wenzlaff and Wegner, 2000). Finally, experimental 
outcomes have been reported for the believability of thoughts related to aversive experiences 
(e.g., Masuda et al., 2010; McMullen et al., 2008): this is a measure of how strongly the participant 
considers it necessary to act upon the thought (Kohl, Rief & Glombiewski, 2012). An example of 
this would be when a participant has thoughts that the aversive stimuli in an experimental 
condition are “too much” and acts to avoid or stop participation in the condition.  
 
4.9  Current status of the experimental effects of acceptance, reappraisal 
and suppression 
4.9.1  Search strategy 
The studies reviewed for this chapter were the outcome of the following search strategy.  
Electronic literature searches were conducted in PsychInfo, PubMed and Google Scholar from 
1990 to mid-2012, with the following combination of search terms used:   [Acceptance OR 
Experiential Avoidance OR Distancing OR Mindfulness OR Defusion] AND [Suppression OR 
Reappraisal OR Rumination OR Distraction OR Control]. Abstracts for studies were then checked 
for eligibility (see below), and the full article retrieved if it fulfilled the following criteria:  
1) Published in an English language journal, with the year of publication between 1990 and 
June, 2012 
2) Recruited human participants 




4) Compared acceptance, reappraisal or suppression strategies with other emotion 
regulation strategies or a control condition.  
Dissertations and single case studies were excluded. For all selected studies the reference list was 
checked against the search results, and additional studies meeting the inclusion criteria were 
added.  
4.9.2  A priori hypotheses regarding the experimental literature   
The experimental literature was approached with the following a priori hypotheses, based upon 
the emotion regulation and psychological flexibility literature (discussed above):  
1) It was predicted that reappraisal would show a comparative advantage over acceptance in 
distress intensity.  
2) It was predicted that acceptance would show a comparative advantage over reappraisal in 
behavioural task persistence/ tolerance of aversive stimuli.  
3) It was predicted that acceptance would show a comparative advantage over reappraisal in 
reduced believability of thoughts related to experimental challenges. 
4) It was predicted that suppression would show comparative disadvantages to both 
acceptance and reappraisal conditions on all three outcomes (distress intensity, tolerance, 
believability).   
 
The studies reviewed for this chapter appear in Tables 4.1 (Acceptance) and 4.2 (Reappraisal). The 
results of these studies have been summarised in terms of whether the acceptance or reappraisal 
condition was comparatively better, worse or equivalent to comparison conditions. There were 
three outcomes of interest for this review – pain/ distress intensity, tolerance and believability; 
these outcomes were chosen as they have been used in the widest number of studies 
(pain/distress intensity, tolerance) or are of theoretical interest from the perspective of the 
Psychological Flexibility Model and for the focus of this thesis (believability).   
For pain/distress intensity, and believability, regulation strategies were judged by whether they 
produced a comparative reduction; for tolerance, whether the strategy resulted in a comparatively 





4.9.3  Variety of psychological challenges reported   
As can be seen from Table 4.1 there are a number of experimental studies that have investigated 
the influence of acceptance vs. control-based strategies upon the tolerance of aversive stimuli 
(e.g., Feldner, Zvolensky, Eifert & Spira, 2003; Hayes, Bisset, Zorn, Zettle, Rosenfarb, Cooper & 
Grundt, 1999;). In these studies, which have used both healthy and clinical samples, the aversive 
stimuli presented have included physiological symptoms associated with panic (e.g., Eifert & 
Heffner, 2003), induced pain (e.g., Guiterrez, Luciano, Rodriguez & Fink, 2004)and unpleasant 
visual images (e.g., Campbell-Sills et al., 2006). There have also been several studies that induced 
intrusive thoughts as the psychological challenge (e.g., Marcks & Woods, 2005; Najmi, Riemann & 
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2) Suppression 
3) Monitor only 
4)  
   
Broderick (2005)  Non-clinical (177 
students) 
Mood induction 1) Acceptance 
2) Rumination 
3) Distraction 
   (vs rumination)                 
 (vs distraction) 
 
Vowles et al. 
(2007) 
Chronic lower back 




2) Control of pain 
3) Continued practice 
4)  
    
Campbell-Sills et 
al.(2006) 
Anxiety or mood 
disorder patients 
(60) 
Emotional film 1) Acceptance 
2) Suppression 
     
 
results favour Acceptance   
results were equivalent between conditions  




















Students - scoring 
high on emotion 
regulation 
difficulties (30) 




2) Neutral educational 
material  
     




Mood induction 1) Acceptance 
2) Distraction 
3) rumination 
(vs rumination)              
 (vs distraction) 






Mood induction 1) Acceptance 
2) Distraction 
3) rumination 
(vs rumination)              
(vs distraction) 









White Noise 1) Acceptance 
2) Suppression 
3) Distraction 
     
Dunn et al. 
(2009)  
Non-clinical (89) Distressing Film; 
Affective picture task 
1) Acceptance 
2) Rumination 
3) No Strategy 
(distressing film)      
(affective pic)  
    




Loud Noises 1) Acceptance 
2) Control-based strategy 
     
 
results favour Acceptance   
results were equivalent between conditions  


























Smoking cravings 1) Reappraisal 
2) Acceptance 
3) Suppression 






moderate levels of 
anger on task) 
Frustrating Task 1) Reappraisal 
2) Acceptance 
3) Suppression 
    
Wolgast, Lundh 
& Viborg (2011) 
Non-clinical (94) Film Clips 1) Reappraisal 
2) Acceptance 
3) Neutral (condition) 
(Disgust clips)  
       (other clips) 
  (vs 




Perry et al. 
(2012) 
Non-clinical (24) Film Clips 1) Reappraisal 
2) Suppression 
3) Acceptance 
  (vs acceptance)   
  (vs suppression) 
    




Impromptu Speech 1) Acceptance 
2) Reappraisal 
3) Suppression 
     
McRae et al. 
(2010) 
Non-clinical (18  
females) 
Affective Pictures 1) Reappraisal 
2) Distraction 





Affective Pictures 1) Reappraisal 
2) Distraction 
     
 
results favour Reappraisal   
results were equivalent between conditions  




















Goldin et al. 
(2008) 
Non-clinical (17  
females) 




     
Gross (1998) Non-clinical (120 
students) 
Disgust Film 1) Reappraisal 
2) Suppression 
     




Disgust Film 1) Reappraisal 
2) Suppression 
     





b) Never depressed 
(43)  
Sad Film 1) Reappraisal 
2) Suppression 






Mood Films 1) Reappraisal 
2) Acceptance 
     




Angry Memory 1) Reappraisal 
2) Rumination 
     










     
 
results favour Reappraisal   
results were equivalent between conditions  





Studies of the experimental effects of reappraisal have not involved pain or panic analogues, 
which do not allow direct comparison with the effects of acceptance for these types of challenges. 
Experimental studies of reappraisal (Table 3.2) have typically involved participant exposure to film 
clips that induce disgust, fear or sadness (e.g., Ehring et al., 2010; Goldin et al., 2008; Gross, 1998; 
Schartau, Dalgleish & Dunn, 2009; Wolgast et al., 2011); other studies have used affective pictures 
(McRae et al., 2010; Ochswer et al., 2002;), participating in frustrating tasks (Szasz et al., 2011), 
cued cravings (Szasz et al., 2012) or conditions where participants are asked to recall angry or 
stressful memories (Ray et al., 2008; Rood et al., 2011). Most reappraisal studies have involved 
non-clinical samples; however, there are studies that have also involved people with generalised 
anxiety disorder (Aldao et al., 2012), schizophrenia (Perry et al., 2012; described below) or those 
who have recovered from depressive episodes (Ehring et al., 2010).   
 
4.9.4  Comparison conditions 
Acceptance and reappraisal have usually been compared to regulation strategies that are regarded 
as unhelpful or ineffective, that can be considered as analogues of disorder processes: examples of 
this include comparisons to suppression (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2009; Levitt et al., 2004;) and 
rumination (e.g., Broderick, 2005; Kuehner, Huffziger & Liebsch, 2009).     
Acceptance has also been compared to experimental instructions for experiential control in 
investigations of the Psychological Flexibility Model (where experiential control is predicted to be 
less effective), such as studies where participants were taught diaphragmatic breathing in carbon 
dioxide challenge tasks (e.g., Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Levitt, Brown, Orsillo & Barlow, 2004), to 
control pain through self-discipline (Vowles et al., 2007), to engage in suppression/ experiential 
avoidance (e.g., Luciano et al., 2010), use positive self-statements (Guitterez et al., 2004; Hayes, 






Finally several studies have compared acceptance to distraction (e.g., Guiterrez et al., 2004; Keogh 
et al., 2005; McMullen et al., 2008; Najmi, Riemann & Wegner, 2009); and one study has 
compared reappraisal with distraction (McRae et al., 2010). Based upon the broader experimental 
evidence distraction has been argued to be an effective strategy for emotion regulation, in 
particular, for improving affect and limiting the use of rumination (Augustine & Hemenover, 2009; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993), and reducing negative cognitions (Fennell & Teasdale, 1984). 
Thus, it can be suggested that studies that use a distraction condition may be comparing 
acceptance and/or reappraisal with another potentially effective regulation strategy.   
The experimental effects of acceptance, reappraisal and suppression will be considered in the 
remainder of this section  
 
4.9.5  Effects on pain/distress intensity of psychological challenges 
4.9.5.1  Acceptance  
There are mixed findings for the effect of acceptance on the intensity of pain. In studies of induced 
pain (cold pressor, shocks): acceptance has been associated with greater pain intensity compared 
to instructions that were inert (Branstetter-Rost et al., 2009), or involved distraction (McMullen et 
al., 2008) and positive thinking (Gutiérrez et al., 2004; Hayes et al., 1999;). One study found no 
differences on shock intensity compared to suppression (Paez-Blarrina et al., 2008). There are 
several studies where acceptance has been associated with less pain intensity, compared to 
positive thinking, suppression and distraction (Roche et al., 2007; Masedo & Rosa Esteve, 2007; 
Keogh et al., 2005, respectively). There are several possible explanations for these differing results. 
There is a greater variance of pain intensity outcomes in the cold pressor experiments, compared 
to the electric shock studies (with either no difference or worse outcomes compared to 
suppression or distraction). It may be that pain intensity is heightened (or at least not 
comparatively reduced) by acceptance when the pain experience involves brief, acute and 
repeated exposures (electric shocks). There may have also been variable outcomes due to the 




and format, from brief instructions for acceptance versus control (Keogh et al., 2005), through to 
lengthy exercises and metaphors (Masedo & Rosa Esteve, 2007; Paez-Blarrinaet al., 2008).  
In terms of levels of distress, acceptance in a carbon dioxide challenge produced equivalent effects 
to breathing control and suppression in non-clinical samples (Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Feldner et al., 
2003), but was associated with less distress compared to suppression and neutral instructions for 
a sample of people with panic disorder (Levitt et al., 2004). This could suggest the possibility that 
acceptance is a more effective strategy when people are prone to experiencing strong 
physiological responses. In a similar vein, the use of acceptance following distressing film clips 
suggest that acceptance is associated with reduced distress when compared to inert and 
suppression instructions with clinical and high-trait anxiety samples (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006; 
Erisman & Roemer, 2010), but inconsistent effects when compared to rumination instructions with 
a non-clinical sample (Dunn et al., 2009). 
Experiments that have involved mood induction have demonstrated that acceptance results in less 
distress when compared to rumination with people who have recovered from depressive episodes 
(Huffziger & Kuehner, 2009; Singer & Dobson, 2007) but equivalent levels of distress with the use 
of distraction. Similar studies with non-clinical samples have produced inconsistent results, with 
Kuehner, Huffziger & Liebsch (2009) reporting equivalent levels of distress across acceptance, 
distraction or rumination conditions, while Broderick (2005) reported superior effects for the use 
of acceptance. The Broderick (2005) study had a much larger sample size compared to Kuehner et 
al. (2009), possibly having greater power; another difference between the studies was that while 
Kuehner et al (2009) provided a rationale for using mindful acceptance, Broderick (2005) trained 
participants using an experiential exercise.  
There are more consistent results for whether training in acceptance leads to lower distress when 
intrusive thoughts are induced: in non-clinical samples acceptance has been found to be superior 
to distraction (Masuda e al., 2010), suppression (Marcks & Woods, 2005), and self-relevant 
appraisal (Healey et al., 2008). Najmi, Riemann & Wegner (2009) comparing non-clinical and 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) samples, found that for the OCD group acceptance was 
superior to distraction and suppression for limiting distress associated with intrusive thoughts. 




again, it may be that acceptance is comparatively effective in reducing distress levels for those 
participants who already prone to finding negative experiences challenging.   
4.9.5.2  Reappraisal 
Studies of the effects of reappraisal  suggest that this strategy reduces distress and arousal during 
psychological challenges, when compared to other regulation strategies (e.g., Gross, 1998, 2002; 
Jackson, Malmstadt, Larson, & Davidson, 2000; Richards & Gross, 2000; Schartau, Dalgleish & 
Dunn, 2009).  
Following exposure to distressing film clips or affective picture tasks non-clinical participants 
report less distress in reappraisalconditions when compared to suppression (Ehring et al., 2010; 
Goldin et al., 2008; Gross, 1998; Jackson et al., 2000;), distraction (McRae et al., 2010; Ochsner et 
al., 2002), and acceptance (Perry et al., 2012;  Wolgast, Lundh & Viborg, 2011;). An inconsistent 
finding was that Perry et al (2012) found equivalent distress levels between reappraisal and 
suppression, but not acceptance (which was worse) with a small non-clinical sample; the authors 
suggested that a possibility is that suppression is not an emotionally costly strategy in terms of 
distress for non-clinical participants (see below for a further description of this study). Two studies 
with clinical samples have found that reappraisal is superior to acceptance (Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder: Aldao & Mennin, 2012) and suppression (participants remitted from depression: Ehring 
et al, 2010).  
Reappraisal has also been found to be associated with less distress when recalling angry or 
stressful memories in non-clinical samples, when compared with rumination or acceptance (Ray, 
Wilhelm & Gross, 2008; Rood et al., 2011). Similarly, when faced with a threatening (an 
impromptu speech: Hofmann et al., 2009) or frustrating task (Szasz, Szentagotai & Hofmann, 
2011), or smoking cravings (Szasz, Szentagotai & Hofmann, 2012), non-clinical participants report 
comparatively less distress following reappraisal, than when using acceptance or suppression as 
regulation strategies.   In addition there is evidence to suggest that reappraisal is not as taxing 
cognitively as suppression, with participants in reappraisal conditions having greater recall of 





4.9.5.3  Suppression 
As can be deduced from the discussion above, the weight of the experimental evidence strongly 
suggests that suppression is an ineffective method for coping with challenges, producing 
comparative increases in physiological arousal (Gross, 1998), distress (e.g., Ehring et al., 2010; 
Levitt et al., 2004; Masedo & Esteve, 2007;), as well as rebound effects and associated negative 
affect in target thoughts (Marcks & Woods, 2005; Wegner & Gold, 1995; Wegner and Wenzlaff, 
1996; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994;). Suppression does appear to work to inhibit outward expression 
of emotion, but does not alleviate the subjective experience of emotion (Gross & Levenson, 1997); 
in fact use of suppression may lead to a paradoxical increase in the unwanted experience (Cioffi & 
Holloway, 1993; Gross, 1998). These counterproductive effects of suppression have been shown 
for a range of emotions, such as sadness, disgust, and amusement (Gross, 1998). Moreover, 
people who are already high in trait experiential avoidance and instructed to engage in 
suppression may experience increased distress and poorer task performance, compared to those 
low in this trait (e.g., Feldner et al., 2003; Kashdan, Barrios, Forsyth & Steger, 2006).  
 
4.9.6  Effects on Tolerance and Task Persistence  
4.9.6.1  Acceptance 
Unlike the mixed findings for intensity of distress, the majority of studies have demonstrated that 
participants in acceptance conditions will engage in greater task persistence and display greater 
willingness to experience unpleasant stimuli (e.g., pain induced by a cold pressor task, electric 
shocks, films with unpleasant images), compared to conditions that have instructions for 
distraction (Gutiérrez et al., 2004; McMullen et al., 2008;), emotional suppression (Levitt, Brown, 
Orsillo & Barlow, 2004; Masedo & Rosa, 2007; Paez-Blarrina et al., 2008) use of positive thinking 
(Hayes et al., 1999; Roche et al., 2007;), experiential control (Feldner, Zvolensky, Eifert & Spira, 
2003), and diaphragmatic breathing to reduce arousal (Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Hayes et al., 1999). 
Participants persist with contact with aversive stimuli after being trained in acceptance, while 
reporting little difference in levels of distress compared to other conditions (e.g., McMullen et al., 




condition compared to participants trained in suppression (a second experiment reported in Paez-
Blarrina et al., 2008), and distraction (Keogh et al., 2005). Possible explanations for these differing 
results include a small sample size, limiting study power (Paez-Blarrina et al., 2008), and the use of 
brief, rationale-based instructions without an experiential component that may have limited the 
effect of acceptance (Keogh et al., 2005), in comparison to other studies (see Levin et al., 2012).  
4.9.6.1  Reappraisal 
There are inconsistent results for the effects of reappraisal on tolerance and task persistence (or 
reduced task avoidance). Reappraisal has been reported to produce greater task persistence than 
acceptance or suppression for a frustrating task, and with smoking cravings (Szasz, Szentagota & 
Hofmann, 2011, 2012), but not produce greater length of impromptu speeches. Similarly 
inconsistent results have been found when participants are exposed to film clips that induce 
disgust: Wolgast et al. (2011) report no significant difference for reappraisal compared to 
acceptance in increasing the willingness of participants to undergo further film clips, while Perry et 
al (2012) found that reappraisal was associated with lower tolerance compared to acceptance. 
One possible explanation for these inconsistent results are the differences between studies on the 
types of instructions used: for example, Szasz et al (2012) instructed the reappraisal condition to 
cue the participants to think about the negative consequences of smoking cigarettes, while in the 
Wolgast et al (2011) study participants were instructed to reappraise film clips in an unemotional 
way. Similarly the Hofmann et al. (2009) impromptu speech study instructed participants to take a 
realistic perspective on the task and realise that the situation did not pose a threat. It is possible 
that the differing emotional outcomes of these reappraisal instructions may have had an impact 
on tolerance and task persistence.     
4.9.6.1  Suppression 
Finally, as above, suppression as a comparison condition to reappraisal and acceptance has been 
demonstrated to result in  reduced task persistence (e.g., Paez-Blarrina et al., 2008), distress 
tolerance (e.g., Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & Hofmann, 2006; Feldner, Zvolensky, Eifert & 




has been found to have deleterious effects on short-term memory, compared to cognitive 
reappraisal (Richards & Gross, 2000). 
 
4.9.7  Effects on Believability 
A small number of studies have demonstrated that participants trained in acceptance report lower 
levels of believability compared to suppression (Najmi, Riemann & Wegner, 2009; Paez-Blarrina et 
al., 2008;), positive thinking (Guitierrez et al., 2004) and rumination conditions (Broderick, 2005; 
Kuehner et al., 2009). The results of the Healy et al. (2008) study raise the possibility that the 
reduction of believability produced by acceptance may be specific to negative self-referent 
thoughts, when compared to positive thoughts. Healy et al (2008) suggest that this may 
demonstrate that defusion may be more impactful on psychological content that is likely to be the 
focus of experiential avoidance, consistent with the Psychological Flexibility Model.  Kohl, Rief & 
Glombiewski (2012) suggest that reducing believability of private experiences may be an effect 
specific to acceptance, as cognitive defusion is not a target of other emotion regulation strategies. 
However, in comparisons with distraction conditions there have been mixed results, with  
McMullen et al. (2008) and Masuda et al. (2010) reporting lower believability associated with 
acceptance, while other studies have shown equivalence between acceptance and distraction 
(Broderick, 2005; Kuehner, Huffziger & Liebsch, 2009; Najmi, Riemann & Wegner, 2009). A 
potential explanation for these results is that distraction may produce similar effects on 
believability to acceptance; in other words as an effective regulation strategy distraction may work 
to reduce the influence of internal experiences as the participant focuses on other stimuli.  At 
present it is unknown what the effects of reappraisal are upon believability, as this comparison has 
not been reported in a published study 
 
4.9.8  Regulation strategies and psychosis: experimental studies 
Perry et al. (2012) compared participants with schizophrenia and non-clinical controls trained in 




(sadness). Subjective experience and behavioural expression of emotion, along with willingness (to 
watch further video clips) were used as outcomes for the experiment; instructions for emotion 
regulation strategies were delivered using audiotape, with a standardised length and complexity 
(no metaphors or experiential delivery). It was found that both groups (schizophrenia and non-
clinical) displayed equivalent levels of sadness and general negative affect, during and after the 
mood induction: the acceptance condition appeared to amplify the magnitude of negative 
experiences in the short-term, but with no lasting difference compared to the other conditions in 
the longer term; the reappraisal condition resulted in the lowest level of negative affect 
throughout the experiment. Participants with schizophrenia did exhibit greater behavioural 
expression of emotion (measured by brow activity) in response to the video clips, while their 
reported levels of affect were similar to the non-clinical group. The main difference between the 
two groups was that the participants with schizophrenia were less willing to watch another 
sadness-inducing video clip; in contrast, non-clinical participants in the acceptance condition 
displayed significantly greater willingness to watch another video. Perry et al (2012) report that 
the superiority of acceptance for greater willingness to experience difficult affect was only found 
in the non-clinical group, and that this result may reflect the general experiential avoidance 
associated with schizophrenia (Perry et al., 2011), that may not be influenced by a brief 
acceptance instruction.  
 
4.10  Summary & Discussion 
This review suggests that there are comparative differences in the effects of acceptance, 
reappraisal, and suppression on the regulation of private experiences. Acceptance may be an 
effective strategy for increasing willingness and persistence in the face of a negative experience, 
but may involve increased intensity of the experience, at least in the short-term. It also appears to 
reduce the influence that negative experiences have upon subsequent behaviour (a cognitive 
defusion effect), which may be a unique effect to acceptance. Reappraisal appears to be 
advantageous for limiting the intensity of an aversive experience, and may possibly produce 
greater task persistence. In comparison to both reappraisal and acceptance, suppression, while 




strategy in terms of the intensity of negative experience, tolerance and willingness to persist in a 
challenging situation, and increased experience of unwanted thoughts: it may be that suppression 
amplifies increased contact with private experiences.  
In terms of the emotion regulation framework, reappraisal is considered to be an antecedent-
focused strategy, and certainly is advantageous over the response-focused strategy of 
suppression; acceptance appears to have features of both antecedent- and response-focused 
strategies, i.e. not involving direct change of emotion itself, but rather on influencing behaviour in 
response to emotion. 
The most problematic limitation of the experimental literature reviewed above is that it may not 
be generalizable to clinical contexts. For instance, reappraisal has been operationalized within the 
experimental literature as an antecedent strategy, while in clinical practice and through learning it 
may be more an “on-line”, response-focused strategy, with potentially diminishing returns in 









Chapter 5  
Study 1 - Correlates of naturally-occurring psychological flexibility and 





The psychological flexibility model has been hypothesised as a trans-diagnostic, process-oriented 
approach to understanding various clinical disorders and problems, including chronic pain, anxiety 
and substance misuse. In this study we investigated the model’s applicability to the experience of 
hearing distressing voices, exploring the relationships that psychological flexibility and non-
judgemental acceptance have with distress, disability, and behavioural responses to voice hearing, 
with a sample of people experiencing persisting auditory hallucinations. We predicted that 
psychological flexibility, mindful action and non-judgemental acceptance would be negatively 
associated with distress, disability and behavioural responses to voice hearing. In addition we 
predicted that psychological flexibility and mindfulness would have increased explanatory power 
over and above appraisal and thought control strategies. A cross-sectional design was used; fifty 
participants experiencing persisting auditory hallucinations completed a number of scales 
assessing depression, anxiety, beliefs about voices, thought control strategies, severity of auditory 
hallucinations, as well as psychological flexibility and mindfulness. Psychological flexibility and 
non-judgemental acceptance were found to account for a significant proportion of the variance in 
regression-based models of depression and anxiety, as well as emotional and behavioural 
resistance to voices, beyond the models predicted by appraisals of voices and use of thought 
control strategies alone. However, this was not found for distress associated with voice hearing, 
life disruption and engagement with voices. The study results suggest that psychological flexibility 
and non-judgemental acceptance are related to general emotional well-being, rather than specific 





5.2  Introduction 
Psychological flexibility models and treatments have shown promise in understanding 
maintenance factors and helping those who are impacted by a variety of problems (Hayes, Luoma, 
Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). As discussed in Chapter 2, there may also be potential for 
psychological flexibility models to inform our understanding of distress and disability with 
psychotic symptoms. Psychological treatments that focus on reducing experiential avoidance are 
showing emerging effectiveness in helping individuals overcome their difficulties (Hayes et al., 
1999; Hayes et al., 2006). One of the ways that psychological flexibility is developed is through 
mindfulness (Hayes et al, 2006; Linehan, 1993), a set of skills that involves learning to become 
aware of the processes of thinking (such as taking thoughts as literal truth or “cognitive fusion”, 
described by Hayes et al.), and relating differently to these processes by developing a de-
centred/”de-fused” stance toward the content of thoughts, emotions and other private 
experiences (Teasdale et al., 2002). It is theorised that this de-centred stance toward private 
experiences reduces experiential avoidance and encourages greater persistence and flexibility in 
actions toward valued life directions (Hayes et al., 2004). Mindfulness and acceptance techniques 
target the relationship that a person has with their internal experiences (Pérez-Álvarez et al., 
2008), and cultivate alternate influences over behaviour by allowing the individual to have greater 
capacity to respond pro-actively rather than reactively (by chosen, value-based behaviours, as 
described by Hayes et al., 1999).  
As discussed in Chapter 1, there are indications that acceptance of voices may play a role in better 
functioning and less distress in voice-hearers (e.g., Farhall and Gehrke, 1997). As discussed in 
Chapter 3, Gaudiano and Herbert (2006) found that encouraging non-judgemental acceptance of 
voices mediated outcomes for distress of those experiencing voices. Non-judgemental acceptance 
also encompasses the relationship that a person has with appraisals, responding to automatic 
evaluations from a dispassionate stance (Baer et al., 2004), and resulting in fewer efforts to 
engage in control of thoughts (Baer et al., 2006). The polar opposite of psychological flexibility and 
non-judgemental acceptance, experiential avoidance (EA), is implicated in clinical models of 
distress with psychosis (e.g., Chadwick, 2006), and there have been a small set of studies that have 




5.2.1  Measures of acceptance and non-judgemental acceptance  
Acceptance/experiential avoidance and non-judgemental acceptance have typically been 
measured by the use of self-report measures (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.1.2). In the Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy (ACT) literature EA has been measured by the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire (AAQ version1: Hayes, Strosahl et al., 2004; version 2: Bond et al., 2011) across 
various populations, although not so far with psychosis. A measure of non-judgemental 
acceptance of mental experience is the “acceptance without judgement” sub-scale of the 
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer, Smith & Allen, 2004).  
In summary, recent trans-diagnostic models consider the effects of EA and non-acceptance as 
contributing to the maintenance of psychological problems (Hayes et al., 1996; Hayes et al., 2006; 
(Hayes, Levin, Plumb-Vilardaga, Villatte, & Pistorello, 2011) . There has been limited attention to 
these constructs within cognitive models of psychosis although there is preliminary evidence from 
treatment studies to suggest that developing non-judgemental acceptance  of voices can be 
helpful (Bach & Hayes, 2002; Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006a). The present study explored the 
relationships between acceptance, mindful action, and non-judgemental acceptance, and 
predictors of distress and disability in auditory hallucinations, such as appraisals of voices as 
malevolent, benevolent and omnipotent (Chadwick, Lees & Birchwood, 2000; Favrod et al., 2004), 
as well as the use thought control strategies, such as punishment and worry (Garcia-Montes et al., 
2006; Morrison, 2001; Morrison & Wells, 2000 ). This study explored the incremental explanatory 
power of adding acceptance constructs to cognitive models of distress with voice hearing.  
 
5.2.2  Research questions and Hypotheses 
The two study questions were:  
1] What relationships are there between psychological flexibility, non-judgemental acceptance, 





It was predicted that psychological flexibility, mindful action, and non-judgemental 
acceptance would be negatively correlated with appraisals of voice malevolence and 
power, resistance to voices, use of thought control strategies, and voice-related distress 
and disruption, as well as depressive and anxiety symptoms.  
2] Do psychological flexibility, mindful action, and non-judgemental acceptance  result in 
additional predictive power for a range of dependent variables (anxiety and depression symptoms, 
distress and disability associated with voice hearing, emotions and efforts to resist/engage with 
voices), when included with variables from cognitive models (such as appraisals of malevolence 
and benevolence, along with thought control strategies)?  
It was predicted that appraisals of voices, as well as use of thought control strategies, 
would significantly account for the variance of the dependent variables.  
It was predicted that a significant amount of variance would then be additionally 
explained by the inclusion of psychological flexibility and non-judgemental acceptance in 
models of voice hearing.    
 
5.2.2.1  Selecting Independent/ Dependent variables 
Two sets of independent variables (IVs) were selected for the study, in order to investigate the 
relative contributions of variables from two differing models (a cognitive model of auditory 
hallucinations, and the Psychological Flexibility Model). The first set of independent variables were 
based on the cognitive models of voice-hearing distress and disability: appraisals of voice 
omnipotence and of voice’s intentions to harm or help (malevolence and benevolence), and levels 
of use of thought control strategies. The second set of IVs included acceptance and mindfulness: 
levels of psychological flexibility, mindful action, and non-judgemental acceptance. 
The dependent variables (DVs) for the study included anxiety and depression symptoms, distress 
and disability associated with voice hearing, and emotional responses and behavioural efforts to 





5.3  Method 
5.3.1  Ethical Considerations 
This study received ethical approval in July 2006 from the Joint South London and Maudsley and 
The Institute of Psychiatry NHS Research Ethics Committee (REC reference 066/04). Research & 
Development approval was obtained from the South London & Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust 
(see Appendix A-1 for relevant documentation).  
 
5.3.2  Design 
The study used a cross-sectional design, exploring the relationships between non-judgemental 
acceptance and psychological flexibility variables, and a number of dimensions of voice hearing. 
These relationships were investigated using a symptom-focused, rather than diagnostic approach, 
with regard to the inclusion of participants in the study (e.g., Bentall, 1990 and as discussed in 
Chapter 1).   
 
5.3.3  Participants & Procedure 
5.3.3.1  Participants 
Participants met the following inclusion criteria: diagnosed with a psychotic illness according to 
ICD-10 criteria (F20-29; or F32.3 Severe Depressive Episode with Psychotic Symptoms), 
experiencing persisting auditory hallucinations for at least 3 months, and on a stable medication 
regime (if they were taking medication). Exclusion criteria were those with a history of organic 
illness or primary diagnosis of substance misuse.   
Voice hearers (N=50) were recruited from mental health services in an inner London borough 
(South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust (SLaM)). Their mean age was 31.8 (SD = 10.54; 
range 18-56) years, 66% were male. Chart diagnoses (ICD-10) for the sample were the following: 




Symptoms. In terms of treatment, 94% of the sample were currently prescribed anti-psychotic 
medication, 6% of the sample were not on any form of psychotropic medication. Participants 
described hearing voices for a mean time of 9 years (range 3 months – 33 years). Consistent with 
other samples of service users from UK inner city localities, the sample was ethnically diverse (with 
36% White British or other white background, 44% Black British/African/Caribbean, 8% mixed 
race, 6% British Asian/Asian, and 6% from other background or unstated). The majority were 
unemployed (74%; student 14%, employed part-time 6%, employed full time 6%). Seventy percent 
of the participants were recruited from community teams, while 30% were inpatients on voluntary 
admissions (at the time of interview).  
5.3.3.2  Procedure 
Participants were recruited from service users who attend community mental health clinics or 
were voluntarily admitted to psychiatric wards. Participants were approached for their consent to 
take part in the study, and the measures were administered in one sitting.   
 
5.3.4  Measures 
Acceptance & Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II; Bond et al, 2011 See Appendix A-2.1) – This 7-item 
questionnaire is designed to be a measure of experiential avoidance/psychological flexibility. 
Respondents rate the degree to which each statement applies to them on a Likert scale (1 - never 
true to 7 - always true); scale range 7-49. High scores on the AAQ-II suggest greater acceptance of 
mental experiences and persistence with life goals in the face of these experiences. The AAQ-II has 
good internal reliability, reported at .84 (Bond et al., 2011).   
Beliefs about Voices Questionnaire Revised (BAVQ-R; Chadwick, Lees & Birchwood, 2000; See 
Appendix A-2.2) – This 35-item questionnaire is designed to measure attributions, beliefs, 
emotional responses and behaviour about voices. Respondents rate the degree to which each 
item describes the way they have been feeling in the past week on a 4-point Likert scale 
(“Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”). The sub-scales for the BAVQ-R have been demonstrated to have 




Birchwood, 2000). The sub-scales for the BAVQ-R are made up of three sub-scales of appraisals 
(malevolence, benevolence, omnipotence), and two sub-scales of emotional and behavioural 
responses (resistance and engagement). Scales range between: 0-18 for malevolence, 
benevolence, and omnipotence; 0-27 for resistance, and 0-24 for engagement.     
For the purposes of this study the behavioural and emotional responses items were examined 
separately, in order to investigate the relationship of psychological flexibility and non-judgemental 
acceptance on volitional responses (behaviours), as compared to non-volitional responding 
(emotions). Therefore to measure behaviours related to resistance and engagement with voices 
on the BAVQ-R, the totals of these items were calculated using only the items that described 
behaviours (e.g., on the Resistance sub-scale, “I do things to prevent it talking”), rather than also 
including the affect items (e.g., “My voice makes me feel down”). There are four emotional 
response items in the Engagement sub-scale (out of eight total) and four emotion items in the 
Resistance sub-scale (out of nine total).  Therefore the behavioural resistance to voices scale range 
was 0-12, and the behavioural engagement with voices scale range was 0-15.  
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer, Smith & Allen, 2004; See Appendix A-2.3): 
This is a 39-item scale designed to measure behaviours associated with mindfulness.  Sub-scales of 
KIMS include skills of Observing, Acting with Awareness (taking mindful action, with undivided 
attention), Accepting without Judgement (non-judgemental acceptance), and Describing, with high 
scores indicating greater use of mindfulness in daily life. The internal consistency of the KIMS 
appears to be good with the alpha coefficients of the sub-scales scoring between .83 and .91.  
Previous studies investigating the relationship between mindfulness and experiential avoidance 
(measured by the original AAQ; Hayes et al., 2004) suggest moderate but significant (p<.001) 
correlations with the Describe (-.35), Acting With Awareness (-.30) and Accept Without Judgement 
(-.26) sub-scales of the measure (using non-psychotic samples) (Baer, Smith & Allen, 2004). For the 
purpose of hypothesis testing in this study, we used only the Act with Awareness and Acceptance 
Without Judgement sub-scales. Scale scores range between: 12 – 60 for Observe, 8 – 40 for 




 Beck Depression Inventory–II (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996; See Appendix A-2.4) - This is a 21-item 
questionnaire designed to measure severity of depressive symptoms; BDI-II scores range between 
0 – 63, with high scores indicating more severe depressive symptoms. It has high reported 
reliability (Coefficient Alpha = .92. Previous correlations with the AAQ-II have been .71, in non-
psychosis samples (Bond et al., 2011).  
Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck & Steer, 1990; See Appendix A-2.5) – This is a 21-item questionnaire 
designed to measure severity of anxiety symptoms; the scale ranges between 0 – 63, with high 
scores indicating more severe anxiety symptoms. It has high reported internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha .92- .94). Previous reported correlations with the AAQ-II have been .61, in non-
psychosis samples (Bond et al., 2011).  
Thought Control Questionnaire (Wells & Davies, 1994; See Appendix A-2.6) – This is a 30-item 
instrument designed to measure individual differences in strategies used to try and control 
unwanted distressing thoughts.  All items are scored 1 (never) to 4 (almost always); total scores 
range from 30 – 120; all subscales range 6-24: high scores suggest frequent use of thought 
strategies. The TCQ measures five factors that correspond to different strategies for controlling 
unwanted thoughts: Distraction; Social Control; Worry; Punishment; and Re-appraisal. The TCQ 
has acceptable psychometric properties, with reported Cronbach Alpha scores for the sub-scales 
reported between 0.64 to .79, and test-retest reliability (six weeks) ranging from .67 to .83 for the 
sub-scales and .83 for the total score.  Previous sub-scale correlations with the AAQ have been 
moderate: Punishment (.37) and Worry (.36) (Hayes et al., 2004).  
Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales (PSYRATS) – Auditory Hallucinations sub-scale (Haddock, 
McCarron, Tarrier & Faragher, 1999; See Appendix A-2.7) – This is an interview-rated scale 
measuring various dimensions of auditory hallucinations, with 11 subscale items for:  frequency, 
duration, location, loudness, disruption; amount and intensity of distress; beliefs about the origin 
of voices; amount and degree of negative content; and controllability. The PSYRATS has been 
found to have high inter-rater reliability and was designed to be sensitive to changes following 
psychological intervention with psychosis (Haddock et al., 1999). Scores for each subscale range 0 
– 4, with a total score range of 0 – 44. In this study these subscales were used as dependent 





5.3.5 Data Analytic Plan 
Statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS version 18.0 for Windows. Preliminary analyses of 
the data distribution were performed: this showed that several variables were not normally 
distributed – PSYRATS Distress Amount and Disruption, and BAVQ-R Malevolence, Benevolence, 
Behavioural/ Emotional Resistance, and Engagement.  
Correlations were calculated to test the hypotheses regarding relationships between variables 
(using Pearson’s correlations for normally-distributed variables, and Spearman’s rho for the 
others), and to clarify the independent variables to be included in the hierarchical regression 
analyses. Hierarchical regression analyses were then conducted to test whether significant 
increases in explained variance resulted from including psychological flexibility, mindful action, 
and non-judgemental acceptance in combination with predictors from cognitive models. For the 
non-normally distributed dependent variables of PSYRATS Distress Amount, Disruption, BAVQ-R 
Behavioural Resistance logistic regressions (Forward Wald) were conducted.   
 
5.4  Results 
The results are reported in several sections:  
1. descriptive statistics of study variables  
2. internal consistency of the mindfulness and acceptance scales 
3. correlations between variables 
4. regression analyses to test the study hypotheses.  
 
5.4.1  Descriptive statistics 
Means, standard deviations (SDs) and ranges of scores obtained on all the measures are presented 




Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics for Study 1 measures, including mean, standard deviation                    
and range of scores 
 
 N Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Auditory Hallucinations  
sub-scale (PSYRATS) 
50 29.7 4.7 17.00 39.00 
Beck Depression Inventory-II 50 2.4 11.9 0 52.00 
Beck Anxiety Inventory 50 23.4 13.8 3.00 55.00 
Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire-II 
50 24.00 10.00 7.00 47.00 
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness 
Skills  
 
Observe  48 38.5 10.5 16.00 58.00 
Describe 47 25.4 5.0 16.00 36.00 
Act with Awareness  48 30.5 5.6 17.00 50.00 
Accept without Judgement  48 24.8 8.0 11.00 45.00 
Thought Control Questionnaire  
Social Control 49 12.7 2.5 8.00 19.00 
Re-appraisal 49 14.4 3.5 6.00 20.00 
Worry 48 12.0 3.6 6.00 22.00 
Distraction 48 14.4 3.7 8.00 23.00 
Punishment 49 12.4 3.5 6.00 20.00 
Beliefs About Voices Questionnaire-
Revised 
 
Voice malevolence 50 9.6 4.1 0 17.00 
Voice benevolence  50 4.3 4.6 0 16.00 
Voice omnipotence 50 10.4 3.8 0 17.00 
Behavioural Resistance to voice 50 10.4 3.9 2.00 15.00 
Behavioural Engagement with voice 50 2.5 2.6 0 10.00 
Emotional Resistance to voice 49 8.6 3.1 0 12 










5.4.1.1  Comparisons with voice hearing /psychosis samples from published research 
This sample showed equivalent levels of symptomatology to previous samples of voice hearers in 
the clinical literature, with reference to mean scores on BDI, BAI and PSYRATS (Gilbert et al., 2001, 
Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier, & Faragher, 1999, Peters et al., 2012). They appeared to be more 
experientially avoidant on the AAQ-II than a student sample (Bond et al, 2011), with similar scores 
to psychosis samples on the AAQ-II (Valiente, Provencio, Espinosa, Chaves, & Fuentenebro, 2011) 
and on the KIMS acting with awareness and non-judgemental acceptance to both psychosis (White 
et al., 2011) and other clinical samples (Baum et al., 2010). In terms of use of thought control 
strategies there were similar levels reported to a psychosis sample (Morrison & Wells, 2000), 
although there was a greater use of reappraisal reported in this study sample. Scores on the 
BAVQ-R were equivalent to the voice hearing samples reported by Chadwick, Lees and Birchwood 
(2000) and Peters et al. (2012).  
 
5.4.2  Internal consistency of the AAQ-II, the KIMS- Accept without Judgement and the Acting with 
Awareness sub-scales 
Both the AAQ-II and the Accept without Judgement sub-scale (KIMS) demonstrated good internal 
consistency, with Cronbach’s alphas of 0.83 and .85 respectively.  
The Acting with Awareness (KIMS) sub-scale demonstrated poor internal consistency with a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .59. As a result of this poor internal consistency the Acting with Awareness 
subscale was dropped from subsequent regression analyses.  
 
5.4.3  Correlations with voice hearing dimensions 
Related to Question (1) (relationships between psychological flexibility, mindful action, non-
judgemental acceptance, appraisals of voices, coping strategies and voice distress and disability), 






Table 5.2 Inter-correlations among study variables – Pearson’s (Spearman’s indicated by italics) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Beck Depression Inventory-II -                  
2. Beck Anxiety Inventory .52*** -                 
3. Voice – Distress Amount (PSYRATS) .17 .01 -                
4. Disruption from Voices (PSYRATS) .23 .07 .24 -               
5. Behavioural Resistance to voice (BAVQ-R) .25 .24 .28 .14 -              
6. Behavioural Engagement with voice (BAVQ-R) -.17 -.13 -.17 .14 -.16 -             
7. Emotional Resistance to voice (BAVQ-R) .40** .24 .18 .01 .46*** -.11 -            
8. Emotional Engagement with voice (BAVQ-R) -.23 .01 -.29* .22 -.09 .66 -.12 -           
9. BAVQ-R: Omnipotence .35* .11 -.01 .33* .28* .23 .45*** .22 -          
10. BAVQ-R: Malevolence .31* -.01 .41** .22 .38** -.22 .39** -.36** .28 -         
11. BAVQ-R: Benevolence -.08 .05 -.35* .08 -.04 .56*** .23 .60*** .31* -.30* -        
12. TCQ: Punishment .40** .46*** .03 .13 .34* .14 .31* .15 .36* .06 .07 -       
13. TCQ: Social Control .24 .45*** .06 .08 .07 .09 .14 -.01 .18 -.14 -.02 .38** -      
14. TCQ: Worry .12 .24 .01 .15 .02 .25 .28 .28 .18 .17 .02 .42** .26 -     
15. TCQ: Distraction -.34* -.21 .08 -.04 .06 -.01 -.05 .09 -.06 .05 .01 -.05 .12 .23 -    
16. TCQ: Reappraisal -.09 .17 -.18 -.06 .24 .30* .06 .30* .19 .20 .33* .40** .33* .31* .51*** -   
17. KIMS: Acting with Awareness -.51*** -.47*** -.01 .07 -.03 .30* -.35* .27 -.07 -.06 .22 -.26 -.07 .05 .14 .04 -  
18. KIMS: Accept without Judgement -.40** -.38** .14 .11 -.42** -.04 -.48*** -.03 -.41** .28 -.04 -.59*** -.25 -.27 .04 -.44** .36* - 
19. AAQ-II -.66*** -.57*** -.16 -.15 -.37** .04 -.28* .06 -.34* -.12 -.06 -.38** -.21 -.10 .15 -.06 .41** .52*** 
***  Correlation significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed)           
 





5.4.3.1  Relationships of psychological flexibility and mindfulness with dependent/independent 
variables  
The AAQ-II (psychological flexibility) was significantly inversely correlated with depressive (p < 
.001) and anxiety (p < .001) symptoms, and emotional (p < .05) and behavioural (p < .01) 
resistance to voices. Similarly The KIMS Accept without Judgement sub-scale had significant 
negative correlations with depressive and anxiety symptoms (both p < .01), as well as 
emotional (p < .001) and behavioural resistance to voices (p < .01). Finally, the KIMS Acting 
with Awareness subscale had significant negative correlations with depression and anxiety 
symptoms (both p < .01), as well as behavioural resistance with voices (p < .05). There was a 
significant positive relationship with behavioural engagement with voices (p < .05).   
However, contrary to the study predictions, neither the AAQ-II nor the KIMS scales 
werenegatively correlated with the PSYRATS amount of distress from the voices, or disruption 
caused by voices. In addition, apart from the KIMS Acting with Awareness subscale, there were 
no significant relationships found with emotional or behavioural engagement with voices. 
There were significant relationships found between appraisals of voice power (omnipotence) 
psychological flexibility and mindfulness: both the AAQ-II (p < .05) and KIMS Accept without 
Judgement (p < .01) were negatively associated with omnipotence appraisals, while KIMS 
acting with awareness was not. There were no significant relationships found between 
psychological flexibility/ mindfulness and appraisals of voice intentions (malevolence, 
benevolence).  
In terms of thought control strategies, psychological flexibility and non-judgemental 
acceptance demonstrated only specific relationships, rather than the expected associations 
with the range of thought control strategies. Thus, psychological flexibility (AAQ-II) was 
negatively associated with the use of punishment (p < .01) only, while KIMS non-judgemental 
acceptance was negatively correlated with the use of punishment (p < .001) and reappraisal (p 
< .01). KIMS acting with awareness did not show any significant relationships with thought 
control strategies.  
 
 




As can be seen from Table 5.2 there were significant positive associations for depressive 
symptoms (BDI-II) and BAVQ-R appraisals of voice omnipotence (p < .05) and malevolence (p < 
.05), as well as with the use of thought control strategies (TCQ): a positive association with the 
use of punishment (p < .01), and a negative relationship with the use of distraction (p < .05).  It 
was also found that anxiety symptoms (BAI) demonstrated highly significant positive 
associations with efforts to control thoughts using punishment, as well as social control (both 
at p < .001); there were no significant associations between anxiety and voice appraisals.  
There were a smaller number of significant associations for the PSYRATS amount of distress 
caused by voices, with a positive correlation with malevolence appraisals (p < .01) and a 
negative association with appraisals of voice benevolence (p < .05); there was no significant 
association with appraisals of voice omnipotence, or the use of thought control strategies.  
The PSYRATS disruption subscale demonstrated only one significant relationship, with 
appraisals of voice omnipotence (p < .05).   
The two Engagement variables showed similar associations: Behavioural Engagement had 
significant positive associations with appraisals of voice benevolence (p < .001) and use of 
reappraisal thought control (p < .05); Emotional Engagement was positively associated with 
benevolence (p < .001), use of reappraisal thought control (p < .05), as well as negatively 
associated with appraisals of voice malevolence (p < .01).  
Finally, for emotional and behavioural resistance to voices there were similar associations: 
both demonstrated significant positive relationships with appraisals of voice omnipotence 
(behavioural resistance: p < .05; emotional resistance: p < .001) and malevolence (p < .01 for 
both), as well as use of punishment thought control (p < .05 for both).  
5.4.4  Regression analyses 
As an initial step in to prepare for the regression analyses multi-collinearity of the IVs was 
tested by running collinearity statistics and diagnostics as part of the regression analyses on 
SPSS (see Table 5.3 below); the Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for all variables 












Tolerance Variance Inflation 
Factor 
KIMS: Acceptance without Judgement .371 2.699 
AAQ-II .628 1.592 
BAVQ-R: Omnipotence .492 2.034 
BAVQ-R: Malevolence .548 1.825 
BAVQ-R: Benevolence .523 1.911 
TCQ: Punishment .542 1.846 
TCQ: Distraction .583 1.716 
TCQ: Social Control  .758 1.319 
TCQ: Reappraisal .353 2.831 
 
 
In order to address question (2), related to the incremental validity of psychological flexibility 
and non-judgemental acceptance, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to assess 
the variance accounted for on the dependent variables of depressive symptoms (BDI-II), and 
anxiety symptoms (BAI).   
These regressions involved including in Step 1 predictors based on cognitive models for 
auditory hallucinations, and then adding in Step 2 psychological flexibility and non-
judgemental acceptance. Independent variables were only selected for Step 1 if they 
correlated significantly with the dependent variables (these variables are shown in Table 5.2 
and described in the correlation section above).  
In addition, Forward Wald analyses were conducted for behavioural resistance (BAVQ-R), 
voice-related distress (PSYRATS), and disruption (PSYRATS); this involved entering stepwise the 
significant cognitive independent variables (again described above in the correlations section) 
in Step 1, and then in Step 2 psychological flexibility and non-judgemental acceptance. In order 
to conduct these analyses we created dichotomous variables using a median split for 
behavioural resistance, behavioural engagement, emotional resistance, emotional 
engagement, voice related distress and disruption. For behavioural resistance scores of 10 or 
below were classed as “low resistance” (46% of sample), with 10 and above “high resistance” 
(54% sample). Behavioural engagement scores of < 3 were classed as “low engagement” (52% 
of sample), with scores 3 and above classed as “high engagement” (48% sample). Emotional 
resistance was classed as “low” for scores < 10 (53% of sample), with “high emotional 




“low” if <3 (54% of sample), or high if 3 or greater (46% of sample). Similarly, scores 0-2 for 
PSYRATS Distress Amount were classed as “low distress” (28% of sample), with 3-4 “high 
distress” (72% of sample). Finally PSYRATS Disruption scores 0-2 were classed as “low 
disruption” (68% of sample), with 3-4 “high disruption” (32% of sample).1  
1 
Due to the skewed distribution of the PSYRATS subscales scores the median splits did not divide the sample evenly 
Table 5.4 shows the regression analyses for the dependent variables of Depressive Symptoms 
and Anxiety Symptoms 
 
Table 5.4 Hierarchical multiple regression analysis of study dependent variables 
 










F Change df1 df2 Significant 
F change 
Depression 1 .26 10.352 .33 5.216 4 43 .01 
2 .44 9.039 .18 7.698 2 41 <.001 
Anxiety 1 .25 12.096 .28 8.636 2 45 .001 
2 .45 10.842 .17 6.506 2 43 .003 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
Depression 
Step 1 – punishment thought control (B = 1.113, ß =.32*), distraction thought control (B = -
1.010, ß =-.31*), omnipotence (B = .444, ß =.14); malevolence (B = .707, ß =.24) 
Step 2 - punishment thought control (B = .526, ß =.15), distraction thought control (B = -.959, ß 
=-.30*), omnipotence (B = .082, ß =.03), malevolence (B = -.665, ß = .23), psychological 
flexibility (B = -.714, ß = -.44**), acceptance without judgement (B = -.125, ß = -.08) 
Anxiety  
Step 1 – punishment thought control (B = .550, ß = .33*), social control thought control (B = 
.753, ß = .31*) 
Step 2 – punishment thought control (B = .923, ß =.23), social control thought control (B = 
1.486, ß = .27*), psychological flexibility (B = -.650, ß = -.47***), acceptance without 




Table 5.5 shows the logistic regression analyses for Behavioural Resistance/ Engagement to 
Voices, Emotional Resistance / Engagement, Voice Distress, and Disruption due to voice 
hearing. 
 



























1 5.364 1 .02 81.5 47.6 66.7    




1 15.281 1 <.001 60.9 88.0 75.0    




1 14.794 2 .001 72.7 84.6 79.2    




1 21.193 1 <.001 72.7 96.2 85.4    




1 10.114 1 .001 35.7 91.2 75.0    
2 10.114 1 .001 35.7 91.2 75.0 - - - 
Disruption 1 7.893 1 .005 87.5 31.3 68.8    
2 7.893 1 .005 87.5 31.3 68.8 - - - 
 
Behavioural Resistance to voices 
Step 1 – omnipotence (B=.19, Wald=4.63, p <.05); not included: malevolence, punishment 
thought control 
Step 2 – omnipotence (B=.13, Wald=1.20, n.s.), acceptance without judgement (B=-.11, Wald, 
4.83, p <.05); not included: psychological flexibility 
 
Behavioural Engagement with voices 
Step 1 – benevolence (B=.32, Wald= 9.038, p <.01); not included: reappraisal thought control.  
Step 2 – no further variables included (psychological flexibility, acceptance without judgement) 
 
Emotional resistance to voices 
Step 1 – malevolence (B=.28, Wald= 6.674, p <.01), punishment thought control (B=.23, 
Wald=4.20, p <.05); not included: omnipotence 




Wald=0.09, n.s); acceptance without judgement (B= -1.54, Wald= 4.529, p <.05), not included: 
psychological flexibility 
 
Emotional Engagement with voices  
Step 1 – benevolence (B=.43, Wald=10.532, p < .001); not included: malevolence, reappraisal 
thought control  
Step 2 - no further variables included (psychological flexibility, acceptance without judgement) 
 
Voices Distress – Amount  
Step 1 – malevolence (B=.27, Wald=7.97, p < .01); not included: benevolence.  
Step 2 – no further variables included (psychological flexibility, acceptance without judgement) 
 
Disruption from voices 
Step 1 – omnipotence (B=.26, Wald=6.36, p <.05) 
Step 2 - no further variables included (psychological flexibility, acceptance without judgement).  
 
5.4.5  Summary of Results 
In this sample of distressed voice hearers we found significant, negative associations between 
psychological flexibility and non-judgemental acceptance and appraisals of omnipotence, use 
of punishment thought control, level of depressive and anxiety symptoms, and actions and 
emotions focused on resisting the voices. Non-judgemental acceptance was also found to be 
negatively associated with the use of reappraisal as a thought control strategy. However, there 
were no relationship between psychological flexibility/non-judgemental acceptance and 
distress and disruption from voices, or with emotional and behavioural engagement with 
voices. 
Using hierarchical and logistic regression analyses we found that models that incorporated 
psychological flexibility and non-judgemental acceptance, along with predictors based on 
cognitive models of distressed voice hearing (appraisals of voices intentionality and power, 
thought control strategies), resulted in a greater proportion of the variance explained for 
depressive and anxiety symptoms, and for behavioural and emotional resistance to voices. As 




hearing, life disruption and the emotions and actions of engaging with voices did not benefit 
from the inclusion of psychological flexibility and non-judgemental acceptance.  
Finally, there were differential contributions between the measures of acceptance: the KIMS 
Acceptance without Judgement contributed to the prediction of behavioural and emotional 
resistance to voices, while the AAQ-II contributed to the prediction of depressive and anxiety 
symptoms. 
 
5.5  Discussion 
The results of this study suggest that naturally-occurring skills of psychological flexibility and 
non-judgemental acceptance, as reported by voice hearers, are related to several important 
outcomes in voice hearing. The study findings suggest that psychological and non-judgemental 
acceptance are associated with levels of depressive and anxiety symptoms, as well as 
emotional and behavioural responses to resist voices.  Moreover in regression-based models 
of these outcomes there were incremental improvements by including psychological flexibility 
and non-judgemental acceptance, in combination with variables identified in cognitive models 
(appraisals, thought control methods).   
However, while psychological flexibility and non-judgemental acceptance were found to be 
related to general wellbeing, the study predictions of significant relationships with voice-
related distress or life disruption were not supported. For these outcomes appraisals of voice 
intention (malevolence, in the case of voice-related distress) or power (for disruption) were 
found to be the only significant independent variables in the regression-based models. These 
results suggest that psychological flexibility (as measured by the AAQ-II) may have a role in 
general emotional outcomes for people who hear distressing voices, but not with the 
processes that result in the amount of distress caused by voices or the disruption associated 
with this experience. It is possible that a general, population-based measure like the AAQ-II 
(Bond et al., 2011) does not have the symptom-specificity to adequately measure 
psychological flexibility for voice hearing; however, subsequent scales that have been 
developed for auditory hallucinations, such as the Voices Acceptance and Action Scale (VAAS) 
have also failed to find an association between psychological flexibility and dimensions of 




Consistent with findings in non-psychosis samples, there was a strong negative association 
between psychological flexibility, as measured by the AAQ-II, and both depression and anxiety 
(Bond et al., 2011). This is consistent with previous research that has found a strong 
relationship between experiential avoidance (EA) and depression (Hayes et al., 1996), and to 
behavioural models of depression that posit a central role for avoidance in maintenance 
(Ferster, 1973; Martell, Addis & Jacobsen, 2001). Considering previous research has suggested 
that depression is associated with increased disability and morbidity for distressed voice 
hearers (Birchwood & Chadwick, 2007; Birchwood, Iqbal & Upthegrove, 2005), the results of 
this study provide further support for the association between EA and depression in psychosis 
(White et al., 2012).   
Non-judgemental acceptance was found to be negatively associated to efforts to resist voices 
and emotions related to resistance; this was a similar finding to a study by Chadwick, 
Barnbrook & Newman-Taylor (2007) that investigated mindfulness and beliefs about voices. 
The relationship between resistance, non-judgemental acceptance and emotional distress may 
be complicated: there have been inconsistent findings about whether resistance is positively 
associated with depression, with significant relationships reported when depression is 
measured using the BDI (Chadwick, Lees & Birchwood, 2000; Peters et al., 2011); however 
Shawyer et al. (2007) reported no relationship when depression was measured by the Calgary 
Depression Scale, a scale to validated with schizophrenia samples. In this study, by dividing the 
emotional from the behavioural resistance BAVQ-R items, it was found that emotional 
resistance was significantly associated with depression severity, while behavioural resistance 
had no association (or indeed with the other dependent variables of anxiety, voice-related 
distress or disruption). One possible explanation is that the emotional resistance items of the 
BAVQ-R may reflect general distress, and this may account for the previously-reported high 
associations with depression, and also for the relationships with non-judgmental acceptance 
and psychological flexibility in this study. For this sample, the behavioural resistance items may 
potentially be measuring strategic or functional actions toward voices, and hence are 
unrelated to negative outcomes, but still negatively associated with non-judgemental 
acceptance/ psychological flexibility: efforts to resist voices imply a judgemental stance toward 
these experiences.  
Psychological flexibility and, more significantly, non-judgemental acceptance showed negative 




appraisals of voice intention (malevolence or benevolence). These findings are similar to the 
correlations reported by Shawyer et al (2007) using the VAAS. The result suggests that 
accepting experiences without engaging in judgement is related to a reduced chance of 
appraising voices as omnipotent. This association fits with the Psychological Flexibility Model, 
in that believing a voice is omnipotent implies greater cognitive fusion, where experiences are 
responded to in a literal manner (so that a person may respond to a perceived powerful other 
in subordinate ways, see Gilbert et al., 2001; Birchwood, Meaden, Trower, Gilbert & Plaistow, 
2000); regarding a voice as powerful is antithetical to non-judgemental of experience. Due to 
the cross-sectional design of this study it is unclear what the direction of causality may be: it is 
possible that appraising voices as omnipotent increases, in general, judgements about other 
experiences also. A potential inconsistency with this theoretical perspective is the lack of an 
association found with appraisals of voice intention (which are also judgements about 
experience). Chadwick, Barnbrook & Newman-Taylor (2007) report a negative association 
between a measure of mindfulness of voices and appraisals of malevolence; it may be in the 
current study that the use of a general measure of non-judgemental acceptance did not 
adequately assess this relationship, or that beliefs about voice intentions are unrelated to non-
judgement/ psychological flexibility. Finally it could be that the construct of mindfulness in the 
Chadwick, Barnbrook & Newman-Taylor (2007) study is different or has an additional facet to 
the measures used in this study; an area for further investigation.  
Also, contrary to the study predictions, thought control strategies were not related to voice 
distress or disruption; however, the use of punishment as thought control was positively 
related to depression, anxiety, appraisals of omnipotence, emotions and actions taken to resist 
voices. The use of distraction was found to be negatively related to depressive symptoms, and 
the use of social control (e.g., seeking reassurance) was strongly related to anxiety symptoms. 
Psychological flexibility and non-judgemental acceptance were related to less use of 
punishment as a thought control strategy: again, as the direction of causality cannot be 
determined in this design it may be that the use of punishment to manage unwanted thoughts 
may increase judgement and non-acceptance of a range of private experiences.  Finally, the 
use of reappraisal to control thoughts was significantly inversely related to non-judgemental 
acceptance; this could be argued to fit with the conceptualisation of acceptance that reduces 




significantly related to emotional outcomes, while the use of reappraisal was not, is in line 
with this potential explanation.     
5.5.1  Limitations of these findings 
As described earlier in this discussion, the cross-sectional design of the study limits the 
conclusions that can be made regarding causality and directionality between the study 
variables. 
This study utilised a sample of distressed voice hearers, and so conclusions cannot be drawn 
about the relationships of the study variables for people who find voice hearing a pleasant or 
neutral experience. The sample was skewed toward those with greater levels of life disruption 
(as measured by the PSYRATS): it was evident when inspecting the data that there were only a 
small number of participants who engaged with the voices, through action and emotion. Thus, 
this study may not have been able to explore adequately the relationships of psychological 
flexibility and non-judgemental acceptance for those who may find their voices engaging and/ 
or benevolent in nature may nevertheless be disabled by this experience.   
There were also several limitations with regard to the measures used in this study. First, 
analyses of the KIMS Acting with Awareness subscale were curtailed, due to the problems with 
the internal consistency of the scale. This subscale has been found to have acceptable levels of 
internal consistency with other samples (Baer, Smith & Allen, 2004), including non-psychosis 
clinical groups (Baum et al., 2010). A possibility is that the subscale items do not adequately 
measure this construct in psychosis samples; subsequent studies by Oliver et al. (2011) and 
White et al. (2011) have found that this subscale does not contribute significantly to study 
predictions or change significantly following intervention.   
Second, it became evident during this study that measures of functioning/disruption need to 
be more fine-grained to capture the potential costs and benefits of various ways of coping 
with voices. In this study, measuring disruption associated with voice-hearing on the PSYRATS 
was unsatisfactory, as the PSYRATS uses a 5 point scale that measures functioning by whether 
the participant is in supported accommodation or hospitalised. In the study sample a minority 
of participants scored poorly on this item, resulting in a restricted range of scores (most 
participants were recruited from community settings and living in independent 




voice-hearing may interfere differentially with different life domains (such as 
concentration/attention, relating to others, self-care, pursuing personal goals). A similar 
challenge was found with the PSYRATS voice-related distress measure (amount of distress 
scale): recruiting a sample of distressed voice hearers meant that there was a restricted range 
of scores (basically the two highest ratings). In retrospect, it may have been better to use an 
alternate measure that allowed for a greater range of ratings for levels of distress associated 
with voices, such as the Personal Questionnaire approach used by Peters et al. (2012) or the 
alternatives to the PSYRATS reviewed by Ratcliff, Farhall & Shawyer (2011).     
5.5.2  Clinical Implications 
Broadly the results of this study provide evidence that psychological flexibility may be helpful 
for emotional problems in psychosis, rather than for distress or disruption associated with 
voices specifically. The study findings suggest that the ability to “step back” from evocative 
private experiences is associated with voice hearers’ experiencing less depression and anxiety, 
and engaging in fewer efforts to resist voices. In this study, this stance toward experiences was 
measured as a trait tendency (naturally-occurring) in distressed voice hearers.  
An implication of this study is that it may be useful to incorporate psychological flexibility and 
non-judgemental awareness in clinical models of emotional distress for voice hearers, as 
potential resilience factors. One advantage of considering these processes in models is that 
clear intervention strategies are suggested by their inclusion: mindfulness and acceptance, 
such as featured in the treatment approaches described by Chadwick (2006; Person-based 
Cognitive Therapy) and Bach and colleagues (Bach et al, 2006; Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy). Theoretically, a contextual shift is developed, from a narrow repertoire of avoidance 
and escape-focused actions that are negatively reinforced and maintain distress, to approach 
behaviours that potentially result in access to a wider range of reinforcers, both directly 
contacted and abstractly derived, resulting in greater life meaning and vitality, even with on-





Study 2 - Multiple-baseline evaluation of an acceptance-based 




Research exploring the outcome and processes of change in ACT suggest that changes in 
believability, non-judgemental acceptance and mindfulness are associated with improved well-
being, reduced symptom impact, and greater quality of life. In this study the process and 
outcome of a 10 session ACT intervention for people experiencing distressing and disabling 
auditory hallucinations was investigated. The study used a multi-baseline, single-case design, 
with baseline and intervention phases and four assessment points. Outcomes investigated 
included mood, anxiety, social functioning, quality of life, and severity of auditory 
hallucinations, which along with process measures (psychological flexibility to voices, non-
judgemental acceptance) were assessed using self-report and interviewer-rated scales.  A 
computer-based method of measuring strength of relational responding (implicit belief) was 
piloted to assess changes in preferences toward acceptance of voices. Eight participants, 
recruited from community mental health settings and on waiting lists for psychological 
therapy, completed the intervention and all measures.  The results demonstrated that over 
half of the participants showed some form of improvement following the intervention, while 
accounting for baseline changes. Significant group improvements in levels of depression, social 
functioning and quality of life were also found following the intervention, compared to post-
baseline. Four participants showed improvement in both well-being and quality of life 
measures, and some form of change in non-judgemental acceptance, autonomy from voices 
and/or acceptance toward voices. Assessment of relational responding suggested that those 
who improved during the ACT intervention may have shown a preference toward acceptance 
of voices prior to starting therapy. The study had limitations in terms of the heterogeneity 
within the group, the lack of follow-up to assess the stability or delayed effects of the 
intervention, and potential issues relating to the difficulties of measuring constructs such as 




6.2  Introduction 
In Chapter 3 the literature on outcome research and hypothesised processes of change in 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) was reviewed, describing intervention studies of a 
number of (non-psychotic) clinical disorders and problems, and then focusing on the studies 
carried out with people distressed and/or disabled by psychosis. The conclusions drawn from 
this research suggest that ACT demonstrates efficacy across a variety of problems, compared 
to no treatment, and equivalent outcomes to other empirically-based therapies in comparison 
studies. The literature suggests that, when the underlying ACT processes are investigated, 
changes in believability and mindfulness appear to mediate outcome (Ruiz, 2012). This has 
been found in studies following up the outcomes  of brief and longer interventions with 
psychosis (Bach, Hayes & Gallop, 2011; Gaudiano et al., 2012; White et al, 2012), and in 
particular for those participants experiencing auditory hallucinations (Gaudiano, 2008).  
Similarly studies of other mindfulness-based interventions for distressed voice hearers have 
found that increases in non-judgemental acceptance and reductions in conviction in 
experiences are related to outcome (Chadwick et al., 2010; Dannahy et al., 2011; Newman-
Taylor, Harper & Chadwick, 2009).  
The purpose of the study described in this chapter was to investigate the effectiveness and 
processes of change in a 10-session ACT individual intervention for people experiencing 
treatment-resistant distressing voices. At the time of planning this study (2007) there had only 
been two published trials of ACT with people experiencing psychosis (Bach & Hayes, 2002; 
Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006), conducted in the USA. Both of these trials employed very brief 
ACT interventions (up to 4 hours contact) in hospital settings with people who were acutely 
psychotic and received only limited community care (Bach & Hayes, 2002; Gaudiano & 
Herbert, 2006). Each of these trials recruited a mix of participants who were experiencing 
hallucinations and/or delusional beliefs. For the current study it was planned to develop an 
ACT protocol that was longer in duration, conducted in a community setting and focused upon 
people experiencing auditory hallucinations, to assess the initial effectiveness of this 
intervention for voice hearers in a United Kingdom context (access to community treatment, 




To explore the possible processes of change in an ACT intervention for psychosis, based upon 
the results of Study 1, changes in non-judgemental acceptance and psychological flexibility 
toward voices were assessed. The Voices Acceptance and Action Scale (VAAS; Shawyer et al., 
2007) was used as a process measure to assess psychological flexibility in the context of voices 
(willingness to experience voices as a private event: acceptance; and independent action from 
voices). In addition, autonomy from voices and willingness to experience voices were 
measured session-by-session.  Outcome measures included measures of auditory hallucination 
symptom severity, levels of depression and anxiety symptoms, social functioning, and quality 
of life.  
 
6.2.1 Use of single-case methodology 
A single-case design was adopted for this study. Single-case designs have a long history of use 
in behaviour therapy research (e.g. Barlow & Hersen, 1973, Leitenberg, 1973; Shapiro, 1966), 
and in the empirical development of cognitive therapy for psychosis researchers utilised single-
case designs to provide useful early indications of efficacy and processes of change (e.g., 
Chadwick & Lowe, 1994; Chadwick, Lowe, Horne & Higson, 1994). Single case designs allow for 
the cost-effective investigation of processes of change in psychological interventions (e.g., 
Moras, Telfer &  Barlow, 1993) when compared to group-based designs (Kazdin, 1998). These 
designs also allow for the detailed analysis of “non-responders” as well as “responders” 
(Barlow & Hersen, 1984). Replication across multiple participants using such designs can 
demonstrate intervention efficacy and effectiveness (e.g., Fisher & Wells, 2008), providing 
evidence that justifies investment in randomised control group designs. 
 
6.2.2 The measurement of relational responding/ implicit beliefs 
Finally, based on the implications of Relational Frame Theory (see Chapter 2), it was planned 
to pilot the measurement of relational responding to voices (in an accepting or non-accepting 
manner). This pilot was to explore whether changes in relational responding might be 
associated with outcome changes following ACT: whether participants would show an implicit 
preference toward acceptance rather than non-acceptance of voices.  Measurement of this 
responding (using a response-timed computer task called the Implicit Relational Assessment 




considered useful in providing a more objective method of determining change, as these 
methods are less susceptible to deception and self-presentational strategies, such as wanting 
to please the experimenter, which can occur with using self-report and interview methods 
(Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006).  
In previous research with the IRAP, participants respond more slowly when asked to choose 
responses which represent the opposite of what they believe (e.g., Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006; 
Dawson et al., 2009) Comparisons of speed of responding between trials consistent and 
inconsistent with a target concept (e.g., an attitude) are then used to measure the strength of 
implicit belief (see below for a description of the IRAP).  
In the context of this study, measuring relational responding using this approach was chosen 
to strengthen the validity of the single-case design, and was additionally an innovation in 
measurement for psychological interventions.  
 
6.2.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The research questions were:  
1) Does the introduction of acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) result in 
outcome changes for people experiencing distressing voices?   
2) Does ACT produce changes in psychological flexibility (mindfulness, acceptance) for 
distressed voice hearers? 
3) Are there greater changes in distress and functioning, compared to frequency and 
duration of symptoms, following ACT for voices? 
4) How does a pilot implicit measure of voice acceptance perform at baseline and 
following ACT for voices? 
 
The following predictions were made:  
1) Significant changes in outcome measures relating to levels of depression and anxiety 
symptoms, social functioning, and quality of life will only occur in the intervention 
phase. It is not expected that there will be significant changes in outcomes following 
the baseline phase of the study. 
2) Significant changes in process measures (psychological flexibility, non-judgemental 
acceptance, willingness toward voices, autonomy from voices) will occur only once 
the intervention phase has commenced.  
3) Significant changes in process measures will precede changes in outcome measures 
(i.e. for responders Mid Therapy assessments will show process changes, while 




4) No change is expected in outcomes not directly targeted by ACT, such as frequency of 
symptoms or auditory hallucination symptom severity.  
 
It is expected that these changes will be significant at a single-case and group level.  
6.3 Method 
6.3.1 Ethical Considerations 
This study received ethical approval in April 2008 from the South East Research Ethics 
Committee (NHS) (REC reference 08/H1102/11). Research & Development approval was 
obtained from the South London & Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust (see Appendix B-1 for 
relevant documentation).  
6.3.2 Design 
This study used a non-concurrent multiple-baseline, single case design (Barlow & Hersen, 
1992) to investigate the intervention; the multiple baseline (1-4 weeks) was across participants 
divided into two groups (N=4 for each; 8 participants total), with randomised, sequential 
commencement to the intervention phase of the study. There were two phases, an 
assessment/baseline phase followed by an intervention phase (A-B design). 
 
6.3.3 Preparatory work for the study 
6.3.3.1 Development of a treatment manual 
The intervention was based on the core clinical processes of ACT  (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 
1999) and using the modifications for psychosis outlined by Pankey and Hayes (2003), Bach 
(2004) and Bach, Gaudiano, Pankey, Herbert & Hayes (2006). The treatment manual is listed in 
Appendix B-2.  
The treatment manual was used as a guide for the intervention session content. Material from 
various ACT publications was incorporated in the intervention: 
1. The general description of the ACT clinical processes (Luoma, Hayes & Walser, 2007) 
2. The outline of the ACT assessment/ case formulation process  (Lillis & Luoma, 2005) 
3. The Tug of War with the Monster (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999) 
4. The Passengers on the Bus (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999) 




6. The Mindfulness: Be Here Now handout (Hayes & Smith, 2005)  
7. The “Minds are don’t-get-eaten-machines” psycho-education handout (Ciarrochi & 
Bailey, 2008)  
8. The Clean vs Dirty Discomfort Diary (from Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999)  
9. The Two Mountains metaphor, to describe the therapeutic relationship (Hayes, 
Strosahl & Wilson, 1999)  
10. Pain and Suffering circles (Hayes & Smith, 2005) 
11. Two Scales metaphor (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999)  
12. A variation of the “White Bear” thought suppression exercise (Wegner, 1989)  
13. The Chessboard Metaphor (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999)  
14. The River of Thoughts exercise (Pankey & Hayes, 2003) 
 
In addition, worksheets and flashcards were created to reinforce several exercises, including 
the  ‘Passengers on the Bus’ metaphor, a values clarification exercise, and a mindfulness 
prompt, as well as a  session summary form, where the participant was asked to list the main 
points of each meeting, which they could peruse between sessions. These materials were 
illustrated with cartoons developed from the University of Wollongong, Australia to illustrate 
ACT concepts (http://www.uow.edu.au/health/ACTherapy/resources/index.html).  
A compact disc of ACT and mindfulness exercises was created (narrated by the author). It 
contained the following exercises:  
1) 5 minute Mindfulness (from Hayes & Smith, 2005)    
2) Clouds Exercise (from Zettle, 2007)  
3) Leaves in the Stream Exercise (from Hayes & Smith, 2005)  
4) Lifetime Achievement Award (from Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999)  
5) Free Experiencing Exercise (from Walser & Westrup, 2007)  
6) Chessboard Metaphor (from Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999)  
7) Observer Exercise (from Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999)  
 
6.3.3.2  Adherence and competence Ratings 
To check the fidelity of the ACT intervention being offered to participants, a measure of 
adherence was developed for the study.  
The background for this measure was based on the literature of measuring psychotherapy 
adherence from a behavioural perspective (Waltz, Addis, Koerner, & Jacobsen, 1993). Waltz et 
al (1993) recommended that adherence measures should include four types of items:  
1. Therapist behaviours that are both unique to that treatment modality and essential 
to it 




3. Behaviours that are compatible with the specified modality, and therefore not 
prohibited, but neither necessary nor unique 
4. Behaviours that are proscribed 
 
Similarly Waltz et al recommended that to determine whether a treatment has been 
adequately administered, there must be an assessment of therapist competence. Determining 
competence involves specifying how sensitively the treatment protocol is applied to individual 
clients, by considering the therapeutic context: a) stage of therapy, b) client difficulty, c) client 
presenting problems.  
An ACT for psychosis adherence measure was developed based on these recommendations. 
This measure is in Appendix B-3; it asks the rater to judge the presence of ACT components in 
the session, appropriateness and client responsiveness to this component. It also asks for 
ratings of proscribed therapist behaviours, plus an overall rating.  
The ACT components were based on the competencies outlined in the general training manual 
(not psychosis specific) of Luoma, Hayes and Walser (2007); their description of each of the 
competencies was included as an appendix in the measure (see Appendix B-3).  
The proscribed therapist behaviours listed were based upon a combination of “ACT 
inconsistent techniques” (Luoma, Hayes & Walser, 2007) and cognitive techniques described in 
the Cognitive Therapy Scale for Psychosis Adherence Scale (CTPAS; Startup, Jackson & Pearce, 
2002), in particular “Evidence for Delusional Beliefs”, “Validity Testing/ Behavioural 
Experiments”, “Colombo Style”, and “Verbal Challenge of Delusions”. For the proscribed 
behaviours these were rated for the degree of presence in the session.  
Adherence was judged by the presence of ACT components and absence of proscribed 
therapist behaviours. Competence was judged by presence, appropriateness and client 
responsiveness, along with the absence of proscribed therapist behaviours. 
6.3.3.3 Development of a relational responding assessment (IRAP) 
Choosing Acceptance and Experiential Avoidance Words 
 
To develop the sets of words to be used in the IRAP task nine experienced ACT therapists were 
asked to rate word lists generated by the author, in a range from 0 to 10 (where 0 is no 
agreement, and 10 is complete agreement) according to how closely they fit with the 




appear in Table 5.3. The same set of words was rated for each definition (presented in a 
different order), with the intention to take the three highest-rated words in each category, as 
stimuli in the IRAP task. The definitions were:  
“Acceptance =  the active and aware embrace of those private events occasioned by 
one’s history without unnecessary attempts to change their frequency or form, 
especially when doing so would cause psychological harm.  (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, 
Masuda & Lillis, 2006)” 
 
“Experiential avoidance = when a person is unwilling to remain in contact with 
particular private experiences (e.g., bodily sensations, emotions, thoughts, memories, 
behavioral predispositions) and takes steps to alter the form or frequency of these 
events and the contexts that occasion them, even when this process is unhelpful 
(Hayes, Wilson & Strosahl, 1999)” 
 
Ratings were averaged across the nine therapists for each definition (acceptance or 
experiential avoidance). As can be seen from Tables 6.1 and 6.2, the ratings were 
unambiguous for either definition - with the three highest-rated words for acceptance (Let Be, 
Accept, Allow) and experiential avoidance (Block Out, Resist, Suppress). 
Table 6.1 – Mean ACT therapist ratings for acceptance words (N=9) 
Word/ Phrase Mean SD 
Resist 0.6 0.7 
Allow 8.6* 1.2 
Block out 0.2 0. 7 
Obey 2.9 2.1 
Fight 1.0 1.2 
Reject 1.4 1.3 
Love 7.2 2.0 
Choose 6.4 1.3 
Ignore 3.8 1.5 
Dislike  3.3 1.6 
Interrupt 3.0 1.6 
Accept 9.0* 1.0 
Argue with 2.7 1.6 
Suppress 1.1 0.9 
Let be 9.00* 0.9 
Forgive 7.7 1.4 
Control 1.4 1.0 
Struggle with 2.0 1.3 
Listen to 6.0 2.4 
Be kind to 7.3 1.6 
Follow  4.2 2.1 
Like 4.8 2.7 
 
Table 6.2 – Mean ACT therapist ratings for Experiential Avoidance words (N=9) 




Interrupt  7.1 1.2 
Allow 1.1 0.9 
Dislike 5.7 2.5 
Listen to  2.8 1.8 
Follow  3.8 1.9 
Struggle with  7.2 2.3 
Love 1.6 1.7 
Obey  4.7 2 
Ignore 6.8 1.6 
Let be  0.9 0.9 
Like 3.2 2.5 
Accept 0.8 1.0 
Argue with 8.0 1.3 
Suppress 8.9* 0.9 
Be kind to  2.2 1.8 
Forgive 1.8 1.8 
Control 8.7 1.2 
Reject 8.7 1.2 
Resist  9.0* 0.7 
Block out 9.2* 0.8 
Fight 8.2 1.6 
Choose 3.2 1.8 
 
A description of the IRAP 
 
The IRAP is presented on a computer, with practice trials and then a fixed set of six test blocks. 
Each block has the same number of trials, and on each trial one of two label stimuli is 
presented at the top of the screen, with one of two types of target stimuli presented in the 
center; the participant is required to choose between two response options, which appear the 
bottom left and right of the screen. These choices are made using the “D” or “K” key, and the 
positions of the response options shift left-right randomly from trial to trial.  
The test blocks are organized into consistent and inconsistent sets of trials: consistent trials 
involve responses that are synonymous with established verbal relations (e.g., voices are to be 
avoided), while in inconsistent trials the participant has to respond in the opposite manner 
(e.g., voices are to be accepted).  
Based on email correspondence with, and a visit to, Professor Dermott Barnes-Holmes at the 
National University of Ireland, Maynooth in 2007, the IRAP task was constructed so that 
participants would respond to word sets related to acceptance or experiential avoidance, in 
the context of “Voices” or a “Close Friend”. The “Close Friend” label was chosen to provide a 




person responded to potentially in a similar manner to voices. Figure 6.1 presents the four 
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On each trial the label (“Voices” or “Close Friend”), target word (either Acceptance /EA words 
– let be, accept, allow or resist, block out, suppress), and response options (Agree, Disagree) 
appeared simultaneously. In Figure 6.1 the arrows with superimposed text boxes indicate 
which responses are considered consistent or inconsistent (boxes and arrows do not appear on 
the screen). If the participant selected the consistent response option during a consistent trial, 
or the inconsistent response option in an inconsistent trial, the screen was cleared for 0.4 
seconds before the next trial was presented. If an inconsistent response option was chosen 
during a consistent block, or a consistent response option during an inconsistent block, a red X 
appeared on the screen. This red X stayed on screen until the participants chose the 
alternative response.   
For the purpose of the study, however, only the responding within the label of Voices was 
planned to be used for the analyses. The speed of responding was measured between 
“consistent” and “inconsistent” (reversed) trials for acceptance vs experiential avoidance (EA) 
words; the difference in timed performance between original and reversed trials is then used 
to measure the strength of implicit belief (in this case for symptom avoidance). It was assumed 
that the “consistent” trials might reflect prior (and normative) learning, in terms of responding 
to voices.  Thus the IRAP task was made up of four different trial types, created by presenting 
each label with two sets of target words (see Figure 6.1). A block of consistent trials would 
require the following responses: Voices-[EA word]-Agree, Voices-[Acceptance word]-Disagree, 
Close Friend-[EA word]-Disagree, Close Friend-[Acceptance word]-Agree.  In contrast the block 
of inconsistent trials that followed would require these responses: Voices-[EA word]-Disagree, 
Voices-[Acceptance word]-Agree, Close Friend-[EA word]-Agree, Close Friend-[Acceptance 
word]-Disagree.  
 
Piloting the IRAP 
 
Five participants who had completed the first study were invited to participate in piloting the 
IRAP task.  
The aim of this pilot was to ascertain whether voice hearing participants 1) find the IRAP 
acceptable and easy to learn, and 2) meet criterion for a “valid” IRAP response, by responding 
within the cut-off of 10 seconds.  The criterion for a valid IRAP was based upon the work by 




convention that responses over 10 seconds would be excluded from analyses, as these 
responses are considered to be too long in duration to reflect an “implicit” response.  
Acceptability was assessed by feedback from the participants, an initial training phase where 
participants would develop fluency in the IRAP, and whether the participants tolerated the 
task, by completing all the IRAP trials.  
Assessment of whether pilot participants could produce valid IRAP responses was assessed 
through using a fluency task, and then if fluency was established, subsequent performance on 
the six trial IRAP.  
The fluency task involved participants correctly matching 80% of neutral terms, each within a 
3-second latency period. The neutral terms chosen were the labels “shape” and “colour”, with 
target words from these categories (i.e., circle, square, triangle; red, blue, yellow), and the 
response option of same/ different. Thus participants were asked to match words as to 
whether they fitted in the label category. The use of neutral words for the fluency task was to 
ascertain if pilot participants could achieve criterion, with stimuli that were likely not to be 
evocative or related to their clinical problems.  
This matching task was simpler than the full IRAP in that it did not involve inconsistent trials: 
pilot participants only had to correctly match 80 per cent of the shape/colour words. This was 
done in order to establish whether participants could produce fluent responses, once familiar 
with the computer task. During the fluency task participants were given feedback on the 
computer screen about whether their responses were correct (a red X appeared on screen if 
not); if the participant did not match at least 80% correctly in the first block (12 trials), they 
were asked to complete a second block to establish if they could achieve criterion.  If 
successful at this in the fluency task, participants were then asked to complete the six block 
Voices IRAP, with the changed criterion of validity of providing <15% of responses longer than 
a 10 second latency.  
Thus the pilot was conducted in two sections:  
1) a training phase, that introduced the participant to the IRAP using neutral terms to 
respond to (matching shape and colour words), and  
2) the IRAP task with the acceptance and experiential avoidance words related to 





A summary of the pilot participants’ performance appears in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 below.  
Fluency - It can be seen from Table 6.3 that all pilot participants achieved fluency in the 
matching task within 24 trials (two blocks of stimuli presented, 12 in each block), with four out 
of the five participants achieving this within the first presentation block. Additionally all 
participants were able to respond over 50% of the time in less than 5 seconds to the trial 
stimuli, and responses that would be considered invalid (> 10 seconds) were minimal for four 
out of five participants, with one participant (Pilot 4) responding 25% of time with long 
responses.  
Valid IRAP responses - All five pilot participants were then asked to complete the six block 
Voices IRAP, the results of which can be seen in Table 6.4. As can be seen all participants 
responded within the 15% response latency limit for validity (with the highest number of 
responses > 10 seconds being 11.1%). In terms of responding three pilot participants (1, 3 and 
5) showed a style of responding suggestive of preferring non-acceptance with voices, while 
Participant 4 showed a preference for acceptance. Participant 2’s response times suggest a 
lack of preference for either acceptance or non-acceptance, in relation to voices.   
Based on the successful pilot of the IRAP, it was included in the main study as a potential 













Table 6.3  Pilot performance on the IRAP: Fluency – Colour and Shape words 
 



























































2.933 0.737 2.214 0.693 0 3.695 2.789* -0.906 
Pilot 
2 
3.550 1.420 3.626 1.329 6 2.614* 2.669 0.055 
Pilot 
3 
5.131 2.027 4.678 2.013 0 2.559 2.333* -0.226 
Pilot 
4 
3.458 2.008 4.440 2.050 6 1.681* 2.158 0.477 
Pilot 
5 
6.157 2.103 4.469 2.130 11.1 2.736 1.985* -0.751 
D
IRAP 
= effect score calculated for each trial type (acceptance and non-acceptance ) by dividing the mean by the 




The participants were eight service users of community mental health services, recruited while 
on waiting lists for psychological therapy (cognitive behavioural therapy for psychosis). 




London & Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, including teams for early intervention and 
recovery. In addition recruitment occurred from a specialist therapy service for psychosis 
(PICuP: Psychological Interventions Clinic for outpatients with Psychosis). Due to recruitment 
occurring while participants were on waiting lists, this study did not assess outcome at a 
follow-up period (when people were subsequently engaged in cognitive behavioural therapy).  
 
6.3.4.1 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Participants were recruited who satisfied the inclusion criteria of the study:  
1) 18 years or older; 
2) experiencing persisting (over 12 months in duration), treatment-resistant auditory 
hallucinations perceived by the participant to be distressing and/or disabling; 
3) on a stable medication regime and engaged in community mental health care;  
4) not currently engaged in cognitive behavioural therapy, or having completed 
therapy in the past 12 months. 
Figure 6.2 shows the flow diagram for study recruitment.   
There were challenges in recruitment, with half of the participants recruited dropping out of 
the study (eight from sixteen recruited). Four dropped out or declined to participate after 
giving consent and completing the first assessment; one participant dropped out during the 
baseline phase; and three participants dropped out during the intervention phase (within the 
first three ACT sessions). Of those participants who dropped out during the intervention phase 
- one participant moved to another part of the country and could not continue sessions, one 
participant did not like engaging in mindfulness exercises or talking about values, finding it 
confusing; one participant did not want to engage in therapy if the approach could not 




Consent & First Assessment 
N = 16 
Commenced Intervention 
N = 11 
Excluded  (N = 4) 
Dropped out N = 2 
Declined to participate  N = 2 
Excluded  (N = 1) 
Dropped out  N = 1 
 
Referred 
N = 26 
Excluded  (N = 10) 
Did not meet study criteria   N = 3 
Declined to participate    N = 7 
Started Baseline Assessments 
N = 12 
Completed Intervention 
N = 8  
Excluded  (N = 3) 
Moved out of area  N = 1 
Dropped out   N = 2 




The sample demographics appear in Table 6.5. As can be seen the participants were 5 males, 3 
females; aged 27 – 54. In terms of ethnicity four were White British, and four were from a 
Black or Minority Ethnic background. None of the participants were in paid employment, 
although three were engaged in voluntary work. All participants were on a stable medication 
regime and receiving a care package of community mental health care. 
 
Table 6.5    Study 2 Participant demographics      
 

















2 “Brian” 50 Male White 
British 
















4 “David” 28 Male White & 
Black 
African 










6 “Fiona” 48  Female Black 
British 





7 “Grace” 33 Female White 
British 
Unemployed Single F20 - 
Schizophrenia 
9 years 













No participant had a change in medication during the period of the study; similarly, no 





Participants had been hearing voices from 2 to 28 years. Seven participants had ICD-10 F20.0 
Schizophrenia-spectrum diagnoses; one participant had a primary Mood Disorder diagnosis, 




6.3.4.1  Session ratings 
Participants were asked to rate process measures at the start of each assessment and 
intervention session, involving multidimensional measurement of hearing voices, measured as 
a self-report percentage scale/ visual analogue for each variable: conviction/ believability, 
frequency, associated distress, preoccupation, degree of autonomy from symptoms, 
willingness to experience symptoms. This measure is presented in Appendix B-5.   
 
6.3.4.2  Outcome and Process Measures 
Outcome measures 
 
The Psychotic Symptoms Ratings Scales – Auditory Hallucinations sub-scale (PSYRATS-AH; 
Haddock et al., 1999; See Appendix A-2.7) - Please refer to Chapter 5 for a description of this 
scale (in the Measures section 5.3.4).   
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996; See Appendix A-2.4).  
Please refer to Chapter 5 for a description of this scale (in the Measures section 5.3.4).    
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1990; See Appendix A-2.5)  
Please refer to Chapter 5 for a description of this scale (in the Measures section 5.3.4).   
Manchester Short Assessment of Quality of Life (MANSA; Priebe, Huxley, Knight & Evans, 1999; 
see Appendix B-6.1). This a 16-item measure comprising questions related to satisfaction with 
various domains of life. The subjective items assess satisfaction with life as a whole, job (or 
sheltered employment, or training/education, or unemployment/retirement), financial 




safety, people that the individual lives with (or living alone), sex life, relationship with family, 
physical health and mental health. Items are rated on a 7-point satisfaction scale, from 
1=‘Couldn’t be worse’ to 7=‘Couldn’t be better’.  The summary score for the MANSA is the 
mean of the 12 subjective items (range 1 to 7, the higher the score the better the quality of 
life). The MANSA has been found to have adequate internal consistency and construct validity 
as a measure of quality of life in severe mental illness samples (Priebe et al., 1999; Bjorkman & 
Svensson, 2005).  
Social Functioning Scale (SFS; Birchwood, Smith, Cochrane, Wetton & Copestake, 1990; see 
Appendix B-6.2). This 79-item scale is designed to assess social functioning in schizophrenia. It 
asks about performance and abilities in seven areas: social engagement, interpersonal 
communication, activities of daily living, recreation, social activities, competence in daily living, 
and occupation/ employment. The measure was completed in this study by the participant. 
Subscale raw scores are converted into scaled score equivalents with a mean of 100 and a 
standard deviation of 15, using the original standardisation sample of the scale (Birchwood et 
al., 1990). The SFS has been shown to be a reliable, valid and sensitive measure of social 
functioning (Barrowclough & Tarrier, 1990; Birchwood et al., 1990).  
 
Process measures 
Voices Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (VAAS; Shawyer, Ratcliff, Mackin, Farhall, Hayes & 
Copolov, 2007; see Appendix B-6.3). This 31-item questionnaire measures acceptance of the 
experience of auditory hallucinations (acceptance, and the ability to live purposefully even 
whilst experiencing voices (action). Participants are asked to respond on a 5-point scale from 
Strongly Disagree (=0) to Strongly Agree (=4), giving a scale scores ranging from 0 to 64 
(acceptance), and 0 to 60 (action). Higher scores indicate greater acceptance and 
independence from voices. The VAAS and its subscales demonstrates adequate internal 
consistency with a Cronbach’s α of between .76 and .90 for subscales, high test-retest 
reliability (ranging 0.72 to 0.82 for subscales).  
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (Baer, Smith & Allen, 2004; See Appendix B-6.4). 
Please refer to Chapter 5, section 5.3.4 for a description of this scale. Based on the results of 
the first study (described in Chapter 5), only the Acceptance Without Judgement (KIMS-AWJ) 




6.3.4.3  Relational responding task (IRAP) 
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006), is a 
response-timed, computer-based matching task to assess the strength and direction of implicit 
beliefs for a target concept. The development of this measure is described above, in Section 
6.3.3.3.  
The IRAP program was run on a Dell Inspiron computer. In the first assessment participants 
were introduced to the IRAP by practicing with the matching task described in the pilot work 
(colour/shape words), and meeting the criterion of correctly matching 80 per cent of the 
words (all participants did this within one test block).  
The IRAP then involved participants matching over six blocks of 12 trials experiential avoidance 
and acceptance words and phrases (such as “block out”, “reject”, “allow”, “let be”) in 
correspondence to a target label, in this case “voices” or “close friend”. The format of the 
presentations was similar to that presented in Figure 6.1: words were presented in large black 
font in the centre of a grey screen; the words would remain on screen until a correct response, 
if an incorrect response was made a red X would appear and the participant would be 
instructed on-screen to respond again. If a correct response was made then the screen would 
go blank for 0.4 seconds before another trial would start.  
At the start of the IRAP participants were given the instruction from the researcher that it was 
a matching task, and that the computer will inform them when they have made a correct 
match between the words presented, giving them the opportunity to make the correct match 
if their first response is incorrect (Participants weren’t prior to the IRAP task about which 
responses were correct in the first block, they were supposed to work it out themselves over 
time, based on the computer’s feedback). Participants were also instructed to respond as 
quickly as they could, while limiting guessing or making random responses.  
Participants were then presented with the first block of matching words (a “consistent” block, 
in that the correct answer to words related to experiential avoidance and voices was “agree” 
and to acceptance words, “disagree”).  Once the participant correctly matched all words (by 
correct first responses, or providing the correct response after receiving feedback that their 
first response was wrong by seeing a red X on the screen; see description earlier in Section 




 In the second block participants were instructed on-screen that the relationships between the 
words were reversed, so that the previously-correct responses were now wrong and the task 
involved responding in an opposite manner (an “inconsistent” block, reversed relations as 
described earlier and in Figure 6.2). Following completion of this block the IRAP repeated 
through four more blocks of trials, in order of blocks Consistent-Inconsistent-Consistent-
Inconsistent (six blocks of trials).  
After each trial, participants were given feedback from the IRAP program on their accuracy and 
speed in responding, in the form of a score appearing on the screen. This was done to increase 
participants’ motivation in completing the task, through “beating their score”. Completion of 
six blocks of the IRAP took participants fifteen minutes on average.   
6.3.5 Procedure 
The participants were recruited into two groups (four in each).  Group allocation was 
sequential, with the first four participants in the first group, and the second four in the second 
group. Allocation for Baseline length (1-4 weeks) was randomised within each group. For the 
purpose of this report participants are described by their order in the group, rather than the 
order that they were recruited to the study.  
Following informed consent the study commenced with the first Assessment session (Start 
Baseline), which involved the participant completing the process and outcome measures for 
the study. The Baseline Phase then commenced (for 1-4 meetings), before a second Baseline 
Assessment (End Baseline), and then the introduction of the Intervention Phase in a 
subsequent session. The Intervention Phase involved 5 sessions of ACT, and then an 
Assessment session (Mid-Therapy), followed by another 5 sessions of ACT. The study then 
ended with a final Assessment session (End Therapy).  
 
6.3.5.1 Assessment Procedure 
Participants were asked to rate process measures at the start of every session, involving 
multidimensional measurement of hearing voices measured as a self-report percentage scale/ 




Participants were asked to complete the outcome and self-report measures of 
mindfulness/acceptance at four time points: prior to the baseline phase, at the end of the 
baseline phase, session 5 of the intervention, and at the end of the intervention phase.  
 
6.3.5.2  Baseline 
The baseline phase involved the researcher meeting with the participant and for 1 - 4 
assessment sessions (as described above), during these sessions the participant was asked to 
complete the process measures. These sessions were conducted by the author; all involved 
face-to-face meetings. In addition to the process measures these sessions involved building 
engagement with the participant and gaining a sense of the presenting problems that the 
participant was bringing to therapy. No problem-solving, normalising, or other active 
intervention methods were used by the therapist during the Baseline sessions.   
 
6.3.5.3  Intervention 
The intervention involved 10 sessions in the form of audio-recorded, weekly therapy sessions 
with a psychologist trained in the ACT approach (the author).  The intervention was based on a 
treatment manual, developed by the author and described in Section 6.3.3.1 above. The 
treatment manual is in Appendix B-2.  
The participants were given the compact disc from session 2 and encouraged to use it as a 
form of home practice. In each ACT session there was brief discussion of how the participant 
was finding using the compact disc, and when exercises were introduced in the session, it was 
reinforced that the exercise was also on the compact disc to review before the next session.  
6.3.5.4  Adherence Ratings Procedure: 
An ACT expert, Prof Frank Bond (Goldsmith’s, University of London) was asked to use this 
measure to rate audio-recordings of complete therapy sessions for two out of the first four 
participants (within the timescale that Prof Bond was available these were the only sets of 
recordings available). He was given a brief, anonymised synopsis of the participant background 
and asked to select randomly sessions from the beginning (sessions 1-3), middle (4-7) and end 




Adherence Ratings Given 
For all of the sessions rated there were judged to be no proscribed behaviours present in the 
recordings.  
All recordings were rated to be adherent to the ACT treatment model; similarly the therapist 
was rated to be competently providing the intervention. The ratings for the session adherence 
appear in Appendix B-7.  
6.3.6  Data Analysis Strategy   
It was planned to analyse the data on two levels, and across the phases of the study: 1) within 
each participant’s measures (single case methods), and 2) at the level of the group. The 
methods used for data analysis are listed in Table 6.6; for each set of measures (outcome and 
process; session-by-session ratings; IRAP scores) the methods will be discussed in terms of 
these two levels.  
 




Level of Analysis 
 
Single Case Method 
 
Group Method 
Outcome & process measures 
 
Reliable Change Indices Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
Session ratings 
 
Tau-u Tau-u omnibus score 
Relational Responding  
(IRAP scores) 








6.3.6.1  Outcome and process measures 
Single-case method 
The outcome and process measures across the four assessment periods (Start of Baseline, End 
Baseline, Mid Therapy, End of Therapy) were analysed by comparing changes in participants’ 
scores against a Reliable Change Index (RCI), where reliable change is defined as a change 




the RCI is a measure of whether a change in a participant’s score is statistically significant: it is 
defined as the change in a participant’s score divided by the standard error of the difference 
for the test being used (Jacobson & Truax, 1991; Martinovich, Saunders & Howard, 1996).  
The level of significance chosen for these analyses was p < .05; therefore a cut-off RCI score of 
+/- 1.96 suggests a significant change. The means and standard deviations for the RCI analyses 
were based on the data produced in the first study of this thesis; the test reliability scores (to 
calculate the standard error of the difference) were taken from published material for each 
measure (cited in the Measures section), using the internal consistency method for clinical 
populations recommended by Martinovich, Saunders and Howard (1996). For measures that 
were not included in the first study, data from published samples were used (MANSA: Priebe 
et al., 1999; VAAS: Shawyer et al., 2007; SFS: Birchwood et al., 1990).  
Each participant’s scores on the outcome measures were subjected to a RCI analysis 
comparing changes in scores from the following phases: 
1) Start of Baseline - End Baseline (to establish whether there was a stable baseline),  
2) End Baseline - Mid Therapy (to ascertain changes in process measures, as hypothesised),  
3) End Baseline - End Therapy (to assess changes following the intervention, pending stability 
in the baseline) 
For the purposes of clarity the RCI scores are reported as a negative score representing reliable 




The outcome and process measures were also compared at a group level across the four 
assessment periods, using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (rather than a paired samples t-test, 
as the data were not normally distributed).  
 
6.3.6.2  Session ratings  
Single-case method 
Statistical analyses were conducted using the Tau-u statistic, as recommended by Parker, 




Tau-u is a non-parametric statistic that combines Kendall’s Rank Correlation and the Mann-
Whitney U test (Parker et al., 2011), producing an index of change between two phases. The 
Tau-u is a measure of non-overlap between study phases, combined with an analysis of trend 
in phase B (the intervention), which is established by the percentage of data-points that 
improve during the phase. The Tau-u can be used to establish whether there is a significant 
difference between the phases, and has been found to be a robust measure of non-overlap, 
with advantages compared to other statistical methods in single-case research in being able to 
control for baseline positive trends. Parker et al. (2011) have demonstrated that the Tau-U 
performs reasonably well with auto-correlated data, which occurs in single case designs as 
each measurement is not independent from preceding points; controlling for auto-correlation 
is important to avoid Type I errors.  
For the analyses of the study data it was sought to establish whether there was a significant 
degree of non-overlap between the study phases, Baseline (A) and Intervention (B), using the 
Tau-u analysis that controls for baseline positive trend. The level of significance chosen for 
these analyses was p < .05; the Tau-u analyses were reported as the statistic and a confidence 
interval (90% CI).  
Group Method 
Group level analysis of the session ratings was conducted by combining derived Tau-u scores 
for participants for the particular measure, to produce an omnibus score of the Tau-u results, 
reported as a confidence interval (90% CI) in order to determine significant effects (i.e., not 
crossing the zero line).    
6.3.6.3  IRAP scores 
Single-case method 
The IRAP data for each assessment phase were analysed in the following manner (using the 
recommendations from Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart & Bowles, 2010):  
1) only response-latency data for “Voices” from the test blocks were used (the “Close 
Friend” response times were not used in any of the study analyses) 
 
2) individual responses that were > 10 seconds were discarded from the analyses 
 
3) a participant’s set of responses were considered invalid if there were more than 





4) for each trial type of acceptance and non-acceptance words (consistent and 
inconsistent) related with “Voices” a mean and standard deviation was calculated. 
This comprised the performance across the six test blocks of 36 trials (nine trials in 
each of the four types; i.e. Acceptance words x consistent trials, Acceptance words x 
inconsistent trials, Non-acceptance words x consistent trials, Non-acceptance words x 
inconsistent trials).   
 
5) An effect score (DIRAP ) was calculated for relations each trial type (consistent and 
inconsistent) by dividing the mean by the pooled standard deviation 
 
6) An effect score difference was calculated by subtracting the effect score for 
acceptance relations (the inconsistent trials) from the effect score of the non-
acceptance relations (consistent trials), for words in relation to “Voices”.  
 
The effect score difference provides the direction of the relation (the participant’s preference), 
as well as an estimate of the strength of that direction (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). Thus a 
score in a positive direction suggests a preference for acceptance, while non-acceptance is 
suggested by a negative score, with the magnitude of this difference suggesting how strong 
the preference is.  
Thus, mean difference scores were interpreted as indicating how quickly a participant was 
responding to acceptance words in relation to speed of response to experiential avoidance 
words, in the context of Voices. 
 
Group Method 
It was planned to compare the IRAP performance for those that responded to the ACT 
intervention, with those that did not, by creating mean DIRAP scores for each group. These 
mean difference scores would then be compared (see the Results section below for a 
discussion).    
 
6.4  Results 
The results of this study are reported in several ways in this section. Summary information and 
data for the group of participants are reported, and group-level analyses presented. Then 
participant data were analysed individually using indices of statistically reliable change (for 




overlap and positive trend (for session-by-session ratings). Finally relational responding data 
(the IRAP) are subject to comparisons between those participants judged to have responded to 
the ACT intervention, and those who did not.  
6.4.1  Descriptive statistics for the Group 
Table 6.7 lists the sample means and standard deviations for the study variables. These data 
are for the whole sample (Groups 1 and 2).  
 
Table 6.7   Sample Means and Standard Deviations for Outcome and Process Measures 
 
 













PSYRATS 30.63 3.34 29.13 4.52 28 3.63 24.5 11.28 
BDI 36.5 13.90 28 13.64 26.5 14.44 21.625 11.65 
BAI 31.5 11.33 29 7.87 23.625 8.99 22.5 14.65 
MANSA 3.39 0.72 3.72 0.78 4.06 0.99 4.42 0.94 
SFS 101.9 6.45 102.9 8.84 103.1 7.26 107.4 8.26 
KIMS-AWJ 25.579 6.34 19.375 4.69 24.875 9.01 26.125 8.31 
VAAS-
Acceptance 
30.625 3.70 31.875 1.81 32.75 6.96 37 7.33 
VAAS-
Action 
29.625 7.74 33.125 6.64 31.75 8.81 38.875 7.75 
 
 
6.4.2  Comparison with other samples 
The levels of symptom severity for the auditory hallucinations at baseline are similar to 
previous samples reported for people experiencing persisting distressing auditory 
hallucinations (e.g., Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier, & Faragher, 1999; Penn et al., 2009). Similarly 
the baseline scores for non-judgemental acceptance (KIMS-AWJ), acceptance of voice 
experience and action independent from voices (VAAS) are similar to published studies (White 
et al., 2011; Shawyer et al., 2007). Compared to the voice hearing samples described by Penn 
et al (2009) for a randomized controlled trial of CBTp vs supportive therapy, the study sample 
had higher levels of depressive symptoms, and poorer social functioning.   
6.4.3  Outcome and process measures: Single Case analyses (Reliable Change Indices) 




It can be seen from Table 6.8, in the Start of Baseline - End Baseline RCI analysis, that several 
participants did not show a stable baseline for the outcome variables.  
Participant 7 showed a reliable improvement on symptom levels for auditory hallucinations 
(PSYRATS) during the baseline phase, although at the end of baseline was still experiencing 
voices to a clinically significant level.  
For depression scores there was a reliable deterioration for Participant 4, and reliable 
improvements for Participants 2, 7 and 8. For anxiety scores there was a reliable deterioration 
for Participant 5, and improvements for Participants 2 and 8. For quality of life there was a 
reliable deterioration for Participant 4, and reliable improvements for Participants 7 and 8.  
Only one participant showed a reliable change on a process measure, with Participant 7 
showing a reliable improvement in non-judgemental acceptance (KIMS-AWJ). This participant 
did not show any other changes on process measures during the Baseline Phase.  
Thus overall Participants 2 and 5 showed reliable deterioration on an outcome measure during 
the Baseline phase, while Participants 4, 7 and 8 showed improvements on one or two 
outcome measures. Participants 4, 7, and 8 all showed a mixed picture of improvements and 
deterioration.  
 
Table 6.8 - Reliable Change Indices for Phases, Start of Baseline – End Baseline 
























#1  1.10 0.92 0.63 0.947 0.68 -0.23 -0.18 0.58 
#2 -.082 -1.16 -3.57* -3.22* -1.81 -0.23 -0.91 -1.95 
#3 0.82 -0.30 -0.42 -0.76 -1.81 0.69 0 -1.17 
#4 1.37 -0.10 2.73* -0.95 2.27* 1.83 -0.91 -0.39 
#5 0 -0.10 -1.05 2.65* -1.13 -1.14 -0.18 -1.36 
#6 -0.82 1.00 0 -0.19 0.45 -0.23 0.91 0.20 
#7 -2.47* 0.14 -7.35* -0.19 -2.49* -2.29* -0.36 0.78 



















*= significant at p<.05 






Changes from Baseline to Mid therapy 
It can be observed from Table 6.9 that the RCI analysis suggests reliable changes for several 
participants. Participant 7 showed a reliable deterioration in depressive symptoms, while 
Participants 3, 4 and 5 showed reliable improvements in levels of anxiety symptoms. 
Participant 2 had a reliable deterioration in quality of life, while Participant 4 showed 
improvement.  
On the process measures Participants 4 and 6 showed reliable improvements in non-
judgemental acceptance and Participant 7 had a reliable improvement in terms of 
independent action from voices. Participant 3 showed a reliable deterioration in independent 
action from voices.  
In summary, for the period from the end of the baseline phase until the mid-therapy 
assessment, four participants showed a reliable improvement on one outcome measure 
(Participants 2, 3, 4 & 5), and one on a process measure (Participant 3). Two participants 
showed a reliable deterioration (Participant 7; depressive symptoms; Participant 4, quality of 
life), with a further 3 participants showing deterioration in one process measure (Participants 
4, 6, and 7).  Participant 4 was the only participant to show a mixture of improvement and 
deterioration. 
 
Table 6.9 - Reliable Change Indices for Phases, End of Baseline - Mid Therapy 























#1  -1.10 -1.04 -0.84 -0.76 -1.36 0 1.09 0.39 
#2 -0.28 -0.23 1.26 1.89 2.49* -0.23 1.27 1.75 
#3 0 -0.57 -0.84 -2.08* 0.91 -1.14 -0.72 2.14* 
#4 -0.55 1.81 -1.47 -4.35* -6.80* -3.89* -0.18 -0.20 
#5 0 -0.40 -1.68 -2.84* -0.91 1.37 0.36 0.78 
#6 0 -0.80 -0.20 -0.38 0 -2.75* -0.18 1.56 
#7 -0.28 0.26 2.10* -0.19 -0.45 -1.60 -1.09 -2.53* 
#8 0.28 0.80 -0.84 0.57 -1.36 -1.83 -1.81 -1.75 








*= significant at p<.05 






Changes within the Intervention phase of the study 
Table 6.10 shows the reliable changes for participants during the whole Intervention phase of 
the study (the 10 sessions following the baseline phase).  
One participant showed a reliable deterioration at the end of the intervention phase 
(Participant 2, anxiety symptoms).  
Five participants showed reliable improvements post the intervention: Participant 3 
experienced a reliable reduction in the severity of auditory hallucinations; Participant 4 had 
improved scores for depressive and anxiety symptoms, as well as quality of life; Participant 5 
showed an improvement in anxiety symptoms; Participant 7 had improvements in severity of 
auditory hallucinations, anxiety symptoms and quality of life; and Participant 8 had 
improvement in quality of life.  
There were also reliable, positive differences in the process measures, with Participants 4, 7 
and 8 reporting greater non-judgemental acceptance and independent action from voices. In 
addition Participant 7 reported greater acceptance of voices.  
  
Table 6.10 - Reliable Change Indices for Phases, End of Baseline - End of Therapy 























#1  -0.28 -1.15 0.72 0 -0.45 -1.37 0 -0.18 
#2 0 -1.44 -0.54 2.27* 0.46 -0.45 0.72 -0.37 
#3 -2.20* -0.43 0 -0.76 -1.36 -0.46 -0.72 -0.74 
#4 -0.55 -0.04 -3.60* -2.84* -4.99* -2.97* -1.63 -2.23* 
#5 -0.55 -0.68 -1.80 -4.17* -0.45 0 -0.54 -0.37 
#6 1.10 -1.18 -1.26 0.76 -0.91 -0.46 -0.72 0.37- 
#7 -3.85* -0.89 -1.26 -4.35* -3.85* -3.89* -2.71* -2.97* 
#8 -1.37 -0.28 -1.44 -0.78 -3.63* -2.74* -1.81 -2.04* 








3 imprvd 3 imprvd 1 imprvd 3 
imprv. 
 
*= significant at p<.05 








6.4.4  Summary of Changes during study  
Table 6.11 summarises the changes across the phases of the study, indicating reliable 
improvements and deteriorations in the outcome and process variables.  
In the Baseline phase only three participants showed a stable trend in their outcome measures 
(Participants 1, 3 and 6). Two participants appeared to have a deteriorating trend (Participants 
4 and 5), while three participants had changes that appear to be an improving trend 
(Participants 2, 7 and 8). There were no changes in the process measures that represented a 

















Table 6.11 - Summary of reliable changes by phases   
  
Participant Baseline 




Post Intervention  
(End Baseline-End 
Therapy) 
#1   
 
 
      
#2  Depression 
 Anxiety 
 Quality of Life  Anxiety 
#3    Anxiety 
 Voices Action* 
 
  Voice Symptom 
Levels 
 
#4  Depression 
 Quality of Life 
 Anxiety 





 Quality of Life 
Non-judgemental 
Acceptance* 


















 Voice Symptom 
Levels 
 Depression 






 Voices Action* 
 
 Voice Symptom 
Levels 
 Anxiety 
 Quality of Life 
Non-judgemental 
Acceptance* 
 Voices acceptance* 






 Quality of Life 
   
 Quality of Life 
Non-judgemental 
Acceptance* 
 voice Action* 








6.4.4.1  Defining “responders” to the intervention 
Based upon the RCI results five participants (3, 4, 5, 7 & 8) were classed as responders to the 
intervention, as there had been an improvement on at least one outcome measure between 
the end of the baseline phase and the end of the intervention. As can be seen in Table 6.10, for 
Participant 3 there had been a reliable reduction in the severity of his auditory hallucinations. 
Participant 4 there were reliable improvements on levels of depressive and anxiety symptoms, 
as well as quality of life. Participant 5 had improvement in anxiety symptoms only. Participant 
7 had improvements in levels of anxiety symptoms and quality of life. Participant 8 had 
improvement in quality of life only.  
It can also be observed that four of these five participants had clinical improvements 
accompanied also by improvements in levels of non-judgemental acceptance, acceptance of 
voices and/or independent action from voices. At the mid therapy point Participant 3 displayed 
an improvement in independent action from voices (and reduced anxiety), although this 
improvement was not sustained at the end of therapy.  At the end of therapy Participants 4, 7 
and 8 had improvements with non-judgemental acceptance and autonomy from voices, with 
Participant 7 also showing an improvement in acceptance of voices. For the purpose of 
analysis we decided to class these four participants as “mindful-responders”.  
Participant 2 demonstrated a reliable worsening following the intervention, with a 
deterioration of levels of anxiety.  
As can be seen from Table 6.11, there were no participants who had reliable changes on non-
judgemental acceptance, acceptance of voices or greater independent action from voices at 
the end of therapy, without changes in at least one outcome variable.  
 
6.4.5  Outcome and process measures: Group level 
In order to establish whether there were significant group-level changes in the outcome and 
process measures, analyses were conducted using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test, with a 
significance level set at p < .05. Comparisons were made between scores for the Start of 
Baseline -End of Baseline (to establish whether there was a stable baseline phase), End of 




Therapy (to ascertain changes following the 10 session ACT intervention). These results are 
reported in Table 6.12 below.  
 
































.042* .173 .024* .017* .061 .035* .139 .012* 
p < .05 
 
 
It can be seen from Table 6.12 that there were no significant differences for the outcome and 
process variables in both the Start of Baseline-End Baseline and End Baseline-Mid Therapy 
comparisons. In contrast significant differences were found between End Baseline-End 
Therapy for five out of the eight variables, with only levels of anxiety (BAI), voices acceptance 
(VAAS) and the severity of auditory hallucinations (PSYRATS total) remaining unchanged. These 
differences suggest that there were significant sample-level increases following the ACT 
intervention in social functioning and quality of life, and a decrease in depressive symptoms. 
Similarly there were significant increases following the ACT intervention for the process 
variables of non-judgemental acceptance (KIMS-AWJ) and independent action from voices 
(VAAS).  
 
6.4.6  Session ratings: Single Case analyses (Tau-u) 




The results of the Tau-u analysis appear in Table 6.13. As can be seen from this table, several 
participants’ scores showed significant positive changes from the Baseline to Intervention 
phase. There were no significant deteriorations demonstrated with the session measures for 
any participant. Participants 2, 4, 5 and 7 showed significant changes in the reporting of 
distress associated with the voices; Participants 1 and 5 had significant reductions in their level 
of preoccupation with voices; Participant 7 also reported significant reductions in voice 
frequency and believability. One participant (5) had a significant (statistical) improvement on 
willingness, although visual inspection of the session ratings (see Appendix B-8) shows that the 
magnitude of change in the ratings was small (baseline range 0-2/100; intervention range 2-5/ 





Table 6.13   Phase A (Baseline) - Phase B (Therapy): Significant and trend level Tau-
u analyses 
 
Participant Distress Preoccupation Frequency Conviction 
  
Willingness Autonomy 
#1   - -0.750 
CI  -1.383,  
-0.117 
p < .05 




P < .05 
 - - - - 0.517 
CI -.004,  
1.037 










p < .01 
 - -  - -  - 
Group 2             
#5  -0.972 
CI  -1.61,  
-0.339 
p < .01 
-1.028 
CI -1.661,  
-0.395 
p < .001 
- - 0.912 
CI 0.284, 
1.55 











p < .02 
-  -0.800 
CI -1.320, 
-0.280 




p < .02 





- - -   - - - 
Confidence intervals at 90%  
For Distress, Preoccupation, Frequency and Conviction negative Tau-u values indicate improvements.  








6.4.7  Session Ratings: Group Level (Tau-u Omnibus) 
Below are Figures 6.3 to 6.8, which display the Tau-u analyses for the session ratings by 
participant, in addition to the omnibus Tau-u (90% confidence intervals). 
The omnibus scores for the Tau-u suggest that there were significant group-level effects 
following the intervention for improvements in ratings of voice-related distress (Tau-ugroup = -
.41, p < .0001, 90% CI [-0.60, -0.21]), preoccupation with voices (Tau-ugroup = -.30, p = .02, 90% 
CI [-0.51, -0.12]), and reductions in voice frequency (Tau-ugroup = -.36, p = .01, 90% CI [-0.55, -
0.16]). Significant effects were not found post-intervention for autonomy from voices (Tau-
ugroup = -.07, p = .54, 90% CI [-0.27, 0.12]), willingness (Tau-ugroup = .08, p = .45, 90% CI [-0.11, 
0.29]), or conviction/ believability (Tau-ugroup = -.20, p = .12, 90% CI [-0.41, 0.02]).  
 




Tau-u  (90% confidence interval) 


























Tau-u  (90% confidence interval) 
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Figure 6.6  Tau-u results for Conviction/ Believability scores by participant and for group 
(omnibus score) 
Conviction / Believability
Tau-u  (90% confidence interval) 




















Figure 6.7   Tau-u results for Autonomy from Voices scores by participant and for group 
(omnibus score) 
Autonomy from Voices
Tau-u  (90% confidence interval) 

























Figure 6.8    Tau-u results for Willingness scores by participant and for group (omnibus 
score) 
Willingness
Tau-u  (90% confidence interval) 




















6.4.8  Combined significant changes in study measures and session ratings 





Table 6.14 - Participant Significant Changes by Phases  
 
Participant Start Baseline - 
End Baseline 
RCI  (p < .05) 
End Baseline-
Mid Therapy 
RCI  (p < .05) 
End Baseline-
End Therapy 
RCI (p < .05) 
Session Measure 
Changes (A/B) 
Tau-u (p < .05) 
#1          Preoccupation 
 
#2  Depression 
 Anxiety 
 
 Quality of Life  Anxiety  Distress 
#3    Anxiety 
 Voices Action* 
 




#4  Depression 
 Quality of Life 
 Anxiety 






















   
#7  Voice Symptom 
Levels 
 Depression 






 Voices Action* 
 Voice Symptom 
Levels 
 Anxiety 











#8  Depression 
 Anxiety 
 Quality of Life 




 voice Action* 
 














6.4.9  Relational Responding:  Single Case analyses (DIRAP) 
Tables 6.15 and 6.16 show the IRAP performance for each participant, across the study phases. 
The DIRAPscores can be interpreted in this manner: a negative score suggests a preference 
toward non-acceptance and voices, while a positive score suggests a preference toward 
acceptance.  
The majority of the participants produced negative DIRAPscores throughout the study, 
suggesting stability in their relational responding, toward non-acceptance of voices. However, 
it can be observed that there were three participants who at the Start Baseline phase had a 
positive DIRAPscore (participants 4, 6 & 7); there were also positive DIRAPscores suggestive of a 
preference toward acceptance at End Baseline (participants 1, 7), Mid Therapy (participant 7), 
and End Therapy (participants 1, 7).  
 
Table 6.15 – IRAP Mean latencies and effect scores for Start and End Baseline Phases 
 



























1 5.132 4.678 2.005 -0.23 4.321 5.051 1.680 0.43 
2 5.415 4.918 1.725 -0.29 4.373 3.616 1.364 -.56 
3 4.262 3.290 2.235 -0.44 4.066 3.148 1.478 -0.62 
4 3.458 4.440 2.057 0.48 4.532 3.898 2.289 -0.28 
5 5.384 3.188 2.200 -0.99 5.209 3.782 2.141 -0.67 
6 2.566 2.582 0.860 0.02 3.189 2.797 0.906 -0.43 
7 2.022 2.583 1.375 0.41 2.452 2.510 1.180 0.05 











   End 
Therapy 



























1 4.305 3.904 1.448 -0.28 4.030 4.549 1.656 0.31 
2 4.740 3.979 1.672 -0.46 3.847 3.593 1.454 -0.17 
3 3.994 3.000 1.536 -0.65 3.876 3.453 1.563 -0.27 
4 3.708 3.100 2.127 -0.29 3.082 2.831 1.208 -0.21 
5 4.313 3.503 1.918 -0.42 5.474 3.342 2.155 -0.99 
6 2.333 1.849 0.873 -0.55 2.505 2.429 0.705 -0.11 
7 1.181 1.929 0.880 0.84 0.833 1.130 0.570 0.52 
8 3.895 2.719 1.227 -0.96 4.726 3.423 1.790 -0.73 
 
 
6.4.10 Relational Responding: Group Level Analysis (Average DIRAP scores) 
Table 6.19 shows the mean DIRAP scores for the participants grouped as “mindful responders” 
due to their performance on the study outcome and process measures (participants 3, 4, 7 and 
8; see above), compared to other participants (”non-responders”, N = 4). It can be seen that 
there was a clear difference between the mindful responders and the other participants at the 
Start Baseline phase, with the mindful responders as a group showing small preference for 
acceptance in the context of voices; this difference was not present in subsequent phases, 
with a group preference toward non-acceptance and equivalent performance to the non-
responders. The “non-responders” as a group showed a preference for non-acceptance in the 
context of voices through all the study phases. Based on the individual performance shown in 
Table 6.17, it can be seen that for the Start Baseline phase the aggregated DIRAP score direction 
is due to the responding of Participants 4 and 7.  These scores are also demonstrated in graph 





Table 6.17 – Mean DIRAP difference scores across phases, Mindful Responders and Non-
Responders 
 
Group Start Baseline End Baseline Mid Therapy End Therapy 
Non-responders  
 
-0.46 -0.30 -0.42 -0.33 
Mindful 
Responders* 
0.05 -0.35 -0.35 -0.33 
*Mindful Responders = Participants 3, 4, 7 & 8.  
 
 








6.4.10.1 Practice effects for the IRAP 
Table 6.18 compares at a group level the speed of responding to IRAP consistent and 
inconsistent trials across the phases of the study. This comparison was conducted using the 
Wilcoxon Sign-Rank test (a non-parametric test due to the small N) and demonstrates that for 
both types of trials that there was a significant difference in speed of responding when 
comparing performance at the Start Baseline phase with the End Therapy phase. Moreover, it 
appears that there was significant reduction in response latency for Inconsistent trials at the 
Mid Therapy phase, when compared to the End Baseline phase. These results suggest that for 
the sample there was a significant, overall increase in speed of responding from the start of 
the study to the end, suggestive of a practice effect.  
 
Table 6.18 - Practice Effects for IRAP - Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test, Reported Significances 
Phase comparison Consistent trials Inconsistent trials 
Start Baseline – End Baseline .674 .674 
End Baseline – Mid Therapy .093 .036* 
Mid Therapy – End Therapy 1.00 .779 
Start Baseline – End Therapy .036* .036* 
 
 
6.4.11  Therapy Generalization: Untargeted Gains 
A therapy model based upon behavioural principles suggests that a common process of change 
that occurs during an effective intervention is a greater proportion of actions based upon 
approach (appetitive control) rather than escape (aversive control) (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 
2012). Although this process was not formally measured in this study, there were participant 
reports during the intervention that were suggestive of this process occurring. In Table 6.19 
below are participants’ reports about engaging in previously-avoided activities that were 
described as being part of ongoing, chosen life directions and associated with a personal sense 
of meaning. It was of note that these actions were not targeted during the therapy sessions; 
rather the participants decided to engage in these activities without suggestion or prompting 




The uncontrolled, anecdotal nature of these reports of course limits the validity of the 
conclusions that can be drawn. Rather these observations may provide some suggestion to 
measuring idiosyncratic processes of change specified within the ACT model not otherwise 
targeted by current measurement methods. 
Table 6.19   Untargeted Gains during the Therapy Phase 
Participant Action 
#1 Participant decided to go to an ceremony to receive an award for 10 years’ 
volunteering 
#2 Participant decided to walk past a petrol station, on the way to the clinic, to 
exercise openness to his experiences (trauma cue)  
#5  Participant engaged back in competitive chess and political activism, after 
long break following onset of illness.  
#6 Participant chose to take long bus journey to get to relative’s birthday party, 
in the face of paranoid thoughts and voices. 
 
6.4.12  Summary of results 
Were the study hypotheses supported?  
The results of the single-case and group levels of analysis were used to determine the support 
for the study predictions.  
1) Reliable changes in certain outcome measures (levels of depression and anxiety 
symptoms, social functioning and quality of life) will only occur in the intervention 
phase. It is not expected that there will be reliable changes in outcomes following the 
baseline phase of the study. 
 
At the single-case level this prediction was not supported: during the baseline phase several 
participants showed reliable improvements in outcome measures, such as depression 
(Participants 2, 7 and 8), anxiety symptoms (Participants 2 and 8), and quality of life 
(Participants 7 and 8). Several participants also showed reliable deteriorations in depression 




 For the four participants that showed a reliable improvement in these outcome measures at 
the end of the intervention, when compared to the end of baseline, two of them (Participants 
7 and 8) were showing improvements in levels of depressive and anxiety symptoms during 
baseline phase (suggestive of a trend toward improvement). However the other two 
participants (4 and 5) were showing deterioration in levels of depression or anxiety symptoms, 
respectively, before improvements in the intervention phase.   
At the group level this prediction was supported: there were no significant changes on 
outcome measures during the Baseline phases. In the Intervention phase there were only 
significant improvements in certain outcome measures (depression, quality of life, social 
functioning) at the End Therapy assessment point. There were no significant improvements 
demonstrated for levels of anxiety symptoms or auditory hallucination severity at the group 
level.    
In addition, for the session ratings at the group level, significant changes were found for 
distress associated with voices, level of preoccupation with voices, and voice frequency.  
 
2) Significant changes in process measures (psychological flexibility, non-judgemental 
acceptance, believability, willingness toward voices, autonomy from voices) will occur 
only when the intervention phase is commenced.  
 
At the single-case level this hypothesis was partially supported in this sample: for those 
participants that demonstrated significant change on the process variables, this largely 
occurred during the intervention phase. The only exception to this was Participant 7, who had 
a significant, positive change in non-judgemental acceptance during the baseline phase.   
This hypothesis was supported when looking at changes in process measures at group level: 
significant changes in levels of non-judgemental acceptance and independent action from 
voices were observed at the end of intervention phase. There was no significant change for 
believability/ conviction, acceptance of voices, willingness or autonomy from voices however.  
 
3) Significant changes in process measures will precede changes in outcome measures 
(i.e. for responders Mid Therapy assessments will show process changes, while 





Contrary to the prediction, significant changes in the process measures did not precede 
changes in the outcome measures (i.e., at the Mid Therapy assessment point). Thus at the 
group level there are concomitant changes in process and outcome measures, but no 
preceding process changes that could imply causality. It may be that improvements in levels of 
depression, anxiety and quality of life led to improvements in non-judgemental acceptance 
and independent action from voices, rather than the other way round, as had been predicted. 
 
4) It is not expected that outcome changes will be concomitant with processes not 
directly targeted by ACT: frequency of symptoms, reductions in auditory hallucination 
symptom severity.  
 
This prediction was partially supported at the single-case level: the majority of participants 
who experienced improvements in outcome measures at the end of therapy did not 
experience significant changes in the severity of auditory hallucinations (PSYRATS) or 
frequency of voices (session ratings). The exceptions were Participants 3 and 7: Participant 3 
had a reliably reduced PSYRATS score at the End Therapy assessment (but no other outcome 
improvements); Participant 7 had a reliably reduced PSYRATS score and a significant reduction 
in frequency of voices on session ratings, in addition to reliably improved outcomes (anxiety 
and quality of life).  
At group level there was no significant reduction in auditory hallucination severity (PSYRATS), 
supporting the prediction.  
However, within the session ratings, a significant group effect was found for reductions in the 
reported frequency of voices following the intervention.  
 
5) Exploratory analyses of I relational responding (IRAP)  
 
The results of the participants’ IRAP performance suggest that the majority of the participants 
responded in manner consistent with preferring non-accepting coping toward voices. 
However, the four participants who subsequently responded to the ACT intervention with 
outcome and process improvements demonstrated a different pattern as a group to the non-




voices. However, over the subsequent phases and at the End Therapy relational responding 
appeared to be consistently (for all participants) in the direction of non-acceptance of voices.  
 
6.5  Discussion 
In this study it was found that a group of eight distressed voice hearers showed improved 
outcomes in depression, quality of life and social functioning after participating in 10 individual 
sessions of acceptance and commitment therapy, when compared with a randomized baseline 
period of three to six weeks of contact with a therapist but no active intervention. 
Improvements in distress, quality of life, and functioning, were concomitant with positive 
changes in psychological flexibility toward voices (voice acceptance) and non-judgemental 
acceptance. In addition there were group-level changes in level of preoccupation and distress 
with voices, as well as reported voice frequency. Consistent with the Psychological Flexibility 
Model changes in levels of psychological flexibility toward voices (values-based actions, rather 
than being guided by voices) and non-judgemental acceptance were associated with the 
introduction of the ACT intervention; these changes did not occur through contact with the 
researcher, during the baseline phase. Qualitative reports by participants of willingly engaging 
in activities associated with greater distress, without direct focus in therapy, are suggestive of 
the processes described in the Psychological Flexibility Model.   
The results of single-case analyses provide partial support of the study hypotheses: reliable 
changes in outcomes and process measures were not exclusive to the intervention phase for 
participants (discussed below); when positive baseline trend was controlled for in statistical 
analyses (i.e., Tau-u), significant intervention effects were found in single cases for levels of 
distress, preoccupation, conviction and voice frequency. Within this study there were no 
indications of changes in psychological flexibility preceding changes in outcomes; it may be 
that the assessment points were too few to adequately measure this process (if it was there); 
it could also be that changes in psychological flexibility co-occur with changes in anxiety or 
depression. 
Contrary to the study predictions ACT was not associated with positive changes in 
believability/ conviction, acceptance and willingness to experience voices, or session ratings of 




consistent with measuring conviction (e.g., Chadwick & Lowe, 1994; Haddock et al., 1999) was 
inconsistent with the construct suggested by the Psychological Flexibility Model, which is a 
measure of the probability that actions are influenced by the appraisal of the voice (see 
discussion in Chapter 2, section 2.4.2.2, and (Farhall, Shawyer, Thomas & Morris, in press). 
Inspection of single-case data also found that several participants had internal explanations for 
their voices (e.g., as a symptom of mental illness) when assessed with the PSYRATS, scoring 
consistently at 0 for conviction in an external attribution for their experience of voices.  At a 
group level this would have created a floor effect for how low conviction scores could have 
gone over the course of the study. For acceptance of voices as measured by the VAAS and the 
willingness item in the session ratings, it may be that this construct is also inconsistent with 
the Psychological Flexibility Model: for example, there are several items on the VAAS that ask 
people how much they “accept” hearing voices. As active acceptance in psychological flexibility 
terms is not about condoning or liking private experiences (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 2012), it 
could be that participants respond to these items and the willingness question from that 
perspective, rather than the type of acceptance cultivated in ACT.  Another possibility is that 
the ACT intervention in this study promoted non-judgemental awareness and independent 
action from voices, but was not as focused on acceptance of the voice as an experience 
(despite regular mindfulness and defusion exercises in-session). Future research may focus on 
refining the measurement of these constructs, as well as trying to capture some of the 
putative generalized changes suggested in the “non-targeted gains” section of the results: 
contextual measures of voice hearing and outcomes in psychosis are in the early stages of 
development (Ratcliff, Farhall & Shawyer, 2011).  
6.5.1  Study Innovations 
This study used a recent innovation in single-case research: the use of non-parametric 
statistics for continuous measures to determine significant change for single-cases, and an 
attempt at determining intervention effects across participants through omnibus statistics. 
This innovation was informed by the recent work to establish robust effect sizes in single-case 
research, to enable the results of small-N research to be used within meta-analyses (Parker & 
Hagan-Burke, 2007). In this study this statistical method allowed for conclusions to be drawn 
at the level of the group, an improvement over determining intervention effects across 
replications through visual analysis (see Parker & Brossart, 2003 for a discussion). The use of 




developments in cognitive behavioural therapies, as effects can be estimated across studies; 
small-N, low-cost research methodologies enhanced by statistical procedures may result in 
more rapid investigations of hypothesized processes.  
The other measurement innovation used in this study was the relational responding measure, 
the IRAP. This pilot work of using implicit measurement was motivated by the author wanting 
to develop methodologies that may have advantages over self-report and interview, as the 
IRAP has been found to be less susceptible to social expectancies (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2011) 
or attempts to deliberately control or “fake” responses (McKenna et al., 2007). This study 
found that people with psychosis can produce valid IRAP responses (see the pilot development 
section earlier);. it was found that the IRAP performance for most participants in the first 
assessment was suggestive of non-acceptance toward voices, however there were also 
participants who displayed a preference toward acceptance. These participants subsequently 
showed reliable changes in psychological flexibility and non-judgemental acceptance, and 
improved outcomes, following ACT. This result could suggest that existing implicit beliefs 
towards acceptance of voices, as assessed by IRAP performance, may have predictive potential 
in identifying those who may benefit from ACT, although this is a highly speculative conclusion 
based on a small number of participants. Nevertheless, these results are consistent with 
findings from other types of psychological interventions: for instance Ross et al (2011) also 
found that response to a reasoning intervention was moderated by the presence of reasoning 
biases at baseline. However, the additional IRAP results limit the conclusions that can be 
drawn about this assessment method: over the course of the study participants’ performance 
showed a preference toward non-acceptance of voices. This included those participants who 
had shown a preference toward acceptance in the first assessment. Additional analysis 
suggests that the IRAP performance in this study was also subject to practice effects.  
Therefore, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the IRAP as an assessment method, as the 
results do not cohere with conclusions drawn from the other assessment methods used in this 
study (such as reliable increases in psychological flexibility and non-judgemental awareness; or 
qualitative descriptions by participants of the greater use of acceptance toward voices and 
other experiences). It may be that IRAP scores from the first assessment are spurious, and that 
the IRAP was not measuring the constructs that it was designed for (experiential avoidance or 
acceptance toward voices); it could also be that participants became more fluent at the IRAP 




performance is unrelated to the intervention outcomes. Further research using the IRAP could 
establish the construct validity of this measure for voice acceptance through a group-based 
design using self-report measures of voice acceptance and psychological flexibility, and 
associations with voice-hearing outcomes such as mood, distress, coping responses, and 
functioning. Recent developments with the IRAP have resulted in a task that may reduce the 
cognitive load and allow for better measurement of individual items (Levin, Hayes & Waltz, 
2010); these improvements may lead to the IRAP having potential as a reliable measure in 
psychosis research.  
6.5.2  Study Limitations 
A limitation of this study was the selection of the participants: there was possibly a greater 
degree of heterogeneity (in terms of auditory hallucination dimensions, concurrent mood and 
anxiety, diagnosis) than could be supported by the research design in being able to draw 
conclusions from the data. This may, in part, have been a result of the recruitment process: 
despite the prevalence of persisting auditory hallucinations for those accessing secondary care 
mental health services, it was a challenge to recruit people in the study, through limited initial 
engagement or dropping out, or a mismatch between the expectations of what therapeutic 
method would be used, or the symptom elimination goals of participants, and what ACT could 
offer (see discussion of this in the Method section).  
The small numbers used in this study, limits the conclusions that can be drawn regarding the 
generalized effectiveness of ACT for voices, although the use of a single-case experimental 
design has allowed for a systematic way to test hypotheses and deal with some of the threats 
to internal validity, and provides directions to assess processes using other designs. 
 The researcher acted as the therapist and assessor in this study, meaning that the 
assessments were not blind/ or independent. The use of statistical procedures and the IRAP 
measure were attempts to limit Type I errors and experimenter bias, however for future 
studies using this design it would be ideal to use a separate assessor to limit the effect of these 
biases.    
Another limitation was that despite recruiting stable ‘medication-resistant’ service users, for 
some participants a stable baseline could not be established for certain outcomes (depression, 




in depression or anxiety during the baseline, which did not threaten the validity of the 
baseline, as the trend was in the opposite direction to the study predictions. However, there 
were also participants who displayed reliable improvements in the baseline, which may limit 
the conclusions about change following the introduction of ACT. For other outcomes, there 
was greater stability during the baseline: social functioning did not reliably change for any 
participants, and the severity of auditory hallucinations was stable for all participants, aside 
from one. Thus, at least for two participants, the possibility that improvements were due to 
non-specific factors (e.g., the introduction of regular social contact with the ACT therapist, 
positive expectations about therapy), cannot be ruled out. An observation that limits the 
conclusion that the baseline phase had general, consistent factors that improved outcomes is 
that several participants showed deterioration in this phase, and the others displayed no 
reliable change from the first assessment.  
Finally a serious limitation was being unable to conduct a follow-up assessment at a 3 month 
or later time period to assess the long-term impact of the intervention. This was due to the 
nature of the recruitment of the participants: all participants were on waiting lists for cognitive 
behavioural therapy and commenced this following the study. Thus there would have been a 
confound if a follow-up assessment had occurred. This was unfortunate, as other ACT for 
psychosis studies have suggested that there are sustained and increasing improvements 
following the end of intervention (Bach, Hayes & Gallup, 2011; Gaudiano et al., 2012; White et 
al., 2011).     
 
6.6  Summary 
This study investigated changes in outcomes and process variables following ACT for people 
experiencing distressing and disabling auditory hallucinations. The results suggest that changes 
in levels of non-judgemental acceptance and psychological flexibility (independent action from 
voices) were associated with, but did not occur prior to, improvements in levels of depressive 
symptoms, social functioning and quality of life, for the participants who responded to the ACT 
intervention.   
Efforts to measure changes in implicit responding to experiential avoidance and willingness 




intervention, there may be a predictive value in measuring relational responding However, 
these results are speculative, due to the small-N of this study. In addition, subsequent 
assessments call into question the validity of the implicit assessment procedure in this study.  
This study highlights the need for future research to focus on developing adequate measures 
of the constructs from the Psychological Flexibility Model, particularly relevant to the context 
of experiencing auditory hallucinations.  This includes refinement of measures of believability 





Study 3 - A comparison of acceptance, reappraisal and suppression 
instructions in coping with an analogue of auditory hallucinations in a 
healthy sample.  
 
7.1  Abstract 
This study investigated healthy participants’ responses to a simulation of auditory verbal 
hallucinations in an experimental paradigm. Participants were randomised to one of three 
conditions, which consisted of being trained to respond with acceptance, reappraisal or 
suppression. Differences in ratings of the experience of, and response to, the simulated 
auditory verbal hallucinations were compared across the experimental groups. In addition the 
relation of several potential moderating variables to the study dependent variables was 
investigated.  
One hundred and ten healthy participants were recruited to the experiment. The results 
demonstrated that there were no significant differences between the three groups on post-
task ratings of the simulated hallucinations unpleasantness, intrusiveness, or believability of 
voices’ statements, or personal sense of control during the task; similarly there was no 
difference in a behavioural measure of controlling the voices. In addition analyses of 
covariance did not detect any significant associations between psychological flexibility, non-
judgemental awareness, conscientiousness and psychosis proneness, and the dependent 
variables.Post hoc analyses of the sub-sample of participants who adhered to the experiment 
instructions were suggestive of equivalent, superior effects for reappraisal and acceptance 
over the use of suppression in terms of reduced ratings of unpleasantness,  intrusiveness and 
believability; this analysis also suggests reappraisal potentially is superior to both suppression 
and acceptance in fostering a greater personal sense of control over simulated hallucinations. 








As described in Chapter 4 experimental analogues of acceptance have been conducted across 
a range of different challenges, and with comparisons to control and active regulation 
methods, such as suppression and reappraisal.  
Several different effects have been identified for regulation methods, including whether a 
particular strategy is associated with: changes in the intensity of physical pain and affect, and 
levels of arousal; increases or reductions in tolerance to challenging stimuli, or with 
behavioural task persistence while in contact with such stimuli (both typically measured by 
how long a participant chooses to stay in contact with aversive stimuli, and whether they 
tolerate repeated exposure to stimuli); and whether the believability of challenging stimuli are 
altered (e.g., avoidance functions reduced or potentiated; the perception of how distressing 
aversive stimuli are).    
These studies are consistent on the effects of suppression – that it is likely to be an ineffective 
method for coping with challenges, and produces comparative increases in physiological 
arousal (e.g., Gross, 1998), rebound effects in target thoughts (e.g., Wegner and Wenzlaff, 
1996), and reduced task persistence and distress tolerance (e.g., Feldner et al., 2003).  
In contrast, studies of the effects of reappraisal suggest that this does reduce distress and 
arousal during psychological challenges (Schartau, Dalgleish & Dunn, 2009), however, there are 
inconsistent findings on whether this strategy positively influences task persistence or 
tolerance, particularly when compared to acceptance (e.g., Szasz, Szentagota & Hofmann, 
2011, 2012; Perry et al., 2012; Wolgast et al., 2011).  
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 4, the results of experiments with an acceptance condition 
suggest that this may be a more effective strategy for distress reduction, compared to 
distraction or suppression, in challenges that involve prolonged exposure to stimuli that elicit 
strong physiological responses (e.g., Keogh et al., 2005) but not necessarily for challenges that 
involve brief pain or distress  (e.g, Paez-Blarrina, 2008; Kuehner, Huffziger & Liebsch, 2009); 
while this training may not influence levels of distress in response to aversive stimuli there 




Paez-Blarrina, 2008) and comparatively greater task persistence and tolerance (e.g., McMullen 
et al., 2008).   
As described in Chapter 1, studies of naturalistic coping of people with schizophrenia who have 
auditory hallucinations suggest that suppression is a commonly used coping strategy, however 
efforts focused on suppressing this experience are associated with poorer functioning and 
greater distress (Badcock, Paulik and Maybery, 2011). It has been suggested that better 
adjustment, at least among those who are less distressed by voices, is associated with greater 
acceptance of auditory hallucinations as an experience (Romme & Escher, 1993; Farhall & 
Gehrke, 1997). There is a broader suggestion from the emotional regulation literature for 
schizophrenia that suggests that active acceptance is a comparatively underused skill in this 
population (Perry, Henry and Grisham, 2011). Finally, reappraisal of auditory hallucinations is a 
technique central to cognitive behavioural therapy approaches to helping people distressed by 
voices, while acceptance has been shown to be beneficial for a number of psychological 
problems, but has not been investigated with voices, particularly in an experimental study. 
The purpose of this third study therefore was to compare the effects of these different 
strategies in coping with an analogue of auditory hallucinations in a healthy sample. 
Participants were asked to complete a task involving problem-solving while experiencing 
simulated auditory hallucinations distracting them from the task and commenting on their 
performance. Participants were trained to cope with the challenge though either:  suppressing 
the experience, re-appraising the experience, or use a stance of active acceptance (flexibility 
responding to the experience, allowing it to be there without attempting to change its form or 
frequency). The associated perceptions of distress, intrusiveness and believability of the 
analogue auditory hallucinations were investigated, in addition to an appraisal of personal 
control over the voices, related to the allocated coping strategy. A behavioural measure 
assessing task persistence and tolerance was also included.   
In addition, the role of a number of moderating variables on the study dependent variables 
was investigated. Based on previous studies the variables considered to potentially moderate 
the effect of the experimental instructions were: trait levels of mindfulness (Evans, Baer & 
Segerstrom, 2009) and psychological flexibility (Kashdan et al., 2006), current mood (Zelman et 




al., 2011) and suppression (Gross, 1998), schizotypy (Henry et al., 2009), psychosis-proneness 
(Wout et al., 2004), and conscientiousness (Bartley & Roesch, 2011).   
 
7.2.1  Research Questions and Hypotheses 
1. In an analogue of auditory hallucinations, are there differences in distress, believability 
and tolerance, when healthy participants are trained to suppress, re-appraise, or 
actively accept the experience? 
2. Are the effects of suppression, reappraisal and acceptance moderated by psychological 
flexibility, non-judgemental awareness, schizotypy, or habitual use of emotion 
regulation strategies? 
 
7.2.2  Study Predictions 
1) It is predicted that experimental instructions/training using acceptance processes will 
produce greater behavioural (task) persistence than training that involves suppression or 
reappraisal.   
2) It is predicted that acceptance instructions will result in less intrusiveness and believability 
of the voices post-task, compared to either the suppression or reappraisal conditions.  
3) It is predicted that the reappraisal condition will result in less distress, compared to both the 
suppression and acceptance conditions.     
There were no predictions made for the moderating variables, instead these were subject to 









7.3.1  Ethical Considerations 
This study received ethical approval in May 2011 from the Psychiatry, Nursing & Midwifery 
Research Ethics Sub-Committee, King’s College London (REC reference: PNM/10/10/11-51). 
Please see Appendix C-1 for documentation.   
 
7.3.2  Study Design 
The study used a randomised, between-participants design, allocating participants randomly to 
three experimental conditions (acceptance, suppression and reappraisal). The independent 
variable was the allocated condition (3 levels), and the dependent variables were voice 
tolerance, unpleasantness, intrusiveness, believability, and sense of personal control.  
To determine the required sample size a power calculation was conducted, based upon the 
effect sizes for acceptance analogues reported in (Gutiérrez et al., 2004 and Paez-Blarrina et 
al., 2008):  three experimental conditions (alpha 0.05, power 0.8), with a predicted effect size 
of 0.30 (Cohen's d); resulted in an estimated N = 90, with 30 participants in each condition. 
 
7.3.2.1  Construction of experimental paradigm  
Simulated hallucinations  
A literature search revealed that experimental analogues of auditory hallucinations were 
already available from studies investigating whether healthy participants’ attitudes toward 
mental illness can be changed by taking part in simulations of auditory hallucinations. A 
common resource used for this purpose is the “Voices that are Distressing” training package 
developed by Deegan (1996), which involves listening through headphones to benign and 
derogatory voices typical of psychosis, while carrying out tasks. Other studies have used virtual 
reality environments (e.g., Banks et al., 2004) and goggle and headset hardware (see Ando, 




However for the current study it was decided to produce voices stimuli that were solely 
derogatory, to be aversive enough for healthy participants to need to use a coping strategy. 
Similar to the Deegan (1996) simulation, participants were asked to complete a task while 
experiencing the voices stimuli, to provide a greater chance of them finding the “voices” 
interfering.  
Stimuli  
The audio stimuli for the study were developed in several steps. The first step was deciding on 
the derogatory content of the voices, in the form of second-person, disparaging and worrying 
comments. Through discussion with two clinical experts in psychosis (PhD supervisors), in 
addition to the author’s clinical experience in working with people with psychosis, a list of 
comments was produced. These comments were about the participant's task performance and 
self-concept, such as “You are failing at this task”, “You cannot do it”, “That was a mistake”, 
and “You are a fool”, “You are stupid”, etc. In addition there were comments designed to 
evoke a sense of paranoia and suspiciousness, such as “Keep on guard, this experiment is a 
fake”,” You are being set up to fail by the experimenter”, etc. For ethical reasons content that 
may be personally offensive to the participants, such as profanities, was avoided. The 
comments used in this study are listed in Appendix C-2.   
Both a male and a female voice were used, in English accents, to say the comments. Two 
volunteers were engaged in recording the comments, using several different tones of voice, 
including mocking and angry tones. These comments were recorded using a Zoom H2 sound 
recorder as .wav files. An audio clip of the voice sounds was produced using an audio editing 
program (Audacity: http://audacity.sourceforge.net/) combining the comments from the male 
and female voices. The audio clip was developed through several versions (reviewed by PhD 
supervisors), resulting in the voices having overlapping, repetitive comments, presented in a 
series of blocks, and superimposed over the sound of a crowd murmuring. Thus there were 
periods of time when the participant only heard murmuring before the voice sounds would 
commence again (ranging in intervals from 10 − 45 seconds). This was in order to reduce the 
predictability of when the comments would be heard, and to provide indistinguishable voice 
noises throughout the experiment.  
Finally, two mental health service users who experienced persisting auditory hallucinations 




the 10 minute recording, and were asked to rate how similar it was to their own experience of 
hearing voices (0-10), in addition to giving general feedback. The service users rated the voices 
stimuli as similar to their own experience (giving scores of 9 and 10), describing the similarities 
as:  the critical content of the voices, the pacing, how the voices repeat each other, that there 
were male and female voices, and that the audio clip contained breaks in voices’ comments, 
making it difficult to predict when the comments would recommence.  
Components of Quality Analogues of Acceptance Protocols 
Barnes-Holmes and Hayes (2005) have suggested a number of criteria for judging the quality of 
analogue studies using acceptance protocols; these recommendations were used to develop 
this study. Appendix C-3 lists the criteria and how this study addresses these.  
7.3.2.2  Development of the experimental instructions 
As described in Chapter 4, a review of the experimental literature on acceptance, reappraisal 
and suppression informed the form and elements of the coping instructions. Instructions for 
each condition were written with similar structure and length, and contained the same 
metaphor. Based on the studies by Gutiérrez et al. (2004), Keogh et al. (2007) and Páez-
Blarrina et al. (2008), the ACT Swamp metaphor (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999, p.248) was 
used as the central metaphor for each of the instructions, with the directions on how to cope 
with difficult experiences when pursuing a goal being consistent with the function of 
suppression, reappraisal or acceptance.  
The instructions had the following common elements:  
 Similar word length (Reappraisal: 612 words, Suppression: 616 words, Acceptance: 614 
words) and duration of instruction (around 3 minutes 30 seconds)  
 Use of similar phrases, where possible 
 Same number of examples (three) 
 A central metaphor (Swamp Metaphor) 
The coping instructions are described in detail in Appendix C-4. The instructions were planned 





To determine whether the instructions could be reliably discriminated as examples of 
reappraisal, acceptance and suppression, five research psychologists were asked to identify 
the coping instructions according to the following definitions:  
Reappraisal – changing the way a situation is construed so as to decrease its emotional 
impact (Gross, 1998) 
Acceptance - the active and aware embrace of those private events occasioned by 
one’s history without unnecessary attempts to change their frequency or form, 
especially when doing so would cause psychological harm (Luoma, Hayes & Walser, 
2007).  
Suppression – conscious inhibition of emotional expressive behavior while emotionally 
aroused (Gross & Levenson, 1993) 
The five research psychologists were sent the three sets of instructions, unlabelled and in 
different orders for each rater. The psychologists reached 100% agreement in categorising the 
instructions by type, and classified them consistent with intended function.   
7.3.2.3  Experimental Task 
Mazes were used as the distractor task, since they involve volition and planning (Lezak, 
Howieson & Loring, 2004).  A set of printed mazes was prepared, to be completed by 
participants in the experiment, while listening to the voices stimuli. These mazes were sourced 
from a website (http://www.onebillionmazes.com/) and organised into a booklet of 16 mazes 
of progressive difficulty.  Please refer to Appendix C-5 for examples of the mazes booklet 
pages.    
 
7.3.3  Participants 
Healthy, non-clinical volunteers were invited to participate in this study. Participants were 
healthy adults aged 18 and older, who met the study inclusion criteria: not currently having 
clinically significant symptoms of depression or anxiety, and not having experienced auditory 
hallucinations or psychosis in their lifetime (established by brief screening questions). Further 





One hundred and eleven participants were recruited from a King’s College London email list 
and a research database of healthy participants (Mindsearch: 
www.kcl.ac.uk/iop/research/mindsearch). One participant withdrew their involvement 
following the experiment, leaving a final sample of 110 participants.  
Participants’ mean age was 24.5 years (SD = 5.9; range 18 - 50), with 32 males and 75 females.  
The sample was skewed toward those with a high level of education: 53.6% reported having an 
undergraduate qualification, 42.7% currently studying toward an undergraduate degree, 3.6% 
having completed secondary education but no further education. In terms of employment, 
82.7% of the participants reported that they were in education or training, 5.5% in part-time 
employment, 10.9% in full-time employment, and 1 participant (0.9%) reported that they were 
unemployed.  Participants’ self-report ethnicity: 48.2% reported a White British or other White 
background, 9.1% a Mixed background, 37.2% an Asian/ Asian British background, 4.6% Black/ 
African/ Caribbean/ Black British, and 1 participant (0.9%) from Arab background.  
 
7.3.4  Measures 
The full questionnaires and scales used in this study appear in Appendix C-6.  
Experiment Ratings 
The dependent variables for this experiment were measured using the computer program. 
These were of two types:  
1) Voice tolerance 
Time until first voice control response - this was a measure of the number of seconds taken 
until the participant used the USB mouse (see below). This duration was measured by a timer 
in the computer program, which responded to the click of the mouse.  
Number of voice control responses - a count of the number of USB mouse button presses, 
measured by the computer program.   




At the end of the experimental task the participant was asked to rate on the computer screen, 
using a visual analogue scale (0-10):  
 How unpleasant the voices were 
 How intrusive the voices were 
 How true the voices comments seemed during the task [voice believability] 
 How much control the participant felt they had over the voices during the task 
Finally participants were asked to indicate whether they would be willing to do the experiment 
again (dichotomous, yes/no choice).   
 
Potential covariates 
Acceptance & Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-2; Appendix A-2.1) - Please refer to Chapter 5 for a 
description of this scale (in the Measures section 5.3.4).   
Acceptance without Judgement sub-scale of the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS-
AWJ; Appendix B-6.4) - Please refer to Chapter 5 for a description of this scale (in the Measures 
section 5.3.4).   
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983; Appendix C-6.1) – this is 
a 14-item self-report screening scale, containing a 7-item sub-scale for anxiety and a 7-item 
sub-scale for depression. The HADS was developed for detecting states of anxiety and 
depression in non-psychiatric hospitals in adults between the ages of 16 and 65. Items are 
rated on a 4- point (0-3) scale; the scale ranges from 0-42. 
Emotional Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003; Appendix C-6.2) - this self-
report scale is designed to measure the amount of use of two emotion regulation strategies, 
cognitive reappraisal and suppression. Participants were asked to rate how they regulate and 
manage their emotions using a 7-point scale, from strongly disagree (infrequent use of a 
strategy) to strongly agree (frequent use). Mean ratings across items were used to generate 




acceptable reliability, with mean coefficient alpha scores of 0.79 for reappraisal and 0.73 for 
suppression, and test-retest reliability of .69 (Gross & John, 2003).  
Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences, short-form version (O-LIFE; Mason, 
Linney & Claridge, 2005; Appendix C-6.3) is a 43-item measure of schizotypy, which covers 
“unusual experiences”, “cognitive disorganization”, “introvertive anhedonia” and “impulsive 
non- conformity” (Mason et al., 1995). These sub-scales were developed from a factor analysis 
of various psychosis-proneness scales based on 715 normal participants (Bentall et al., 1989). 
Internal consistency is high for each subscale (0.72-0.89). All of the items required a “Yes/ No” 
response, which will be summed up to give the final summary score. The potential ranges of 
scores for the subscales are: Unusual Experiences (0-12), Cognitive Disorganisation (0-11), 
Introvertive Anhedonia (0-10), Impulsive Nonconformity (0-10).  
Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale (CAPS; Bell, Halligan & Ellis, 2006; Appendix C-6.4) - is a 
measure of perceptual anomalies, including 32 items with 3 sub-scales: “clinical psychosis” 
(mainly Schneiderian first- rank symptoms), “temporal lobe disturbance” (mainly related to 
temporal lobe epilepsy and related seizure- like disturbances), and “chemosensation” (mainly 
olfactory and gustatory experience). For each item endorsed, participants were asked to rate 
their distress, intrusiveness and frequency on 1-5 rating scales. The questionnaire generates 
four separate scores: (1) total number of items endorsed; (2) a distress score; (3) an 
intrusiveness score; and (4) frequency of anomalous experience. The total scores for these 
subscales are calculated by summing the ratings for all endorsed items, with non-endorsed 
items receiving a score of 0. Therefore, the CAPS total ranges from 0 to 32, and for each of the 
subscales the possible range is 0 to 160. The internal consistency of the CAPS is good 
(Cronbach’s alpha coefficient = 0.87; (Bell et al., 2006) and the test-retest reliability over a six- 
month period is highly stable (Cronbach’s alpha coefficient = 0.92; (Bell et al., 2006). 
Conscientiousness scale of the Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999; Appendix C-6.5) - 
this 9-item measure was used to measure the personality trait of conscientiousness (John and 
Srivastava, 1999; McCrae and Costa, 1999). Items are scored on a 5-point Likert scale, worded 
“disagree strongly” (1) to “agree strongly” (5), yielding a score range of 9-45. The Big Five 
dimensions of personality came from lexical research on personality structures, which enjoys 
considerable support and has become the most widely adopted model of personality 




Conscientiousness is found to correlate with behaviour that is organized, conforming and goal- 
directed.  
Quick-Test (Ammons & Ammons, 1962; Appendix C-6.6)- a brief cognitive test providing a 
measure of verbal IQ. This was used to assess individual intelligence based on perceptual-
verbal performance. The examiner reads words aloud, and the participant is asked to point a 
picture (out of a possible four) that best matches the meaning of the word. There are 50 words 
on the list; the researcher continues reading the words until there were six consecutive fails. 
The Quick test has been found to correlate significantly with the verbal section of the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS; (Wechsler, 1955) and the full WAIS scale (Abidin and Alfred, 
1967).  
 
7.3.5  Apparatus 
A Dell Inspiron laptop computer was used to run the experiment software. Video-clips of 
instructions and audio-clips of voice stimuli were played on the laptop computer, the output of 
which was listened to through external speakers (for instructions) and Sennheiser HD 265 
linear headphones (for the voice stimuli). A single-button USB computer mouse was attached 
to the laptop computer situated 2.5 metres away from the desk. A set of printed mazes and a 
pen were given to the participant to complete.  
 
7.3.6  Procedure 
Prospective participants were recruited through the Mindsearch research database, or 
responded to emails about the study sent through King’s College email distribution system. 
Prospective participants were screened (via telephone or in person) to establish that they met 
the study inclusion criteria:  this involved answering brief questions on whether they had 
experienced auditory hallucinations or psychosis in their lifetime; that their hearing and 
mastery of English were sufficient to comprehend the task instructions; and completing the 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (eligibility cut-off score of 11).  
Participants were tested in a quiet testing room at the Department of Psychology, Institute of 




complete the questionnaires and a cognitive test, prior to the experimental task. All 
questionnaires were in paper form, given as a stapled booklet to the participant.  
Participants were asked to follow the instructions that appeared on a laptop computer screen. 
The participants were randomly allocated by the computer program to one of the three 
experimental conditions – suppression, reappraisal, and acceptance. The participants were not 
informed of which condition they had been allocated to; similarly the researcher was unaware 
of allocation.  
Participants were first trained in the allocated coping strategy using an automated process on 
the laptop computer, using video clips triggered by a program and listening to the instructions 
through the laptop speaker. The video clips featured a trainer who first presented a values-
based rationale for the experiment (see Gutiérrez et al., 2004): emphasising how it was 
important for the participant to engage with the task and instructions as best they could, as 
the study was looking at the way people cope with hearing voices that are disrupting (e.g., 
“people who hear voices can find this experience difficult to manage, particularly when 
focusing on getting things done...”). Participants were then told that the experiment involved 
completing mazes in a test booklet, with the aim of achieving a high score by completing as 
many as possible in the time given, and that while they completed the mazes they would hear 
voices making critical comments on their task performance. The participants were then trained 
in the allocated coping strategy, watching a video clip of the trainer describing a metaphor and 
providing three example ways of using the coping strategy (see Appendix C-4 for the 
instructions for acceptance, reappraisal and suppression).  
 
The participants were encouraged to use the coping strategy that they had received training 
in, as a way of ensuring they completed the task and achieve a high score. At the end of the 
video clip a text box appeared on the computer screen, and the participant was asked to type 
a description of the coping strategy they had been instructed in [these written descriptions 
were rated later, to ascertain participant understanding of the strategy; see results section 
7.4.2 below].  
All participants were additionally instructed that they had the option to reduce the volume of 




some distance (2.5 metres) from the test materials, so that the participant had to move across 
the room to press it (i.e. to involve a cost to performance). Unknown to the participants, the 
button presses did not have any effect on the duration of the recorded voices. This use of 
deception was considered necessary to the study to: 1) provide an analogous experience to 
voice hearing (few people who hear voices can directly control the duration of their voices), 
and 2) that if participants actually had control then there may be individual differences in the 
task experience of participants, which would confound the effect of the conditions.  
Once the video instructions were complete, a written instruction on the computer screen told 
the participants to put on the headphones, and then asked them to indicate when they were 
ready to start the experiment by pressing the space bar of the computer. A tone sounded and 
a message on-screen informed the participants that they could start completing the mazes in 
front of them on the desk in a test booklet. The instructions informed the participants that 
they should try to work consistently on the mazes while hearing the voices, and that they 
would be informed by the computer when they needed to stop (which was indicated by a 
single tone and a set of instructions appearing on the computer screen; participants were not 
informed how long the hearing voices section of the experiment would last, in order to make 
the experience less controllable).  
Participants completed the mazes for 10 minutes while hearing the voices (see description of 
stimuli above). At the completion of this part of the experiment, participants were then asked 
on the computer screen whether they would like to do the task again (yes/no). Regardless of 
the response the participants were then asked to rate (using visual analogue scales on the 
computer screen) how unpleasant and intrusive the voices were while completing the task, 
how believable the voice comments were, and how much control the participant felt they had 
over the voices by pressing the USB mouse. The participants were then asked, via a text box 
appearing on the computer screen, to describe how they coped during the task [these 
descriptions were also rated later, to determine adherence to the allocated coping strategy; 
see Results section 7.4.2 below].  
All participants were debriefed on the study by the researcher (including the use of deception 
on the volume control of the voices) at the end of the study. Participants were then 






Due to the simple randomisation process used, recruitment proceeded until there were at 
least 30 participants in each condition - this resulted in an uneven allocation of participants 
(Reappraisal condition N = 31; Suppression condition N = 36; Acceptance condition N = 43). All 
statistical analyses were conducted on the full sample, and a consecutively-recruited sample 
(i.e. discarding later participants once a condition had reached 30 participants): as the results 
of the analyses are equivalent, the results of the full sample are presented here.   
 
7.4.1  Sample characteristics 
Table 7.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the study variables for the three conditions 




Table 7.1  Means, standard deviations and percentages of measures for three conditions in 
Study 3  
Variable Reappraisal 
condition (N = 
31) 
Suppression 
condition (N = 
36) 
Acceptance 
condition (N = 43) 
Measure    
Quick Test IQ 93.7 (13.4) 94.5 (8.5) 92.4 (11.1) 
HADS Total 5.2 (3.3) 4.8 (3.1) 5.2 (2.9) 
AAQ-II Total 17.6 (8.0) 15.0 (5.7) 15.1 (8.9) 
Acceptance without Judgement 
(KIMS) 
24.0 (6.5) 21.7 (7.6) 22.8 (8.3) 
Conscientiousness 33.7 (5.5) 34.8 (5.6) 35.2 (6.1) 
Unusual Experiences (O-LIFE) 2.6 (2.5) 1.6 (2.0) 2.6 (2.9) 
Cognitive Disorganisation (O-
LIFE) 
4.1 (3.1) 2.7 (2.3) 3.4 (3.1) 
Introvertive Anhedonia (O-LIFE) 2.0 (2.2) 1.1 (1.2) 1.5 (1.5) 
Impulsive Non-conformity (O-
LIFE) 
2.5 (2.1) 2.3 (2.2) 2.4 (1.9) 
Reappraisal  (ERQ) 5.1 (1.0) 4.8 (1.2) 5.2 (1.2) 
Suppression (ERQ) 3.3 (1.4) 3.2 (0.9) 3.3 (1.3) 
CAPS Total 5.9 (5.7) 3.9 (4.2) 5.3 (6.1) 
 
Chi -square analyses demonstrated that were there no significant differences between those 
participants allocated to the acceptance, reappraisal or suppression conditions on variables 
such as gender (2(2) = 1.968, p = .374), ethnicity (2(8) = 7.083, p = .528), level of education 
(2(6) = 4.364, p = .628 ), or employment status (2(8) = 8.38, p = .397).  
Similarly ANOVAs showed that there were no significant differences between the groups on 
demographic and questionnaire measures: age (F (2, 107) = .696, p = .501) , levels of 




psychological flexibility (F(2, 106) = 1.035, p = .359), non-judgemental awareness(F(2, 106) = 
.723, p = .488), conscientiousness(F(2, 106) = .603, p = .549), and use of emotional regulation 
strategies of reappraisal (F(2, 105) = 1.419, p = .247) and suppression (F(2, 106) = .040, p = 
.961). There were no significant differences between conditions on O-LIFE subscales of unusual 
experiences (F(2, 105) = 2.178, p = .118), cognitive disorganization (F(2, 107) = 1.901, p = .154), 
introvertive anhedonia (F(2, 107) = 2.604, p = .079), and impulsive non- conformity (F(2, 107) = 
.086, p = .917); the CAPS total score was not significantly different across conditions (F(2, 104) 
= 1.119, p = .330).     
 
7.4.2  Task validity checks 
7.4.2.1  Participant understanding of instructions 
Participants’ post-instruction written descriptions of their understanding of the experimental 
coping method were classified by two independent raters, blind to condition allocation. The 
raters matched the description to a definition of the coping methods (listed above in the 
experimental instructions section), or classified the response as “Other” in the case that it did 
not match a definition. The result of the inter-rater analysis was Kappa 0.751 (p <.001), 
indicating “Substantial” agreement. Post-instructions, where there was concordance between 
raters on the coping strategy classified, were compared with the allocated condition. Overall, 
77.3% of participants were rated to have post-instruction descriptions of a coping method that 
matched the condition allocated. There was no significant difference between conditions on 
the proportion of participants providing accurate post-instruction descriptions (2(2) = 2.369, p 
= .306).  
7.4.2.2  Participant adherence to coping method trained in condition 
Post-experiment written descriptions of the coping method participants reported using during 
the experiment were also classified by the two independent raters. The classifications for the 
coping methods were similar to above, classifying the description as acceptance, reappraisal or 
suppression, or in the case that the coping method could not be classified, as “Other”. The 
result of the inter-rater analysis was Kappa 0.574 (p <.001), indicating “Moderate” agreement. 
Based on concordant ratings and comparing to condition, it was found that only 38.2% of the 




were also significant differences between conditions on the proportion of participants who 
used the allocated coping strategy (2(2) = 7.493, p = .02), with fewer participants in the 
suppression condition reporting using this strategy.  
7.4.3 Analyses related to study predictions 
1. It is predicted that experimental instructions using acceptance processes will produce 
greater behavioural (task) persistence than instructions that involve suppression or 
reappraisal of experiences. 
As can be seen from Table 7.2 there were no substantive differences between the groups on 
whether participants used the voices control method (pressing the USB) button, with only one 
participant (in the Reappraisal condition) pressing the button.  
Table 7.2  Experiment Outcomes 
Post-Experiment Ratings Reappraisal 
condition (N = 
31) 
Suppression 
condition (N = 36) 
Acceptance 
condition (N = 43) 
Voice Unpleasantness 3.8 (2.6) 3.8 (2.4) 3.7 (3.0) 
Voice Intrusiveness 3.5 (2.2) 3.7 (2.5) 3.4 (2.5) 
Voice Believability 1.6 (1.9) 2.3 (2.2) 2.0 (2.1) 
Sense of Personal Control 7.1 (2.7) 6.1 (3.5) 7.1 (2.9) 
Willing to repeat experiment 74% 92% 86% 
Use of voices control response 3% 1 0% 0% 
1 One participant used the voice control button, once, at 8.35 mins .   
The numbers of participants willing to repeat the experiment were high across the three 
conditions; Chi-square analysis did not show any significant difference between conditions on 
whether participants were willing to repeat the experiment again (2(2) = 4.01, n.s.)  
 
2. It is predicted that acceptance instructions will result in less intrusiveness and 




3. It is predicted that the reappraisal condition will result in less distress, compared to 
both the suppression and acceptance conditions.  
There were no statistically significant differences between conditions as determined by one-
way ANOVA for unpleasantness (F(2, 107) = .007, p = .993), intrusiveness (F(2, 107) = .183, p = 
.833), believability (F(2, 107) = .843, p = .433), or personal control (F(2, 107) = 1.383, p = .255). 
Planned analyses for moderating variables are not reported here due to the lack of main 
effects. These multiple analyses of co-variance (MANCOVAs) are however reported in 
Appendix C-7 for reference purposes.  
7.4.4 Post-hoc analyses  
Post-hoc analyses were conducted on post-task experiment ratings of the sub-sample of 
participants (N=42) who were rated to have adhered with the experimental instructions. It was 
acknowledged that these analyses would be underpowered; as a consequence the results are 
reported using effect sizes.   
Effect sizes were calculated using Cohen’s d, with the mean and standard deviation of the 
participants in the suppression condition as the comparator, for the reappraisal and 
acceptance conditions.  
Table 7.3 presents the results of these analyses for each of the study dependent variables. It 
can be seen that there are equivalent effect sizes for the reappraisal and acceptance 
conditions (in the direction of reduced levels) on ratings of unpleasantness (medium effect) 
and intrusiveness (small effect), when compared to the suppression condition. For believability 
the reappraisal condition (medium effect) demonstrated a comparatively larger effect than the 
acceptance condition (small effect), again in the direction of less believability. For the rating of 
personal control the acceptance condition in essence had no effect compared to the 
suppression condition, while the reappraisal condition had a medium effect, suggestive of a 








Table 7.3  Standardised mean differences for participants’ adherent to the 
experimental instructions (Cohen’s d) 
Post-Experiment Ratings Suppression 
condition (N = 
10) 
Reappraisal 
condition (N = 
13) 
Acceptance 
condition (N = 19) 
Voice Unpleasantness 0 -0.51 -0.52 
Voice Intrusiveness 0 -0.44 -0.43 
Voice Believability 0 -0.51 -0.33 
Sense of Personal Control 0 0.53 0.02 
NB: negative effects are preferable for ratings of unpleasantness, intrusiveness and believability, while a 
positive effect is preferable for a sense of personal control.  
 
In addition to the results reported in Table 7.3 there were no differences between the groups 
on those who used a voices control response (as described in section 7.4.3 only one participant 
in the study did this; this participant was not rated as adherent). In terms of the percentage of 
participants that were willing to repeat the experiment, the post-hoc results by condition 
were: suppression (100%), reappraisal (85%), and acceptance (89%).  
 
7.5 Discussion 
The results of this study did not demonstrate any significant differences between participants 
who were instructed to accept, reappraise or suppress their experiences while hearing critical 
comments in recorded audio and completing a mazes task.  
There are several potential explanations for the null results between the experimental groups:  
1) There are no substantial differences between the effects of suppression, reappraisal and 
acceptance  
This explanation is at odds with the bulk of the literature, at least for stimuli that are 
distressing and/or intrusive. This experiment was based on coping instructions that have 




between two potentially effective coping strategies (as described in Chapter 3). This is 
especially the case for the lack of a difference in comparing the suppression condition to the 
other two strategies, given the reliable findings regarding the comparatively worse effects of 
suppression on distress levels and tolerance (e.g., Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & Hofmann, 
2006; Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema & Schweizer, 2010; Augustine & Hemenover, 2009).  
 
2) The study was lacked power to detect differences between experimental conditions.  
The explanation that the study was under-powered to differences between conditions seems 
unlikely, in light of the power calculation used to determine the sample size (see section 7.3.2). 
As can be concluded from the results there are small effects between the groups in this study. 
The post-hoc analyses reported in section 7.4.4 are suggestive of potentially detectable 
differences between conditions, for participants adherent to the experimental instructions 
(discussed below).   
 
3) The voices stimuli were not sufficiently intrusive and/ or distressing 
This explanation may be the most parsimonious – the audio recordings of the voices may not 
have been aversive for this sample, or found sufficiently intrusive to interfere with task 
performance. Ratings of the unpleasantness and intrusiveness of the voices post-experiment 
were low on average. This can be compared with the Luciano et al (2010) study where 
participants were exposed to unpleasant noises (drills, babies crying etc., but not speech) and 
trained in acceptance vs experiential avoidance coping. Participants in the Luciano et al. (2010) 
study rated their distress on average 81/100 in the control (non-coping) phase; these can be 
compared to the current study, with participant average ratings of 3.7/10 (37/100) for 
unpleasantness within the suppression condition. Ratings following the acceptance condition 
in the Luciano et al (2010) study dropped to 42/100 on average, which is still higher than 
ratings reported in the current study. In a similar vein, for the post-experiment descriptions of 
coping a number of participants described the voices stimuli as humorous or easy to ignore as 
they felt that the comments did not relate to them.  
Several factors may have resulted in the voices stimuli having limited intrusiveness or capacity 




stimuli as ecologically valid as possible, there was also the need to balance this with ethical 
considerations, meaning that offensive material was not used (a difference from many voice 
hearers’ experiences, see Fenekou & Georgaca, 2010), which may have limited the stimuli’s 
capacity to be distressing. Although other studies of simulated hallucinations suggest that 
people do find this experience to be unpleasant (Ando et al., 2011), it is unclear to what level 
or for what period this distress lasts.  
Another possibility is that the stimuli may have been unwittingly normalised by the 
introduction to the task: by describing how hearing voices is a common experience, which 
some people cope poorly with but others manage, may have implied that this experience can 
be controlled. It may be useful to limit the use of normalising language in future studies.  
Similarly, by instructing the participants that there was a way to control the voices (using the 
USB button situated away from the computer), may have resulted in greater tolerance of the 
stimuli, as there was an available way to control the experience (even though this was a 
deception in the experiment). It may be useful in future studies to not use a potential means of 
escape from the experience, which may potentially increase the voices intrusiveness.   
 
4) The mazes task may have been not challenging enough.  
A potential factor may have been that the mazes task lacked challenge for the participants, 
and so was not affected by the concurrent experience of hearing the comments. This seems 
less likely as a possibility, as no participant completed all of the mazes in the available time, 
and most participants completed nine out of a possible sixteen mazes. Future studies that 
simulate the intrusive experience of auditory hallucinations could use computer-based tasks 
where “voices” comments are triggered by the actions of the participant, making them more 
closely related to the task, and appearing to respond to what the participant is doing. This may 
more tightly link task performance with the experience of simulated voices.    
 
5) Participants did not use the allocated coping strategy during the experiment.  
The post-experimental descriptions of the coping strategy used suggest that for the majority of 
the sample, participants did not engage with the instructed coping strategy. Potentially this 
may have occurred because the stimuli were not sufficiently distressing and/or intrusive to 




The results of the post-hoc analyses for those participants who adhered to the experimental 
instructions do suggest potential differences that may be detected in future studies. Firstly the 
post-hoc analyses suggest that participants in the suppression condition responded consistent 
with the study predictions, with higher ratings of voice unpleasantness, intrusiveness, 
believability, and less personal sense of control post-experiment, compared to the acceptance 
and reappraisal conditions. In contrast to the study prediction of an comparative advantage for 
the acceptance condition for intrusiveness and believability compared to reappraisal, the post-
hoc analysis shows equivalence between the two conditions for intrusiveness (with small 
effects), and slightly larger effect favouring reappraisal for believability (a medium effect). 
Similarly the prediction that the reappraisal condition would have a larger effect for 
unpleasantness compared to acceptance was not suggested by the post-hoc analysis, with 
medium effects for both conditions (compared to the suppression condition). In comparing the 
effects for post-experiment ratings of personal control there was a distinct difference 
favouring the reappraisal condition (with a medium effect) and the acceptance and 
suppression conditions (which were equivalent).  This interesting trend favouring reappraisal 
for personal control over the voices compared to acceptance does appear consistent with the 
theoretical understanding of acceptance as a process of eschewing control efforts over private 
experiences (e.g., Kollman, Brown & Barlow, 2009).   
It may have also been that the instructions for the coping strategies were not clear enough 
(although most participants could describe the strategy pre-task sufficiently), or that 
instructions read to participants are insufficient to promote use of coping strategies. Related 
to this point, there is some indication from the Levin et al (2012) meta-analysis of 
Psychological Flexibility Model experiment components that conditions using metaphors and 
experiential exercises to instruct coping strategies produce larger effects than those that have 
instructions alone. While the use of metaphor was central to the instructions in the current 
study, there were no experiential exercises used; this could be a component in future studies.  
It may be of benefit in future studies to have more reminders to use the allocated coping 
strategy, perhaps also over multiple blocks of exposure to simulated hallucinations. Similarly, it 






6) Characteristics of the participant group moderated any potential experimental effects  
There is the possibility that the demographic characteristics of the participants moderated the 
response to the experiment conditions. The sample was highly educated, with over half the 
sample having completed an undergraduate education. It may be that this comparatively 
intelligent and resourceful group of people were more resilient to the effects of hearing 
negative comments while persisting with the mazes task. Future studies may benefit from 
recruiting from broader sources than higher education institutions, including from job centres 
and other community settings, to limit the effects of these demographic factors.  
The participant group was diverse in ethnicity and may have had a higher proportion than 
previous studies of participants where English was not their first language (approximately one 
third of participants). Potentially this made it easier to ignore or disengage from the voice 
comments, through a cognitive defusion effect; it may have been easier to be psychologically 
distanced from critical comments in a second language either through incomprehension or 
greater use of interpretation before perceiving the meaning of the words. This is highly 
speculative, but it may have been that for these participants they more easily “tuned out” the 
voices as sounds, not paying attention to derive meaning (and potentially be distressed by the 
comments). It may be useful in future studies to recruit a sample where English is the first 
language, to limit the possibility of the intrusiveness of simulated auditory hallucinations being 
affected in this way.    
Lastly the participant group were a non-clinical, non-distressed sample. It may be that there 
could be a different response in a group that were currently experiencing anxiety and/ or 
depressive symptoms, or were more psychosis-prone. Potentially such a sample might find the 
audio recordings more aversive and have greater need to use a coping strategy, due to less 
resilience or capacity to experience such a challenge. This is, of course, speculative and would 
require further investigation, if such a study was ethically sound.   
 
7.6 Summary 
In this analogue study of coping with voices, healthy participants trained in three different 
coping strategies (acceptance, reappraisal and suppression) while hearing simulated auditory 




voice qualities and personal control post-experiment.  A number of potential explanations for 
these null results were discussed, including whether there are differences between regulation 
strategies to be found, the level of challenge of the experimental task, the qualities of the 
simulated voices, adherence to the instructions of the experimental condition, and the nature 
of the sample. It is likely that factors such as the limited aversive qualities of the voice stimuli, 
participant non-adherence to instructions, and the nature of the sample, influenced the study 
outcomes.Post hoc analyses provided tentative results that the experimental conditions may 
produce effects in the predicted directions, for those participants who adhered to the 
condition instructions.    
Future studies may benefit from recruiting samples that are experiencing clinical distress, or 
score high on psychosis-proneness, and use stimuli that are more intrusive, linked with greater 
prompting and contingencies for using the allocated coping strategy to produce greater 












8.1  Summary discussion  
In this thesis I have described three studies that have explored the association of psychological 
flexibility with the experience of auditory hallucinations. I have used three different 
methodologies to study this association, in a similar vein to the multiple research strategies 
consistent with the contextual behavioural science paradigm (Villadarga et al., 2009). This 
association has been explored with clinical participants cross-sectionally and within an 
intervention study, and with non-clinical participants with an experimental analogue of 
hearing voices.  
In these studies psychological flexibility has been operationalised in several ways, using 
components suggested by the general model (Hayes, 2004; Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 2012). 
This has included a measure of psychological flexibility in addition to mindfulness (non-
judgemental acceptance) (Studies 1 and 3), or a symptom-related measure of acceptance of 
voices and autonomy (reduced fusion), in addition to mindfulness (non-judgemental 
acceptance) (Study 2). Psychological flexibility therefore has been considered as a trait-like 
measure (Study 1), a process variable (Study 2), and as an experimental context cued by 
instructions and metaphor (Study 3).  
The first study explored cross-sectionally the relationship of psychological flexibility with 
dimensions of voice hearing, emotional dysfunction, thought control strategies and appraisals 
of voices. The second study explored whether an intervention that aims to increase 
psychological flexibility toward the experience of distressing voices would result in 
improvements in outcome, and whether changes in process measures such as acceptance and 
autonomy from voices would be associated with outcome changes. The third study 
investigated whether there were outcome differences in being trained in acceptance, 
reappraisal or suppression of experiences, for a non-clinical sample who experienced a 









Table 8.1  - Summary of Main Findings  
 
Chapter  Question Method Answer 
5  
Study 1  
What relationships are there 
between psychological flexibility, 
non-judgemental acceptance , 
appraisals of voices, coping 





Psychological Flexibility and non-
judgemental acceptance show 
significant, negative associations   with 
appraisals of omnipotence, use of 
punishment thought control, level of 
depressive and anxiety symptoms, and 
actions focused on resisting the voices 
 Do psychological flexibility, mindful 
action, and non-judgemental 
acceptance result in additional 
predictive power for a range of 
dependent variables (anxiety and 
depression symptoms, distress and 
disability associated with voice 
hearing, efforts to resist/engage 
with voices), when included with 
variables from cognitive models 
(such as appraisals of malevolence 
and benevolence, along with 




Greater variance explained in models 
that incorporated psychological 
flexibility and non-judgmental 
acceptance with cognitive model 
predictors for:  
- depressive and anxiety symptoms,  
- behavioural resistance to voices.  
 
No incremental advantage for models 
of:  
- distress associated with voice 
hearing,  
- life disruption  
- engagement with voices 
6 
Study 2 
Does the introduction of 
acceptance and commitment 
therapy result in outcome changes 
for people experiencing distressing 




Following the introduction of ACT 
there were significant group-level 
changes in depressive symptoms, 
quality of life and social functioning 
 Does ACT produce changes in 
psychological flexibility 
(mindfulness, acceptance) for 
distressed voice hearers? 
 Following the introduction of ACT 
there were significant group-level 
changes in psychological flexibility, in 
particular non-judgemental 
acceptance (mindfulness) and 
independent action from voices.  
 
There was no significant change from 
baseline in acceptance toward voices.    
 Are there greater changes in 
distress and functioning, compared 
to frequency and duration of 
symptoms, following ACT for 
voices?  
 Yes - at a group level there were 
significant changes in depressive 
symptoms and social functioning, but 
no significant changes in the severity 
of auditory hallucinations. 
 
 How does a pilot implicit measure 
of voice acceptance perform at 
baseline and following ACT for 
voices? 
 
 Results are difficult to interpret: across 
assessment phases there may be a 






At baseline, those participants who 
subsequently showed clinical  
improvements responded 
differentially to non-responders (in the 
direction of voice acceptance), 
possibly suggesting the implicit 
measure has predictive validity.   
7  
Study 3 
In an analogue of auditory 
hallucinations, are there 
differences in distress, believability 
and tolerance, when healthy 
participants are trained to 
suppress, re-appraise, or actively 




No differences found between 
experimental conditions.  
 Are the effects of suppression, 
reappraisal and acceptance 
moderated by psychological 
flexibility, non-judgemental 
awareness, schizotypy, or habitual 
use of emotion regulation 
strategies? 
 No moderation effects found in 
secondary analyses.  
 
 
I will now discuss a set of conclusions that arise from the three studies, and place these within 
the context of the broader literature, as well as any future research directions. The limitations 
of the studies will be further discussed within the conclusions.  
 
 
8.1.1 CONCLUSION Psychological flexibility is demonstrated to be related to emotional 
wellbeing, but not symptom dimensions of voice hearing   
These relationships are demonstrated in both the correlational and intervention studies, with 
no significant associations found for mindfulness or psychological flexibility, or significant 
changes in levels of symptoms (frequency, duration) following intervention, at least as 
measured by a validated measure in the intervention study.  
These results are consistent with previous studies investigating experiential avoidance/ 
psychological flexibility (Hayes et al., 2006). The negative association of psychological flexibility 
with depression and anxiety has been previously demonstrated for people recovering from 
psychosis (White et al., 2012), as well as other clinical populations (Hayes et al., 2006). Bond et 
al  (2011) demonstrate that the construct of psychological flexibility using the Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-II is not simply analogous to a depression measure, with confirmatory 




variables having a better fit, than a model of both measures having the same underlying 
variable.     
Similarly this result matches the conclusions of the meta-analysis by Chawla and Ostafin 
(2007), finding that experiential avoidance (psychological flexibility) showed a stronger 
association with general psychiatric distress, rather than with disorder-specific symptom levels 
or processes. This could be due to the properties of the psychological flexibility and 
mindfulness measures used in these studies, which were both designed for population level 
studies, rather than as clinical measures (Hayes, et al., 2004; Baer, Smith & Allen, 2004). A 
consideration could be that symptom- or problem-specific measures of experiential avoidance 
could demonstrate associations with symptom dimensions, similar to measures that have been 
developed for chronic pain (MCCracken, Vowles & Eccleston, 2004) and tinnitus (Westin, 
Hayes & Andersson, 2008). However, this may not be the case with psychosis: a symptom-
focused measure of experiential avoidance, the Voices Acceptance and Action Scale, used in 
the intervention study, has previously been shown to not relate to dimensions of auditory 
hallucination severity, while demonstrating strong negative associations with levels of 
depressive symptoms and appraisals of voice omnipotence (Shawyer et al., 2007). 
An implication of the results of the correlation study is that a more adequate model of 
emotional dysfunction for people who hear voices (depression and anxiety) appears to include 
both appraisals of voices and unhelpful thought control strategies, in combination with 
psychological flexibility and non-judgemental acceptance. It has previously been established 
that appraising voices as powerful does predict emotional dysfunction (e.g., Peters, Williams, 
Cooke & Kuipers, 2011); incorporating components from the psychological flexibility model 
suggests that emotional dysfunction in the context of voice hearing is exacerbated when there 
is a general tendency toward non-acceptance of experiences, that is associated with rigidity in 
adapting to situational demands or shifting behavioural repertoires when strategies 
compromise functioning, and a lack of commitment to actions congruent with deeply held 
values (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). It has previously been found that acceptance is an 
under-used, but effective, emotion regulation strategy in people with schizophrenia (Perry, 
Henry & Grisham, 2011): it may be that understanding emotional dysfunction in the context of 
hearing voices is progressed by an appreciation of the role of experiential avoidance that can 
limit resilience in the face of challenging experiences (e.g., McCracken, 1998; Kashdan et al., 




8.1.2  CONCLUSION Psychological flexibility and non-judgemental acceptance are negatively 
associated with appraisals of voice power and intention, and behaviours to resist voices 
The first study found significant negative relationships between psychological flexibility, 
nonjudgemental acceptance on the one hand, and appraisals of voice omnipotence and 
malevolence, and actions taken to resist voices.  
These results are partially consistent with those found by Shawyer et al (2007), who reported 
that acceptance of voices was negatively associated with appraisals of voice omnipotence in a 
sample of people experiencing command hallucinations. However Shawyer et al did not find a 
relationship between voice acceptance and appraisals of malevolence, or resistance toward 
voices. In a similar vein, the first study results are fully consistent with those reported by 
Chadwick, Barnbrook and Newman-Taylor (2007) who found that a mindfulness of voices 
measure was negatively associated with appraisals of voice malevolence and omnipotence, as 
well as resistance to voices.  
It may be that cognitive fusion (an outcome of the tendency to be judgemental of experience) 
is a useful way of considering how appraisals of voices link to subsequent behaviour, and is in 
turn maintained through actions to avoid or control the experience of hearing voices.  It is 
important to consider that the direction of the relationship is unclear - it could be that 
appraising voices as powerful and harmful or evil in intent results in less psychological 
flexibility in general and greater judgement toward experiences. This could, for example, fit the 
theoretical frame suggested by Birchwood, Gilbert et al. (2004), where the appraisal of others, 
in this case voices, as powerful, could activate emotion regulation systems that lead to narrow 
repertoires of behaviour focused on limiting threat through avoidance and suppression of 
experiences. Appraising a voice as powerful and harmful may limit flexible responding: needing 
to escape or control the experience, necessitated by acting literally toward these appraisals 
(cognitive fusion) could lead to greater contact and entanglement with voices (Morrison, 







8.1.3  CONCLUSION Changes in levels of psychological flexibility and non-judgemental 
awareness may be related to changes in depression, quality of life and social functioning.  
The intervention study showed the introduction of ACT following a baseline, was associated 
with improvements in levels of depression, quality of life and social functioning. These changes 
were associated with changes in non-judgmental acceptance and autonomy from voices 
(reduced symptom impact/ believability), but not with acceptance toward voices (this result is 
discussed below).  
This result is consistent with the White et al (2011) trial, which found that the proportion of 
participants who met case-ness for depression was significantly lower following the ACT 
condition compared to treatment as usual. This is also consistent with the processes suggested 
by the Psychological Flexibility Model: that increased acceptance and other flexible responding 
to experience is associated with greater well-being and life vitality (Hayes et al., 2006; Ruiz, 
2010). Within the limitations of the intervention study, such as the small sample size and use 
of non-independent ratings, this result suggests that brief ACT does increase psychological 
flexibility and produce positive outcomes in well-being and functioning, at least in those who 
responded to the intervention. This result was found following the intervention rather than 
during the baseline phase, providing more confidence that the finding is not simply due to the 
introduction of contact with the therapist.  
 
8.1.4  CONCLUSION Acceptance toward experiences may not imply an openness toward 
hearing voices.  
In the intervention study greater psychological flexibility was not associated with a greater 
willingness to hear voices or to accept this as an experience. Similarly while some participants 
became less judgemental and accepting of experiences in general, they did not necessarily 
become less judgemental of the experience of hearing voices. This was shown by a lack of a 
significant change in acceptance toward voices on the Voices Acceptance and Action Scale 
following ACT, as well as the session by session measure of “willingness” to hear voices.  
It is likely that relying upon a single question measure, and that question being about their 
“willingness” to hear voices, did not adequately capture the type of acceptance that has been 




Escher (1993) as a means of better coping and finding meaning in the experience of hearing 
voices. The use of the Voices Acceptance and Action Scale with two subscales suggested that 
what changed during the intervention was the degree of autonomy that participants felt that 
they had from their voices: this autonomy potentially arising from a reduction in efforts to 
control the voices, assumed to be promoted through a stance of active acceptance (similar to 
that suggested by Farhall & Gehrke, 1997) and cognitive defusion. Within this frame it can also 
be suggested that the association of lower levels of non-judgemental awareness with efforts to 
resist voices, appraisals of voice power and malevolence found in the correlational study could 
imply the effect of cognitive fusion, and that while efforts to resist voices may function to 
enable values-based behaviours, the tendency to engage in judgements of experiences may 
also lead to personal costs in greater time spent resisting voices, a greater focus on voices as 
barriers to action, and distress. 
 
8.1.5  CONCLUSION Changes in levels of psychological flexibility are not necessarily associated 
with changes in dimensions of voice hearing 
In the intervention study it was demonstrated that while changes in levels of psychological 
flexibility were associated with positive changes in levels of depression and anxiety symptoms, 
there appeared to no significant associated change with the various dimensions of auditory 
hallucinations (as rated by the PSYRATS measure). The results of the intervention study 
suggest that reducing the tendency to engage in experiential avoidance is associated with 
positive emotional changes: as suggested by the correlation study experiential avoidance/ 
psychological flexibility is not associated with dimensions of voice hearing. Thus the results of 
the intervention and correlation studies are consistent in this regard.    
It can be argued that this result is also consistent with previous ACT for psychosis intervention 
studies: in the Bach and Hayes (2002) study there were no significant changes in symptom 
levels such as frequency or duration of voices following intervention (albeit measured by a 
rating scale that had not been validated); there were similar results with the Gaudiano and 
Herbert (2006) trial. 
In addition the intervention study results were consistent with the Gaudiano and Herbert 
(2006) trial results: changes in level of voice believability appeared to co-occur with changes in 




who responded to ACT: two of the three responders reported reductions in believability 
toward external explanations for voices on a one-item measure, while the third responder 
already had an internal explanation for the origin of the voice, having rejected, prior to 
therapy, a long-held delusional belief.  
An observation is that for several participants there were not strongly-held beliefs about the 
cause or origin of the voices - for example, one participant admitted that he had previously 
considered the voices to be part of a persecution from a political group, but that since starting 
his personal recovery (prior to his participation in the study) he rejected this explanation for 
the cause of the voices, and now appraised the voices as originating from his own mind. For 
this participant there was little room for his ratings of believability to change, at least in terms 
of lower ratings. However, it could also be observed that the study involved ratings in a belief 
about external causation, which the participant was defused from (he did not take this 
literally), however there were other aspects of the voice hearing experience that the 
participant was fused with, such as the urge to act on efforts to control, fix or defeat the voices 
before he could do other things during the day. A major component of the intervention was to 
work to reduce the amount of time engaged in these activities, as they were coming at the 
cost of other personally important actions. Thus, in a measurement sense, it may have been 
better, in retrospect, to measure the strength of this urge as the proxy for cognitive fusion, as 
it was linked more centrally to the problems that led this participant to want to engage in 
therapy, rather than approach believability measurement in essentially a similar way as to how 
conviction is measured in other psychological therapy studies. 
Similarly another measure of cognitive fusion were the ratings of the amount of time that the 
participants felt that they had spent thinking about the voices. In the intervention study 
several participants had significant changes on preoccupation with voices, spending less time 
thinking about them. This measure may have related to occasions when participants engaged 
in rumination about voices, amongst other responses, and served as a means of judging how 
much cognitive effort the participant was engaging in related to the experience of hearing 
voices. There is evidence to suggest that interventions that reduce the extent to which people 
with psychosis engage in worry and rumination are helpful, in terms of reducing  distress for 
those with persecutory delusions (Foster, Startup, Potts & Freeman, 2010; Hepworth, Startup 
& Freeman, 2011). An alternative explanation is that participants who were less preoccupied 




for all the participants who reported reductions in preoccupation, at least on a one-item 
measure of voice frequency, compared to ratings on an interviewer-rated symptom-severity 
measure, which remained stable throughout the study.   
The limitations of the design in the intervention study in terms of a lack of follow-up period to 
measure the maintenance of gains or any delayed effects, meant that the longitudinal 
relationship of psychological flexibility and non-judgemental awareness and auditory 
hallucination symptom dimensions cannot be determined. It may be that those who become 
more psychologically flexible and mindful experience less distress and entanglement with 
symptoms over the longer term (such as the results suggested by the long-term follow-up of 
an ACT for psychosis trial: Bach et al., 2012); it may also be that there are delayed effects from 
mindfulness and acceptance-based interventions for psychosis, similar to those effects found 
with cognitive behavioural therapy (Sarin, Wallin & Widerlӧv, 2011).  
 
8.1.6  CONCLUSION Implicit measurement of ways of relating to voices may be possible within 
a psychosis population 
The results of Study 2 suggest that participants with psychotic disorders are able to complete a 
task of relational responding and perform with accuracy and latency that allow for 
measurement of implicit responding (according to the criteria outlined by Vahey et al, 2009).  
The observation that the responders to ACT in the intervention study performed differently on 
the task than non-responders is interesting, although subsequent performance on the IRAP 
appears to suggest that responders and non-responders performed similarly across three 
further assessment points (with a bias toward non-acceptance of experience), even though 
there were differences between the participants when considering more explicit measures of 
autonomy from voices and non-judgemental awareness. It could be that this reduced 
difference between participants did reflect a change occurring over time due to the 
intervention, however competing explanations include that this was a practice effect and that 
task performance did not reflect clinical changes.  
Further investigations of this methodology may illuminate whether it provides a reliable and 
valid measure of beliefs about voices and how to respond to them. The results of Study 2, 




worth further study: this could be done using a prospective group-based design of participants 
who are about to undertake psychological therapy, and the association between pre-therapy 
implicit response performance and post-therapy outcome studied. Further studies could also 
be made of associations between implicit responding for voices acceptance and appraisals of 
voices, behavioural and emotional responses to voices, emotional and social functioning. 
 
8.1.7  CONCLUSION Differences between strategies of acceptance, reappraisal and suppression 
were not evident in an experimental analogue of hearing voices 
As discussed in Chapter 7, there are several potential explanations for the lack of difference 
between conditions for this experimental study.  
Based upon the previous experimental literature it does seem unlikely that the different 
instructions to suppress, accept or reappraisal would in themselves produce negligible 
differences between groups in outcomes such as distress or intrusiveness. A possibility is that 
the effects of the instructions are context-dependent: for example, it may be that the effects 
of acceptance to reduce the intensity of an unwanted experience only extend as far as 
experimentally-induced pain (cold pressor, electrical shocks), as suggested by the Kohl et al. 
(2012) meta-analysis. However, similar weak effects were evident also in the reappraisal and 
suppression conditions, which have been shown to produce effects on the intensity of aversive 
experiences of pain, but also a range of other psychological challenges, such as situations 
evoking disgust, sadness and fear (e.g., Gross, 1998).  
In this experiment the coping instructions were based on those used in several other studies, 
including a metaphor that was a central feature (e.g., Keogh et al., 2007). These elements of 
the instructions appeared to be consistent with the meta-analysis by Levin et al (2012), in 
terms of the features (experiential, metaphorical) that are likely to increase the probability of 
there being an instructional effect. Thus it may be reasonable to consider that the instructions 
were not the weak component in the experimental study.  
It is more likely that for this experimental study the voices stimuli were only mildly aversive, as 
is evidenced by the participants’ post-task scores. Simulating auditory hallucinations using 
audio recordings may not be sufficient to produce an aversive stimulus that can be used in 




Previous studies, that have explored whether stigma toward those with schizophrenia can be 
influenced by such simulations, have found that audio recordings of voice content can produce 
emotional and physical discomfort, poor task functioning, and provide participants with the 
experience of cognitive impairment (Ando et al., 2011). Participants may experience negative 
feelings such as anger, anxiety, vulnerability, and embarrassment, amongst others (Dearing, 
2008; Wise, 2009); there is tentative evidence that simulations may produce feelings of grief or 
hopelessness (Dearing & Steadman, 2008). Negative feelings in response to simulated 
hallucinations are more likely with derogatory content; in contrast the duration or volume of 
the simulation do not appear to make a significant difference (Brown et al., 2008). However, 
despite these findings estimates of the prevalence and intensity of distress in these 
simulations is unknown, although it is likely that distress is not particularly intense or lasting 
due to the high levels of acceptability of these simulations (Ando et al., 2011). Thus, in the 
experimental study the voices stimuli were similar in content and duration as other studies, 
and while it may have been the case that participants did experience discomfort, it was 
perhaps not at a level that interfered with task performance or necessitated using the 
allocated coping strategy. So, the smaller effects of the experimental conditions may have also 
been a function of the voices stimuli being less of a challenge than anticipated by the design.  
There may be other ways to make the voices stimuli more aversive. Future studies using the 
same experimental paradigm could increase the aversiveness of the "voices" by 1) using more 
personal insults, 2) linking task performance more closely with the experience of the voices 
(such as using a task that competes with hearing the “voices”, such as audio discrimination 
task where the participant has to track several sounds, while also experiencing the voices), 3) 
using a more demanding task to complete while hearing the voices, that involves greater use 
of attention. As an analogue of hearing voices the recorded audio paradigm does have a major 
limitation of not being able to recreate a central feature of auditory hallucinations: that they 
are experiences as externally-generated without there being a clear cause or origin. This 
experience of hearing voices may be better engineered through a greater use of deception 
about the purpose of the experiment (such as not informing the participants that they will 
experience hearing comments about their performance, as was done in the experimental 
study).  
As discussed in Chapter 7 a further reason for the smaller than expected effects could have 




participants - that may have responded less strongly to hearing critical comments in English, as 
well as being a more robust group than a comparable sample of participants who may be 
experiencing depressive or anxiety symptoms, or have schizotypal features.  Based upon the 
work by Kashdan et al (2006) it may be worth investigating whether highly experientially 
avoidant participants respond with greater distress and less tolerance to simulated 
hallucinations, compared to those who are more psychologically flexible. Experientially 
avoidant participants are more likely to engage in suppression or avoidance of negative 
experiences, which can increase the frequency and distress of the symptoms (García-Montes, 
Pérez-Álvarez, & Fidalgo, 2003). There is some evidence to suggest that interventions that 
reduce experiential avoidance positively impact on distress associated with hallucination-like 
experiences (Langer, Cangas, & Gallego, 2010).  
So, it remains an open question as to whether there are differences in distress, believability 
and task tolerance following these different instructions while experiencing simulated 
hallucinations, if these moderating factors are investigated. The possibility that there is no 
difference between conditions seems unlikely due to the consistent findings about suppression 
being associated with greater intensity of distress and less tolerance (e.g., Gross, 1998; 
Masedo & Esteve Rosa, 2007).    
Finally it may be that the participants did not engage in the allocated coping strategy, and if 
distressed by the voices stimuli engaged in habitual strategies to cope with the experience.  
In the experimental study it was found that the a substantial number of participants did not 
engage in the coping strategy as trained: this finding is similar to the study by Demaree et al 
(2006) who found that participants can have a difficult time engaging in a specific coping 
strategy that have been instructed in experiments, possibly relying on habitual coping 
strategies instead. The post-hoc analyses of the sub-sample of participants who did adhere to 
the experimental instructions are suggestive of potential, interesting differences between 
reappraisal, acceptance and suppression. These analyses suggest both reappraisal and 
acceptance could be both more effective than suppression for limiting the unpleasantness and 
intrusiveness of voices stimuli. Consistent with the literature in Chapter 4, these tentative 
results suggest that reappraisal but not acceptance may be associated with greater perceived 






8.2  Clinical implications 
There are several clinical implications from the results of these studies.  Firstly, considering the 
argument that suggests habitual and extensive use of experiential avoidance is a psychological 
vulnerability (e.g., Kashdan et al, 2010), it may be helpful to consider this general response 
style in psychological therapies for distressed voice hearers. Understanding the contexts that 
lead to voice hearers experiencing emotional dysfunction may involve consideration of 
psychologically inflexible styles of coping  and relating to internal experience (in addition to 
appraisals of voices, resistance to or engagement with voices, safety behaviours). The 
Psychological Flexibility Model may be helpful in clinical models of voice hearing, as it suggests 
vulnerabilities to a range of problems that may be considered co-morbidities, but may be the 
consequence of purposeful behaviours that have the function of experiential avoidance (Hayes 
et al., 2006). It can be suggested that experiential avoidance is a useful construct to consider 
within the frame of cognitive models of auditory hallucinations, as it does unite several areas 
identified as potential maintenance process (e.g., Morrison, 2001 model), such as safety-
seeking behaviours, use of suppression and avoidance, and points to the potential efficacy of 
addressing this is a response style (similar to the strategy discussed by Chadwick, 2006).  
A second implication from this research for psychological therapies is that in addition to 
addressing appraisals of voice power (omnipotence), there may also be potential in 
encouraging flexibility toward thinking in general. The intervention study, consistent with the 
ACT model, had this broad-based stance toward internal experiences (including voices): to 
judge their value by whether they help you to achieve valued ends (workability), and if not, to 
practice mindfulness and defusion to enable engagement in values-based actions. Thus, study 
participants practiced noticing their thoughts, emotions and auditory hallucinations as 
experiences (non-judgemental acceptance), rather than guides, shifting the relationship 
toward being an observer or container of these experiences (Bach, 2004; Chadwick, 2006).  
The intervention study results suggested that the participants did show greater defusion 
toward thoughts and voices as a group, and for those that responded to therapy in particular.  
A third implication that requires further investigation is whether some people who are 
distressed by hearing voices may be open to acceptance before therapy, although not using 




treatment. It may be that the under-utilisation of acceptance as a means of coping in people 
with schizophrenia (Farhall & Gehrke, 1997; Perry, Henry & Grisham, 2011) is strengthened by 
an explicit focus on this skill of emotion regulation, at least in order to broaden the coping 
repertoires which may allow for more flexible responding to unwanted experiences. It may 
also be that acceptance-based treatments benefit those predisposed to using acceptance, 
while for others this does not lead to improvements in distress, quality of life or functioning.    
8.3  Future Research 
In addition to the research implications discussed above, there are several general areas that 
can be informed by the studies that form this thesis.   
8.3.1  Measurement of values and committed action 
This thesis has studied psychological flexibility largely through measures of mindfulness, non-
judgemental acceptance, the tendency to engage in experiential avoidance, believability and 
autonomy from voices. While these measures have taken or been interpreted from a 
functional perspective, the components of the Psychological Flexibility Model that were not 
studied directly in this thesis were, in particular, values and committed action. During the time 
that the correlation and intervention studies were planned and conducted (2006- 2008) there 
were not adequate measures of these processes; however, more recently values measurement 
has been refined (e.g., the Valuing Questionnaire: Smout et al., in press), and there are 
developments with committed action suggesting that it may be possible to measure greater 
use of approach behaviours and flexibility of behavioural repertoires (e.g., McCracken, 
personal communication). The development and use of measures for these processes, as well 
as flexible perspective taking (e.g., McHugh & Stewart, 2012) may help to better understand 
what role psychological flexibility play in emotional and behavioural responses to auditory 
hallucinations.   
8.3.2  Finding better measures of cognitive fusion than “believability” 
The construct of believability, reflecting cognitive fusion as described in the Psychological 
Flexibility Model, requires further refinement. As argued elsewhere (Farhall, Shawyer, Thomas 
& Morris, in press) believability is in essence measured the same way as the conviction variable 




veracity of an appraisal. Cognitive fusion instead reflects the extent to which people are 
psychologically entangled with and dominated by the form or content of thoughts and other 
private experiences (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 2011, p. 69); in contexts of cognitive fusion 
people act as though their thoughts are a literal reality.   
Recent publication of cognitive fusion measures (e.g., Gillanders et al., in press; Herzberg, 
Sheppard, Forsyth, Credé, Earleywine & Eifert, 2012) and studies demonstrating the 
associations between cognitive defusion, wellbeing, functioning in chronic pain (McCracken, 
Gutiérrez-Martínez & Smyth, 2012) suggest that there may be potential in exploring how a 
private event can act as a source of behavioural regulation (fusion), and the development of 
contexts that weaken this relationship (defusion). The intervention study used a measure of 
autonomy from voices that suggests a relationship toward voices that is not engagement or 
resistance, and potentially is promoted by cognitive defusion (Shawyer et al., 2007).  
8.3.3  Developing measures and procedures from a functional perspective 
Future studies may benefit from using more contextual measurements of the impact of voices 
upon life functioning, including possibly assessing the degree to which the person hearing 
voices can persist in valued choices and actions while having this experience (e.g., personal 
autonomy, Shawyer et al., 2007). In particular, it would be useful to investigate the 
relationship between coping and actions associated with valued living, along with ratings 
about life meaning and quality of life. It is theorised that lifestyles characterised by greater 
acceptance and mindfulness toward unwanted experiences will have a greater proportion of 
approach-based activities, as well as more flexible, effective problem-solving (Teasdale 2002; 
Hayes et al., 2004).  
Thus further psychosis research guided by a functional perspective should focus on developing 
assessment methods that better describe life functioning, success at valued living (an  
acceptance & commitment therapy goal), and functional classification of coping methods 
depending on whether their purpose is experiential avoidance or approach.   
It is suggested that in future investigations of the functional relationships between various 
forms of coping and distress and disability in voice-hearing, measures are developed that do 
not pre-suppose the function of a particular coping strategy. In the Beliefs About Voices 




behaviours described serve the functions as named by the scales (Chadwick & Birchwood, 
1994, 1995; Chadwick, Lees & Birchwood, 2000), however it is possible that different 
functional relationships are operating. An example of this may be the use of various forms of 
resistance to manage the demands of a voice giving commands: in a number of contexts this 
may be a functional strategy that allows the person to limit the influence of the voice(s) upon 
their choices and actions. Although responses of engagement and resistance have both been 
associated with poorer functioning (Shawyer, Farhall, Sims, & Copolov, 2005),  
resistance may not necessarily be a dysfunctional coping method: it may work to have a 
strategic resistance to voices in order to carry out values-based actions.  This could mean that 
actions of resistance may be flexibly applied in context (rather than a rigid, narrow repertoire) 
to achieve valued goals consistent with the pragmatism of the concept of workability (Hayes, 
Strosahl & Wilson, 1999, 2012). 
A topographical approach may only look at the form of these strategies, instead of considering 
function (e.g., function based assessment, Carr & LeBlanc, 2003). There may be voice hearers 
who are relatively successful at using a degree of resistance behaviours in the service of 
remaining autonomous from their voices, while there may be also those who are more 
engulfed or entangled by their experience of voices through the effects of certain resistance 
behaviours, such as rebound effects from thought suppression or argumentation that could 
inadvertently strengthen the importance of “fixing” the content or presence of the voices, 
leading to increased cognitive fusion and/or supporting experiential avoidance. It is an 
empirical matter to discover whether when people report using resistance as a response to 
voices, that they are reporting a habitual and rigid behavioural response that leads to 
diminished life meaning, or a workable response in context, amongst a range of other actions 
that helps to increase contact with valued life directions (and may result in voices being 
appraised as less powerful and dominating; Vaughan & Fowler, 2004).   
Consistent with the functional contextual philosophy, there are several research 
methodologies that may be better suited to the investigating the dynamic nature of the 
relationship of actions that build or limit psychological flexibility and outcomes such as 
wellbeing, quality of life and greater autonomy in the face of unwanted experiences. The 
results of the correlational study, which used a cross-sectional design, suggest associations 




and behavioural resistance to voices. This design does not allow for exploration of the 
dynamics of these relationships - for example in the case of resistance from voices, a 
longitudinal design using an Experience Sampling Method (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987) 
may help to better understand the functions of this behaviour in context and when there is a 
cost to resisting voices. Similarly in the intervention study more frequent measurement of 
psychology flexibility and mindfulness using this methodology may have captured changes 
between variables and established temporality (i.e, whether hypothesised process changes 




8.4 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis contributes to the field of psychological flexibility and auditory hallucinations by:  
1) presenting a series of studies that investigate psychological flexibility, and component 
processes of non-judgemental acceptance, mindfulness, cognitive defusion and behavioural 
autonomy from symptoms, as a process that potentially ameliorates the impact of auditory 
hallucinations; and thus,  
2) clarifying the role that psychological flexibility makes to emotional well-being in the context 
of auditory hallucinations, while taking into account appraisal and thought control strategies; 
and,  
3) demonstrating that promoting psychological flexibility using acceptance and commitment 
therapy may be effective in helping distressed voice hearers to have greater quality of life, less 
emotional distress and improve social functioning. Moreover these changes appear to be 
associated with concomitant changes in non-judgemental acceptance and autonomy from 
symptoms, and to be possibly predicted by responses to an implicit measure of acceptance 
toward hearing voices; and,  
4) describing an attempt to ascertain differences between reappraisal, acceptance and 
suppression in a simulation of auditory hallucinations with non-clinical participants, that will be 
use to further refine experimental investigations of analogues of therapy and coping 
processes.  
These data contribute in clarifying that psychological flexibility for voice hearers may influence 
emotional processes, but have more limited scope in changing directly the experience of 
hearing voices, in terms of voice duration, frequency and intensity. This is consistent with the 
theoretical frame of the Psychological Flexibility Model. The thesis also makes a contribution in 
clarifying methodologies that may adequately investigate psychological flexibility with auditory 
hallucinations, which may hopefully lead to more refined studies, and potentially more 
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Appendix A-2 -  Study Measures 
 





Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by circling 
a number next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice.  
 















       
1. My painful experiences and memories make it difficult for me to 
live a life that I would value. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I’m afraid of my feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I worry about not being able to control my worries and feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. My painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilling life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Emotions cause problems in my life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. It seems like most people are handling their lives better than I 
am. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 

























































0 Voices not present or present less than once a week 
1 Voices occur for at least once a week 
2 Voices occur at least once a day  
3 Voices occur at least once a hour 




0 Voices not present 
1 Voices last for a few seconds, fleeting voices 
2 Voices last for several minutes 
3 Voices last for at least one hour 
4 Voices last for hours at a time 
 
3 Location 
0 No voices present 
1 Voices sound like they are inside head only 
2 Voices outside the head, but close to ears or head. Voices inside the head may also be 
present 
3 Voices sound like they are inside or close to ears and outside head away from ears 
4 Voices sound like they are from outside the head only 
 
4 Loudness 
0 Voices not present 
1 Quieter than own voice, whispers. 
2 About same loudness as own voice 
3 Louder than own voice 








5 Beliefs re-origin of voices 
0 Voices not present 
1 Believes voices to be solely internally generated and related to self 
2 Holds < 50% conviction that voices originate from external causes 
3 Holds ~ 50% conviction (but < 100% ) that voices originate from external causes 
4 Believes voices are solely due to external causes (100% conviction) 
 
6 Amount of negative content of voices 
0 No unpleasant content 
1 Occasional unpleasant content ( < 10%) 
2 Minority of voice content is unpleasant or negative ( < 50%) 
3 Majority of voice content is unpleasant or negative (> 50%) 
4 All of voice content is unpleasant or negative 
 
7 Degree of negative content  
0 Not unpleasant or negative 
1 Some degree of negative content, but not personal comments relating to self or family e.g. 
swear words or comments not directed to self, e.g. 'the milkman's ugly' 
2 Personal verbal abuse, comments on behavior e.g. ' shouldn't do that or say that , 
3 Personal verbal abuse relating to self-concept e.g. 'you're lazy, ugly, mad, perverted , 
4 Personal threats to self-e.g. threats to harm self or family, extreme instructions or 
commands to harm self or others 
 
8 Amount of distress 
0 Voices not distressing at all 
1 Voices occasionally distressing, majority not distressing ( < 10%) 
2 Minority of voices distressing ( < 50% ) 
3 Majority of voices distressing, minority not distressing ( ~ 50% ) 
4 Voices always distressing 
 
9 Intensity of distress 
0 Voices not distressing at all 
1 Voices slightly distressing 
2 Voices are distressing to a moderate degree 
3 Voices are very distressing, although subject could feel worse 







10 Disruption to life caused by voices 
0 No disruption to life, able to maintain social and family relationships (if present) 
1 Voices causes minimal amount of disruption to life e.g. interferes with concentration 
although able to maintain daytime activity and social and family relationships and be able to 
maintain independent living without support 
2 Voices cause moderate amount of disruption to life causing some disturbance to daytime 
activity and/or family or social activities. The patient is not in hospital although may live in 
supported accommodation or receive additional help with daily living skills 
3 Voices cause severe disruption to life so that hospitalisation is usually necessary . The 
patient is able to maintain some daily activities, self-care and relationships while in hospital. 
The patient may also be in supported accommodation but experiencing severe disruption of 
life in terms of activities, daily living skills and/or relationships  
4 Voices cause complete disruption of daily life requiring hospitalization. The patient is 




11 Controllability of voices 
0 Subject believes they can have control over the voices and can always bring on or dismiss 
them at will 
1 Subject believes they can have some control over the voices on the majority of occasions 
2 Subject believes they can have some control over their voices approximately half of the 
time 
3 Subject believes they can have some control over their voices but only occasionally. The 
majority of the time the subject experiences voices which are uncontrollable 


































Appendix B-2 ACT for Psychosis treatment manual (2008) 
General Principles 
 
The ACT therapeutic approach to psychosis focuses on helping clients to increase psychological 
flexibility in order to pursue life goals and directions that are personally meaningful. ACT assumes 




An ACT view of psychosis 
 
ACT formulates the problems of distressing psychosis in terms of psychological inflexibility, where 
individuals experience diminished life circumstances due to excesses of experiential avoidance, over-
literality about private experiences, lack of clarity and/or resignation about life directions, and 
difficulty with committing to actions that are effective over the longer term.  
 
The approach of ACT encourages clients to shift agendas from experience elimination and control to 
pursuing greater life vitality. In terms of coping with psychotic symptoms ACT encourages a shift 
from entanglement with anomalous experiences, to orientating behaviour toward chosen values (even 
in the presence of anomalous experiences).  
 
The ACT model posits that people who are distressed and disabled by psychotic symptoms are likely 
to be living in aversive, escape-based contexts for their behaviour. It is theorised that these contexts 
are largely verbally regulated (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999). ACT helps the client to access 
approach-based contexts through an experiential therapeutic approach that uses a set of inter-related 
processes (see below for the “hexaflex” ACT model).  
 
The ACT stance with distressing psychosis: 
 Focusing on symptom impact -  Exploring the effects of cognitive fusion and experiential 
avoidance with delusions and hallucinations 
 The experience (in the case of voices), or the feared outcomes of it (delusions), are targets for 
avoidance and control, thereby increasing symptom impact  
 Negative symptoms may be considered a possible outcome of chronic avoidance (limited 
social reinforcement) 
 Emphasising acceptance rather than disputation 
 Pragmatic truth criterion: focused on moving things forward, rather than finding the cause of 
psychotic symptoms 
 Targets symptoms indirectly by altering the context within which they are experienced rather 
than frequency and believability per se 
 
Where ACT fits as a CBT approach with psychosis 
 
ACT is a contextual cognitive behavioural therapy approach, based upon behaviour analytic view of 
cognition. It uses techniques and methods taken from traditional behavioural therapy, as well as from a 
set of principles from a treatment model that is based upon understanding behaviour in terms of rule 





ACT emphasises acceptance of psychological experience as experience, and noticing the present 
moment and choices.  
 
It can be argued that CBT for Psychosis involves components of acceptance, decentring from 
experience, and values-focused behaviour change. In CBT for psychosis therapists create the context 
for change by:  
 Displaying willingness and acceptance 
 Reinforcing discussion of experiences (exposure?)  
 Allowing defusion through distancing (reformulation, floating alternatives, using the cognitive 
model in a functional way) 
 Avoiding trap of being overly literal about beliefs (ie, not colluding but also not demanding 
belief change) 




Why an experiential rather than a direct instruction/sense making approach?  
 
The ACT model considers the effects of rule-governance (Hayes, 1989) in contributing to narrow 
repertoires of behaviour. It is predicted that broad, flexible responding to private experiences and life 
events is more likely to occur when behaviour is contingency-shaped, rather than rule-governed.  
 
ACT targets several types of rule-governed behaviour that are theorised to contribute to client 
problems (pliance, tracking and augmenting: see Hayes, Wilson & Strosahl, 1999 for a discussion).  
 
Therapy can be considered a social context where behaviour is shaped, and new rules are developed. 
In ACT terms it is important that new behavioural repertoires are developed that will generalise, be 
flexible to contextual changes, and not require the ongoing presence of the therapist for maintenance. 
Thus, the aim is for ACT to provide a context where contingency shaped learning occurs (rather than 
more rule-following): such a context is experientially- and pragmatically-focused, and non-literal in 
style.  
 
The Therapeutic Relationship  
 
The therapeutic relationship is validating, normalising, and collaborative. It is about creating a social 
context that teaches the limits of literal language for problem-solving, and encourages experiential 
learning. In rule governance terms the context of the therapeutic relationship reduces the effects of 
pliance, shapes effective tracking of what is workable with private experiences, and orientates 





ACT sessions focus on:  
 
 pragmatic working with client problems 
 creating a context that is focused on the present moment, mindful, defused from literal 
language, and oriented to client values 
 about identifying patterns of experiential avoidance and fusion (that contribute to distress and 
disability with psychotic symptoms) 
 clarify client values to establish goals/focus for therapy 






ACT Made Simple (Gaudiano, 2005) 
 
 Explore unworkable coping strategies (struggle, avoidance)   
 Suggest acceptance (and other underused coping strategies) as an alternative stance 
 Place acceptance in the context of a valued life domain   
 Identify a valued goal and formulate specific action plan (however small to be accomplished 
today)  
 
ACT with Psychosis methods 
 
 Informed Consent  
 Normalise psychotic symptoms & introduce observing private events (including voices) as 
EXPERIENCES. Broaden to contrast between having experiences and responding to them; 
difference between experience and action.  
 Contrast experience of symptoms with responses to them, linking with workability and the 
function of coping methods 
 Suggest acceptance and defusion (willingness/ observing/ describing experiences) as an 
alternate stance to (resisting/ being entangled in/ judging these experiences) 
 Experientially contact a sense of self as perspective – (self as observing and containing 
experiences, but not the content of these experiences) 
 Suggest personal values as providing direction in action, contrast with cost of experiential 
avoidance and fusion with experiences  
 Develop step by step and progressive plans to engage in valued actions; review regularly, 
encouraging use of skills in acceptance, present focus, and defusion to persist or change plans 





Core Clinical Processes of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
 
In ACT six processes have been identified as central to the ability to persist or change in the service of 
valued action, and collectively define the intervention model (Hayes, et al, 2004). These core 
processes are based on a consistent theory of the functional properties of human language and 
cognition (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001). Figure 1 below shows the relationships that these 















Figure 1: ACT Hexaflex (Hayes et al, 2004) illustrating the relationship between the core clinical processes.   
 
 
A description (from Strosahl et al, 2004) of each of these clinical processes is as follows:  
 
Acceptance Foster acceptance and willingness while undermining the dominance of 
emotional control and avoidance in the client’s response hierarchy 
Defusion Undermine the language-based processes that promote fusion, needless 
reason-giving, and unhelpful evaluation and thus cause private 
experiences to function as psychological barriers to life-promoting 
activities 
Contact with Present Moment Live more in the present moment, contacting more fully the ongoing flow 
of experience as it occurs 
Self-as-Context Make experiential contact with the distinction between self-as-context 
versus the conceptualised self to provide a position from which 
acceptance of private events is less threatening 
Values Identify valued outcomes in living that will legitimise confronting 
previously avoided psychological barriers 
Committed Action Build larger and larger patterns of committed action that are consistent 















There are several principles in the delivery of these clinical processes (Hayes et al., 2004):  
 
 The processes are highly interdependent, so that starting to use one process is likely to see the 
emergence of other processes. Thus there is no correct order for doing these processes.  
  
 Clients will exhibit idiosyncratic profiles within these processes, so that not all the processes 
will need to be worked on in therapy.  
 
 Therapists need to be highly proficient at providing interventions within any of the core 
processes, and avoiding using a “one size fits all” approach with regard to sequencing and 
form of interventions.  
 
 Many ACT interventions touch upon multiple processes, and as therapy is contextualistic the 
meaning of the intervention is dependent upon the client’s unique history and life situation.  
 
 
Considerations of mindfulness/acceptance interventions with psychosis 
 
Mindfulness with psychosis 
 
Working with delusional/unrealistic goals 
 
Seeing medication adherance as a workability issue 
 
Closed eye exercises with a person experiencing psychosis 
 















Developing Willingness/ Acceptance 
 
Theoretical Rationale  
 
Key functional goal of an ACT intervention. It is a skill rather than a concept.  
 
The therapist fosters acceptance and willingness while undermining the dominance of emotional 
control and avoidance in the client’s response hierarchy 
 
Key targets (Luoma, Hayes & Walser, 2007) 
 help clients let go of the agenda of control as applied to internal experience 
 help clients to see experiential willingness as an alternative to experiential control 
 help clients come into contact with willingness as a choice, not a desire 
 help clients to understand willingness as a process, not an outcome 
 
Process: 
1) Undermine experiential control as a dominant method of relating to one’s self and world;  
2) Structure opportunities for the client to actively practice and intentionally develop willingness skills 
in the presence of previously avoided internal experience.   
 
Example Clinical Methods  
 
Pain and Suffering Circles 
Tug of War with the Monster 
Quicksand metaphor 
Chinese Finger Trap exercise 
Exploring short- vs long-term effects of coping methods: Clean vs Dirty Pain 
 
Willingness: Taking a Leap; Two Scales metaphor 
 




In general it is useful to make metaphors and exercises brief and concrete with repetition to help those 
with limited concentration and memory (Bach, 2004).  
 







Defusion & Mindfulness 
 
Theoretical Rationale  
 
Undermine the language-based processes that promote fusion, needless reason-giving, and unhelpful 




Key targets for cognitive defusion (Luoma, Hayes & Walser, 2007):  
 
 help the clients to see thoughts as what they are – thoughts – so those thoughts can be 
responded to in terms of their workability given the client’s values, rather than in terms of their 
literal meaning 
 help clients attend to thinking and experiencing as an ongoing behavioural process, and away 
from the literal meaning of the contents of the mind.  
 
Example Clinical Methods  
 
Mindfulness 
 Mindful Listening 
 Focus on the Breath 
 To sitting in a chair/ grounded by physical experience 
 CD: with mindfulness exercises on the breath, lake/mountain imagery 
 
River of Thoughts (Pankey, 2006) 
Leaves on the Stream  
Taking your Mind for a walk 
Two Computers Metaphor 
Titchener’s repetition (Milk, Milk, Milk) 
The Bad Cup analogy 
Normalising:   Mind as a Don’t Get Eaten Machine 
Demonstrating rebound effects from thought suppression:  Pink Elephants, White Bear, Chocolate 
Cake 
 
Adaptation for psychosis 
 
There have been several recommendations in the use of mindfulness with people experiencing 
distressing psychosis (Chadwick et al., 2006), suggesting using briefer exercises, not requiring people 
to sit in one position or with their eyes closed, to have more instructions so that participants can focus 
on the therapists voice if having intrusions (rather than periods of silence), to include reference to 






Self As Context 
 
Theoretical Rationale  
 
Make experiential contact with the distinction between self-as-context versus the conceptualised self 
to provide a position from which acceptance of private events is less threatening 
 
Key targets (Luoma, Hayes & Walser, 2007) 
 help clients to make contact with a sense of self that is continuous, safe, and consistent, and 
from which they can observe and accept all changing experiences 
 help clients differentiate this consistent sense of self as the context, arena or location in which 
all experience happens, from the content of that experiences (e.g., emotions, thoughts, 
sensations, memories) 
 
Facilitating 3 key ACT processes: 
1) decreasing an attachment to a conceptualised self,  
2) creating a context in which acceptance and defusion work is not threatening,  
3) fostering greater flexibility.  
 
Example Clinical Methods  
 
Chessboard Metaphor 
“And who is noticing that”  
“I’m not that” mindfulness exercise 
Observer exercise 
 
Recognising a sense of “you” exists that is aware of thoughts and emotions.  
Teaching and requesting practice of mindfulness and awareness.  
Actively practicing noticing a transcendent and compassionate, socially expansive sense of self in and 
out of the session.  
Focusing on experience instead of logic.  
Defusing from the content of thinking.  
 
 
Adaptation for psychosis 
 
Making exercises briefer in duration and use multiple examples, referring to these across the course of 




Present Moment Focus 
 
Theoretical Rationale  
 
Live more in the present moment, contacting more fully the ongoing flow of experience as it occurs.  
 
Key Targets (Luoma, Hayes & Walser, 2007) 
 
 help clients to discover that life is happening right now, and to return to now from the 
conceptualised past or future 
 help clients to make contact with the life that is happening now, whether it be filled with 
sorrow or happiness 
 help clients to notice what is happening in relationships in the moment 
 
 
Example Clinical Methods  
 
Mindfulness 
 Leaves on the stream: watching private events come and go from an observer perspective 
 Raisin exercise: focus on experiencing a simple object in the moment 
 
“Grounding” to breathing, as a moment to moment experience, can be cued in the session 
 
Noticing private events (including voices) in the moment – describing them, noticing when you are 
pulled away from the present by them, and bringing your awareness back to the moment.  
 
Therapist modelling present moment focus with statements (e.g., “just at this moment…”, ), drawing 
attention to things occurring in the present moment and in the therapeutic relationship.  
 
Adaptation for psychosis 
 







Theoretical Rationale  
 
Values are defined in ACT as “verbally constructed, global, desired, and chosen life directions (Dahl, 
Wilson, Luciano & Hayes, 2005).  
 
Relates to the constructional approach (Goldiamond, 1974), and informs effective and pragmatic goal 
setting, allows response flexibility and motivation 
 
Key targets  (Luoma, Hayes & Walser, 2007) 
 help clients contact and clarify the values that give their life meaning 
 help clients link behaviour change to chosen values, while making room for their automatic 
reactions and experiences.  
 
 




Passengers on the Bus metaphor 
Values clarification exercises 
- bulls eye measure 
- Love – Work – Play 
- Moving from goals to broader life directions (even when goals appear “psychotic”) 
The I-ACT valued goal setting tool 
 
Adaptation for psychosis 
 
Simplify values clarification for people with limited literacy, attention span or cognitive ability using 
values bullseye, “love-work-play” (Bach, 2006).  
 
Less evocative content by using Lifetime Achievement Award, Lost on a Desert Island exercises 
rather than imagery related to death (e.g., Tombstone or Eulogy exercises)  (Bach, 2006).  
 
Explore values within unrealistic (or psychotic) goals rather than dismiss or avoid these discussions – 







Theoretical Rationale  
Coach client to build larger and larger patterns of committed action that are consistent with valued life 
ends. Contact with natural reinforcement rather than arbitrary social reinforcement from therapist.   
 
Key Targets (Luoma, Hayes &Walser, 2007): 
  
 work with clients for behaviour change in the service of chosen values, while making room for 
all their automatic reactions and experiences 
 help the client to take responsibility for patterns of action, building them into larger and larger 
units that support effective values-based living.  
 
Committed action encompasses the behaviours and therapy targets that are specifically aimed at 
helping the client move from inaction to action in the realm of overt behaviour and to maintain the 
consistency of new, more flexible behaviour over time (Luoma, Hayes &Walser, 2007).  
 
Example Clinical Methods  
 
Committed action can be broken down into four steps (Luoma, Hayes & Walser, 2007):  
1. Pick one or two high priority valued domains and develop an action plan for behaviour change, 
based on functional analysis, the best available evidence, or both. 
2. Help the client commit to actions that are linked to values – to be accomplished between 
sessions – being mindful of the larger behavioural patterns that are being assembled.  
3. Attend to and overcome barriers to action with acceptance, defusion, and mindfulness skills.  
4. Return to step 1 and generalise to larger patterns of action, to other domains of living, to feared 
or avoided private experience, or to other areas of psychological inflexibility, until the client 
has sufficient practice to be able to maintain a pattern of flexible and wise committed action 
without the therapist’s support.  
 
Workable goals are:  
 Specific and measurable 
 Practical and within the client’s ability to accomplish 
 Not dead man goals (Lindsley, 1968): goals that a dead person could do better (e.g., not 
have voices) 
 Public (public commitments are more likely to be carried out) 
 On target and linked to client values 
 Linked to the evidence and to the functional needs of the client.  
 
Argyle Socks/Cliff Richard Fan – is it OK to “fake it” for your values? 
Nail in the Hand – what if going through pain meant moving forward? What would you choose? 
The I-ACT Playlist (Morris, Oliver & Bloy, 2008) 






Adaptation for psychosis 
Aside from usual behaviour therapy methods it is suggested that behavioural experiments should focus 
on response flexibility rather than belief veracity (Wilson & Murrell, 2004).  
 
An example 10 session ACT protocol for distressing psychosis 
 
Session Focus Interventions 
1 Informed consent and orientation to ACT 
 
Introduce present moment focus/ mindfulness 
 
Explore coping with symptoms – short & 
long-term cost, workability 
 
Dirty Glass/Two Mountains metaphors/ 
therapy as a journey 
 
Mindfulness of the Breath 
 
 
Discuss coping methods with emotions, 
thoughts and voices 
2 Mindfulness/getting present 
 
 
Introduce idea of primary and secondary pain 
 
Introduce willingness  
 
Validate and normalise efforts at control 
while pointing to effects 
 
Normalise experiences + discuss in 
decentred, observing way  
 
Mindfulness – breath/ chair 
Introduce mindfulness CD 
 
Pain and Suffering Circles 
 
 
Two Scales metaphor 
 
Tug of War with the Monster 
 
 
The Mind vs You as Observer 
Noticing effects of thought suppression – 





Review short- and long-term coping, with 
reference to workability/ values 
 
Control may be counterproductive 
 
Introduce values as a direction 
Mindfulness – breath 
Mindful walking 
 









Values as directions 
 
Taking your mind for a walk exercise 
Two Computers metaphor 
Lifetime Achievement Award exercise 
5 Introduce Self as Context 
 






Mindfulness/ Defusion using imagery  
 
 
Committed Action – link to willingness and 
values, contrast with experience elimination 
 
Physicalising exercise 
Trains on Waterloo station 
 
Two tracks of Life sheet 





Review mindfulness & defusion 
Mindfulness of the breath 
 
I-ACT activity sheet/ values bullseye 
7 Mindfulness 
 
Opening to unwanted experiences in pursuit 
of life direction 
 
Link to values & committed action, review 
valued activity  
 
Brief mindfulness exercise 
 
Unwelcome Guest metaphor/  
“Guest House” poem 
 





Defusion, self as context and values 
 
Review committed action and coach skills 
Leaves on the Stream 
 
Continuity of self: Observer exercise 
I-ACT/ values bulls eye 
9 Mindfulness/ self as context 
 
Review committed action and coach skills 
Breathing – continuity, “I’m not that” 
experience vs self 
10 Mindfulness 
 
Review of ACT focus: 
 
1) continuity of private experiences 
2) distancing from thoughts 
3) engage in valued life process 












Appendix 1: Outline of ACT Assessment/Case Formulation Process  (from Lillis & Luoma, 2005) 
 
Much of the process below is taken verbatim from Chapter 3 of the A Practical Guide to Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (2004), by Steve Hayes and Kirk Strosahl. Please reference that chapter for more detailed 
information. 
 
The most important principle in an ACT case conceptualization is that you are not just assessing a particular 
symptom with a particular topography; you are also attempting to understand the functional impact of the 
presenting complaint. Attempting to understand the function of client behavior involves a focus on the learning 
history of the client as well as the current context in which events happen. This context involves both the events 
of the client’s life and the verbal context in which the client experiences these events. How their current and 
historical context is functionally organized will alter how the client interacts with situational variables in a way 
that either promotes or defeats the client’s best interests. Conducting a functional analysis that captures these 
important variables in order to better guide treatment is 
the goal of an ACT case conceptualization. 
 
1) Begin your assessment with an analysis of the presenting problem as formulated by the client.  
 
Take what the client would say is their “problem” and reformulate this in ACT consistent terms (if necessary). 
For example, frequently clients will nominate a set of negative private events (negative feelings, thoughts, 
memories, sensations, physical symptoms, and so on) as the “problem.” Instead of “eliminating anxiety so that I 
can start to live” (the client’s view of the presenting problem) you may eventually reformulate “the problem” in 
other ways (e.g., “warring with anxiety” or more specifically “not getting on about the business of living while 
needlessly warring with anxiety”). At a deeper level such reformulations must be consistent with the client’s 
true goals and values.  
 
Avoid buying into or challenging the initial formulation presented by the client. Take an open, data gathering 
stance in which you assess the client’s learning history, current situational triggers, the domains of avoided 
private events and specific behavior avoidance patterns. Pay attention to the function of these behaviors in the 
client’s life, 
both “positive” and “negative.” 
 
From an ACT model the two most important initial case conceptualization questions are: 
 
2) What private experiences is the client attempting to avoid? Assess these and outline them in the 
space provided. 
3) What avoidance behaviors are being used and how pervasive are they?  
 
Consider: 
Level of overt behavioral avoidance displayed (e.g., what parts of life has the client dropped out of, what 
activities/pursuits are not occurring that would occur if the problem was solved? Hint: ask “If a miracle 
happened and all your problems were solved, what would your life be like then?”) 
 
Level of internally based emotional control strategies (e.g., negative distraction, negative self instruction, 
excessive self monitoring, dissociation) 
 
Level of behaviorally focused emotional control strategies (e.g., drinking, drug taking, smoking, 
selfmutilation, suicide attempting, overeating) 
 
In-session avoidance or emotional control behaviors (e.g., topic changes, counterpliance, aggressiveness, 
dropout risk) – While in-session barriers may not be apparent from the beginning of therapy, it may be possible 




find out that the client has a tendency to flee relationships when they begin to feel threatened by intimacy. Thus, 
you might have a conversation at the start of therapy about what the client could do, rather than leave therapy, 
in the case that they feel they are getting too close to the therapist. 
 
4) Consider factors related to motivation to change. 
Is the "cost" of avoidance behaviors contacted in terms of daily functioning (e.g., lack of life direction, no 
friends, loss of important goals, addicted person has to spend all day getting his “fix”, etc. If this is low or not 
properly contacted, consider paradox, exposure, evocative exercises before work that assumes significant 
personal motivation) 
 
Experience of the unworkability of improperly focused change efforts (if this is low, move directly to diary 
assessment of the workability of struggle, to experiments designed to test that)  
 
Clarity and importance of valued ends that are not being achieved due to target behavior and the place of these 
ends in the client's larger set of values (if this is low, as it often is, consider values clarification. If it is necessary 
to the process of treatment itself, consider putting values clarification earlier in the treatment. Consider linking 
work that requires significant motivation to valued activities and/or relationships.). 
 
Strength and importance of therapeutic relationship (if not positive, attempt to develop, e.g., through use of 
self-disclosure; if positive, consider integrating ACT change steps with direct support and feedback in session) 
 
Beliefs about consequences of facing feared events (explore client’s fears and consider teaching defusion 
skills and willingness, titrate willingness/exposure exercises to a level client can complete successfully) 
 
5) What environmental factors could be barriers to client’s change?  
For example, a client may be motivated to not improve in order to keep their disability payments. A spouse may 
be unsupportive of change because it is challenging 
to them. They may have friends which encourage their drug use. 
 
6) Consider other factors contributing to psychological inflexibility: 
 
Cognitive entanglement/ fusion 
Check for fusion with evaluative thoughts and conceptual categories (e.g., domination of “right and wrong” 
even when that is harmful; high levels of reason-giving; overuse of “insight” & “understanding,” self-loathing, 
comparisons with or critical attitudes towards others) 
 
Is the client overly attached to beliefs, expectations, right & wrong, good-bad evaluations of 
experience? Does the client confuse evaluations and experience? 
 
Out of contact with the present moment 
Does the client exhibit ongoing, fluid tracking of immediate experience? Does the client find ways to “check 
out” or get off in their head? Does the client seem pre-occupied with past or future or engage in lifeless story 
telling? 
 
Fused with self-as-content 
Can the client see a distinction between provocative and evocative content and self? Is the client’s identity 
defined in simplistic, judgmental terms (even if positive), by problematic content or a particular life story? 
 
Out of contact with values 
Can the client describe personal values across a range of domains? Does the client see a 
discrepancy between current behaviors and values? Does the client describe tightly held but 





Ability to build patterns of committed action 
Is the client engaged in actions that promote successful working? Does the client exhibit specific, step by step 
pattern of action? Can the client change course when actions are not working? Are there chronic self control 
problems such as impulsivity, self defeating actions (e.g., procrastination, under performing, poor health 
behaviors, impulsive behavior)? 
 
7) Consider specific treatment implications/foci based on particular patterns of client behavior, e.g.: 
 
Client has a strong tendency toward rule following and being right 
o Consider confronting reason giving through defusion strategies; pit being right versus cost to vitality; 
consider need for self-as-context and mindfulness work to reduce attachment to the conceptualized self. 

High level of conviction or behavioral entanglement with unworkable strategies 
o This is usually seen as an insistence on doing the same thing even though the client admits it doesn’t seem to 
work. If this is an issue, consider the need to undermine the improperly targeted change agenda, using creative 
hopelessness interventions. 

Belief that change is not possible combined with a strong attachment to a story that promotes this conclusion. 
o This is often seen in chronically distressed clients or clients with history of repeated trauma. If this is an 
issue, consider using defusion strategies, especially attacking the attachment to the story; revisit the cost of not 
trying in terms of valued life goals; arrange behavioral experiments to test whether even small changes can 
occur. 

Fear of the consequences of change. 
o This is often seen in clients that are hiding in unsatisfying relationships or jobs for fear of the unknown. If 
this is an issue, consider working on values clarification and teaching qualities of committed action, choice and 
decision; work on acceptance of feared experiences under conditions of change. 
 
Domination of a rigid, content-focused self-identity in which changing would pose a threat to a dearly held 
set of self beliefs. 
o This is often seen in “therapy wise” clients or clients with a history of treatment failure. If this is an issue, 
consider undermining the story using various defusion strategies such as the autobiography rewrite; consider 
values work to get the client to make contact with the “cost” of holding to the story. 
Domination of the conceptualized past or future. 
o This is often seen in clients complaining of excessive worry, regret, or anticipatory fear that functions to 
block effective behavior. If this is an issue, consider self-as-process and self-as-context work, including “just 
noticing” interventions, and experiential exercises to help make contact with the moment. Link this to defusion 
work so that temporal thoughts can be caught and observed without belief or disagreement. 
 
Short term effect of ultimately unworkable change strategies is evaluated as positive. 
o This is often seen in addictive behaviors, chronic suicidality, or chronic pain. If this is an issue, consider 
values clarification and creative hopelessness work tied to what have you tried, how has it worked, what has it 
cost you? 
 
Social support for avoidance and fusion. 
o This is often seen in trauma victims, “disabled” clients of all kinds and may involve relationships, family, 
financial or institutional reinforcement. If this is an issue, early values clarification work can be used to 
highlight the cost of not changing. 
 




If a client has had past experience engaging life problems in ways that are ACT consistent, these experiences 
can sometimes be harnessed to allow one to move more quickly through the protocol. Current therapy efforts 
can usefully be linked to these past experiences, allowing these experiences to serve as models for current 
actions. 

Prior positive experience with mindfulness, spiritual practice or human potential concepts (if they are positive 
and safe from an ACT perspective, consider linking these experiences to change efforts; if they are weak or 
unsafe - such as confusing spirituality with dogma - consider building self-as-context and mindfulness skills) 

Episodes in life where “letting go” of urges, self defeating thoughts, uncontrollable feelings led to greater 
personal efficacy (i.e., Alcoholics Anonymous, smoking cessation, getting through a death)  

Moments in life when the client felt intensely present and in contact with life, even if the experience involved 
negative affect 

Prior experiences where laughing at oneself, seeing the irony or humor in a situation seemed to decrease the 
gravity associated with it 

Times in the past when the client took a course of action that was painful but was consistent with their values 

Prior experiences with setting personal goals, taking step by step concrete steps to achieve them 

Prior experiences with starting in one life direction and ending up going in another more positive direction 
 
9) In this section, describe specific treatment procedures for this particular client.  
 
Consider following a specific, relevant treatment manual that has evidence for its effectiveness.  
 
Consider relevant ACT process and outcome measures. Consider modifications to the general, step-wise 
process of treatment that outlined in the ACT (1999) book. 
 
Consider client strengths in this conceptualization and how these might be harnessed to potentially move 
through the process more quickly.  
 
Consider social, financial, and vocational resources available to mobilize in treatment.  
 
Consider use of other compatible techniques and theories that may be relevant but not directly theorized about 
in ACT (e.g., contingency management, skills building). Address life skills deficits (if this is an issue, consider 
those that may need to be addressed through first order change efforts such as relaxation, social skills, time 
management, personal problem solving) 
 
Given the functions that have been identified in this assessment consider the relevant contributions of: 
 
1. Generating creative hopelessness (client has not faced the unworkable nature of the current agenda) 
 
2. Understanding that emotional control is the problem (client does not understand experientially the 
paradoxical effects of control) 
 
3. Developing willingness (client is afraid to change behavior because of beliefs about the consequences of 





4. Experiential exposure to the non-toxic nature of private events through acceptance and defusion (client is 
afraid to change behavior because of beliefs about the consequences of facing feared events) 
 
5. Generate experiences of self-as-context to facilitate experiencing of feared events in the present moment 
(client is unable to separate self from reactions, memories, unpleasant thoughts; client needs safe place from 
which to engage in exposure) 
 
6. Make contact with the present moment/mindfulness (client lives in conceptualized future, e.g., worry; client 
is not contacting reinforcements already present in the environment) 
 
7. Values exploration (client does not have a substantial set of stated values or is out of contact with their 
values)  
 
8. Engage in committed action based on chosen values (client needs help to rediscover a value based way of 
living; client’s behavior is not generally productive or well-directed and client could use help in maintaining 





Appendix B-3   ACT for Psychosis Adherence Measure 
Participant:     Therapy Session Number:  
For the therapy session please rate for the presence of each of the components below. 
For each component that is present, please rate how appropriate for this stage of therapy, and then rate 
client responsiveness to this component. 
ACT Therapeutic Stance How present in 
this session?  
How appropriate for 
this stage of therapy? 
Client 
Responsiveness? 
 0   Not at all 
1  Minimal 
2 Satisfactory 
3 High 
4 Very High 
0 Inappropriate 
1  Minimally 
2  Satisfactory 
3 Highly  





4 Very High 
Developing Acceptance and 
Willingness/Undermining Experiential Control 
How present in 
this session?  
How appropriate for 
this stage of therapy? 
Client 
Responsiveness? 
 0   Not at all 
1  Minimal 
2 Satisfactory 
3 High 
4 Very High 
0 Inappropriate 
1  Minimally 
2  Satisfactory 
3 Highly  





4 Very High 
Undermining Cognitive Fusion How present in 
this session?  
How appropriate for 
this stage of therapy? 
Client 
Responsiveness? 
 0   Not at all 
1  Minimal 
2 Satisfactory 
3 High 
4 Very High 
0 Inappropriate 
1  Minimally 
2  Satisfactory 
3 Highly  





4 Very High 
Getting in Contact with the Present 
Moment 
How present in 
this session?  
How appropriate for 
this stage of therapy? 
Client 
Responsiveness? 
 0   Not at all 
1  Minimal 
2 Satisfactory 
3 High 
4 Very High 
0 Inappropriate 
1  Minimally 
2  Satisfactory 
3 Highly  





4 Very High 
Distinguishing the Conceptualized Self from 
Self-as-context 
How present in 
this session?  
How appropriate for 
this stage of therapy? 
Client 
Responsiveness? 
 0   Not at all 
1  Minimal 
2 Satisfactory 
3 High 
4 Very High 
0 Inappropriate 
1  Minimally 
2  Satisfactory 
3 Highly  





4 Very High 
Defining Valued Directions How present in 
this session?  
How appropriate for 
this stage of therapy? 
Client 
Responsiveness? 
 0 Not at all 
1  Minimal 
2 Satisfactory 
3 High 
4 Very High 
0 Inappropriate 
1  Minimally 
2  Satisfactory 
3 Highly  





4 Very High 
Building Patterns of Committed Action How present in 
this session?  
How appropriate for 





0 Not at all 
1  Minimal 
2 Satisfactory 
3 High 
4 Very High 
0 Inappropriate 
1  Minimally 
2  Satisfactory 
3 Highly  











ACT-Inconsistent techniques/  
Proscribed behaviours 
How present in this session?  
Did the therapist explains the “meaning” of 
paradoxes or metaphors (possibly to 
develop “insight”) 
0  Not at all   1  Minimal    2 Moderate   3 High      4 Very High 
Did the therapist engage in criticism, 
judgement or taking a “one up” position?  
0  Not at all   1  Minimal    2 Moderate   3 High      4 Very High 
Did the therapist  argue with, lecture, 
coerce or attempt to convince the client?   
0  Not at all   1  Minimal    2 Moderate   3 High      4 Very High 
Did the therapist substitute his or her 
opinions for the client's genuine experience 
of what is working/ not working?  
0  Not at all   1  Minimal    2 Moderate   3 High      4 Very High 
Did the therapist model the need to resolve 
contradictory or difficult ideas, feelings, 
memories, and the like? 
0  Not at all   1  Minimal    2 Moderate   3 High      4 Very High 
Evidence for Delusional Beliefs: Did the 
therapist assess the evidence that the client 
uses to support his/her delusional beliefs? 
0  Not at all   1  Minimal    2 Moderate   3 High      4 Very High 
Validity Testing/Behavioural 
Experiments: Did the therapist encourage 
the client to 1) engage in specific 
behaviours for the purpose of testing the 
validity of their beliefs, OR 2) make 
explicit predictions about external events so 
that the outcomes of those events could 
serve as tests of those predictions OR 3) 
review the outcome of previous validity 
tests? 
0  Not at all   1  Minimal    2 Moderate   3 High      4 Very High 
Colombo Style:  Did the therapist help the 
client to explain his/her reasons for holding 
a belief by apologising for being confused 
about it all but then carefully questioning to 
gain the details? 
0  Not at all   1  Minimal    2 Moderate   3 High      4 Very High 
Verbal Challenge of Delusions:  Did the 
therapist challenge the client’s beliefs 
through discussion? 




How would you rate the clinician overall in this session, as an ACT therapist? 
 









Appendix of ACT Component therapist-consistent behaviours 
 
ACT Therapeutic Stance 
 
Any of the following: 
 The therapist speaks to the client from an equal, vulnerable, genuine, and sharing point 
of view 
 The therapist models willingness to hold contradictory or difficult ideas, feelings, 
memories, and the like without needing to “resolve” them. 
 The therapist takes a compassionate and humanizing stance toward the client’s 
suffering. 
 The therapist always brings the issue back to what the client’s experience is showing, 
and does not substitute his or her opinions for that genuine experience 
 The therapist is willing to self disclose about personal issues when it makes a 
therapeutic point  
 The therapist sequences and applies specific ACT interventions in response to client 
needs, and displays readiness to change course to fit those needs at any moment. 
 New metaphors, experiential exercises and behavioural tasks are allowed to emerge 
from the client’s own experience and context 
 The therapist recognises ACT relevant processes in the moment and where appropriate 
directly supports these in the context of the therapeutic relationship 
 
Developing Acceptance and Willingness/Undermining Experiential 
Control 
 
Any of the following:  
 Therapist communicates that client is not broken, but is using unworkable strategies  
 Therapist helps client examine direct experience and detect emotional control 
strategies 
 Therapist actively uses concept of “workability” in clinical interactions 
 Therapist actively encourages client to experiment with stopping the struggle for 
emotional control and suggests willingness as an alternative. 
 Therapist uses shifts between control and willingness, as an opportunity for the client to 
directly experience the contrast in vitality between the two strategies. 
 Therapist helps the client investigate relationship between levels of willingness and 
sense of suffering 
 Therapist helps client make experiential contact with the cost of being unwilling relative 
to valued life ends  
 Therapist helps client experience the qualities of willingness (a choice, a behaviour, not 
wanting, same act regardless of how big the stakes) 
 Therapist uses exercises and metaphors to help client contact willingness the action in 
the presence of difficult material 
 Therapists structures graded steps or exercises to practice willingness 
 Therapist detects struggle in session and teaches the client to do so 
 





Any of the following:  
 Therapist identifies client’s emotional, cognitive, behavioral or physical barriers to 
willingness 
 Therapist suggests that “attachment” to the literal meaning of these experiences 
makes willingness difficult to sustain 
 Therapist actively contrasts what the client’s “mind” says will work versus what the 
client’s experience says is working 
 Therapist uses language tools, metaphors and experiential exercises to create a 
separation between the client and client’s conceptualized experience 
 Therapist uses various interventions to both reveal the flow of private experience and 
that such experience is not “toxic” 
 Therapist works to get the client to experiment with “having” these experiences, 
using willingness as a stance 
 Therapist helps client make contact with the evaluative and reason giving properties 
of the client’s story 
 
Getting in Contact with the Present Moment 
 
Any of the following: 
 Therapist displays defusion from client content and direct attention to the moment 
 Therapist can bring his or her own feelings or thoughts in the moment into the 
therapeutic relationship 
 Therapist uses exercises to expand the clients sense of experience as an ongoing 
process 
 Therapist tracks content at multiple levels and emphasizes the present when it is 
useful 
 Therapist models coming back to the present moment 
 Therapist detects client drifting into past and future orientation and comes back to 
now 
 Therapist teaches the client to detect their own drifting into the past and future, and to 
come back to the present moment 
 
 
Distinguishing the Conceptualized Self from Self-as-Context 
 
Any of the following: 
 Therapist helps the client differentiate self-evaluations from the self that evaluates 
 Therapist employs mindfulness exercises to help client make contact with self-as-
context 
 Therapist uses metaphors to highlight distinction between products and contents of 
consciousness versus consciousness 
 Therapist employs behavioral tasks to help client practice distinguishing private events 
from self 
 Therapist helps client understand the different qualities of self conceptualization, just 
noticing events and simple awareness 
 





Any of the following components: 
 The therapist helps the client clarify valued life directions 
 The therapist helps client “go on record” as wanting to stand for valued life ends 
 The therapist teaches client to distinguish between values and goals 
 Therapist distinguishes between outcomes and processes 
 Therapist puts his or her own therapy relevant values in the room and models their 
importance 
 
Building Patterns of Committed Action 
 
Any of the following components: 
 The therapist helps client identify valued life goals and build an action plan?  
 The therapist encourages the client to “have” barriers and make and keep commitments 
 The therapist encourages client to take small steps and to look at the quality of 
committed action 
 The therapist keeps the client focused on larger and larger patterns of action 












Appendix B-4   Participant voice hearing experiences, substance use and mental health treatment 
 
Participant Voice Hearing Experience Substance Use Mental Health Treatment 
Medication Psychosocial 
1 “Andrew” Andrew reports that he occasionally hears 5 different voices. Although the voices are very 
distressing for him when they occur, he feels that he can manage to live with them. They do 
not interfere significantly with his life at the moment.  
Andrew believes voices are people using telepathy on him with malevolent intent. Voices are 
critical and threatening, and give commands to do boring repetitive activities. Finds voices 
distressing 




community mental health 
team  
2 “Brian” hears the ‘grinding’ voice of Freddie Kruger around 3 or 4 times a day, for an hour at a time; 
makes him feel like he is being ‘bombarded’.  hears voice a lot more when stressed ; voice 
sounds like it is coming from inside his head only, painfully loud.  Unsure of cause of voice; 
voice content is always extremely negative and unpleasant, hears commands to kill self and 
youths outside his flat, resists and ignores commands. voice is always very distressing; Brian 
feels that voice has control over him, does not feel he has any control over the voice. Finds 
the voice very disruptive and exhausting, finding it difficult to do things while hearing it. Tries 
to distract self by cleaning flat, sometimes for hours.  




community mental health 
team  
3 “Charles” Believes that he is under surveillance, paranoid delusions that people are actively ruining his 
chances at employment and friendships; government agencies are spying on him; 
Hears voices that he believes are people keeping him under surveillance (90% conviction). 
Similarly hears comments from strangers when he is on the street etc. that he considers to be 
part of the surveillance.  
Believes that he and his family are being targeted by psychics  
None reported Clozapine Recovery-oriented 





4 “David” Hearing voices: commentary on actions, derogatory. 2
nd
 person; 1 male voice, no identity; 
mostly at night; says he talks to them but they don’t reply; no command hallucinations; 
believes that voices are caused by someone using a “power” to contact him 70% conviction), 
uncertain of voice intention, content is derogatory, negative comments about his behaviour, 
which he finds distressing.  
Frequent paranoia and anxious when alone; 
Occasional crack 
cocaine and cannabis 
use (has on-going 
support by Drug 
Services to reduce his 
usage); intermittent 
problem alcohol use; 





community mental health 
team  
 
Substance misuse team 
5 “Edward” Hears two to three male voices at least once a day and lasting for hours at a time. These 
voices sound like they are close to Edward’s head, and are louder than his own voice. Edward 
believes that the voices are being caused by his own mind (100% conviction), and are due to 
a mental illness. He reports that the 80% of the voice content is unpleasant- this is not 
personally insulting, but rather time-consuming, as the voices make comments about his past 
and various problems to solve. Edward reports that he find 90% of the voices distressing to 
hear, to a highly distressing level. Edward considers that he experiences a moderate degree 
of disruption to his life because of hearing voices, in particular the time taken dealing with 
the voices and their content, as well as their distracting nature, which interferes with 
concentrating on important activities; he wishes that he could be free of hearing voices. 
Edward does not think that he has any control over when the voices occur.  
In addition to auditory hallucinations Edward reports a daily (early morning) experience of 
visual hallucinations, in the form of puzzles, which he has been tempted to spend time 
solving. He finds this experience to be highly disruptive to his preferred activities, particularly 
as it is quite vivid and leading him to feel that there is little he can do until it passes.  
None reported Olanzapine  Recovery-oriented 
community mental health 
team  
 
6 “Fiona” Reports hearing a continuous, unidentified female voice talking in the third person, that lasts 
for hours at a time; sounding like it is coming from outside of her head; low volume 
murmuring, which can make it difficult to distinguish what the voice is saying; thinks that the 
voice are due to a psychiatric illness (90% conviction); sll of the voice content is unpleasant 
and negative, involving critical comments about Fiona’s self-concept; when more distressed 
can hear commands to hurt self and others, as well as threats; finds the voice always 
distressing, currently to a moderate degree. Describes that the voice causes a moderate 
amount of disruption to her life – finds it challenging to socialise and plan activities due to 
the intrusive and worrying nature of the voice’s comments, which contributes toward her 
paranoia when around others; feels that she has no control over the voice.  
None reported Clozapine Recovery-oriented 
community mental health 
team  
 






7 “Grace” Grace reported hearing many voices, which she described as “like a crowd at a football 
pitch”, occurring at least 3-5 times/day, lasting up to an hour and as loud as her own voice. 
These are second- and third-person hallucinations heard outside of the head, male and 
female, and unidentified. Grace described the content as 90% unpleasant and negative. She 
stated that lately the voices call her names, comment on her choices and actions, but with no 
current threats or commands. She described the voices controlling her by causing physical 
pain if she does things they do not approve of, rather than receiving direct commands. She 
believes she would feel compelled to act if given commands, and is fearful of this happening.  
 
Grace stated that she does not know what causes the voices, but does believe the voices are 
real people contacting her in some way (80% conviction); she also reported that perhaps her 
voices are created by her mind (50% conviction). She perceived her voices as powerful and 
knowledgeable. Grace denied trying to get in contact with the voices, or finding them helpful. 
Grace does not believe that she has any control over when the voices happen.  
 
Grace described attempting to suppress voices through distraction (listening to music), trying 
to think of other things, and keeping busy. She also reported trying not to upset the voices, 
by avoiding social contact, particularly situations involving a degree of vulnerability.  
 
None reported Clozapine Recovery-oriented 
community mental health 
team  
 
8 “Heidi” Hears a male and female voice (second person hallucinations), identified as “Jenny” and 
“Jim”, at least once an hour. These voices can last between 15 minutes to an hour, and sound 
like they are close to Heidi’s ears; the same loudness as her own voice. Heidi reported that 
she believes that the voices are being caused by her own mind – “I’m mad” (100% 
conviction); she stated that she previously thought that the voices were due to telepathy or a 
device being implanted in her head, but now rejects these ideas (0% conviction for both). 
Heidi described that 80% of the voice content is critical, with comments about her attitudes, 
abilities and self-concept. She denied hearing commands. Heidi stated that she always finds 
her voices distressing, currently to a moderate degree – “they are a sign that I am mad”. 
Heidi reports that she has occasional control over when the voices happen, and that she feels 
that they cause a moderate amount of disruption to her life, particularly in what she worries 

































Appendix B-6.2  The Social Functioning Scale 
 
 































Social Withdrawal (tick or underline the correct answers) 
 
 
1. On average, what time do you get up? 
      
 Average weekday:     
  3 2 1 0 
  Before 9 am 9 – 11 am 11 am – 1 pm after 1 pm 
      
 Average weekend:     
  3 2 1 0 
  Before 9 am 9 – 11 am 11 am – 1 pm after 1 pm 
      
2. How many hours of the working day do you usually spend 
alone? 
 
 (e.g. in your room alone, walking alone, watching TV alone) 
 
 3 Very little time / 0 – 3 hours alone 
 2 Some of the time / 3 – 6 hours alone 
 1 Quite a lot of the time / 6 – 9 hours alone 
 0 A great deal of the time / 9 – 12 hours alone 
 0 Practically all the time / more than 12 hours 
 
3. How often do you start a conversation at home? 
 
  0 1 2 3 
  Almost never rarely sometimes often 
 
4. How often will you leave the house for any reason? 
 
  0 1 2 3 
  Almost never rarely sometimes often 
 
5. How do you react to the presence of strangers? 
 
  0 1 2 3 








Relationships (tick or underline the correct answers) 
 
1. How many friends do you have at the moment? 
 (people whom you see regularly, talk with, do activities with, etc.) 
 0 1 2 3 
 none one friend two friends 3 or more friends 
     
2.  Do you have someone with whom you find it easy to discuss feelings and 
difficulties? 
 3 0   
 yes no 
 
  
3. How often have you confided in them? 
 0 1 2 3 
 almost never rarely sometimes often 
 
4. Do other people discuss their problems with you? 
 0 1 2 3 
 almost never rarely sometimes often 
 
5. If not married, do you have a boyfriend/girlfriend? 
 3 0 3  
 yes no married 
 
 
6. Have you had any arguments with friends, relatives or neighbours 
recently? 
 3 2 1 0 
 none 1 or 2 minor continued minor 
or 1 major 
 
many major 
7. How often are you able to have a conversation with someone? 
 0 1 2 3 
 almost never rarely sometimes often 
 
8.  How easy or difficult do you find talking to people at present? 
 3 3 2 1 0 
 very easy quite easy average quite difficult very difficult 
 
9. Do you feel uneasy with groups of people? 
 3 2 1 0 
 almost never rarely sometimes often 
 
10. Do you prefer to spend time on your own? 
 0 1 2 3 







Over the past three months, how often have you participated in any of the following 
activities? 
 
 (put a tick in the appropriate boxes) 








Cinema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .       
Theatre/ concert, etc. . . . . . . . .       
Watching an indoor sport . . . . .       
Watching an outdoor sport . . . .       
Art gallery/ museum . . . . . . . . .      
Exhibition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
Visiting places of interest . . . . .      
Meeting, talk, etc. . . . . . . . . . . .      
Evening class . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
Visiting relatives in their homes      
Being visited by relatives . . . . .      
Visiting friends * . . . . . . . . . . . .      
Being visited by friends * . . . . .      
Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
Formal occasions . . . . . . . . . . .      
Disco, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
Nightclub/ social club . . . . . . . .      
Playing an indoor sport . . . . . . .      
Playing an outdoor sport . . . . . .      
Club/ society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
Pub . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
Eating out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
Church activity . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
 






. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    






Over the past three months, how often have you done any of the following activities? 
 









Playing musical instruments . . . .      
Sewing, knitting . . . . . . . . . . . . .       
Gardening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     
Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
Watching television . . . . . . . . . .      
Listening to records or radio . . . .      
Cooking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
DIY activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
Fixing things (car, bike, etc). . . . .      
Walking/ rambling . . . . . . . . . . . .      
Driving/ cycling (for recreation) . .      
Swimming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
Hobby (e.g. collecting things) . . .      
Shopping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
Artistic or craft activity . . . . . . . . .     
 
 






. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    



























Public transport . . . . . . . . . . . . .       
Handling money correctly . . . . . .       
Budgetting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
Cooking for self  . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
Weekly shopping . . . . . . . . . . . .       
How to look for a job . . . . . . . . .       
Washing own clothes . . . . . . . . .       
Personal hygiene . . . . . . . . . . . .       
Washing, tidying, etc . . . . . . . . .      
Purchasing from shops  . . . . . . .      
Leaving the house alone . . . . . .       
Choosing and buying clothes . . .      
Taking care of personal . . . . . . .      




















Buying items from shop alone . .        
Washing pots, tidying up, etc . . .       
Regular washing, bathing, etc . .       
Washing own clothes  . . . . . . . .       
Looking for a job . . . . . . . . . . . . .       
Doing the food shopping . . . . . .       
Prepare & cook a meal . . . . . . . .      
Leaving the house alone . . . . . .        
Using buses, trains, etc . . . . . . .      
Using money  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
Budgetting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        
Choosing and buying own clothes .      
Taking care of personal . . . . . . .      







1. Are you in regular employment (this includes industrial therapy, 
rehabilitation or retraining courses) ? 
 Yes / No (please underline) 
 
IF YES: 
    
 What sort of job ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 How many hours a week do you work ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 How long have you had this job ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
IF NO: 
    
 When were you last in employment ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 What sort of job was it ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 How many hours a week did you work ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
2. If not employed: 
 Are you registered disabled ? 
 Yes / No (please underline) 
 Do you attend hospital as a day patient ? 
 Yes / No (please underline) 
 Do you think you are capable of some sort of employment ? 
 3 2 0 
 * Definitely Yes Would have difficulty Definitely No 
 How often do you make attempts to find a job? 
 0 1 2 3 
 * Almost never Rarely Sometimes Often 
3.  If not employed, how do you usually occupy your day 
 Morning:  
 Afternoon:  
 Evening:  
  SCORING 
10 = Full time gainful employment or full time student 
9 = Part time gainful employment or housewife/ husband 
8 = Unemployed for no more than 6 months and actively seeking work 
7 = Undergoing industrial therapy or rehabilitation 
If none of the above, add together scores of scales marked * for a score 











































































Appendix B-8 Session ratings for participants 

































































































































3. Useless.  
4. Rubbish.  
5. Loser.  
6. Idiot 
7. Stupid, stupid, stupid.  
8. Fool, fool, fool.  
9. Useless, useless, useless.  
10.  Rubbish, rubbish, rubbish.  
11. Loser, loser, loser.  
12. Idiot, idiot, idiot.  
13. You are stupid. 
14. You are an idiot. 
15. You are useless.   
16. You are a fool.  
17. You are rubbish.  
18. You are a loser.  
19. That was stupid.  
20. That was useless.  
21. That was rubbish.  
22. That was foolish. 
23. This is stupid.  
24. This is useless.  
25. This is rubbish.  
26. You are too stupid.  
27. You are useless at doing this.  
28. You are rubbish at doing this.  
29. What a loser.  
30. What an idiot.  
31. You are so useless.  
32. You are so stupid.  
33. I wouldn't have done that.  
34. You are going the wrong way.  
35. You'll never get this done.  
36. People will know that you have failed this 
task.  
37. I would give up if I were you.  
38. There is no point going on.  
39. This is a stupid test anyway, you may as 
well stop.  
40. Why don't you give up?  
41. You are fooling no-one: you are hopeless 
at this task.  
42. This is the dumbest I have seen anyone 
do at this task.  
43. Why try at doing this? You are useless.  
44. Some people can do this, but not you. 
45. The best thing you can do is give up. 




47. You’re doing this wrong. 
48. That was a mistake.  
49. You’ll never get this done.  
50. That was hopeless.  
51. You are very slow.  
52. Absolutely useless.  
53. Absolutely hopeless.  
54. Absolutely pathetic.  
55. You are too stupid to do this.  
56. You are making some serious mistakes.  
57. You are going the wrong way.  
58. You are lost.  
59. You are a failure. 
60. What a mess.  
61. What a mess you are making.  
62. Pathetic.  
63. You are clueless.  
64. Slow.  
65. That was feeble.  
66. Failure.  
67. You are thick.  
68. You are dumb.  
69. You’re making lots of errors. 
70. Terrible.  
71. This is silly.  
72. This is futile.  
73. You are quite muddled.  
74. You’re getting confused.  
75. This is pointless.  
 
Paranoia statements 
1. The experimenter is doing this to make 
you look stupid.  
2. Don’t trust the experimenter.  
3. This experiment is a set-up.  
4. The experiment is a fake.  
5. The experiment is a giant “con”. 
6. The experiment is just to make you fail.  
7. The experimenter has been lying to you.  
8. Keep on guard, this experiment is a fake/ 
set up/ a fraud/ a trick.  
9. Your every move is being watched.  
10. You are on “candid camera” right now.  
11. This is going to end up on the internet.  
12. The experimenter is making fun of you.  
13. You are being set up to fail by the 
experimenter.  






Appendix C-3  Quality Criteria for analogue studies  
Based upon the recommendations of Barnes-Holmes and Hayes (2005), sourced from: 
http://contextualpsychology.org/how_to_do_act_laboratory_based_component_studies 
Recommendation Current study component 
1. The experimenter should be blind to the 
intervention applied to each participant (or the 
procedure automated; see below). 
The experimenter was blind to the intervention 
taught to participants, due to the experiment 
being automated.  
2. The experimental conditions must balance as 
much as possible for all relevant attribute 
variables (e.g., gender, psychopathology, unless 
the attribute(s) is the target of the analysis). 
Allocation was randomised for all participants. 
Conditions did not show significant differences 
on demographic and potential moderating 
variables (refer to Results section).  
 
3. The experimenter should not be personally 
familiar with the participants and if they are, 
familiarity should be balanced across conditions. 
The experimenter was not personally familiar 
with the participants, due to the recruitment 
process.  
4. The different interventions should be 
balanced in all possible ways, except for the 
critical difference you are seeking to manipulate 
(e.g., they should be the same length; they 
require similar levels of engagement with the 
material; if exercises are used that are 
appropriate for both conditions, they should be 
used in both; working should be matched where 
possible; method of delivery should be identical; 
etc). 
The three conditions were balanced in terms of:  
 Word- and instruction-length 
 A common metaphor used across all 
conditions 
 The method of delivery was identical 
 Similar levels of engagement required 
5. The interventions should connect directly to 
the experimental challenge. In a pain tolerance 
study, for example, each of the interventions 
should focus on pain not anxiety or anger etc. 
(unless different foci are the target of the study). 
The intervention instructions connected directly 
to coping with negative comments from external 
voices.  
6. Points 4 and 5 should be checked and 
supported by independent raters. 
The instructions for the conditions were rated by 
independent raters (see Method section).  
7. Where possible and appropriate, the 
procedure should involve requiring participants 
to articulate in their own words the intervention 
strategy that is being provided. Ideally this 
should be done at regular points throughout the 
intervention. 
The participants were asked to provide a 
description in their own words following the 




Recommendation Current study component 
8. The verbal material produced under point 7 
should be checked by independent raters to 
determine that participant “understanding” did 
not differ significantly across conditions, and to 
ensure that the manipulation successfully 
altered the intended process. 
 
These statements were checked by independent 
raters  
9. Participants should be reminded briefly of the 
relevant intervention strategy before the 
presentation of each physical or psychological 
challenge (e.g., CO2 inhalation, electric shock 
delivery, emotionally aversive pictures or video 
clips, spider BAT, etc). 
 
Participants were reminded to use the trained 
coping strategy prior to starting the mazes task; 
however, were not reminded during the task.  
10. Ideally, the entire procedure, including pre-
intervention baseline, intervention, and post-
intervention tasks should be automated. For 
example, the intervention could be presented 
via audio or video clips and these can then be 
checked by independent raters. Moreover, 
others can then take your automated procedure 
and attempt to replicate in a different lab. If 
automation is not possible, then EVERY session 
should be videotaped to check for fidelity. If only 
some sessions are videotaped, then the 
experimenter should NOT know which ones. 
The entire procedure for the experimental task 
was automated, using a computer program and 
video clips for the instructions.  
 
 
11. All participants should be asked to 
summarize at the very end of the experiment the 
strategy they employed during the study and 
these can be checked by independent raters. 
Post-task, participants were asked to summarise 
what coping strategy they used within the 
experiment. These statements were then 
classified by independent raters, to determine 
adherence to the experiment instructions.   
12. Other questions can also be asked, in which 
the participant rates features such as the like-
ability of the experimenter (including any video- 
or audio-based material), expectation for 
performance on the task, relevance of 
intervention to "real life", etc. 
This was not a feature of this study.  
13. Ideally, some form of standardized self-
report instrument should be developed to 
measure the extent to which participants 
understand and apply specific strategies. 




Recommendation Current study component 
14. For ACT / RFT studies the design of the 
protocols should be tied to RFT concepts. Studies 
should not just grab a metaphor or exercise 
without working through how the 
metaphor/exercise is predicted, theoretically, to 
influence the participants’ responses in your 
study. 
The use of the Swamp Metaphor was influenced 
by the previous use of this metaphor in studies 
by Kehoe et al    . In relational frame theory 
terms the use of the metaphor was designed to 
do the following in each condition: 
 Acceptance – transform the stimulus 
functions of critical comments to an 
experience to be approached, rather 
than struggled with (needing to be 
controlled) 
 Reappraisal – a contextual cue to elicit 
efforts to respond relationally – find 
alternate meaning 
 Suppression – transform the stimulus 
functions of critical comments to an 
experience that needs to be controlled/ 
eliminated as inconsistent with goal (i.e., 
completing mazes).  
 
15. If the study is a group design it should be 
adequately powered to test the key hypotheses, 
especially if null results are to be meaningful. For 
example, if an interaction is possible, each 
individual cell size must have a large enough N to 
test that interaction at an adequate level (say, 
power of .8 assuming a sensible effect size) 
 
The study power was adequate to test the key 
hypotheses of differences in responding 
between the three conditions. The study was 
under-powered to detect interactions.  
16. If mediational analyses are important, the 
study must be powered to test these analyses. 
 
Mediational analyses were not a feature of this 
study.  
17. Especially if null results are predicted, make 
sure the actual measurement characteristics, 
outliers, and similar issues do not undermine the 
calculated power. 
 






Appendix C-4  Experiment Instruction Scripts 
Participants were trained in the allocated coping strategy using an automated process on a 
laptop computer. Instructions were provided using video clips triggered by a program, which 
featured a female trainer speaking directly to camera. Participants listened to the 
instructions through a set of headphones.  
 
Experiment Introduction (played to all participants)  
“Welcome to the Hearing Voices Experiment – thank you very much for agreeing to participate. 
Your involvement in this experiment will help us to understand better how people cope with 
hearing voices, while getting important things done in their lives.  
 
During this next part of the experiment you will have an experience similar what it is like to hear 
voices. Hearing voices is a common experience; approximately 10% of people hear a voice at 
least once in their lifetime.  
 
Many times people hear voices when they are in stressful situations. For example, following a 
bereavement a person may hear the voice of their loved one who has died. Similarly people who 
have experienced intense periods of isolation or sleeplessness have found that they start to hear 
voices. In very stressful situations such as being taken hostage, or being put in solitary 
confinement, it is common to start to hear voices without other people being around. 
  
For many people hearing voices can be a puzzling and disturbing experience, and if the voices 
persist for a length of time, this can lead to big problems with being able to concentrate, relate 
to other people, and carry out tasks at work and home. Unfortunately hearing voices can 
sometimes lead to people being seriously disabled, finding it difficult to cope with daily life and 
being scared of what the voices may say to them about what they are doing and thinking.  
 
It seems that some people can cope better than others with hearing voices, and this experiment 
is looking at why this might be the case. Your participation is therefore very important in helping 
us understand this problem better.  
 
You are going to be completing a series of mazes while hearing comments about your 
performance. You may find it stressful or frustrating to hear what the voices are saying, but we 
would like you to try your best with the tasks given; the better you can do this, the more we will 
understand how to help people who are disabled by hearing voices.  
 
We will also teach you a way of coping with hearing voices: it is important that you try to use this 
skill while doing the experiment.  





You will be getting points for every maze that you complete: by working to get a high score, this 
will make sure that the experiment is most useful in understanding how hearing voices can be a 
serious problem.  
 
Finally, thank you again for agreeing to participate: by doing this experiment you are assisting us 
to find better ways to really help people who hear voices.  
 
In the next clip I will next teach you a way of coping with hearing voices. “ 
 




“In the experiment you will hear voices making comments about what you are doing – if you find 
these comments create barriers to doing your best then we encourage you to use the following 
coping strategy.  
 
If you have upsetting thoughts and feelings about hearing the voices, then we would like you to 
deliberately try other ways of thinking about this situation. So, imagine hearing voices' 
comments about what you are doing and having irritable thoughts (for example, ‘I can’t 
concentrate with this’) or being down on yourself (for example, ‘I’m rubbish at this task’). The 
best thing to do is to take a different perspective on these thoughts; this will change what they 
mean to you and enable you to get on with the task.   
 
There are several ways to think differently about the situation and the voices that should help 
you to succeed at the task.   
For example:  
You could look at whether your thoughts about hearing the voices are biased toward a negative 
view: could there be another, more helpful way of thinking about this? Perhaps you are being too 
hard on yourself, or you are concentrating on the annoying aspects of the situation. Instead, you 
could try telling yourself that it’s quite normal to feel the way you do under the circumstances, 
and to give yourself a break. You could also remind yourself that in the grand scheme of things 
this is not that bad, and you have successfully finished difficult tasks before. By drawing upon 
your experience of how you have dealt with other difficult tasks you can remind yourself that 
there is likely to be another way of looking at things.  
 
In other words, try to find another way of thinking about the voices if the comments upset you or 
get in the way of finishing.  
 
You could try to work out what it is that’s upsetting you about the situation (for example, what 
the voices are saying, or how you are judging yourself), and ask yourself whether it’s really true. 
For instance, are the voices telling the truth? Is your judgement of your performance realistic? 
How would you advise someone else about how to think or do about this situation? How would a 




that, when looked at more realistically, are not as bad as they first seem.  
 
In other words, try to question how accurate your thoughts are, so that you may be able to be 
less bothered by the voices. 
 
You can try reminding yourself of why you are doing this in the first place; for example, because 
you are getting paid, or because it will help other people, or just because you are curious about 
psychology, or whatever your personal reasons are. Try ‘egging’ yourself along by telling yourself 
it won’t last long, or that you can do this, or that it’s not that bad really, or any other ‘self-
statement’ that helps you to cope with the situation.  
 
In other words, try to remind yourself of your reasons for doing this, which can provide a better 
perspective on the situation and help you get the task done.  
 
So, to summarise, we would like you to approach the experiment in this way: if you have 
upsetting thoughts about the voices that seem to get in the way of doing the task, please handle 
them by reminding yourself that there are other ways of thinking that will be less distressing and 
more helpful in getting the job done.  
 
By seeing the situation in another way when comments from the voices are upsetting you can 




“In the experiment you will hear voices making comments about what you are doing – if you find 
these comments create barriers to doing your best then we encourage you to use the following 
coping strategy.  
 
If you have upsetting thoughts and feelings about hearing the voices, then we would like you to 
deliberately block them out and make sure they don’t interfere with the task.    
 
So, imagine hearing the voices make comments about what you are doing and having irritable 
thoughts (for example, ‘I can’t concentrate with this’) or being down on yourself (for example, 
‘I’m rubbish at this task’). The best thing to do is to make sure you actively keep the voices’ 
comments from your mind and not let them get to you, behaving as though you are not 
bothered. You will be able to succeed at the task by controlling how much these experiences 
trouble you and intrude on what you are doing.   
 
There are several ways to block things out that that should help you to succeed at the task.   
For example:   
Try to actively obstruct the voices and what they are saying. Don’t let the words the voices are 





In other words, push away the experience of the voices, so that they do not get in the way of you 
doing what you need to do. By making sure you don’t listen to the voices, this will help you get 
through the task.  
 
If you do find the voices upsetting then we would like you to keep these thoughts and feelings 
under control by pushing them out of your mind. It is a case of mind over matter, and staying in 
control of your thoughts and feelings is the best way to get through the task. Remember that 
there have been times in your life when you have put a lid on your feelings in order to get 
important things done. By stopping unhelpful thoughts and feelings you will not let them get to 
you.  You can do the same thing in this task when the voices are making comments to upset you 
– just focus on keeping your thoughts and feelings in check and under control.  
 
In other words, you can block out upsetting or unhelpful thoughts and feelings from your mind: 
what matters is doing the task and making sure your thoughts and feelings do not get in the 
way.  
 
Finally, focus your mind on just what you are doing, and nothing else: try to concentrate on the 
task at hand, and use your will power to ignore anything else that is happening (like voices, 
feelings or upsetting thoughts). Try ‘egging’ yourself along by using “self-statements” that will 
help you to focus and prevent feelings from intruding. You can tell yourself not to listen to the 
voices, or not to pay attention to your thoughts and feelings, or not to let them get to you: any 
statement that helps you to keep a lid on your feelings, and allows you to make the task the 
focus.  
 
In other words, use your will power to focus on doing well, preventing voices and feelings from 
distracting you, and motivate yourself to make sure you stay in control.  
 
So, to summarise, we would like you to approach the experiment in this way: if you have 
upsetting thoughts about the voices that seem to get in the way of doing the task, please handle 
them by blocking them out and keeping them from your mind.  
 
By actively preventing and stopping unhelpful thoughts and feelings that happen when 








“In the experiment you will hear voices making comments about what you are doing – if you find 
these comments create barriers to doing your best then we encourage you to use the following 





If you have upsetting thoughts and feelings about hearing the voices, then we would like you to 
choose to have these experiences and let them be, making room and being open to them, while 
going forward in the direction you planned to go. So, imagine hearing the voices make 
comments about what you are doing and having irritable thoughts (for example, ‘I can’t 
concentrate with this’) or being down on yourself (for example, ‘I’m rubbish at this task’). The 
best thing to do is to notice that you got hooked into struggling, and choose to make room for 
these voices and thoughts; this will enable you to get on with the task.  
 
There are several ways to make room for your experiences that should help you to succeed at the 
task.   
For example: 
Imagine that the task is like going on a journey to a beautiful mountain you can see clearly in the 
distance. However, no sooner do you start walking toward the mountain than you walk right into 
a swamp that extends as far as you can see, in all directions. The swamp is full of dirt, rubbish 
and leftovers that look and smell really bad.  
 
You say to yourself “I didn't realise I was going to have to go through a swamp. It’s all smelly, 
and the mud is all mushy in my shoes. It's hard to lift my feet out of the muck. I'm wet and tired. 
Why didn't anybody tell me about this swamp?” When that happens, you have a choice: to 
abandon the journey, or enter the swamp. Life is like this. We go into the swamp, not because 
we want to get muddy, but because it stands between us and where we are wanting to go. 
 
While being in the swamp it’s likely that thoughts such as “This is unpleasant. This is boring.” or 
““It’s not worth the effort.”, or “It’s nonsense” may all show up. The best way through the 
swamp is for you to notice these experiences and let them be, being open to them while going 
forward in the direction you planned to go. 
 
Similarly, if you find the voices upsetting, then try to notice these thoughts as experiences you 
are having in the moment. By making room for your experiences, you can walk through the 
swamp.  
 
You could freely let your feelings and thoughts go in whatever direction they want to, while 
moving forward in the swamp. We would like you to practice  choosing to experience what you 
are experiencing, being open to it, not fighting it or needing it to be different than it is; this will 
get you through the task. Being open to experiences will allow you to remain flexible and get the 
task done.  It is understandable to have thoughts and feelings about what you are doing: this is 
what our minds do; in this task choose to have these experiences, giving them permission to be 
there, as they happen. 
 
So, to summarise, we would like you to approach the experiment in this way: if you have 
upsetting thoughts about the voices that seem to get in the way of doing the task, please handle 
them by gently observing these voices, feelings and thoughts and letting them be there, as you 
would if you were going through a swamp to get where you want to go.  




can succeed at the task. “ 
 
All participants were additionally instructed that they had the option to reduce the volume 
of the voice by pressing a mouse button attached to the computer:  
 “Finally, if you are finding it too difficult or distressing to hear the voices while you are doing the 
mazes, then you are able to stop them.  
  
You can do this by steadily pressing the mouse button, located a short distance from you. 
 
By pressing the button a number of times the voices will stop, for a period of time, before 
starting back again. This will give you a short break from hearing them.  
 








 Appendix C-5    Examples of a Mazes booklet, used as the experimental task 










































































































Appendix C-7      Multiple Analysis of Covariance (MANCOVA) for Study 
Dependent Variables 
A MANCOVA was conducted, with four dependent variables (voice unpleasantness, 
intrusiveness, believability, and personal sense of control), and 12 covariates (depression and 
anxiety symptoms, psychological flexibility, non-judgemental acceptance, conscientiousness, 
perceptual anomalies, trait use of reappraisal and suppression, and schizotypy. Due to multiple 
analyses the level of significance was set at p < .01.  
Voice Unpleasantness 
Table 7.3 presents the MANCOVA for the voice unpleasantness dependent variable and the 
covariates. There was no significant effect for the interaction between the covariates and 
condition (F 2, 87) = .004, n.s. 
 Table 7.3 MANCOVA: Dependent variable -  Voice Unpleasantness  
Potential Covariate  F df1  df2 Significance 
Quick Test IQ 1.150 1 87 .70 
HADS Total 14.429 1 87 .18 
AAQ-II Total 7.531 1 87 .33 
Acceptance without Judgement (KIMS) 0.695 1 87 .77 
Conscientiousness 2.887 1 87 .55 
Unusual Experiences (O-LIFE) 0.042 1 87 .94 
Cognitive Disorganisation (O-LIFE) 1.915 1 87 .62 
Introvertive Anhedonia (O-LIFE) 0.394 1 87 .82 
Impulsive Non-conformity (O-LIFE) 10.065 1 87 .26 
Reappraisal  (ERQ) 2.204 1 87 .60 
Suppression (ERQ) 0.134 1 87 .90 
CAPS Total 1.639 1 87 .65 





Table 7.4 presents the MANCOVA for the voice intrusiveness dependent variable and the 
covariates. There was no significant effect for the interaction between the covariates and 
condition (F 2, 87) = .287, n.s. 
 
Table 7.4 MANCOVA: Dependent variable -  Voice Intrusiveness 
Potential Covariate  F df1  df2 Significance 
Quick Test IQ 0.811 1 87 .71 
HADS Total 29.748 1 87 .03 
AAQ-II Total 18.827 1 87 .08 
Acceptance without Judgement (KIMS) 1.052 1 87 .68 
Conscientiousness 1.412 1 87 .63 
Unusual Experiences (O-LIFE) 0.467 1 87 .78 
Cognitive Disorganisation (O-LIFE) 0.106 1 87 .90 
Introvertive Anhedonia (O-LIFE) 0.066 1 87 .92 
Impulsive Non-conformity (O-LIFE) 9.888 1 87 .20 
Reappraisal  (ERQ) 12.594 1 87 .15 
Suppression (ERQ) 0.260 1 87 .84 
CAPS Total 0.896 1 87 .70 





Table 7.5 presents the MANCOVA for the voice believability dependent variable and the 
covariates. There was no significant effect for the interaction between the covariates and 
condition (F 2, 87) = .429, n.s. 
 
Table 7.5 MANCOVA: Dependent variable -  Voice Believability 
Potential Covariate  F df1  df2 Significance 
Quick Test IQ 2.309 1 87 .48 
HADS Total 0.291 1 87 .80 
AAQ-II Total 5.078 1 87 .29 
Acceptance without Judgement (KIMS) 0.008 1 87 .97 
Conscientiousness 0.001 1 87 .98 
Unusual Experiences (O-LIFE) 0.482 1 87 .75 
Cognitive Disorganisation (O-LIFE) 1.246 1 87 .60 
Introvertive Anhedonia (O-LIFE) 7.605 1 87 .20 
Impulsive Non-conformity (O-LIFE) 1.971 1 87 .51 
Reappraisal  (ERQ) 1.488 1 87 .57 
Suppression (ERQ) 8.146 1 87 .18 
CAPS Total 0.001 1 87 .99 





Personal sense of control 
Table 7.5 presents the MANCOVA for the personal control dependent variable and the 
covariates. There was no significant effect for the interaction between the covariates and 
condition (F 2, 87) = .426, n.s. 
 
Table 7.6 MANCOVA: Dependent variable -  Personal Control 
Potential Covariate  F df1  df2 Significance 
Quick Test IQ 0.001 1 87 .99 
HADS Total 2.753 1 87 .61 
AAQ-II Total 6.112 1 87 .45 
Acceptance without Judgement (KIMS) 0.582 1 87 .81 
Conscientiousness 4.101 1 87 .53 
Unusual Experiences (O-LIFE) 7.230 1 87 .41 
Cognitive Disorganisation (O-LIFE) 2.718 1 87 .61 
Introvertive Anhedonia (O-LIFE) 4.509 1 87 .51 
Impulsive Non-conformity (O-LIFE) 3.704 1 87 .55 
Reappraisal  (ERQ) 8.978 1 87 .36 
Suppression (ERQ) 2.896 1 87 .60 
CAPS Total 12.630 1 87 .27 
Significant level set at p < .01 
 
 
